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
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WORKS

OF

PRESIDENT EDWARDS:

IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

CONTAINING,

I. INQUIRY INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
II. THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN DEFENDED.

NEW YORK:

G. & C. & H. CARVILL.

1830.

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A

CAREFUL AND STRICT

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS

OF

THAT FREEDOM OF WILL,

WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL

TO

MORAL AGENCY,

VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT,

PRAISE AND BLAME.

ROM. IX. 16.—IT IS NOT OF HIM THAT WILLETH.

PREFACE.

MANY find much fault with calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct *names;* especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions: as calling some professing Christians *Arminians*, from ARMINIUS; others *Arians*, from ARIUS; others *Socinians*, from SOCINUS, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard *to*, and reliance *on* those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their rule; in the same manner, as the followers of CHRIST are called *Christians;* after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus (say they) there is not the least ground to suppose, that the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is, by many, called *Arminianism*, believe it the more, because ARMINIUS believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the holy scriptures, and enquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as *Arminius* did; yea, that, in some things, they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named, and others, to be greater than it is; so great, as if they were another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit; which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say, moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names, has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, though they cannot, in all things, think alike.

I confess, these things are very plausible; and I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to

be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself from many things in themselves innocent, useful and necessary. But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that our thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things of which they have often occasion to speak, which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And our thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters may not imply any more, than that there is a *difference;* a difference of which we find we have often occasion to take notice: and it is always a defect in language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name. Thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of *France*, in distinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of *Spain;* and find the great convenience of those distinguishing words, *French* and *Spaniards;* by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwise be embarrassed.

That there is occasion to speak often concerning the difference of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two noted men, CALVIN and ARMINIUS, is what the practice of the latter confesses; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case cannot reasonably be objected against, as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exigence of the case, whereby mankind express those things, which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect, similar to what we see in cases innumerable, where the cause is not at all blameworthy.

Nevertheless, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the use of the appellation, *Arminian*, in this Treatise. But I soon found I should be put to great difficulty by it; and that my discourse would be too much encumbered with circumlocution, instead of a name, which would better express the thing intended. And therefore I must ask the excuse of such as are apt to be offended with things of this nature, that I have so freely used the term *Arminian* in the following Discourse. I profess it to be without any design to stigmatize persons of any sort with a name of reproach, or at all to make them appear more odious. If, when I had occasion to speak of those Divines who are commonly called by this name, I had, instead of styling them *Arminians*, called them "*these men*," as Dr. WHITBY does *Calvinistic* Divines, it probably would not have been taken any better, or thought to show a better temper, or more good manners. I have done as I would be done by, in this matter. However the term *Calvinistic* is, in these days, among most, a term of greater reproach

than the term *Arminian;* yet I should not take it at all amiss, to be called a *Calvinist*, for distinction's sake: though I utterly disclaim a dependence on CALVIN, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and taught them; and cannot justly be charged with believing in every thing just as he taught.

But, lest I should really be an occasion of injury to some persons, I would here give notice, that though I generally speak of that doctrine, concerning Free-will and moral Agency, which I oppose, as an *Arminian* doctrine; yet I would not be understood as asserting, that every Divine or Author, whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an *Arminian*, or one of that sort which is commonly called by that name. Some of them went far beyond the *Arminians;* and I would by no means charge *Arminians* in general with all the corrupt doctrine, which these maintained. Thus, for instance, it would be very injurious, if I should rank *Arminian* Divines, in general, with such Authors as Mr. CHUBB. I doubt not, many of them have some of his doctrines in abhorrence; though he agrees, for the most part, with *Arminians*, in his notion of the Freedom of the Will. And, on the other hand, though I suppose this notion to be a leading article in the *Arminian* scheme, that which, if pursued in its consequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the rest; yet I do not charge all that have held this doctrine, with being *Arminians*. For whatever may be the consequences of the doctrine really, yet some that hold this doctrine, may not own nor see these consequences; and it would be unjust, in many instances, to charge every Author with believing and maintaining all the real consequences of his avowed doctrines. And I desire it may be particularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the following Discourse, often to mention the Author of the book, entitled *An Essay on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature*,* as holding that notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppose; yet I do not mean to call him an *Arminian:* however, in that doctrine he agrees with *Arminians*, and departs from the current and general opinion of *Calvinists*. If the Author of that Essay be the same as it is commonly ascribed to, he doubtless was not one that ought to bear that name. But however good a Divine he was in many respects, yet that particular *Arminian* doctrine which he maintained, is never the better for being held by such an one: nor is there less need of opposing it on that account, but rather more: as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence, for being taught by a Divine of his name and character; supposing the doctrine to be wrong, and in itself to be of an ill tendency.

I have nothing further to say by way of preface; but only to bespeak the Reader's candour, and calm attention to what I have written. The subject is of such importance, as to *demand* attention, and the most thorough consideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves, are the most important. As religion is the great business for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends; and as

* This Essay has been generally ascribed to Dr. WATTS, and is included in his works. W.

religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker; and so has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful, in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the *understanding* and *will*. Both are very important: yet the science of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment; inasmuch as all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the Freedom of the Will, is the main point that belongs to the science of the Will. Therefore, I say, the importance of this subject greatly *demands* the attention of Christians, and especially of Divines. But as to my *manner* of handling the subject, I would be far from presuming to say, that it is such as *demands* the attention of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to own, that in this matter I depend on the Reader's courtesy. But only thus far I may have some colour for putting in a *claim;* that if the Reader be disposed to pass his censure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly *ask* of my Readers; together with the prayers of all sincere lovers of truth, that I may have much of that spirit which Christ promised his disciples, which guides into all truth; and that the blessed and powerful influences of this spirit would make truth victorious in the world.

A

CAREFUL AND STRICT ENQUIRY,

&c.

PART I.

WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE.

SECT. I.

Concerning the Nature of the Will.

It may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the *Will;* this word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it: and so perhaps it would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to greater clearness in the following discourse, to say a few things concerning it.

And therefore I observe, that the *Will* (without any metaphysical refining) is, *That by which the mind chooses any thing.* The faculty of the *Will*, is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of *choosing:* an act of the *Will* is the same as an act of *choosing* or *choice.*

If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to say, that it is that by which the soul either *chooses* or *refuses;* I am content with it: though I think it enough to say, It is that by which the soul chooses: for in every act of Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another; it chooses something rather than the contrary, or rather than the

want or non-existence of that thing. So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative; and the mind's making its choice in that case is properly the act of the Will: the Will's determining between the two, is a voluntary determination; but that is the same thing as making a choice. So that by whatever names we call the act of the Will, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or *being* averse, *being* pleased or displeased *with*; all may be reduced to this of *choosing*. For the soul to act *voluntarily*, is evermore to act *electively*.

Mr. LOCKE* says, "The Will signifies nothing but a power or ability to *prefer* or *choose*." And, in the foregoing page, he says, "The word *preferring* seems best to express the act of volition;" but adds, that "it does it not precisely; for, though a man would *prefer* flying to walking, yet who can say he ever *wills* it?" But the instance he mentions, does not prove that there is any thing else in *willing*, but merely *preferring*: for it should be considered what is the immediate object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or any other external action; which is not being removed from one place to another; on the earth, or through the air; these are remoter objects of preference; but such or such an immediate *exertion* of himself. The thing next chosen, or preferred, when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present moment, is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has so made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a body in proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such alterations of my external sensations and motions; together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so; having ever found by experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensations and motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise. But it is not so in the case of flying: though a man may be said *remotely* to choose or prefer flying: yet he does not prefer, or desire, under circum-

* Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197.

stances in view, any *immediate exertion* of the members of his body in order to it; because he has no expectation that he should obtain the desired end by any such exertion; and he does not prefer, or incline to, any bodily exertion, under this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish the *proper objects* of the several acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such like instances, that there is any difference between *volition* and *preference;* or that a man's choosing, liking best, or being best pleased with a thing, are not the same with his *willing* that thing. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by *its pleasing a man* to do thus or thus; and a man doing as he *wills*, and doing as he *pleases*, are in common speech the same thing.

Mr. LOCKE* says, "The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire; which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A man, says he, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the Will and Desire run counter." I do not suppose, that *Will* and *Desire* are words of precisely the same signification: *Will* seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent. *Desire* respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation and posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may *will* it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires any thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned instance, which Mr. LOCKE produces, is no proof that he ever does. He may, on some consideration or other *will* to utter speeches which have a tendency to persuade another, and still may *desire* that they may not persuade him; but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he does not will a thing, and desire the *contrary*, in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully observed, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired: if it were, it would be found, that Will and Desire do not clash in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is to utter such words; and certainly, the same consideration so influences him, that he does not desire the contrary; all things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. And so as to the thing which Mr. LOCKE speaks of as *desired*, viz. That the words, though they tend to persuade.

* Hum. Und. vol. i. p. 203. 204.

should not be effectual to that end, his Will is not contrary to this; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with respect to the *very same object* of Will or desire: but here the objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree. And it is no wonder that they should not agree in *different* things, though but little distinguished in their nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree with Desire, in different things. As in this very instance which Mr. LOCKE mentions, a person may, on *some* consideration, desire to use persuasions, and at the same time may desire they may not prevail; but yet no body will say, that *Desire* runs counter to *Desire;* or that this proves that *Desire* is perfectly a distinct thing from *Desire.*—The like might be observed of the other instance Mr. LOCKE produces, of a man's desiring to be eased of pain, &c.

But, not to dwell any longer on this, whether *Desire* and *Will*, and whether *Preference* and *Volition* be precisely the same things, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of *will* there is an act of *choice;* that in every *volition* there is a *preference*, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby, at that instant, it is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the Will, there is some preponderation of the mind, one way rather than another; and the soul had rather *have* or *do* one thing, than another, or than *not* to have or do that thing; and that where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect, continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.

SECT. II.

Concerning the Determination of the Will.

By *determining* the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, *causing* that the act of the Will or Choice should be thus, and not otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action, or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a direction, rather than another.

The Determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by

them that say the Will determines itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action.

With respect to that grand enquiry, "What determines the Will?" it would be very tedious and unnecessary, at present, to examine all the various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular discussion of all points debated in disputes on that other question, "Whether the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding?" It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, *It is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will.* But it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning.

By *motive*, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their strength, to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are as one complex motive. And when I speak of the *strongest* motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.

Whatever is objectively* a motive, in this sense, must be something that is *extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding*, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of *tendency*, or *advantage* to move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the Will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the *strength* of the motive.

* This appears to be the author's meaning, in order to preserve a consistency with his professed sentiment of divine influence. He believed that a real christian's mind is born of the Spirit; and that such a state of mind induces one choice rather than another. But he could not maintain that *divine influence*, which is a *subjective cause* of one volition rather than another, must be "in the view or apprehension of the understanding." For "the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit." Beside, the proper acceptation of the term "motive" seems to plead in favour of the restriction suggested in the text by the word "objectively;" and the use of this distinction may appear more fully hereafter.—W.

That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage, or tendency to move the will, or which appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a *weaker* motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the *strongest* motive. And in this sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest motive.

Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move, or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the *thing viewed*, the nature and circumstances of the *mind that views*, and the degree and manner of its *view*; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed *as good*; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear, have a tendency, by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that *the Will always is, as the greatest apparent good is.* But only, for the right understanding of this, two things must be well and distinctly observed.

1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term "good;" namely, as of the same import with "agreeable." To appear *good* to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to *appear agreeable*, or *seem pleasing* to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its inclination and choice, considered as *evil* or *disagreeable*; nor indeed, as *indifferent*, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which *suits* the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good: to say otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.

The word "good," in this sense, includes in its signification, the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing, to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasiness removed. So that here is included what Mr. LOCKE supposes determines Will. For when he speaks of "uneasiness," as

determining the Will, he must be understood as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of preference, is the avoiding or the removal of that uneasiness; and that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable.

2. When I say, that the Will is as the greatest apparent good, or, (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the *direct* and *immediate* object of the act of volition; and not some object to which the act of Will has only an indirect and remote respect. Many acts of volition have some remote relation to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to drink it, or no; the immediate objects, about which his present volition is conversant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own *acts*, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses to drink it, and not to let it alone; then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone.

But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and between which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the consequence of it; he may judge that this future misery, when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of is next conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of, is concerning present drinking or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then *drinking* is the proper object of the act of his Will; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then *refraining* is the immediate object of his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the case, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes; then a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance. If on the contrary a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still, the present volition is, as the greatest apparent good at present is.

I have rather chosen to express myself thus, "that Will always is as the greatest apparent good," or "as

appears most agreeable," than to say that the Will *is determined by* the greatest apparent good," or "by what seems most agreeable;" because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the *voluntary action*, which is the immediate *consequence* of the mind's choice, is *determined* by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself; but that *volition* itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which *causes it to appear* most agreeable. I say, "in or about the mind's view of the object;" because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears *in* the object viewed, but also *the manner* of the view, and *the state and circumstances* of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention some things in general.

I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the *apparent nature* and *circumstances of the object*. And there are various things of this sort, that have influence in rendering the object more or less agreeable; as

1. That which appears *in* the object, rendering it *beautiful* and pleasant, or *deformed* and irksome to the mind; viewing it as it is *in itself*.

2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble *attending* the object, or the *consequence* of it. Such concomitants and consequences being viewed as circumstances of the object, are to be considered as belonging to it; and as it were parts of it, as it stands in the mind's view a proposed object of choice.

3. The *apparent state* of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with respect to *distance of time;* being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed: so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but one is beheld as near, and the other afar off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because, though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.

II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice, as it stands in the mind's view, is the *manner of the view*. If the object be something which appears connected with future pleasure, not only will the degree of ap-

parent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of the view, especially in two respects.

1. With respect to the degree of *assent*, with which the mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a *certain* happiness, than an *uncertain* one; and a pleasure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that which is viewed as less probable.

2. With respect to the degree of the *idea* or apprehension of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present or future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes, the idea we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves, than at another. Now the strength of the idea or the sense that men have of future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite volition. When two kinds of future pleasure are presented for choice, though both are supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, yet of one the mind has a far more lively sense, than of the other; this last has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure of which it has a strong and lively sense, than that of which it has only a faint idea. The view of the former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several future enjoyments are presented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others less; the mind also having a more lively idea of the good of some, and of others a less; and some are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others; and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others: in this case, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind

has of that good; because all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable; and accordingly will volition be determined.

I might further observe, that the *state of the mind* which views a proposed object of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the same object does not always appear alike agreeable to the same person, at different times. It is most agreeable to some men; to follow their reason; and to others, to follow their appetites: to some men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination, that to gratify it: others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others, to counter-act a former resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times.

But possibly it is needless to mention the "state of the mind," as a ground of the agreeableness of objects distinct from the other two mentioned before; *viz.* The apparent *nature and circumstances* of the objects viewed, and the *manner* of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently *beautiful or deformed*, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and, as it occasions the *manner* of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness to be more or less lively.

However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at the time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things considered. If the immediate objects of the will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak: if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is another [illegible] and more universal dictate of the [illegible] mind, than that, when men act vo-

luntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most *agreeable to them.* To say, that they do what *pleases* them, but yet not what is *agreeable* to them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please.

It appears from these things, that in some sense, *the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.* But then the *understanding* must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called *reason* or *judgment.* If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most *agreeable*, all things being put together which pertain to the mind's present preceptions in any respect: although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, has concern in the compound influence which moves the Will; and should be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the Will always follows; either as having its influence added to other things, or subducted from them. When such dictate of reason concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the same scale; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, resisting the influence of other things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it.

These things may serve, I hope, in some measure, to illustrate and confirm the position laid down in the beginning of this section, viz. "That the Will is always determined by the strongest motive," or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of *previous* tendency to excite volition. But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is a point of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse: And the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearness, before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty.

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luntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most *agreeable to them*. To say, that they do what *pleases* them, but yet not what is *agreeable* to them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please.

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SECT. III.

Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence.

The words *necessary*, *impossible*, *&c.* are abundantly used in controversies about Free-Will and Moral Agency; and therefore the sense in which they are used, should be clearly understood.

Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be *necessary*, when it *must* be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of Necessity, any more than if I explained the word *must* by the phrase, there being a Necessity. The words *must*, *can*, and *cannot*, need explication as much as the words *necessary* and *impossible;* excepting that the former are words that in earliest life we more commonly use.

The word *necessary*, as used in common speech, is a relative term; and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome, or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say, that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is impossible, it should not be. But the word *impossible* is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect; as the word *unable* is relative, and has relation to ability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. Also the word *irresistible* is relative, and has always reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power, or hinder the effect. The common notion of Necessity and Impossibility implies something that frustrates endeavour or desire.

Here several things are to be noted.

1. Things are said to be necessary in *general*, which are or will be notwithstanding any supposable opposition from whatever quarter. But things are said to be necessary *to us*, which are or will be notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case *from us*. The same may be observed of the word *impossible*, and other such like terms.

2. These terms *necessary*, *impossible*, *irresistible*, *&c.* more especially belong to controversies about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mention-

ed, *viz.* as necessary or impossible *to us*, and with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavour *of ours*.

3. As the word *Necessity*, in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition; so when we speak of any thing as necessary *to us*, it is with relation to some supposable opposition of *our Wills*, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary. For we do not properly make opposition to an event, any otherwise than as we *voluntarily* oppose it. Things are said to be what must be, or *necessarily* are, *as to us*, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence: but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies opposition of our wills.

It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are understood in this manner. A thing is said to be *necessary*, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be *impossible* to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavour it; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it; but all our desires and endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is said to be *irresistible*, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavour to the contrary. And we are said to be *unable* to do a thing, when our supposable desires and endeavours are insufficient.

We are accustomed, in the common use of language, thus to apply and understand these phrases: we grow up with such a habit; which, by the daily use of these terms from our childhood, becomes fixed and settled; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire, and endeavour of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so associated, that they unavoidably go together; one suggests the other, and never can be easily separated as long as we live. And though we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceedingly circumspect, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner, which will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, even when we pretend to use them as terms of art.

4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms *necessary*, *impossible*, *irresistible*, *unable*, *&c.* are used in cases wherein no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will or endeavour, they are then not used in their proper signification. The reason is manifest; in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable opposition, will or endeavour. And therefore if any

man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original and proper meaning. As for instance; if any one should affirm after this manner, That it is *necessary* for a man, or what *must* be, that he should choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues; such a one would use the terms *must*, *irresistible*, *&c.* with either perfect insignificance, or in some new sense, diverse from their common use; which is with reference, as has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness and resistance; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any such thing: for the case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing.

5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms *necessary*, *impossible*, *&c.* are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common and original signification; for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposable. Thus they use them with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being; with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So they apply them to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings, wherein all opposition of the Will is excluded in the very supposition of the case.

Metaphysical or *Philosophical* Necessity is nothing different from their certainty. I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.

What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely, "*That by which a thing cannot but be*," or "*whereby it cannot be otherwise*," fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts: *First*, the words *can*, or *cannot*, need explanation as much as the word *Necessity*; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing *cannot but be*, we might explain ourselves by saying, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And *Secondly*, this definition is liable to the forementioned great inconvenience; the words *cannot*, or *unable*, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which

as I have now observed, the word *Necessity*, as used by philosophers, has no reference.

Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the FULL AND FIXED CONNECTION BETWEEN THE THINGS SIGNIFIED BY THE SUBJECT AND PREDICATE OF A PROPOSITION, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connection, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any opposition, or contrary effort be supposed, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and CERTAIN CONNECTION, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be *necessary* in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word *Necessity*, in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove *that Necessity is not inconsistent with Liberty.*

The subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection several ways.

(1.) They may have a full and perfect connection *in and of themselves;* because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of being generally considered, is necessary *in itself;* because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions; as might be shewn, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary *in its own nature*, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary, that all right lines drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary *in themselves:* the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them, are perfectly connected *of themselves.*

(2.) The connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is *already* come to pass; and either now is, or has been; and so has, as it were, made sure of existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may by this means, be made certain, and necessarily and unalterably true; the past event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary;

it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been.

(3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be, may have a real and certain connection *consequentially;* and so the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary; as it may be surely and firmly *connected* with something else, that is necessary in one of the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or with something which has already received and made sure of existence. This Necessity lies *in*, or may be explained *by* the connection of two or more propositions one with another.—— Things which are *perfectly connected* with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Necessity of consequence.

And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way. Their existence is not necessary *in itself;* for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary by being *already* come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a *connection* with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows.— And this also is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary *before they come to pass;* and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will.

It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe concerning *metaphysical* Necessity, that (agreeable to the distinction before observed of Necessity, as *vulgarly* understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a *general* or *particular* Necessity. The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a *general* Necessity, when, all things considered, there is a foundation for the certainty of their existence; or when in the most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connection.

An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with a *particular* Necessity, when nothing that can be taken into consideration, in or about a person, thing or time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of an event, or

the existence of a thing; or can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the connection of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing, at least at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a Necessity that is most *universal* and *absolute*. Thus there are many things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time; as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair.——I shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances in the following discourse.—Whether the same things that are necessary with a *particular* Necessity, be not also necessary with a *general* Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of Necessity.

These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms *necessary* and *Necessity*, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity, in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than their original meaning, in common language, which was before explained.

What has been said to shew the meaning of the terms *necessary* and *Necessity*, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms, *impossible* and *impossibility*. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former positive. *Impossibility* is the same as *negative Necessity*, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used as a term of art in a like diversity from the original and vulgar meaning, with Necessity.

The same may be observed concerning the words *unable* and *Inability*. It has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavoured. But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about Free Will, they are used in a quite different, and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass, is or can be supposed.

As the words *necessary*, *impossible*, *unable*, &c. are used by polemic writers, in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term *contingent*. Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is *not discerned*; and so is what

we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be contingent, or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope.

But the word *contingent* is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection.

SECT. IV.

Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.

That Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into *moral* and *natural* Necessity.

I shall not now stand to enquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the following discourse.

The phrase, *moral Necessity*, is used variously; sometimes it is used for a necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of *duty* and conscience, from which he cannot be discharged. Again, the word *Necessity* is often used for great obligation in point of *interest*. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that apparent connection of things, which is the ground of *moral evidence*; and so is distinguished from *absolute Necessity*, or that sure connection of things, that is a foundation for *infallible certainty*. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of *probability*, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind, in their conduct and behaviour in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connection and *consequence*, which arises from such *moral causes*, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in *this* sense, that I use the phrase, *moral Necessity*, in the following discourse.

By *natural Necessity*, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural

causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Necessity: they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural Necessity mens' bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them.

But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of Necessity.

1. Moral Necessity may be as *absolute*, as natural Necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the Will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the Will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some *difficulty* in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly *impossible* to surmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a *sure* and *perfect* connection between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of *moral Necessity*.

2. When I use this distinction of *moral* and *natural Necessity*, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any thing come to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the *nature* of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a *moral* habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not

owing to the *nature of things*. But *natural* and *moral* are the terms by which these two kinds of Necessity have usually been called; and they must be distinguished by some names, for there is a difference between them, that is very important in its consequences. This difference, however, does not lie so much in the nature of the *connection*, as in the two terms *connected*. The cause with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind; *viz.* that which is of a moral nature; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular kind; being likewise of a moral nature; consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul, or voluntary action.

I suppose, that Necessity which is called *natural* in distinction from *moral* necessity, is so called, because *mere nature* as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of *choice*. The word *nature* is often used in opposition to *choice;* not because nature has indeed never any hand in our choice; but, probably, because we first get our notion of nature from that obvious course of events, which we observe in many things where our choice has no concern; and especially in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled course; the stated order, and manner of succession, being very apparent. But where we do not readily discern the rule and connection, (though there be a connection, according to an established law, truly taking place) we signify the manner of event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and inanimate world, which do not obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of *nature*, but by such names as *accident*, *chance*, *contingence*, &c. So men make a distinction between nature and choice; as if they were completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, *in many cases*, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But the connection between acts of choice, and their causes, according to established laws, is not so obvious. And we observe that choice is, as it were, a new principle of motion and action, different from that established order of things which is most obvious, and seen especially in corporeal things. The choice also often interposes, interrupts, and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone. Hence it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition to it. Names being commonly given to things, according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research.

3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of *moral Necessity*, the word *Necessity* is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word: for, as was observed before, such terms, *necessary*, *impossible*, *irresistible*, &c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative; having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd, to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself, in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same time.—And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this Necessity.

What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral *Inability*. We are said to be *naturally* unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. *Moral* Inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views.

To give some instances of this *moral Inability*.—A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that

they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness, may cause a moral Inability to love wickedness in general, and may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things; or to choose a wicked, in preference to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and choose holiness; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.

Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is *general and habitual*, and that which is *particular and occasional*. By a *general and habitual* moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man whose heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert grateful acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By *particular and occasional* moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, *on this occasion*.——If it be so, that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any case, that the will should, at present, go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it.——The former of these kinds of moral Inability, is most commonly called by the name of *Inability*; because the word, in its most proper and original signification, has respect to some *stated defect*. And this especially obtains the name of *Inability* also upon another account:—because, as before observed, the word Inability in its original and most common use, is a relative term; and has respect to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavoured. Now there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from transient occasions and causes. Indeed will and endeavour against, or diverse from *present* acts of the will are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose the will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it is. But yet there may be will and endeavour against *future* acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no

contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will at one time, may be against the acts of the will at another time: and there may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such desires and endeavours are, in many cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes, and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional and transient; because the occasion or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of *Inability*. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case also, when the acts arise from strong habit.

But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word *Inability* is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to shew his neighbour kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so, is a downright contradiction: it is to say, he *cannot* will, if he *does* will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing e remains to be done. Therefore, in these things, to ascrib non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not ji

because the thing wanting is not a being *able*, but a being *willing*. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.

SECT. V.

Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency.

The plain and obvious meaning of the words *Freedom* and *Liberty*, in common speech, is *The power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has, to do as he pleases.* Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect as he wills.* And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no *will*, cannot have any *power* or *opportunity* of doing *according to its will*, nor be necessitated to act *contrary to its will*, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the *very will itself*, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words.—For the *will itself* is not an Agent that *has a will*: the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of an agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of persons; and not the properties of properties.

There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty

* I say not only *doing*, but *conducting*; because a voluntary forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, &c. are instances of persons' *conduct*, about which Liberty is exercised; though they are not so properly called *doing*.

in common speech. One is *constraint;* otherwise called *force*, *compulsion*, and *coaction;* which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing *contrary* to his will. The other is *restraint;* which is, his being hindered, and not having power to do *according* to his will. But that which has no will cannot be the subject of these things.—I need say the less on this head, Mr. LOCKE having set the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called *Liberty*; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the *cause* of that choice; or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.

What has been said may be sufficient to shew what is meant by *Liberty*, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by *Arminians*, *Pelagians* and others, who oppose the *Calvinists*, has an entirely different signification.—These several things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a *self-determining power* in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. *Indifference* belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be *in equilibrio*. 3. *Contingence* is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all *necessity*, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.

A *moral Agent* is a being that is capable of those actions that have a *moral* quality, and which can properly be deno-

minated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a *moral faculty*, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.

The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its actions and influence on the earth, in warming and causing it to bring forth its fruits; but it is not a moral Agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents: the actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous; nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds.

Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency of a *ruler* and a *subject*. I call it *circumstantial*, because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements, by which they are capable of being influenced, arising from the difference of *circumstances*. A *ruler* acting in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promises, rewards and punishments, as the *subject* is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a *ruler* towards his creatures, and never as a *subject*, differs in that respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor, have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced in the highest degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement; viz. the moral good which He sees in such and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under

the influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding, to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we read of *Gen.* i. 26, 27, and *chap.* ix. 6.) by which God distinguished man from the beasts, *viz.* in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much consists the *natural* image of God; whereas the *spiritual* and *moral* image, wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he was endowed.

PART II.

WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.

SECT. I.

Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.

HAVING taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human Liberty, and particularly observed what *Liberty* is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by *Arminians;* I proceed to consider the *Arminian* notion of the *Freedom of the Will*, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not sufficient, and the only Liberty, which makes, or can make any one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In *this Part*, I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which *Arminians* insist on; and shall enquire, whether any such sort of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c. in the *next* Part.

And first of all, I shall consider the notion of *a self-determining Power* in the will: wherein, according to the *Arminians*, does most essentially consist the Will's Freedom; and shall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that *the will itself determines all the free acts of the will.*

Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such ways of speaking, as *the Will determining itself;* because actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. LOCKE observes. But I shall suppose that the *Arminians*, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the *Will* mean the *soul willing*. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean *the soul in the exercise of a power of willing*, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or principles of acting, or doing such things, we mean that the agents which have these Powers of acting, do them, in the exercise of those Powers. So when we say, valour fights courageously, we mean the man who is under the influence of valour fights courageously. When we say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that object. When we say the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty. So when it is said, the will decides or determines, the meaning must be, that the person in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines.

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the *soul* determines them in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing; or, which is the same thing, it determines them of choice; it *determines* its own acts, by *choosing* its own acts. If the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice: and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of *other* acts of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the Will be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the Will is self-determined: that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the Will, choosing that. Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the Will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom: but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.

If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and determines their motions, does also govern itself, and determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice: and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that: and if that *directing* volition be also free, in that also the Will is determined; that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and so on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series: and if that first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a contradiction; because by the supposition it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the *Arminian* notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the Will which determines and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following acts, which are determined by it can be free.—If we suppose there are five acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each of them are as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in determining. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will we should suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being determined by something out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on; none of them are free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by some cause out of the Will: and so all freedom in the case is excluded,

and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next; and so the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link; and that is moved by something else; in this case, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain; yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-moving or self-determining Power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by something that did not belong to the chain.—If the will be not free in the first act, which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act: for though indeed the will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding act, by which it was caused, was not free. And again, if the will be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because, in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the will that was not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one; if the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the will is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it determines them all is not a free act; and therefore the will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all.—Thus, this *Arminian* notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's *Self-determination*, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.

SECT. II.

Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning, considered.

If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said, that when the *Arminians* speak of the will determining its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines them by any preceding act, or that one act of the will determines another; but only that the faculty or power of will, or the soul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does it without any act going before the act determined; such an evasion would be full of the most gross absurdity.—I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing; and I do not know but I should wrong the *Arminians*, in supposing that any of them would make use of it. But it being

as good a one as I can invent, I would observe upon it a few things.

First, If the power of the will determines an act of volition, or the soul in the *use or exercise of that power*, determines it, that is the same thing as for the soul to determine volition *by an act of will*. For an *exercise* of the power of will, and an *act* of that power, are the same thing. Therefore to say, that the power of will, or the soul in the *use* or *exercise* of that power, determines volition, without an *act* of will preceding the volition determined, is a contradiction.

Secondly, If a power of will determines the act of the will, then a power of choosing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every act of will, there is a choice, and a power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a power of choosing determines the act of volition, it determines it by choosing it. For it is most absurd to say, that a power of choosing determines one thing rather than another, without choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing determines volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition.

Thirdly, To say, that the faculty, or the soul, determines its own volition, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Because for the soul to *direct*, *decide*, or *determine* any thing, is to act; and this is supposed: for the soul is here spoken of as being a cause in this affair, doing something; or, which is the same thing, exerting itself in order to an effect, which effect is the determination of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an act of will. But certainly, this action is not the same with the effect, in order to the production of which it is exerted; but must be something prior to it.

The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the will, speak of a certain *sovereignty* in the will, whereby it has power to determine its own volitions. And therefore the determination of volition must itself be an act of the will; for otherwise it can be no exercise of that supposed power and sovereignty. Again, if the will determines itself, then either the will is *active* in determining its volitions, or it is not. If active, then the determination is an *act* of the will; and so there is one act of the will determining another. But if the will is not *active* in the determination, then how does it *exercise* any liberty in it? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein the will *exercises* liberty, is in its determining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not *active* in determining? Certainly the will, or the soul cannot *exercise any liberty* in that wherein it doth not *act*, or wherein it doth not *exercise itself*. So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown.

If there be an act of the will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the will is determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liberty consists in the will's power to determine its own acts: or, which is the same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the will.

If it should be said, That although it be true, if the soul determines its own volitions, it must be active in so doing, and the determination itself must be an act; yet there is no need of supposing this act to be prior to the volition determined; but the will or soul determines the act of the will *in willing;* it determines its own volition, *in* the very act of volition; it directs and limits the act of the will, causing it to be so and not otherwise, *in* exerting the act, without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they must mean one of these three things: Either, (1.) That the determining act, though it be before the act determined in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That the determining act is not before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly distinct from it; but that the soul's determining the act of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of volition: the mind's exerting such a particular act, is its causing and determining the act. Or, (3.) That volition has no cause, and is no effect; but comes into existence, with such a particular determination, without any ground or reason of its existence and determination.—I shall consider these distinctly.

(1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act determined in order of *time*, it will not help the case at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before the determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from, and independent on it, as if it were before in the order of time. As the cause of the particular motion of a natural body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to time, yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but must be as distinct from it, as any other cause, that is before its effect in the order of time: as the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, or the father distinct from the son which he begets. And if the act of the will determining be distinct from the act determined, and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another, till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the will before it in the order of nature, determining it; and con-

sequently is an act not determined by the will, and so not a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act which determines all the rest, none of them are free acts. As when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand; all the rest may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any distance of time; but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature; the last is moved by the next, and that by the next, and so till we come to the first; which not being moved by any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the chain, as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time.

(2.) If any should say, that the determining act is not before the determined act, either in the order of time, or of nature, nor is distinct from it; but that the *exertion* of the act is the *determination* of the act; that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of volition: I would on this observe, that the thing in question seems to be forgotten, or kept out of sight, in a darkness and unintelligibleness of speech; unless such an objector would mean to contradict himself.—The very act of volition itself is doubtless a determination of mind; i. e. it is the mind's drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two or more things proposed to it. But determining among external *objects* of choice, is not the same with determining the *act* of choice itself, among various possible acts of choice.—The question is, What influences, directs, or determines the mind or will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the cause, ground or reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwise? Now it must be answered, according to the *Arminian* notion of freedom, that the will influences, orders and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say, it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, influenced and determined by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is some way the cause or reason of the thing, with respect to which it is said to be prior.

If the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into existence, be any thing properly determined at all, then it has some cause of existing, and of existing in such a particular determinate manner, and not another; some cause, whose influence *decides the matter:* which cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the will or mind orders, influences and determines itself to exert an act by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and effect;

or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason of the soul's exerting such an act? To which the answer is, The soul exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be distinct from, and in the order of nature prior to itself.

(3.) If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a particular act of will, is a thing that comes to pass *of itself*, without any cause; and that there is absolutely no reason of the soul being determined to exert such a volition, and make such a choice, rather than another; I say, if this be the meaning of *Arminians*, when they contend so earnestly for the will determining its own acts, and for liberty of will consisting in self-determining power; they do nothing but confound themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the question, *What determines the will?* and in their answer, that *the will determines itself*, and in all the dispute, it seems to be taken for granted, that *something* determines the will; and the controversy on this head is not, whether its determination has any cause or foundation at all; but where the foundation of it is, whether in the will itself, or somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above-mentioned, then nothing at all determines the will; volition having absolutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either within, or without.—— There is a great noise made about self-determining power, as the source of all free acts of the will: but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is the source of these acts, neither self-determining power, nor any other, but they arise from nothing; no cause, no power, no influence, being at all concerned in the matter.

However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the will are events which come to pass *without* a cause, is certainly implied in the *Arminian* notion of liberty of will; though it be very inconsistent with many other things in their scheme, and repugnant to some things implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particular determination of volition is without any cause; because they hold the free acts of the will to be *contingent* events; and contingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause which antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are, do not happen contingently. If something foregoing, by a casual influence and connection, determines and fixes precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.

And because it is a question in many respects very important in this controversy, *Whether the free acts of the will*

are events which come to pass without a cause? I shall be particular in examining this point in the two following sections.

SECT. III.

Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence.

Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would explain how I would be understood, when I use the word *Cause* in this discourse; since, for want of a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive, than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a *positive efficiency* or influence to *produce* a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influence: which yet are Causes in this respect, that they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are, rather than others; or why they are thus, rather than otherwise. Thus the absence of the sun in the night, is not the Cause of the fall of dew at that time, in the same manner as its beams are the Cause of the ascent of vapours in the day-time; and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the same manner the Cause of the freezing of the waters, as its approach in the spring is the cause of their thawing. But yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun is an antecedent, with which these effects in the night and winter are connected, and on which they depend; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come to pass at that time, rather than at other times; though the absence of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence.

It may be further observed, that when I speak of *connection of Causes and Effects*, I have respect to *moral* Causes, as well as those which are called *natural* in distinction from them. Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense, as any Causes whatsoever; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's coming to pass.

Therefore I sometimes use the word *Cause*, in this enquiry, to signify any *antecedent*, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise: or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the propo-

sition which affirms that Event, is true; whether it has any positive influence, or not. And agreeably to this, I sometimes use the word effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a Cause, most properly speaking.

I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off occasion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some things which I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass, on some Cause, and their connection with their Cause.

Having thus explained what I mean by *Cause*, I assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a Cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable: but as to all things that *begin to be*, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves. That whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to come.

And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes, or things, and the manner and circumstances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some Cause, or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should suddenly change the direction of its motion; or if it should put off its old figure, and take a new one; or change its colour: the beginning of these new modes is a new Event, and the human mind necessarily supposes that there is some Cause or reason of them.

If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from Effects to Causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence, besides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition, particularly all our proof of the being of God ceases: we argue His being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are sensible once were not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.

Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God,

without any evidence of it from his works. I do suppose there is a great absurdity in denying Being in general, and imagining an eternal, absolute, universal nothing: and therefore that there would be, in the nature of things, a foundation of intuitive evidence, that there must be an eternal, infinite, most perfect Being; if we had strength and comprehension of mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal Being. But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God by arguing; our evidence would be intuitive: we should see it, as we see other things that are necessary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory; as we see that twice two is four; and as we see that a circle has no angles. If we had as clear an idea of universal, infinite entity, as we have of these other things, I suppose we should most intuitively see the absurdity of supposing such Being not to be; should immediately see there is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most general, abstracted notion of it, should not be. But we have not that strength and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive, independent manner: but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i. 20. *The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made; even his eternal power and Godhead.* We *first ascend*, and prove *a posteriori*, or from effects, that there must be an eternal Cause; and then *secondly*, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessarily existent; and then *thirdly*, from the proved necessity of his existence, we may *descend*, and prove many of his perfections *a priori*.*

But if once this grand principle of common sense be

* To the inquirer after truth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argument *a priori* and one *a posteriori*, a distinction of considerable use, as well as of long standing among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument from either of these, when *legitimately* applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used, for instance, relatively to the being and perfections of God; but the one should be confined to the *existence* of Deity, while the other is applicable to his *perfections*. By the argument *a posteriori* we rise *from* the effect to the cause, from the stream to the fountain, from what is *posterior* to what is prior; in other words, from what is contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity; that is, from the *manifestation* of God to his *existence*. By the argument *a priori* we descend *from* the cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream, from what is *prior* to what is posterior; that is, from the necessary existence of God we safely infer certain properties and perfections. To attempt a demonstration of the existence of a first cause, or the Being of God *a priori*, would be most absurd; for it would be an attempt to prove a *prior* ground or cause of existence of a *first* cause; or, that there is some cause *before* the *very first*. The argument *a priori*, therefore, is not *applicable* to prove the divine *existence*. For *this* end, the argument *a posteriori* alone is legitimate; and its conclusiveness rests on this axiom, that "there can be *no effect without a cause*."—The absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantly demonstrated by our author. W.

given up, that *what is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause;* and we begin to maintain, that things which heretofore have not been, may come into existence, and begin to be of themselves, without any cause; all our means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any Cause at all, then they doubtless may without any Cause answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things; namely, that what begins to be has a Cause, and also that it has a cause proportionable to the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine, that there cannot be any thing coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause.

Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without a Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to Causes: from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view; from sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes of these sensations; and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, on which they depend, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else, by memory; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only *by means* of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without Causes, all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty: nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.

And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of the will coming to pass without a Cause, it is the cause in fact, that millions of millions of Events are continually coming into existence *contingently*, without any Cause or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day and

hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant succession, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No Cause, is always ready at hand, to produce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he has occasion.

If it were so, that things only of one kind, *viz.* acts of the will, seemed to come to pass of themselves; and it were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were found subjects capable of such events; this very thing would demonstrate that there was some Cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence is blind, and does not pick and choose a particular sort of Events. Nothing has no choice. This No-Cause, which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distinguished from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, shows that there is some Cause or Reason of the falling of water out of the heavens; and that something besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter.

If we should suppose Non-entity to be about to bring forth; and things were coming into existence, without any Cause or Antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner of existence depends; or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals, or new ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in the will; or any thing else of all the infinite number of possibles; then certainly it would not be expected, although many millions of millions of things were coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that constantly, whenever there is occasion.

If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of Event that renders it possible for it to come into existence without a cause, and should say, that the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding *different nature* from other things: by reason of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot: if they make this objection in good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the ex-

istence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it never so diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that thing coming into existence without a cause: because to suppose this, would be to suppose the *particular nature* of existence to be a thing prior to the existence, and so a thing which makes way for existence, without a cause or reason of existence. But that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to the existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence: for then the thing has made sure of existence already, without its help.

So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the will should come into existence without a cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as a Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too? It is not the particular *kind* of effect that makes the absurdity of supposing it has being without a Cause, but something which is common to all things that ever begin to be, *viz.* That they are not self-existent, or necessary in the nature of things.

SECT. IV.

Whether Volition can arise without a Cause through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.

The author of the *Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures*, in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a self-determining power in the will, (p. 68—69.) *That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another*, allows that it is thus in corporeal things, *which are properly and philosophically speaking, passive being;* but denies it is thus in *spirits, which are beings of an active nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can determine themselves.* By which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as an act of the will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after this manner.

rather than another. But certainly this author, in this matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,

1. The objection or difficulty proposed by him seems to be forgotten in his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this: How an event can come to pass *without a sufficient reason* why it is, or why it is in this manner rather than another? Instead of solving this difficulty, with regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets himself, and answers another question quite diverse, viz. What *is a sufficient reason* why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another? And he assigns the active being's own determination as the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the effect; and leaves all the difficulty unresolved, even, How the soul's own determination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and to be what it was, *without a Cause?* The *activity* of the soul may enable it to be the *Cause* of effects; but it does not at all enable it to be the subject of effects which have *no Cause;* which is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce effects, and determine the manner of their existence, *within* itself, without a Cause, than *out of* itself, in some other being. But if an active being should, through its activity, produce and determine an effect in some external object, how absurd would it be to say, that the effect was produced *without* a Cause!

2. The question is not so much, How a spirit endowed with activity comes to *act*, as why it exerts *such* an act, and not another; or why it acts with such a particular determination? If activity of nature be the Cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts, and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the Cause why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Active nature is a *general* thing; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, generally taken; which may be a Cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is given; but this alone cannot be a sufficient Cause why the soul exerts such a *particular* act, at such a time, rather than others. In order to this, there must be something besides a *general* tendency to action; there must also be a *particular* tendency to that individual action.—If it should be asked, why the soul of man uses its activity in such a manner as it does; and it should be answered, that the soul uses its activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has activity; would such an answer satisfy a rational man? Would it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one?

3. An active being can bring no *effects* to pass by his activity, but what are *consequent* upon his *acting:* he produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the *exercise* of his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise: he brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity. But the exer-

cise of his activity is action; and so his action, or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant about himself, to produce and determine some effect in himself; still the exercise of his activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his *activity* cannot be the *Cause* of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction; it would be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the Cause of it.

4. That the soul, though an active substance, cannot *diversify* its own acts, but by first acting; or be a determining Cause of *different* acts, or any different effects, sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this; that if so, then the *same* Cause, the *same* casual Influence, *without variation in any respect*, would produce *different* effects at different times. For the same substance of the soul before it acts, and the same active nature of the soul before it is exerted, i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the Cause of different effects, viz. Different Volitions at different times. But the substance of the soul before it acts, and its active nature before it is exerted, are the same without variation. For it is some *act* that makes the first variation in the Cause, as to any causal exertion, force or influence. But if it be so, that the soul has no different causality, or diverse causal influence, in producing these diverse effects; then it is evident, that the soul has no influence in the diversity of the effect; and that the difference of the effect cannot be owing to any thing in the soul; or which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the diversity of the effect; which is contrary to the supposition. It is true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and before there is any difference in that respect, may be in a different state and circumstances: but those whom I oppose, will not allow the different circumstances of the soul to be the determining Causes of the acts of the will; as being contrary to their notion of self-determination.

5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the soul, strictly speaking, but free volitions; then it will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing further than it is a voluntary or elective being; and whenever it produces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce effects thus, is the same thing as to

produce effects *in consequence of*, and *according to* its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by its activity produce all its own acts of will or choice themselves; for this, by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily and electively, or in consequence of its own free acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the forementioned contradiction, of a free act of choice *before the first* free act of choice.—According to these gentlemen's own notion of action, if there arises in the mind a Volition without a free act of the will to produce it, the mind is not the voluntary Cause of that Volition; because it does not arise from, nor is regulated by choice or design. And therefore it cannot be, that the mind should be the active, voluntary, determining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the affair.—The mind being a *designing* Cause, only enables it to produce effects in consequence of its *design;* it will not enable it to be the designing Cause of all its own designs. The mind being an *elective* Cause, will enable it to produce effects only in consequence of its *elections*, and according to them; but cannot enable it to be the elective Cause of all its own elections; because that supposes an election before the first election. So the mind being an *active* Cause enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own *acts*, but cannot enable it to be the determining Cause of all its own *acts;* for that is, in the same manner, a contradiction; as it supposes a determining act conversant about the first act, and prior to it, having a causal influence on its existence, and manner of existence.

I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul having power to cause and determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the soul, sometimes at least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure, or according as it chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such cases, a choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caused, even the first of them. Which runs into the forementioned great absurdity.

Therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties with which the notion of a self-determining power in the will is attended, nor will it help in the least, its absurdities and inconsistencies.

SECT. V.

Shewing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.

What was last observed in the preceding section, may shew—not only that the active nature of the soul cannot be a reason why an act of the will is, or why it is in this manner rather than another, but also—that if it could be proved, that volitions are contingent events, their being and manner of being not fixed or determined by any cause, or any thing antecedent; it would not at all serve the purpose of *Arminians*, to establish their notion of freedom, as consisting in the will's *determination of itself*, which supposes every free act of the will to be determined by some act of the will going before; inasmuch as for the *will* to determine a thing, is the same as for the soul to determine a thing by *willing*; and there is no way that the *will* can determine an act of the will, than by willing that act of the will, or, which is the same thing, *choosing* it. So that here must be two acts of the will in the case, one going before another, one conversant about the other, and the latter the object of the former, and chosen by the former. If the will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it does not cause or determine it at all; for that which is not determined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or *willingly*: and to say, that the will determines something which the soul does not determine willingly, is as much as to say, that something is done by the will, which the soul doth not with its will.

So that if *Arminian* liberty of will, consisting in the will determining its own acts, be maintained, the old absurdity and contradiction must be maintained, that every free act of will is caused and determined by a foregoing free act of will.—Which doth not consist with the free acts arising without any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by any thing foregoing. So that this evasion must be given up, as not at all relieving this sort of liberty, but directly destroying it.

And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its own acts of will some other way, than by a foregoing act of will; still it will not help their cause. If it determines them by an act of the understanding, or some other power, then *the will* does not determine *itself*; and so the *self-determining*

power of the will is given up. And what liberty is there exercised, according to their own opinion of liberty, by the soul being determined by something besides *its own choice?* The acts of the will, it is true, may be directed, and effectually determined and fixed; but it is not done by the soul's own will and pleasure: there is no exercise at all of choice or will in producing the effect: and if *will* and choice are not exercised in it, how is the *liberty of the will* exercised in it?

So that let *Arminians* turn which way they please with their notion of liberty, consisting in the will determining its own acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free act of will to be determined by the soul's own free choice, or foregoing free act of will; *foregoing*, either in the order of time, or nature; it implies that gross contradiction, that the *first* free act belonging to the affair, is determined by a free act which is *before* it. Or if they say, that the free acts of the will are determined by some *other act* of the soul, and not an act of will or choice; this also destroys their notion of liberty consisting in the acts of the will being determined by the *will itself*; or if they hold that the acts of the will are determined by *nothing at all* that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in that sense, that they are determined and fixed by no cause at all; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the will determining its own acts.

This being the true state of the *Arminian* notion of liberty, the writers who defend it are forced into gross inconsistencies, in what they say upon this subject. To instance in Dr. WHITBY; he, in his discourse on the freedom of the will,* opposes the opinion of the *Calvinists*, who place man's liberty *only in a power of doing what he will*, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. HOBBES. And yet he himself mentions the very same notion of liberty, as the dictate of *the sense and common reason of mankind, and a rule laid down by the light of nature:* viz. that *liberty is a power of acting from ourselves*, or DOING WHAT WE WILL.† This is indeed, as he says, a thing agreeable to *the sense and common reason of mankind*; and therefore it is not so much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against himself: for if liberty does not consist in this, what else can be devised that it should consist in? If it be said, as Dr. WHITBY elsewhere insists, that it does not only consist in liberty of *doing what we will*, but also a liberty of willing without necessity; still the question returns, what does that liberty of willing without necessity consist in, but in a power of willing *as we please*, without being impeded by a contrary necessity? or in other words, a liber-

* In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 350, 351, 352.
† Ibid. p. 325, 326.

ty for the soul in its willing to act *according to its own choice?* Yea, this very thing the same author seems to allow, and suppose again and again, in the use he makes of sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words of ORIGEN, which he produces as a testimony on his side; * "The soul acts by HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part SHE WILL." And those words of JUSTIN MARTYR; † "The doctrine of the Christians is this, that nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man doth good or evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE." And from EUSEBIUS, these words; ‡ "If fate be established, philosophy and piety are overthrown.—All these things depending upon the necessity introduced *by the stars, and not upon meditation and exercise* PROCEEDING FROM OUR OWN FREE CHOICE." And again, the words of MACCARIUS; ‖ "God to preserve the liberty of man's will, suffered their bodies to die, that it might be IN THEIR CHOICE to turn to good or evil."—"They who are acted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any necessity, but have liberty to turn themselves, *and* DO WHAT THEY WILL *in this life.*"

Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of liberty, which the *Calvinists* have; which he at the same time condemns, as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. HOBBES, namely, "*The soul acting by its own choice, men doing good or evil according to their own free choice, their being in that exercise which proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice to turn to good or evil, and doing what they will.*" So that if men exercise this liberty in the acts of the will themselves, it must be in exerting acts of will *according to their own* free *choice;* or, exerting acts of will *that proceed from their choice.* And if it be so, then let every one judge whether this does not suppose a free choice going before the free act of will, or whether an act of choice does not go before that act of the will which *proceeds from it.* And if it be thus with all free acts of the will, then let every one judge, whether it will not follow that there is a free choice going *before the first* free act of the will exerted in the case! And finally, let every one judge whether in the scheme of these writers there be any possibility of avoiding these absurdities.

If liberty consists, as Dr. WHITBY himself says, in a man's *doing what he will;* and a man exercises this liberty, not only in external actions, but in the *acts* of the will themselves; then so far as liberty is exercised in the latter, it consists in *willing what he wills:* and if any say so, one of these two things must be meant, either, 1. That a man has power to will,

* Ibid. p. 342. † Ibid. p. 360. ‡ Ibid. 363.
‖ In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 369, 370.

as he does will; because what he wills, he wills; and therefore power to will what he has power to will. If this be their meaning, then all this mighty controversy about freedom of the will and self-determining power, comes wholly to nothing; all that is contended for being no more than this, that the mind of man does what it does, and is the subject of what it is the subject, or that what is, is; wherein none has any controversy with them. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that a man has power to will as he chooses to will: that is, he has power by one act of choice, to choose another; by an antecedent act of will to choose a consequent act; and therein to execute his own choice. And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but shuffling with those they dispute with, and baffling their own reason. For still the question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act of will which chose the consequent act. The answer according to the same principles must be, that his liberty in this also lies in his willing as he would, or as he chose, or agreeable to another act of choice preceding that. And so the question returns *in infinitum*, and the like answer must be made *in infinitum*: in order to support their opinion, there must be no beginning, but free acts of will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts of will in the soul of every man, without beginning.

SECT. VI.

Concerning the Will determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the Mind.

A great argument for self-determining power, is the supposed experience we universally have of an ability to determine our Wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented: the Will, as is supposed, has its choice to make between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the view of the mind; and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice; the Will can instantly determine itself to one, by a sovereign power which it has over itself, without being moved by any preponderating inducement.

Thus the fore-mentioned author of an *Essay on the Freedom of the Will, &c.* (p. 25, 26, 27.) supposes, "That there are many instances, wherein the Will is determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by any thing else, but merely by itself, as a sovereign self-determining power of the soul; and that the soul does not will this or that action, in some cases, by any other influence but because it will. Thus

says he, I can turn my face to the South, or the North; I can point with my finger upward or downward.—And thus, in some cases, the Will determines itself in a very sovereign manner, because it will, without a reason borrowed from the understanding: and hereby it discovers its own perfect power of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all influence or restraint of any kind." And (p. 66, 70, 73, 74,) this author very expressly supposes the Will in many cases to be determined by *no motive at all, and acts altogether without motive, or ground of preference.*—Here I would observe,

1. The very supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows itself. For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several things the Will actually chooses one before another, at the same time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very same thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same time that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that the mind is indifferent *before* it comes to have a choice, or until it has a preference; for certainly this author did not imagine he had a controversy with any person in supposing this. Besides, it appears in fact, that the thing which he supposes, is—not that the Will chooses one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent *before it chooses*, but that the will is indifferent *when it chooses;* and that it being otherwise than indifferent is not until afterwards, in consequence of its choice; that the chosen thing appearing preferable, and more agreeable than another, arises from its choice already made. His words are (p. 30.) "Where the objects which are proposed, appear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a guide or director; and therefore must take its own choice, by its own determination; it being properly a self-determining power. And in such cases the will does as it were make a good to itself by its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-chosen good. Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoccupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his own possession and property, and as such rejoices in it. Where things were indifferent before, the will finds nothing to make them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves, but the pleasure it feels *arising from its own choice*, and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we have chosen, *and purely because we chose them.*"

This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many things, purely because we have preferred and chosen them before.—These things must needs be spoken inconsiderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either in the order of time or nature: It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing *rather*

than another, is *preferring* that thing, and that is setting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the *fruit* of its setting a higher value on that thing.

This author says, (p. 36.) "The will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the will may determine itself to choose one or the other." And again, in the same page, "I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet my Will may determine itself to choose." And again, "Which I shall choose must be determined by the mere act of my will." If the choice is determined by a mere act of Will, then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice. And concerning this matter, *viz.* That the act of the Will itself is determined by an act of choice, this writer is express. (p. 72.) Speaking of the case, where there is no superior fitness in objects presented, he has these words: "There it must act by its own CHOICE, and determine itself as it PLEASES." Where it is supposed that the very *determination*, which is the ground and spring of the Will's act, is an act of *choice* and *pleasure*, wherein one act is more agreeable than another; and this *preference* and *superior pleasure* is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so, the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but *had rather* determine itself one way than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in indifference; not so much as in the first step it takes. If it be possible for the *understanding* to act in indifference, yet surely the *Will* never does; because the Will beginning to *act* is the very same thing as it beginning to choose or *prefer*. And if in the very first act of the Will, the mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind: or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will. So that this wholly destroys the thing supposed, *viz.* That the mind can by a sovereign power choose one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind are, in every respect, perfectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another.

So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to choose one of two or more things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in effect, deny the thing he supposes, even that the Will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing influence of the view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without overthrowing it; the thing supposed in it being that which denies itself. To suppose the Will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow its pleasure,

when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in the instances of two cakes, or two eggs, &c. which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concerning which this author supposes the mind in fact has a *choice*, and so in effect supposes that it has a *preference*; it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose, they prove that a man chooses without choice. And yet this is not to his purpose; because if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much against him, and does as much contradict him, as the words of those he disputes against can do.

2. There is no great difficulty in shewing, in such instances as are alledged, not only *that it must needs be so*, that the mind must be influenced in its choice by something that has a preponderating influence upon it, but also *how it is so*. A little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consideration of the acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be sufficient to clear up the matter.

Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me; and because I am required by a superior, or desired by a friend, or on some other consideration, I am determined to touch some one of the spots or squares on the board with my finger. Not being limited or directed, in the first proposal, to any one in particular; and there being nothing in the squares, in themselves considered, that recommends any one of all the sixty-four, more than another; in this case, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called *accident*,* by determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view, which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by some other such like accident. Here are several *steps* of the mind proceeding (though all may be done, as it were, in a moment) the *first* step is its *general* determination that it will touch one of the squares. The *next* step is another *general* determination to give itself up to accident, in some certain way; as to touch that which shall be most in the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident. The *third* and last step is a *particular* determination to touch a certain individual spot, even that square, which by that sort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually offered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute indif-

* I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly called *accident*: that is nothing akin to the *Arminian* metaphysical notion of *contingence*, or something not connected with any thing foregoing; but that it is something that comes to pass in the course of things, unforeseen by men, and not owing to their design.

ference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the *first* step, the mind's general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots: the mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no; it is induced to it, for the sake of making some experiment, or by the desire of a friend, or some other motive that prevails. So it is in the *second* step, the mind determining to give itself up to accident, by touching that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no; but chooses it, because it appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfil the general purpose. And so it is in the *third* and last step, which is determining to touch that individual spot which actually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not indifferent concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason; which is, that this is a prosecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requisite, and was fixed before in the second step.

Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering a moment in such a case. Among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear sun-shine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light; but the attention of the mind is not equal to several of them at once; or if it be, it does not continue so for any time. And so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general: several ideas are not in equal strength in the mind's view and notice at once; or at least, do not remain so for any sensible continuance. There is nothing in the world more constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind; they do not remain precisely in the same state for the least perceivable space of time; as is evident by this:—That all time is perceived by the mind, only by the successive changes of its own ideas. Therefore while the perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable length of time, because no sensible succession at all.

As the acts of the Will, in each step of the forementioned precedure, do not come to pass without a particular cause, but every act is owing to a prevailing inducement; so the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unsearchable course of things, to which the mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pass without a cause. The mind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by something that has no cause; any more than if it be determined to be guided by a lot, or the casting of a die. For though the die falling in such

a manner be accidental to him that casts it, yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The involuntary changes in the succession of our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the surface of the water.

There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confusion in the minds of them who insist upon it, that the will acts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determinations in such cases as have been mentioned.*

1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the *objects* presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be indifferent with respect to his own *actions;* whether he does not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant about the *objects presented;* but *the acts to be done* concerning these objects. The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them; but the next act of the Will being about the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another. In each step of the mind's progress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects.

There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever at all properly choose one of the objects before another; either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man chooses to *take* or *touch* one rather than another; but not because it chooses the *thing taken*, or *touched;* but from foreign considerations. The case may be so, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons, prefer taking that which he *undervalues*, and choose to neglect that which his mind *pre-*

* The reader is particularly requested to give due attention to these two remarks, especially the former, as being of the utmost importance in the controversy. If he be pleased to examine, with this view, the most popular advocates for the liberty of indifference, he will find them continually confounding the *objects* of choice, and the *acts* of choice. When they have shewn, with much plausibility, that there is no perceivable difference, or ground of choice, in the *objects*, they hastily infer the same indifference as applicable to the *acts* of choice. W.

fers. In such a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing to take, are diverse: and so they are in a case where the things presented are equal in the mind's esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one *action* rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be to their purpose, should be to prove that the mind chooses the *action* in perfect indifference, with respect to *that action;* and not to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indifference with respect to the *object;* which is very possible, and yet the will not act at all without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.

2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be, not distinguishing between a *general* indifference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it, and a *particular* indifference, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular and present circumstances. A man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own *actions*, in the former respect; and yet not in the latter. Thus in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a chess-board; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch; because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the very next thing to be determined is *which* is to be touched, having already determined that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, considered thus immediately, and in these particular present circumstances, is not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about.

SECT. VII.

Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.

What has been said in the foregoing section, has a tendency in some measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent bias; that the determination of the Will to either side may be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and

the sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than that.*

But in as much as this has been of such long standing, and has been so generally received, and so much insisted on by *Pelagians*, *Semi-Pelagians*, *Jesuits*, *Socinians*, *Arminians*, and others, it may deserve a more full consideration. And therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough enquiry into this notion.

Now lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of Liberty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express themselves as though they would not be understood to mean the Indifference of the *inclination* or tendency of the will, but an Indifference of the soul's *power* of willing; or that the Will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. This indeed seems to be a refining of some particular writers only, and newly invented, which will by no means consist with the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. I wish such refiners would thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own meaning, when they make a distinction between an Indifference of the soul as to its *power* or *ability* of choosing, and the soul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itself; and whether they do not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning at all. The indifference of the soul as to its ability or power to will, must be the same thing as the Indifference of the state of the power or faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the state which the soul itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in,

* Dr. WHITBY, and some other *Arminians*, make a distinction of different kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect spirits above; another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr WHITBY allows to consist with necessity; the latter he holds to be without necessity: and this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the subject of praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenant-treaty. And to this freedom he supposes *Indifference* to be requisite. In his Discourse on the five points, (p. 299, 300) he says; "It is a freedom (speaking of a freedom not only from co-action, but from necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punishments." And in the next page, speaking of the same matter, he says, "Excellent to this purpose, are the words of Mr. THORNDAKE: *We say not, that Indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in this state of travail and proficience; the ground of which is God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and dehortations, it is enforced with.*"

as to the exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and by make.

But not to insist any longer on the inexplicable abstruseness of this distinction; let what will be supposed concerning the meaning of them that use it, thus much must at least be intended by *Arminians* when they talk of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, in any respect to their purpose, viz. That it is such an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already; but free from actual possession, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there may be room for the exercise of the *self-determining power* of the Will; and that the Will's freedom consists in, or depends upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the Will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act.

And here I would observe in the *first* place, that to make out this scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be *perfect* and *absolute*; there must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of Indifference, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere self-determination.—The least degree of an antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their notion of Liberty. For so long as prior inclination possesses the will, and is not removed, the former binds the latter, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act otherwise than agreeably to it. Surely the Will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose that the Will is *inclined* contrary to its present prevailing *inclination*, or contrary to what it is *inclined* to. That which the Will prefers, to that, all things considered, it preponderates and inclines. It is equally impossible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining and present preponderating inclination, as it is to *prefer* contrary to its own present *preference*, or *choose* contrary to its own present *choice*. The Will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act; or any, that shall now be an act of self-determination. That which is a self-determined free act, must be one which the will determines in the possession and use of a peculiar sort of Liberty; such as consists in a freedom from *every thing*, which, if it were there, would make it *impossible* that the Will, at that time, should be *otherwise* than that way to which it tends.*

* There is a little intricacy in this mode of expression. It may be thus illustrated. Suppose it were asserted, "That it is impossible for the will to be other-

If any one should say, there is no need that the Indifference should be perfect; but although a former inclination still remains, yet, if it be be not very strong, possibly the strength of the Will may oppose and overcome it:—This is grossly absurd; for the strength of the Will, let it be never so great, gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice.

Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary way. And if the Will determines itself the *same* way, it was not a *free determination*, because the Will is not wholly at Liberty in so doing; its determination is not altogether *from itself*, but it was partly determined before, in its prior inclination: and all the Freedom the Will exercises in the case, is in an increase of inclination, which it gives itself, added to what it had by a foregoing bias; so much is from itself, and so much is from perfect Indifference. For though the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore the previous tendency is of no consideration, with respect to the act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the same thing which was said at first, that as to the act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be *perfect Indifference*, or *equilibrium*.

To illustrate this: suppose a sovereign self-moving power in a natural body; but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias; for instance, gravitation towards the centre of the earth; and has *one degree* of motion by virtue of that previous tendency; but by its self-moving power it *adds one degree more* to its motion, and moves so much more swiftly towards the centre of the earth than it would do by its gravity only: it is evident, all that is owing to a self-moving power in this case, is the *additional* degree of motion; and that the other degree which it had from gravity, is of no consideration in the case; the effect is just the same, as if the body had received from itself *one* degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So, if we suppose a self-moving power given to the scale of a balance, which has a weight of *one degree* beyond the opposite scale; and if we ascribe to it an ability to add to itself *another degree* of force the same way, by its self-mov-

wise at any one given time, than that way to which it tends." Such a proposition one might think, none who understood the terms would controvert; for it would be to controvert this proposition, "The will is as its tendency." And yet, the advocates for a self-determining power must assert a liberty which denies this plain proposition. W.

ing power; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itself *one degree* of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium; and so much power as the scale has to give itself an over-balance from a perfect equipoise, so much self-moving self-preponderating power it has, and no more So that its free power this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium.

I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be essential to Liberty, it must be *perfect* Indifference; and that so far as the Will is destitute of this, so far is it destitute of that freedom by which it is in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being at all passive, or subject to the power and sway of something else in its motions and determinations.

Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's self-determination in such a state, be not absurd and inconsistent.

And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth; *that every free act is done* IN *a state of freedom*, and *not only* AFTER *such a state*. If an act of the Will be an act wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a *state of freedom*, and in the *time of freedom*. It will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue, and co-exist with the act; the soul remaining in possession of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul *uses* or *exercises Liberty*. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in the *possession* of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the *use* of it.

Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty, *viz.* as implying a state of Indifference; or whether the soul ever exerts an act of preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer; for how ridiculous would it be for any body to insist, that the soul chooses one thing before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each! This is the same thing as to say, the soul prefers one thing to another, at the very same time that it has no preference.—Choice and preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium.—Motion may be the next moment after rest; but cannot co-exist with it, in *any*, even the *least* part of it. So choice may be immediately *after* a state of Indifference, but cannot co-

exist with it: even the very beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So that the Will acts not at all, does not so much as begin to act in the time of such Liberty: freedom has ceased to be, at the first moment of action; and therefore Liberty cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denomination, any more than if it had ceased to be, twenty years before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness succeed each other instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightsome or bright, at the first moment of perfect darkness, any more than months or years after. Life denominates nothing *vital*, at the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it consists in, or implies Indifference, can denominate nothing *free*, at the first moment of preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no Liberty which the soul is possessed of, or ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, consists in Indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very essence of Liberty, is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.

If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but a trick and delusion; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the thing wherein the will exercises its Liberty, is not in the *act* of choice or preponderation itself, but in *determining* itself to a certain choice or preference; that the act of the Will, wherein it is free, and uses its own sovereignty, consists in its *causing* or *determining* the *change* or *transition* from a state of Indifference to a certain preference or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which has hitherto been even; and that the Will exerts this act in a state of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself.—I say, if any one chooses to express his notion of Liberty, after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can succeed any better than before.

What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, *determines* to change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so, that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, *determines*

to put itself out of that state, and to give itself a certain preponderation; then I would enquire, whether the soul does not determine this of *choice;* or whether the Will coming to a determination to do so, be not the same thing as the soul coming to a choice to do so. If the soul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own *will*, then in what sense does its *will* determine it? And if the will does not determine it, then how is the *Liberty of the Will* exercised in the determination? What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the will is not concerned? But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and to turn itself one way; then the soul is already come to a choice, and chooses that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of *choice*, and in a state of *equilibrium*, both at the same time: the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other. And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity, in the obscurity of expression, increases the inconsistence. To say, the free act of the will, or the act which the will exerts in a state of freedom and Indifference, does not imply preference in it, but is what the will does in order to cause or produce a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to *will* and to *choose* are the same thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order to cause or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted without choice, in order to produce itself!

If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Liberty and a state of Indifference, are not the same, and that the former may be without the latter; but should say, that Indifference is still *essential* to freedom, as it is necessary to go immediately *before it;* it being essential to the freedom of an act of will that it should directly and immediately *arise out* of a state of Indifference: still this will not help the cause of *Arminian* Liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not arise from *antecedent* choice or preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of Indifference, without any intervening *choice* to determine it, then the act not being determined by choice, is not determined by the *will;* the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free will have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is

entirely inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of Volition.

If any should suppose, that these absurdities may be avoided, by saying, that the Liberty of the mind consists in a power to *suspend* the act of the will, and so keep it in a state of *Indifference*, until there has been opportunity for consideration; and so shall say, that however Indifference is not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that the mind must make its choice in a state of Indifference, which is an inconsistency, or that the act of will must spring immediately out of Indifference; yet Indifference may be essential to the Liberty of acts of the will in this respect; viz. That Liberty consists in a power of the mind to forbear or suspend the act of Volition, and keep the mind in a state of Indifference for the present, until there has been opportunity for proper deliberation: I say, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great mistake: it reconciles no inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty.—For here the following things must be observed,

1. That this *suspending* of Volition, if there be properly any such thing, is itself an act of Volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily; it chooses on some consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or determination, is an act of the will: And indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis; for it is supposed that the Liberty *of the will* consists in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein *the will exercises its Liberty*. But how can the will exercise Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the will? The Liberty of the will is not exercised in any thing but what the will does.

2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the will, but it is supposed to be the *only* free act of the will; because it is said, that *this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the will consists*—If so, then this is all the act of will that we have to consider in this controversy. And now, the former question returns upon us; viz. Wherein consists the freedom of the will *in those acts* wherein it is free? And if this act of determining a suspension be the only act in which the will is free, then wherein consists the will's freedom with respect to this act of suspension? And how is Indifference essential to this act? The answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion under consideration, that the Liberty of the will in this act of suspension, consists in a power to suspend even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest nonsense: for it is the act of suspension itself that we are speaking of; and there is no room for a space of deliberation and suspension in order to determine whether we will

suspend or no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself may be deferred: which is absurd; for the very deferring the determination of suspension, to consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of suspension, to consider whether to suspend, the act is, *ipso facto*, suspended. There is no medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment.

And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way: for now, it seems, Liberty consists wholly in the mind having Power to suspend its determination whether to suspend or no; that there may be time for consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Liberty consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under consideration. We have to enquire now, how Liberty, with respect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension, consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, according to the hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a Power of suspending even this last-mentioned act, to have time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same difficulties and enquiries return over again with respect to that; and so on for ever. Which, if it would shew any thing, would shew only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back *in infinitum;* and that is to drive it out of the world.

And besides all this, there is a Delusion, and a latent gross contradiction in the affair another way; in as much as in explaining how, or in what respect the will is free, with regard to a particular act of Volition, it is said, that its Liberty consists in a Power to determine to suspend *that act*, which places Liberty not in *that act* of Volition which the enquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the question and answer. The question is, wherein consists the mind's Liberty *in any particular act* of Volition? And the answer, in pretending to shew wherein lies the mind's Liberty *in that act*, in effect says, it does not lie in that act at all, but in another, *viz.* a Volition *to suspend that act.* And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose. For it does not shew wherein the Liberty of the will consists in the act in question; instead of that, it supposes it does not consist in that act at all, but in another distinct from it, even a Volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider of it. And no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed consists, *viz.* the act of suspension, or of determining the suspension.

On the whole, it is exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of the mind does not consist in Indifference, and that Indifference is not essential or necessary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the *Arminians* suppose; that opinion being full of nothing but self-contradiction.

SECT. VIII.

Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.

It is chiefly insisted on by *Arminians*, in this controversy, as a thing most important and essential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the will, are *contingent* events; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to constraint, but to all Necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this matter.

And, *First*, I would enquire, whether there is, or can be any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint or co-action, but also without a *Necessity of consequence*, or an infallible connection with any thing foregoing.—*Secondly*, Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause of Liberty.

I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.

And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shewn, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or a reason, why it exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts of the will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the will are never contingent, or without Necessity in the sense spoken of; in as much as those things which have a cause, or a reason of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following considerations.

1. For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an inconsistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause; its existence is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend it, or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not: And that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it. And to say, the event is not dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same thing as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect of it; for dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an

effect. If there be no such relation between one thing and another, consisting in the connection and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no such relation between them as is signified by the terms *cause* and *effect*. So far as an event is dependent on a cause, and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no more. The cause does, or brings to pass, no more in any event, than is dependent on it. If we say, the connection and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect, though it has some connection and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; that is the same thing as to say, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but that only part of it arises from thence, and part some other way.

2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow, rather than not follow? Of this there is no cause or reason. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is, *viz.* the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be no necessary connection of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in another not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world, that is absolutely without a cause. Which is contrary to the supposition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.

3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. Thus; if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence and influential circumstances; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circumstances, and

yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the supposition, in another instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influence, and when all circumstances which have any influence, are the same, it *was followed* with the effect. By which it is manifest, that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause, but must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it, then the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then it is not the cause. Which brings us to the contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is NOT the ground and reason of its existence.

If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause; its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect: and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to say, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be actually produced at *one time;* all these things concurring, will produce the effect at *all times.* And so we may turn it the other way; that which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the same influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause; unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence: but that is contrary to the supposition; for it is supposed that all circumstances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the time to be the cause; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same time.

On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary connection with its cause, or with that which is the true ground and reason of its existence. And, therefore,

if there be no event without a cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent, in the manner that *Arminians* suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent.

SECT. IX.

Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.

It is manifest, that no Acts of the Will are contingent, in such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and Connection; because every Act of the Will is some way connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has already been explained; namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which in the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was observed before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to them; and to say otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing to them; or that they do not choose what they prefer. Which brings the matter to a contradiction.

And as it is very evident in itself, that the Acts of the Will have some Connection with the dictates or views of the Understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the *Arminian* writers; particularly by Dr. WHITBY and Dr. SAMUEL CLARK. Dr. TURNBULL, though a great enemy to the doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing. In his *Christian Philosophy*, (p. 196.) he with much approbation cites another philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words: "No man, (says an excellent philosopher) sets himself about any thing, but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the Understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill formed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all her operative powers are directed. The Will itself, how absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the Understanding. Temples have their sacred images; and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind; but in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them; and to these they all pay universally a ready submission." But whether this be in a just consistence with them-

selves, and their own notions of liberty, I desire may now be impartially considered.

Dr. WHITBY plainly supposes, that the Acts and Determinations of the Will always follow the Understanding's view of the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided; or, in other words, that the Determinations of the Will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the Understanding: 1. The *degree of good* to be obtained, and evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The *degree of the Understanding's* apprehension of that good or evil; which is increased by attention and consideration. That this is an opinion in which he is exceeding peremptory, (as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his controversy with the *Calvinists*) with disdain of the contrary opinion, as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words, in his Discourse on the Five Points.*

"Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Understanding to perceive, is evidence proposed, and apprehended, considered or adverted to: for nothing else can be requisite to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what makes the Will choose, is something approved by the Understanding; and consequently appearing to the soul as good. And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as evil. Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this; to refuse the evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended and considered, is not sufficient to make the Understanding approve; or that the greatest good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, *that which alone doth move the Will to choose or to refuse*, is not sufficient to engage it so to do; which being contradictory to itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel: that only can make us indisposed to attend to them, but cannot hinder our conviction when we do apprehend them, and attend to them.—Be it, that there is in us also a renitency to the good we are to choose; that only can indispose us to believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that we are prone to the evil that we should decline; that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of evils. But yet, *what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be chosen; and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we do continue under that conviction,*

* Second Edit. p. 211, 212, 213.

be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate our Understandings, that we attending to, and considering what lies before us, should apprehend, and be convinced of our duty; and that the blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be our chiefest good; and the miseries it threateneth, so as we may be convinced that they are the worst of evils; that we may choose the one, and refuse the other."

Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted, *that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good, and refuse the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choose or to refuse; and that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose otherwise; and therefore must of necessity be false; and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest good will still be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we continue under that conviction, be refused by us.* Nothing could have been said more to the purpose, fully to signify, that the determinations of the Will must evermore follow the illumination, conviction and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood, and the degree of Understanding, notice and conviction of that proposed good and evil; and that it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no instance: because it is asserted, that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.

I am sensible, the doctor's aim in these assertions is against the *Calvinists;* to show, in opposition to them, that there is no need of any physical operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice, but that God's operation and assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the Understanding; which he supposes to be enough, if those ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more directly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in choosing and refusing, is *necessary;* directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the determination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the light, conviction, and view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise; then it is *necessarily* so, the Will necessarily follows this light or view of the Understanding, not only in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not determine itself, in any one of its own acts; but every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected

with some antecedent cause; which cause is not the Will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty, but something belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in all its acts, and govern and determine them.

Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that according to the doctor, the final determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with the Understanding's conviction, and notice of the greatest good; yet the Acts of the Will are not necessary; because that conviction of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceding Act of the Will, in determining to take notice of the evidence exhibited; by which means the mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequent and ultimate choice of the Will; and that the Will, with regard to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not necessary; and that in this, the liberty of the Will consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective light, the Will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it or not.

Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a reply as this. For that preceding Act of the Will, in determining to attend and consider, still is an *Act of the Will;* if the *Liberty of the Will* consists in it, (as is supposed) as if it be an Act of the Will, it is an act of *choice* or *refusal.* And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by some antecedent light in the Understanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it is that light *which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse.* And therefore the Will must be moved by that, in choosing to attend to the objective light offered, in order to another consequent act of choice: so that this act is no less necessary than the other. And if we suppose another Act of the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still that also must be an Act of the Will, and an act of choice; and so must, by the same principles, be infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the Understanding concerning the greatest good. And let us suppose as many Acts of the Will, one preceding another, as we please, yet are they every one of them, necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the Understanding, concerning the greatest and most eligible good in that case; and so, not one of them free according to Dr. WHITBY's notion of freedom. And if it be said, the reason why men do not attend to light held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed before, whereby their minds are indisposed to consider the truth held forth to them, the difficulty is not at all avoided: still the question returns, What determined the Will in those preced-

ing evil acts? It must, by Dr. WHITBY's principles, still be the view of the Understanding concerning the greatest good and evil. If this view of the Understanding be *that alone which doth move the Will to choose or refuse*, as the Doctor asserts, then every act of *choice or refusal*, from a man's first existence, is moved and determined by this view; and this view of the Understanding exciting and governing the act, must be before the act. And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or depend on any act of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole scheme of Liberty of Will; and he, at one stroke, has cut the sinews of all his arguments from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness and sincerity of God, in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations, and expostulations; which he makes use of, under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient and effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man; and has made vain all his exclamations against the doctrine of the *Calvinists*, as charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy, fallaciousness, and cruelty.

Dr. SAMUEL CLARK, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,* to evade the argument to prove the necessity of volition, from its necessary Connection with the last dictate of the Understanding, supposes the latter not to be diverse from the Act of the Will itself. But if it be so, it will not alter the case as to the *necessity* of the Act. If the dictate of the Understanding be the very same with the determination of the Will, as Dr. CLARK supposes, then this determination is no *fruit* or *effect of choice;* and if so, no *liberty* of choice has any hand in it: it is *necessary;* that is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of the Understanding be the same with the determination of volition itself, then the existence of that determination must be necessary as to volition; in as much as volition can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence already before volition has opportunity to determine any thing. It is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a thing, *after* it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence; it is too late for that.

If liberty consists in that which *Arminians* suppose, *viz.* in the Will determining its own acts, having free opportunity and being without all necessity; this is the same as to say, that liberty consists in the soul having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the Will it pleases. And if the determinations of the Will, and the last dictates of the Un-

* Edit. VI. p. 82.

derstanding, be the same thing, then Liberty consists in the mind having power and opportunity to choose its own dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the determination of choice prior to the dictate of Understanding, and the ground of it; which cannot consist with the dictate of the Understanding being the determination of choice itself.

Here is no alternative, but to recur to the old absurdity of one determination before another, and the cause of it: and another before, determining that; and so on *in infinitum*. If the last dictate of the Understanding be the determination of the Will itself, and the soul be free with regard to that dictate, in the *Arminian* notion of freedom; then the soul, before that dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily and according to its own choice determines, in every case, what that dictate of the Understanding shall be; otherwise that dictate, as to the Will, is necessary; and the acts determined by it must also be necessary. So that here is a determination of the mind prior to that dictate of the Understanding, an act of choice going before it, choosing and determining what that dictate of the Understanding shall be: and this preceding act of choice, being a free act of Will, must also be the same with another last dictate of the Understanding: And if the mind also be free in that dictate of Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and so on for ever.

Besides, if the dictate of the Understanding, and determination of the Will be the same, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the same. Whether they be the same or no, I will not now dispute; but only would observe, that if it be so, and the *Arminian* notion of liberty consists in a self-determining power in the Understanding, free of all necessity; being independent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own acts and determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over its own determinations, the more free: then the freedom of the soul, as a moral agent, must consist in the independence of the Understanding on any *evidence* or appearance of things, or any thing whatsoever that stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what a liberty is this! consisting in an ability, freedom and easiness of judging, either according to evidence, or against it; having a sovereign command over itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Certainly, it is no liberty that renders persons the proper subjects of persuasive reasoning, arguments, expostulations, and such like moral means and inducements. The use of which with mankind is a main argument of the *Arminians*, to defend their notion of liberty without all necessity.

For according to this, the more free men are, the less they are under the government of such means, less subject to the power of evidence and reason, and more independent on their influence, in their determinations.

And whether the Understanding and Will are the same or no, as Dr. CLARK seems to suppose, yet in order to maintain the *Arminian* notion of liberty without necessity, the free Will is not determined by the Understanding, nor necessarily connected with the Understanding; and the further from such Connection, the greater the freedom. And when the liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will have no Connection at all with the dictates of the Understanding. And if so, in vain are all the applications to the Understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous act; and so in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and persuasives whatsoever: for these are but applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But if, after all, the Will must be self-determined, and independent on the Understanding, to what purpose are things thus represented to the Understanding, in order to determine the choice?

SECT. X.

Volition necessarily connected with the Influence of Motives; with particular Observations on the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will.

That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive: which is manifest, because, if the mind, in willing after the manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing. Which brings the matter to a contradiction; because for the mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.

But if every act of the will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the causes of their

being excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their Motives. Motives do nothing, as Motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else.

And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they are necessarily connected with their Motives. Every effect and event being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the will: the volition, which is caused by previous Motive and inducement, is not caused by the will exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause and excite volitions in itself. This is not consistent with the will acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium, to determine itself to a preference; for the way in which Motives operate is by biassing the will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderaton one way.

Here it may be proper to observe, that Mr. CHUBB, in his Collection of Tracts on various Subjects, has advanced a scheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive of itself; and that many ways.

I. He is abundant in asserting, that the will, in all its acts, is influenced by motive and excitement; and that this is the *previous ground and reason* of all its acts, and that it is never otherwise in any instance. He says, (p. 262.) "No action can take place without some Motive to excite it." And (p. 263.) "Volition cannot take place without some PREVIOUS reason or Motive to induce it." And (p. 310.) *Action would not take place without some reason or motive to induce it; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted without some* PREVIOUS *reason to dispose the mind to action.*" So (also p. 257.) And he speaks of these things, as what we may be absolutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have of certainty respecting God's moral perfections. (p. 252—255, 261—264.)

And yet, at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of Motives upon us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is *consequent* on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the subject of those volitions, which Motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will comply with the Motive, which presents itself in view, or not; and when various Motives are presented, it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. (p. 256.) "Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting agreeably with, or con-

trary to, any motive that presents." (p. 257.) "Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these Motives, considered singly, would excite him to.—Man has power, and is as much at liberty to reject the Motive, that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty to reject those Motives that do not." (And so p. 310, 311.) "In order to constitute a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives, as he pleases." And to the like purpose in many other places. According to these things, the will acts first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the Motive, that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing influence: and it is first determined by the mind's pleasure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them.

Now, how can these things hang together? How can the mind first act, and by its act of *volition* and *choice* determine, what motives shall be the ground and reason of its *volition* and *choice?* For this supposes, the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect; and that the volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground of the volition; and make the prevailing of the Motive the consequence of the volition, of which yet it is the ground. If the mind has *already* chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to its excitement, the excitement comes in too late, and is needless afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which *invites* to a thing, that implies, and in fact is a choosing of the thing *invited to;* and the very act of choice is before the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the choice; the son is before-hand with the father that begets him: the choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice. And so *vice versa*, the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the consequence of that very choice.

And besides, if the will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive "a PREVIOUS ground and reason of the act and choice, so that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take place without some PREVIOUS reason and Motive to induce it;" and that this act is consequent upon, and follows the motive? Which things Mr. CHUBB often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth. So that the very same Motive is both *previous* and *consequent*, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing!

II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of the will first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to it becoming a ground of the will's acting, before any act of volition can take place, Mr. CHUBB frequently calls Motives and excitements to the action of the will, "the passive ground or reason of that action." Which is a remarkable phrase; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent meaning, in all the writings of DUNS SCOTUS, or THOMAS AQUINAS. When he represents the Motive volition as passive, he must mean—passive in that affair, or passive with respect to that action, which he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing to the design of his argument: he must mean, (if that can be called a meaning) that the Motive to volition is first acted *upon* or *towards* by the volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from thence; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence. Which is the same absurdity, as if one should say, that the soul of man, previous to its existence chose by what cause it would come into existence, and acted upon its cause, to fetch influence thence to bring it into being; and so its cause was a passive ground of its existence!

Mr. CHUBB very plainly supposes Motive or excitement to be the *ground of the being* of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of the EXERTION of an act of the will, (p. 391, and 392.) and expressly says, that "volition cannot TAKE PLACE without some *previous* ground or Motive to induce it," (p. 363.) And he speaks of the act as "FROM the Motive, and FROM THE INFLUENCE of the Motive," (p. 352) "and from the influence that the Motive has on the man, for the PRODUCTION of an action," (p. 317.) Certainly there is no need of multiplying words about this; it is easily judged, whether Motive can be the ground of volition taking place, so that the very production of it is from the influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is passive, or acted upon by the volition. But this I will say, that a man who insists so much on clearness of meaning in others, and is so much in blaming their confusion and inconsistence, ought if he was able, to have explained his meaning in this phrase of "passive ground of action," so as to shew it not to be confused and inconsistent.

If any should suppose, that Mr. CHUBB when he speaks of Motive as a "passive ground of action," does not mean passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but some other antecedent volition (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will by no means allow of such a supposition) yet it would not help the matter in the least. For, (1.) If we suppose an act, by which the soul chooses to yield to the

invitation of a Motive to another volition; both these supposed volitions are in effect the very same. A volition to yield to the force of a Motive inviting to choose something, comes to just the same thing as choosing the thing, which the Motive invites to, as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be passive, not with respect to the same volition, to which the Motive excites, but to one truly distinct and prior; yet, by Mr. CHUBB, that prior volition cannot take place without a Motive or excitement, as a *previous ground* of its existence. For he insists, that "it is absurd to suppose any volition should take place without some previous Motive to induce it." So that at last it comes to just the same absurdity: for if *every* volition must have a previous Motive, then the very *first* in the whole series must be excited by a previous Motive; and yet the Motive to that first volition is *passive;* but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition, because, by the supposition, it is the very first: therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so with regard to that very volition of which it is the ground, and that is excited by it.

III. Though Mr. CHUBB asserts, as above, that every volition has some Motive, and that "*in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it;*" yet he asserts, that volition does not always follow the *strongest* Motive; or, in other words, is not governed by any superior strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words, (p. 258.) are as follow: "Though with regard to physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is otherwise with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger, sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the ground of this difference is evident, namely, that what we call moral causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but barely passive reasons of, or excitements to the action, or to the refraining from acting; which excitements we have power, or are at liberty to comply with or reject, as I have shewed above." And so throughout the paragraph, he, in a variety of phrases, insists, that the will is not always determined by the strongest Motive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean actually prevailing in the event; which is not in the Motive, but in the will; but that the will is not always determined by the Motive, which is strongest by any strength previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere abundantly asserts, that the will is determined by no superior strength or advantage, that Motives have, from any constitution or state of things, or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual determination of the will. And indeed his whole dis-

course on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded upon it.

But these things cannot stand together. There is a diversity of strength in Motives to choice, previous to the choice itself. Mr. CHUBB himself supposes, that they do *previously invite, induce, excite* and *dispose the mind to action.* This implies, that they have something in themselves that is *inviting*, some tendency to *induce* and *dispose* to volition, previous to volition itself. And if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity; and some have it in greater degrees, others in less; and they that have most of this tendency, considered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to volition, are the strongest motives; and those that have least, are the weakest Motives.

Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive which is strongest, or has most previous tendency or advantage, all things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakest, or that which as it stands previously in the mind's view, has least tendency to induce it; herein the will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous reason to dispose the mind to it, contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the will must proceed, without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the weakest motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the same time to suppose, that there is nothing in the Motive, in its nature, state or any circumstances of it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that gives it any preference; but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it that is inviting and moving, and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive for the act of preference, and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives which tends to preference, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other: and yet Mr. CHUBB supposes, that the act of preference is from *previous ground and reason* in the Motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent? Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no previous tendency in it to that event? If one thing follows another, without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason why it should follow.

Yea, in this case, Mr. CHUBB supposes, that the event follows an antecedent, as the ground of its existence, whic

has not only *no tendency* to it, but *a contrary tendency*. The event is the preference, which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness, or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary Motive; and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to comparative neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred: and yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the *previous ground or reason* of this act of preference, *exciting it, and disposing the mind to it.* Which, I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that consequent does not follow; and the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason why that event does follow.

An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view. If the mind, in this comparative act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, to both which he finds an appetite, but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that which he has least appetite to, and refuses that to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous Motive, Excitement, Reason, or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either; because his volition in this case is a comparative act, following a comparative view of the food which he chooses, in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same principle volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without Motive. If so, this demonstrates the independence of volition on Motive; and no reason can be given for what Mr. CHUBB so

often asserts, even that "*in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.*"

If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequal weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the scales; at least, as much as if the balance should move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight at all.

Mr. CHUBB supposes, that the will cannot stir at all without some Motive; and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that Motive. This is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the will on Motives; if it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little without them; or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his supposing that the will, when it has before it various opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on Motives.

It further appears, on Mr. CHUBB's hypothesis, that volition must be without any previous ground in any Motive, thus: if it be, as he supposes, that the will is not determined by any previous superior strength of the Motive, but determines and chooses its own Motive, then, when the rival Motives are exactly equal, in all respects, it may follow either; and may in such a case, sometimes follow one, sometimes the other. And if so, this diversity which appears between the acts of the will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the Motives; for all that is previously in the Motives is supposed precisely and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the consequent. Perfect identity in the ground, cannot be a reason why it is not followed with the same consequence. And therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere.

And lastly, it may be observed, that however much Mr. CHUBB insists, that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its Motive

to follow; he himself herein plainly supposes, that, with regard to the mind's preference of one Motive before another—it is not the Motive that disposes the will, but—the will disposes itself to follow the Motive.

IV. Mr. CHUBB supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with *agency*; and that to suppose a being to be an agent in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction, p. 311, and throughout his discourses on the subject of Liberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make Liberty and Necessity, Action and Passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking, but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary.

And yet, according to him, volition itself is the *effect of volition*; yea, every act of free volition; and therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from him, be necessary. That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly supposed by him. In p. 341, he says, "If a man is such a creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power of Liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of his own free choice, so that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, have CHOSEN and done the contrary."——Here he supposes, all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice; and so that his good or evil choice itself is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, "*he might if he had* PLEASED, *have* CHOSEN *the contrary*." So in p. 356, "Though it be highly reasonable, that a man should always choose the greater good,—yet he may, if he PLEASE, CHOOSE otherwise." Which is the same thing as if he had said, *he may if he chooses, choose otherwise.* And then he goes on,—"that is, he may, *if he pleases, choose* what is good for himself," &c. And again in the same page, "The will is not confined by the understanding to any particular sort of good, whether greater or less; but it is at liberty *to choose* what kind of good *it pleases*."—If there be any meaning in the last words, it must be this, that *the will is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose*; supposing the act of choice itself determined by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. CHUBB speaks of, is not only a man's power to move his body, agreeably to an antecedent act of choice, but to use, or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, (p. 379,) speaking of the faculties of the mind, he says, "Man has power and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them, *as he pleases*." And that he supposes an act of choice, or

exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to, those acts thus chosen, directing, commanding and producing the chosen acts, and even the acts of choice themselves, is very plain in page 283. "He can *command his actions;* and herein consists his Liberty; he can give or deny himself that pleasure, *as he pleases.* And p. 377.—If the actions of men—are not the *produce of a free choice*, or election, but spring from a necessity of nature,——he cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or evil, is *the produce of will or free choice;* so that a man in either case had it in his power, and was at liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment, according as he CHOOSES to behave himself." Here, in these last words, he speaks of *Liberty of* CHOOSING, *according as he* CHOOSES. So that the behaviour which he speaks of as subject to his choice, is his *choosing* itself, as well as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of *all free actions, as the* PRODUCE *of free choice.* And this is abundantly evident in what he says elsewhere, (p. 372, 373).

Now these things imply a twofold great inconsistence.

1. To suppose, as Mr. CHUBB plainly does, that every free act of choice is *commanded by*, and is the *produce of free choice*, is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be *the produce* of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I need not labour at all to convince my readers, that it is an absurdity to say, the very *first* act is the produce of another act that went *before* it.

2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. CHUBB insists, that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice; yet even then, according to his principles, no one act of choice would be free, but every one necessary; because, every act of choice being the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with that foregoing cause. For Mr. CHUBB himself says, (p. 389.) "When the self-moving power is exerted, it becomes the necessary cause of its effects."—So that his notion of a free act that is rewardable or punishable, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is necessary; and therefore by him it is a contradiction, to suppose it to be free. According to him, every free act is the produce of a free act; so that there must be an infinite number of free acts in succession, without any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning. And therefore here is an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free; and yet not any one of them

free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary effect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and yet the agent cannot, in reason, be the object of reward or punishment, on account of any one of these actions. He is active in them all, and passive in none; yet active in none, but passive in all, &c.

V. Mr. CHUBB most strenuously denies, that Motives are *causes* of the acts of the will; or that the moving principle in man is *moved*, or *caused to be exerted* by Motives. His words, (p. 388 and 389,) are, "If the moving principle in man is MOVED, OR CAUSED TO BE EXERTED, by something external to man, *which all Motives are*, then it would not be a self-moving principle, seeing it would be moved by a principle external to itself. And to say, that a self-moving principle is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERTED, by a cause external to itself, is absurd and a contradiction, &c."—And in the next page, it is particularly and largely insisted, that Motives are causes in no case, that "*they are merely passive in the production of action, and have no causality in the production of it,—no causality, to be the cause of the exertion of the will.*

Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possibly consist with what he says in other places. Let it be noted here,

1. Mr. CHUBB abundantly speaks of Motives as *excitements of the acts of the will;* and says, that *Motives do excite volition, and induce it*, and that they are necessary to this end; that *in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take place without motives to excite it.* But now, if Motives *excite* the will, they *move* it; and yet he says it is absurd to say, the will is moved by Motives. And again, if language is of any significancy at all, if Motives excite volition, then they are the *cause* of its being excited: and to cause volition to be excited, is to cause it to be put forth or *exerted.* Yea, Mr. CHUBB says himself, (p. 317.) Motive is necessary to the *exertion* of the active faculty. To excite, is positively to *do* something; and certainly that which does something, is the cause of the thing *done* by it. To create, is to cause to be created; to make, is to cause to be made; to kill, is to cause to be killed; to quicken, is to cause to be quickened; and *to excite*, is *to cause to be excited.* To excite, is to be a cause in the most proper sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive influence. The notion of *exciting*, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence.

2. Mr. CHUBB himself, (p. 317.) speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action BY INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING INFLUENCE. Now, what can be meant by a cause, but some-

thing that is the ground and reason of a thing by its influence, an influence that is *prevalent* and effectual?

3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action, by prevailing influence; but expressly of their *influence as prevailing* FOR THE PRODUCTION of an action, (p. 317.) which makes the inconsistency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an effect is certainly the *causing* of an effect; and *productive influence* is *causal influence*, if any thing is; and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to become the ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This influence, Mr. CHUBB says, Motives have to produce an action; and yet he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.

4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives as *disposing* the Agent to action *by their influence*. His words are these: "As Motive, which takes place in the understanding, and is the product of intelligence, is NECESSARY to action, that is, to the EXERTION of the active faculty, because that faculty would not be exerted without some PREVIOUS REASON to DISPOSE the mind to action; so from hence it plainly appears, that when a man is said to be *disposed* to one action rather than another, this properly signifies the PREVAILING INFLUENCE that one Motive has upon a man FOR THE PRODUCTION of an action, or for the being at rest, before all other Motives, for the *production* of the contrary. For as Motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the Motive that *prevails*, DISPOSES the agent to the performance of that action."

Now, if Motives dispose the mind to action, then they *cause* the mind to be disposed; and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be willing; and to cause it to be willing is to cause it to will; and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the will. And yet this same Mr. CHUBB holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the act of the will.

And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole heap of inconsistences. *Motives are the previous ground and reason* of the acts of the will; yea, the *necessary* ground and reason of *their exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take place;* and they do *excite* these acts of the will, and do this by *a prevailing influence;* yea, *an influence which prevails for the production of the act* of the will, and for *the disposing of the mind to it:* and yet it is *absurd* to suppose *Motive to be a cause* of an act of the will, or that *a principle of will is moved or caused to be exerted by it*, or that it has *any causality in the production of it*, or *any causality to be the cause of the exertion of the will.*

A due consideration of these things which Mr. CHUBB has advanced, the strange inconsistences which his notion of Liberty—consisting in the will's power of self-determination void of all necessity, united with that dictate of common sense, that there can be no volition without a motive—drove him into, may be sufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impossible ever to make that notion of Liberty consistent with the influence of Motives in volition. And as it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be no act of will, or preference of the mind, without some motive or inducement, something in the mind's view which it aims at, and goes after; so it is most manifest, that there is no such Liberty in the universe as *Arminians* insist on; nor any such thing possible, or conceivable.

SECT. XI.

The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.

That the acts of the wills of moral Agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without all necessity, appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of such events.

In handling this argument, I would in the *first* place prove, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral Agents; and *secondly*, shew the consequence, or how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral Agents are not contingent, so as to be without necessity of connection and consequence.

FIRST, I am to prove that God has an absolute and certain Foreknowledge of the free actions of moral Agents.

One would think it wholly needless to enter on such an argument with any that profess themselves Christians: but so it is: God's certain Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral Agents is denied by some that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God: and especially of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay will admit; supposing myself herein to have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible.

ARG. I. My *first* argument shall be taken from God's *prediction* of such events. Here I would, in the first place, lay down these two things as axioms.

1. If God does not *foreknow*, He cannot *foretell* such events; that is, He cannot peremptorily and certainly foretell *them*. If God *has* no more than an uncertain guess concern-

ing events of this kind, then He can *declare* no more than an uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to profess to foreknow, or declare positive Foreknowledge.

2. If God does not certainly foreknow the future Volitions of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow those events which are *dependent* on these Volitions. The existence of the one depending on the existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on the knowledge of the existence of the other; and the one cannot be more certain than the other.

Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive soever the consequences of the Volitions of moral Agents may be; though they should extend to an alteration of the state of things through the universe, and should be continued in a series of successive events to all eternity, and should in the progress of things branch forth into an infinite number of series, each of them going on in an endless chain of events; God must be as ignorant of all these consequences, as He is of the Volition whence they first take their rise: and the whole state of things depending on them, how important, extensive and vast soever, must be hid from him.

These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to observe the following things.

1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their wickedness and good practice, things rewardable and punishable, have often been foretold by God.—*Pharaoh's* moral conduct, in refusing to obey God's command, in letting his people go, was foretold. God says to *Moses*, Exod. iii. 19. "I am sure that the King of *Egypt* will not let you go." Here God professes not only to guess at, but to know *Pharaoh's* future disobedience. In chap. vii. 4, God says, "but *Pharaoh* shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon *Egypt*, &c." And chap. ix. 30. *Moses* says to Pharaoh, "as for thee, and thy servants, I KNOW that ye will not fear the Lord." See also chap. xi. 9.—The moral conduct of *Josiah*, by name, in his zealously exerting himself to oppose idolatry in particular acts, was foretold above three hundred years before he was born, and the prophecy sealed by a miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second prophet, as what surely would not fail, (1 *Kings* xiii. 1—6, 32.) This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral conduct of the people, in upholding their schismatical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those priests of the high places, which it is foretold *Josiah* should offer upon that altar of *Bethel*. *Micaiah* foretold the foolish and sinful conduct of *Ahab*, in refusing to hearken to the word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the false prophets, in going to *Ramoth-Gilead* to his ruin.

(1 *Kings* xxi. 20,—22.) The moral conduct of *Hazael* was foretold in that cruelty he should be guilty of; on which *Hazael* says, "What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing!" The prophet speaks of the event as what he knew, and not what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. "I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel: Thou wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child." The moral conduct of *Cyrus* is foretold long before he had a being, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to the true God, in turning the captivity of the *Jews*, and promoting the building of the temple, (Isai. xliv. 28. and lxv. 13. compare 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 22, 23. and *Ezra* i. 1,—4.) How many instances of the moral conduct of the *Kings of the North and South*, particular instances of the wicked behaviour of the Kings of *Syria* and *Egypt*, are foretold in the eleventh chapter of *Daniel?* Their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery and lies. And particularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, called there "a vile person," instead of *Epiphanes*, or illustrious. In that chapter, and also in chap. viii. ver. 9, 14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery, deceit and lies, his having "his heart set to do mischief," and set "against the holy covenant," his "destroying and treading under foot the holy people," in a marvellous manner, his "having indignation against the holy covenant, setting his heart against it, and conspiring against it," his "polluting the sanctuary of strength, treading it under foot, taking away the daily sacrifice, and placing the abomination that maketh desolate;" his great pride, "magnifying himself against God, and uttering marvellous blasphemies against Him," until God in indignation should destroy him. Withal, the moral conduct of the *Jews*, on occasion of his persecution, is predicted. It is foretold, that "*he should corrupt many by flatteries*," (chap. xi. 32,—34.) But that others should behave with a glorious constancy and fortitude, in opposition to him, (ver. 32.) And that some good men should fall and repent, (ver. 35.) Christ foretold *Peter's* sin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances, in a peremptory manner. And so, that great sin of *Judas*, in betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner, *Matt.* xxvi. 21—25, and parallel places in the other Evangelists.

2. Many events have been foretold by God, which are dependent on the moral conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished either by their virtuous or vicious actions. Thus, the children of *Israel's* going down into *Egypt* to dwell there, was foretold to *Abraham*, (Gen. xv.) which was brought about by the wickedness of *Joseph's* brethren in selling him, and the wickedness of *Joseph's* mistress, and his own signal virtue in resisting her temptation. The accomplishment of

the thing prefigured in *Joseph's* dream, depended on the same moral conduct. *Jotham's* parable and prophecy, (*Judges* ix. 15,—20.)was accomplished by the wicked conduct of *Abimelech*, and the men of *Shechem*. The prophecies against the house of *Eli*, (1 *Sam.* chap. ii. and iii.) were accomplished by the wickedness of *Doeg* the *Edomite*, in accusing the priests; and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of *Saul* in destroying the priests at *Nob*. (1 *Sam.* xxii.) *Nathan's* prophecy against *David*, (2 *Sam.* xii. 11, 12.) was fulfilled by the horrible wickedness of *Absalom*, in rebelling against his father, seeking his life, and lying with his concubines in the sight of the sun. The prophecy against *Solomon*, (1 *Kings* xi. 11,—13.) was fulfilled by *Jeroboam's* rebellion and usurpation, which are spoken of as his wickedness, (2 *Chron.* xiii. 5, 6. compare ver. 18.) The prophecy against *Jeroboam's* family, (1 *Kings* xiv.) was fulfilled by the conspiracy, treason, and cruel murders of *Baasha*, (2 *Kings* xv. 27, &c.) The predictions of the prophet *Jehu* against the house of *Baasha*, (1 *Kings* xvi. at the beginning,) were fulfilled by the treason and parricide of *Zimri*, (1 *Kings* xvi. 9,—13, 20.)

3. How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and people, of numbers, bodies, and successions of men: with God's judicial proceedings, and many other events consequent and dependent on their virtues and vices; which could not be foreknown, if the Volitions of men, wherein they acted as *moral Agents*, had not been foreseen? The future cruelty of the *Egyptians* in oppressing *Israel*, and God's judging and punishing them for it, was foretold long before it came to pass, (*Gen.* xv. 13, 14.) The continuance of the iniquity of the *Amorites*, and the increase of it until it *should be full*, and they ripe for destruction, was foretold above four hundred years before, (*Gen.* xv. 16. *Acts* vii. 6, 7.) The prophecies of the destruction of *Jerusalem*, and the land of *Judah*, were absolute; (2 *Kings*, xx. 17—19. chap. xxii. 15, to the end.) It was foretold in *Hezekiah's* time, and was abundantly insisted on in the book of the prophet *Isaiah*, who wrote nothing after *Hezekiah's* days. It was foretold in *Josiah's* time, in the beginning of a great reformation, (2 Kings xxii.) And it is manifest by innumerable things in the predictions of the prophets, relating to this event, its time, its circumstances, its continuance and end; the return from the captivity, the restoration of the temple, city and land, &c. I say, these shew plainly, that the prophecies of this great event were *absolute*. And yet this event was connected with, and dependent on two things in men's moral conduct: first, the injurious rapine and violence of the king of *Babylon* and his people, as the efficient cause; which God often speaks of as what he highly resented, and would severely punish; and secondly, the

final obstinancy of the *Jews*. That great event is often spoken of as suspended on this, (*Jer.* iv. 1. and v. 1. vii. 1.—7. xi. 1,—6, xvii. 24, to the end. xxv. 1,—7. xxvi. 1,—8, 13. and xxxviii. 17, 18.) Therefore this destruction and captivity could not be foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the *Chaldeans* and *Jews* had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, that the people *should be finally obstinate*, to the utter desolation of the city and land. (*Isai.* vi. 9, –11. *Jer.* i. 18, 19. vii. 27,—29. *Ezek.* iii. 7. and xxiv. 13, 14.)

The final obstinacy of those *Jews* who were left in the land of *Israel*, in their idolatry and rejection of the true God, was foretold by him, and the prediction confirmed with an oath, (*Jer.* xliv. 26, 27.) And God tells the people, (*Isai.* xlviii. 3. 4,—8.) that he had predicted those things which should be consequent on their treachery and obstinacy, because he knew they would be obstinate; and that he had declared these things beforehand, for their conviction of his being the only true God, *&c.*

The destruction of *Babylon*, with many of the circumstances of it, was foretold, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtiness of the heads of that monarchy, *Nebuchadnezzar* and his successors, and their wickedly destroying other nations, and particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his people, before any of these monarchs had a being; (*Isa.* chap. xiii. xiv. xlvii: compare *Habbak.* ii. 5, to the end, and *Jer.* chap. l. and li.) That *Babylon's* destruction was to be "a recompence, according to the works of their own hands," appears by *Jer.* xxv. 14.—The immorality of which the people of *Babylon*, and particularly her princes and great men, were guilty, that very night that the city was destroyed, their revelling and drunkenness at *Belshazzar's* idolatrous feast, was foretold, (*Jer.* li. 39, 57.)

The return of the *Jews* from the *Babylonish* captivity is often very particularly foretold, with many circumstances, and the promises of it are very peremptory: (*Jer.* xxxi. 35,—40. and xxxii, 6,—15, 41,—44. and xxxiii. 24,—26.) And the very time of their return was prefixed; (*Jer.* xxv. 11, 12. and xxix. 10, 11. 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 21. *Ezek.* iv. 6. and *Dan.* ix. 2.) And yet the prophecies represent their return as consequent on their repentance. And their repentance itself is very expressly and particularly foretold, (*Jer.* xxix. 12, 13, 14. xxxi. 8, 9, 18,—31. xxxiii. 8. l. 4, 5. *Ezek.* vi. 8, 9, 10. vii. 16. xiv. 22, 23. and xx. 43, 44.)

It was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Messiah should suffer greatly through the malice and cruelty of men; as is largely and fully set forth, *Psal.* xxii. applied to Christ in the New Testament, (*Matt.* xxvii. 35, 43. *Luke* xxiii. 34. *John* xix. 24. *Heb.* ii. 12.) And likewise in *Psal.* lxix. which,

it is also evident by the New Testament, is spoken of Christ; (*John* xv. 25. vii. 5, *&c.* and ii. 17. *Rom.* xv. 3. *Matt.* xxvii. 34, 48. *Mark* xv. 23. *John* xix. 29.) The same thing is also foretold, *Isai.* liii. and l. 6. and *Mic.* v. 1. This cruelty of men was their sin, and what they acted as moral Agents. It was foretold, that there should be an union of Heathen and *Jewish* rulers against Christ, (*Psal.* ii. 1, 2. compared with *Acts* iv. 25,—28.) It was foretold, that the *Jews* should generally reject and despise the Messiah, *Isai.* xlix. 5, 6, 7. and liii. 1,—3. *Psal.* xxii. 6, 7. and lxix. 4, 8, 19, 20.) And it was foretold, that the body of that nation should be rejected in the Messiah's days, from being God's people, for their obstinacy in sin; (*Isai.* xlix. 4,—7. and viii. 14, 15, 16. compared with *Rom.* x. 19, and *Isai.* lxv. at the beginning, compared with *Rom.* x. 20, 21.) It was foretold, that Christ should be rejected by the chief priests and rulers among the *Jews* (*Psalm* cxviii. 22. compared with *Matt.* xxi. 42. *Acts* iv. 11. 1 *Pet.* ii. 4, 7.)

Christ himself foretold his being delivered into the hands of the elders, chief priests and scribes, and his being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to death; and that He by them should be *delivered to the Gentiles:* and that He should be *mocked* and *scourged*, and *crucified*, (*Matt.* xvi. 21. and xx. 17,—19. *Luke* ix. 22. *John* viii. 28.) and that the people should be concerned in and consenting to his death, (*Luke* xx. 13,—18.) especially the Inhabitants of *Jerusalem;* (Luke xiii. 33—35.) He foretold, that the disciples should all be offended because of Him, that night in which he was betrayed, and should forsake him; (*Matt.* xxvi. 31. *John* xvi. 32.) He foretold that He should be rejected of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they should continue obstinate to their ruin; (*Matt.* xii. 45. xxi. 33,—42. and xxii. 1,—7. *Luke* xiii. 16, 21, 24. xvii. 25. xix. 14, 27, 41,—44, xx. 13,—18. and xxiii. 34,—39.)

As it was foretold in both the Old Testament and the New that the *Jews* should reject the Messiah, so it was foretold that the *Gentiles* should receive Him, and so be admitted to the privileges of God's people; in places too many to be now particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Testament, that the *Jews* should envy the *Gentiles* on this account; (*Deut.* xxxii. 21. compared with *Rom.* x. 19.) Christ himself often foretold, that the *Gentiles* would embrace the true religion, and become his followers and people; (*Matt* viii. 10, 11, 12, xxi. 41,—43. and xxii. 8,—10. *Luke* xiii. 28. xiv. 16,—24. and xx. 16. *John* x. 16.) He also foretold the *Jews'* envy of the *Gentiles* on this occasion; (*Matt.* xx. 12,—16. *Luke* xv. 26, to the end.) He foretold, that they should continue in this opposition and envy, and should manifest it in the cruel persecutions

of his followers, to their utter destruction; (*Matt.* xxi. 33,—42. xxii. 6. and xxiii. 34,—39. *Luke* xi. 49,—51.) The obstinacy of the Jews is also foretold, (*Acts* xxii. 18.) Christ often foretold the great persecutions his followers should meet with, both from *Jews* and *Gentiles;* (*Matt.* x. 16,—18, 21, 22, 34,—36. and xxiv. 9. *Mark* xiii. 9. *Luke* x. 3. xii. 11, 49,—53. and xxi. 12, 16, 17. *John* xv. 18,—21. and xvi. 1,—4. 20,—22, 23.) He foretold the martyrdom of particular persons; (*Matt.* xx. 23. *John* xiii. 36. and xxi. 18, 19, 22.) He foretold the great success of the Gospel in the city of *Samaria,* as near approaching; which afterwards was fulfilled by the preaching of *Philip,* (*John* iv. 35,—38.) He foretold the rising of many deceivers after his departure, (*Matt.* xxiv. 4, 5, 11,) and the apostacy of many of his professed followers; (*Matt* xxiv. 10, 12.)

The persecutions, which the apostle *Paul* was to meet with in the world, were foretold; *Acts* ix. 16. xx. 23, and xxi. 11.) The apostle says to the Christian *Ephesians,* Acts xx. 29, 30.) "I know, that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock; also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them." The apostle says, *He knew this:* but he did not know it, if God did not know the future actions of moral Agents.

4. Unless God foreknows the future acts of moral Agents, all the prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great *Antichristian* apostacy; the rise, reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of "the man of sin," and his instruments and adherents; the extent and long continuance of his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry, and other foul vices; his great and cruel persecutions; the behaviour of the saints under these great temptations, &c. &c.—I say, unless the Volitions of moral Agents are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without knowing the things foretold.

The predictions relating to this great apostacy are all of a moral nature, relating to men's virtues and vices, and their exercises, fruits and consequences, and events depending on them, and are very particular; and most of them often repeated, with many precise characteristics, descriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, circumstances, final issue, &c. which it would be tedious to mention particularly. And to suppose that all these are predicted by God, without any certain knowledge of the future moral behaviour of free Agents, would be to the utmost degree absurd.

5. Unless God foreknows the future acts of men's wills, and their behaviour as moral Agents, all those great things

which are foretold both in the Old Testament and the New, concerning the erection, establishment and universal extent of the *Kingdom* of the *Messiah*, were predicted and promised while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or no, and did but guess at them. For that kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; and in these things made manifest in practice, to the praise and glory of God. The Messiah came to save men from their sins, and deliver them from their spiritual enemies; that they might serve him in righteousness and holiness before him: "he gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." And therefore his success consists in gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being made God's willing people in the day of his power. His conquest of his enemies consists in his victory over men's corruptions and vices. And such a victory, and such a dominion is often expressly foretold: that his kingdom shall fill the earth; that all people, nations and languages should serve and obey him; and so that all nations should go up to the mountain of the House of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways, and that they might walk in his paths; and that all men should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord (true virtue and religion) as the waters cover the seas; that God's laws should be put into men's inward parts, and written in their hearts; and that God's people should be all righteous, &c. &c.

A very great part of the Old Testament prophecies is taken up in such predictions as these.—And here I would observe, that the prophecies of the universal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus Christ, are delivered in the most peremptory manner, and confirmed by the oath of God, *Isai.* xlv. 22, to the end, "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else. I have SWORN by my Self, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, that unto Me every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall swear. SURELY, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength: even to Him shall men come," &c. But, here, this peremptory declaration and great oath of the Most High, are delivered with such mighty solemnity, respecting things which God did not know, if he did not certainly foresee the Volitions of moral Agents.

And all the predictions of Christ and his apostles, to the like purpose, must be without knowledge: as those of our Saviour comparing the kingdom of God to a grain of mustard-seed.

growing exceeding great from a small beginning; and to leaven, hid in three measures of meal, until the whole was leavened, &c.—And the prophecies in the epistles concerning the restoration of the Jewish nation to the true church of God, and bringing in the fulness of the *Gentiles;* and the prophecies in all the *Revelation* concerning the glorious change in the moral state of the world of mankind, attending the destruction of Antichrist, "the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ;" and its being granted to the church to be "arrayed in that fine linen, white and clean, which is the righteousness of saints," &c.

Corol. 1. Hence that great promise and oath of God to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old Testament and the New, namely, "That in their seed all the nations and families of the earth should be blessed," must be made on uncertainties, if God does not certainly foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents. For the fulfilment of this promise consists in that success of Christ in the work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual kingdom over the nations of the world, which has been spoken of. Men are "blessed in Christ" no otherwise than as they are brought to acknowledge Him, trust in Him, love and serve Him, as is represented and predicted in *Psal.* lxxii. 11. "All Kings shall fall down before Him; all nations shall serve Him." With ver. 17. "Men shall be blessed in Him; all nations shall call Him blessed." This oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in subduing men's iniquities; as is implied in that of the prophet *Micah*, chap. vii. 19, 20.

Corol. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel-promise that ever was made to mankind, that great prediction of the salvation of the Messiah, and his victory over *Satan*, made to our first parents, (*Gen.* iii. 15.) if there be no certain prescience of the Volitions of moral Agents, must have no better foundation than conjecture. For Christ's victory over *Satan* consists in men's being saved from sin, and in the victory of virtue and holiness over that vice and wickedness which *Satan* by his temptations has introduced, and wherein his kingdom consists.

6. If it be so, that God has not a prescience of the future actions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in *general* are without Foreknowledge. For Scripture prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally, are either predictions of the actings and behaviour of moral Agents, or of events depending on them, or some way connected with them; judicial dispensations, judgments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of virtue and righteousness, remarkable manifestations of favour to the righteous, or manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving their iniqui-

ties, and magnifying the riches of divine Grace; or dispensations of Providence, in some respect or other, relating to the conduct of the subjects of God's moral government, wisely adapted thereto; either providing for what should be in a future state of things, through the Volitions and voluntary actions of moral Agents, or consequent upon them, and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events that are foretold, are either moral events, or others which are connected with, and accommodated to them.

That the predictions of Scripture in general must be without knowledge, if God does not foresee the Volitions of men, will further appear, if it be considered, that almost all events belonging to the future state of the world of mankind, the changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires, kingdoms, and nations, and all societies, depend, in ways innumerable, on the acts of men's wills; yea, on an innumerable multitude of millions of Volitions. Such is the state and course of things in the world of mankind, that one single event, which appears in itself exceeding inconsiderable, may, in the progress and series of things, occasion a succession of the greatest and most important and extensive events; causing the state of mankind to be vastly different from what it would otherwise have been, for all succeeding generations.

For instance, the coming into existence of those particular men, who have been the great conquerors of the world, which, under God, have had the main hand in all the consequent state of the world, in all after-ages; such as Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Cæsar, &c. undoubtedly depended on many million of acts of the will, in their parents. And perhaps most of these Volitions depended on millions of Volitions in their contemporaries of the same generation; and most of these on millions of millions of Volitions in preceding generations.—As we go back, still the number of Volitions, which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as the branches of a river, until they come at last, as it were, to an infinite number. This will not seem strange to any one who well considers the matter; if we recollect what philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are the *principia*, or *stamina vitæ*, concerned in generation; the animalcula in semen masculo, and the ova in the womb of the female; the impregnation, or animating of one of these in distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely minute relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents, the state of their bodies, &c. which must depend on innumerable foregoing circumstances and occurrences; which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing acts of their wills; which are occasioned by innumerable things that happen in the course of their lives, in which their own, and

their neighbour's behaviour must have a hand an infinite number of ways. And as the Volitions of others must be so many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such men; so no less, in their preservation and circumstances of life, their particular determinations and actions, on which the great revolutions they were the occasions of depended. As, for instance, when the conspirators in *Persia* against the *Magi* were consulting about a succession to the empire, it came into the mind of one of them to propose, that he whose horse neighed first, when they came together the next morning, should be king. Now, such a thing coming into his mind, might depend on innumerable incidents, wherein the Volitions of mankind have been concerned. But, in consequence of this accident, *Darius*, the son of *Hystaspes*, was king. And if this had not been, probably his successor would not have been the same, and all the circumstances of the *Persian* empire might have been far otherwise: Then perhaps *Alexander* might never have conquered that empire; and then probably the circumstances of the world in all succeeding ages, might have been vastly otherwise. I might further instance in many other occurrences; such as those on which depended *Alexander's* preservation in the many critical junctures of his life, wherein a small trifle would have turned the scale against him; and the preservation and success of the *Roman* people, in the infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth, and afterwards; upon which all the succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world, depended. But these hints may be sufficient for every discerning considerate person, to convince him that the whole state of the world of mankind in all ages, and the very being of every person who has ever lived in it, in every age, since the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on more Volitions, or acts of the wills of men, than there are sands on the sea-shore.

And therefore, unless God does most exactly and perfectly foresee the future acts of men's wills, all the predictions which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah, Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander; concerning the four monarchies, and the revolutions in them; and concerning all the wars, commotions, victories, prosperity and calamities, of any kingdoms, nations or communities in the world, have all been without knowledge.

So that, according to this notion, God not foreseeing the Volitions and free actions of men, he could foresee nothing appertaining to the state of the world of mankind in future ages; not so much as the being of one person that should live in it; and could foreknow no events, but only such as he would bring to pass Himself by the extraordinary interposi-

tion of his immediate power; or things which should come to pass in the natural material world, by the laws of motion, and course of nature, wherein that is independent on the actions or works of mankind: that is, as he might, like a very able mathematician and astronomer, with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the greater wheels of the machine of the external creation.

And if we closely consider the matter, there will appear reason to convince us, that he could not, with any absolute certainty, foresee even these. As to the *first*, namely, things done by the immediate and extraordinary interposition of God's power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be foreseen when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary interposition. And that cannot be foreseen, unless the state of the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus interposes, it is with regard to the state of the moral world, requiring such divine interposition. Thus God could not certainly foresee the universal deluge, the calling of Abraham, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and Israel's redemption out of it, the expelling of the seven nations of *Canaan*, and the bringing *Israel* into that land; for these all are represented as connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor can God foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of judgment and general conflagration; for that chiefly depends on the course and state of things in the moral world.

Nor, *Secondly*, can we on this supposition reasonably think, that God can certainly foresee what things shall come to pass in the course of things, in the natural and material world, even those which in an ordinary state of things might be calculated by a good astronomer. For the moral world is the end of the natural world; and the course of things in the former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with respect to the latter. Therefore he has seen cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to interpose, to interrupt, and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural world; and unless he can foresee the Volitions of men, and so know something of the future state of the moral world, He cannot know but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had: nor can He foresee how, or when, He shall have occasion thus to interpose.

Corol. 1. It appears from the things observed, that unless God foresees the Volitions of moral Agents, that cannot be true which is observed by the apostle *James*, (Acts xv. 18.) "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world."

Corol. 2. It appears, that unless God foreknows the Volitions of moral Agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no better foundation than mere conjecture; and *that*, in most instances, a conjecture which must have the utmost uncertainty; depending on an innumerable multitude of Volitions, which are all, even to God, uncertain events: however, these prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many of them in the most positive manner, with asseverations; and some of them with the most solemn oaths.

Corol. 3. It also follows, that if this notion of God's ignorance of future Volitions be true, in vain did Christ say, after uttering many great and important predictions, depending on men's moral actions, (*Matt.* xxiv. 35.) "Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away."

Corol. 4. From the same notion of God's ignorance, it would follow, that in vain has he himself often spoken of the predictions of his word, as evidences of Foreknowledge; of that which is his prerogative as GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguishing Him from all other beings, (as in *Isai.* xli. 22,—26. xliii. 9, 10, xliv. 8. xlv. 21. xlvi. 10. and xlviii. 14.)

ARGUM. II. If God does not foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents, then he did not foreknow the *fall* of man, nor of angels, and so could not foreknow the great things which are *consequent* on these events; such as his sending his Son into the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to the great work of redemption; all the things which were done for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare the way for it; and the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ; setting Him at the head of the universe as King of heaven and earth, angels and men; and setting up his church and kingdom in this world, and appointing Him the Judge of the world; and all that Satan should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ: and the great transactions of the day of judgment, &c. And if God was thus ignorant, the following Scriptures, and others like them, must be without any meaning, or contrary to truth. (Eph. i. 4.) "According as he hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world." (1 Pet. i. 20.) "Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world." (2 Tim. i. 9.) "Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling; not according to our works, but according to his own purpose, and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." So (Eph. iii. 11.) speaking of the wisdom of God in the work of redemption, "according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus." (Tit. i. 2.) "In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie, promised before the world began." (Rom. viii. 29.) "Whom he did foreknow, them he also

did predestinate," &c. (1 Pet. i. 2.) "Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father."

If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemption by Jesus Christ, nor the Volitions of man since the fall; then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense; neither as particular persons, nor as societies or nations; either by election, or by mere foresight of their virtue or good works; or any foresight of any thing about them relating to their salvation; or any benefit they have by Christ, or any manner of concern of theirs with a Redeemer.

ARG. III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the future Volitions of free Agents, it will follow, that God must in many cases truly *repent* what he has done, so as properly to wish he had done otherwise: by reason that the *event* of things, in those affairs which are most important, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, being uncertain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was before aware of. And there would be reason to understand that, in the most literal sense, (*Gen.* vi. 6.) "It repented the Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart," (and 1 *Sam.* xv. 11.) contrary to *Numb.* xxiii. 19. "God is not the Son of Man, that He should repent:" and 1 *Sam.* xv. 15, 29. "Also the strength of Israel will not lie, nor repent; for He is not a man that He should repent." Yea, from this notion it would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at His heart, in a *literal* sense, continually; and is always exposed to an infinite number of real disappointments in governing the world; and to manifold, constant, great perplexity and vexation: but this is not very consistent with his title of "God over all, blessed for evermore;" which represents Him as possessed of perfect, constant, and uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the universe, and in his management of the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal ruler. (See *Rom.* 1. 25. ix. 5. 2 *Cor.* xi. 31. 1 *Tim.* vi. 15.)

ARG. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God is liable to be continually repenting of what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly *changing* his mind and intentions, as to his future conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projects. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral Agents: He must be a Being, who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that

his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation, he must have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and of which he has the care, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; for which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known before, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion.

But how do these things consist with reason, or with the word of God? Which represents, that *all God's works*, all that he has ever to do, the whole scheme and series of his operations, are *from the beginning* perfectly in his view; and declares, that whatever devices and designs are in the hearts of men, "the counsel of the Lord shall stand, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations," (Prov. xix. 21. Psal. xxxiii. 10, 11.) And "that which the Lord of hosts hath purposed, none shall disannul," (Isai. xiv. 27.) And that he cannot be frustrated *in one design or thought*, (Job, xlii. 2.) And "that which God doth, it shall be for ever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it," (Eccl. iii. 14.) The stability and perpetuity of God's counsels are expressly spoken of as connected with his foreknowledge, (*Isai.* xlvi. 10.) "Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."—And how are these things consistent with what the scripture says of God's immutability, which represents him as "without variableness, or shadow of turning;" and speaks of him, most particularly, as unchangeable with regard to his purposes, (*Mal.* iii. 6.) "I am the Lord; I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed." (Exod. iii. 14.) "I AM THAT I AM." (Job xxiii. 13, 14.) "He is in one mind; and who can turn him? And what his soul desireth, even that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me."

ARG. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of future Volitions of moral Agents be thoroughly considered in its consequences, it will appear to follow from it that God, after he had made the world, was liable to be wholly *frustrated of his end* in the creation of it; and so has been, in like manner, liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great works he had wrought. It is manifest, the moral world is the end of the natural: the rest of the creation is but an house which God hath built, with furniture, for moral Agents: and the good or bad state of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural Agency, and so depends on their Volitions. And therefore, if these cannot be foreseen by God, because they are contingent, and subject to no kind of necessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong to any assignable degree; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on this scheme it may well be supposed to be *literally* said, when mankind, by the abuse of their moral Agency, became very corrupt before the flood, "that the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart;" so, when he made the universe, he did not know but that he might be so disappointed in it, that it might grieve him at his heart that he had made it. It actually proved, that all mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels apostatized: and how could God know before that all of them would not? And how could God know but that all mankind, notwithstanding means used to reclaim them, being still left to the freedom of their own will, would continue in their apostacy, and grow worse and worse, as they of the old world before the flood did?

According to the scheme I am endeavouring to confute, the fall of neither men nor angels could be foreseen, and God must be greatly disappointed in these events; and so the grand contrivance for our redemption, and destroying the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things God has done in the prosecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of his own disappointment; contrivances to mend, as well as he could, his system, which originally was all very good, and perfectly beautiful; but was broken and confounded by the free will of angels and men. And still he must be liable to be totally disappointed a second time: He could not know that he should have his desired success, in the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and exaltation of his only begotten Son, and other great works accomplished to restore the state of things: he could not know, after all, whether there would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration; for this depended on the free will of man. There has been a general great apostacy of almost all the Christian world, to that which was worse than heathenism; which continued for many ages. And how could

God, without foreseeing men's Volitions, know whether ever Christendom would return from this apostacy? And which way would he foretell how soon it would begin? The apostle says, it began to work in his time; and how could it be known how far it would proceed in that age? Yea, how could it be known that the gospel which was not effectual for the reformation of the *Jews*, would ever be effectual for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apostacy, which they had been confirmed in for so many ages?

It is represented often in scripture, that God, who made the world for himself, and created it for his pleasure, would infallibly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works; that as all things are *of* him, so they would all be *to* him; and that in the final issue of things, it would appear that he is "the first, and the last." (Rev. xxi. 6.) "And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last." But these things are not consistent with God's liability to be disappointed in all his works, nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing that he has undertaken.

SECT. XII.

God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those volitions, as is without all Necessity.

Having proved that GOD has a certain and infallible Prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now, in the *second* place, to shew the consequence; how it follows from hence, that these events are *necessary*, with a necessity of connection or consequence.

The chief *Arminian* divines, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of *any Necessity* of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly enquired into. I cannot but think, that on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not.

In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things.

I. It is very evident, that with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars:

1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence is now

necessary: having already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect; it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed.

2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already *has*, and long ago *had* existence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowledge should be or should have been.

3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, the existence of which is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may *possibly not exist*, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence. —Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that, whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.

To say the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that foreknowledge is dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm, that there is no necessary connection between a proposition being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is *necessary;* or, in other words, that it is *impossible* but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossible, but that there now should be no truth in that proposition, which is now infallibly known to be true.

II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all Necessity, may be proved thus; it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without *evidence*. To suppose

otherwise, implies a contradiction: because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be *evident* to that understanding: and for a thing to be *evident* to any understanding is the same thing, as for that understanding to *see evidence* of it; but no understanding, created or uncreated, can *see evidence* where there is none; for that is the same thing as to see that to be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.

But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all Necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely *without evidence*. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either *self-evidence* or *proof*; an evident thing must be either evident *in itself*, or evident *in something else*: that is, evident by *connection* with something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all Necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be *self-evident*: for if it be, it may be now known, by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; its present existence, or the Necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence is not self-evident. And *Secondly*, neither is there any *proof*, or evidence *in any thing else*, or evidence of connection with something else that is evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the *contingent* event is connected. For such a connection destroys its *Contingence*, and supposes necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all necessity, (if any such event there be) neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.

Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being; and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form; all in *absolute Contingence*, without any concern of God, or any other cause, in the matter; without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connection at all with any thing foregoing: I say, that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen *in the thing itself*; for

the thing itself as yet was not. And there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing else: for evidence is something else, is *connexion with* something else: but such connection is contrary to the supposition. There was no evidence before that this thing *would happen*: for by the supposition, there was no reason why it *should happen* rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, that all things before were exactly equal, and the same, with respect to that and other possible things: there was no preponderation, no superior weight or value: and therefore, nothing that could be of weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable. An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and makes no advance towards discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased never so much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness: but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease; yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not: but on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none.

III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God's Knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so *contingent*, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his Knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows. It is the same as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all Necessity, that nothing hinders but it may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that nothing hinders but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true: and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they are. If the event be

not necessary, then it is possible it may never be: and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be; and that is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all Necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of Knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake: because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much so as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know; or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing, which we cannot comprehend.

Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute *decrees* of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event which follows from such decrees, than the absolute *Foreknowledge* of God. Because the connection between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The connection between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition: because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connection between the Knowledge and thing known cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connection, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the Knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree.

There is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or, which is the same thing, as great a Necessity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connection possible between the writing and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had ex-

isted already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than this.

And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necessity of connection and consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man, or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees, which do not at all increase the Necessity, are not inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are inconsitent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any *Necessity* which absolute decrees infer.

Dr. WHITBY supposes there is a great difference between God's Foreknowledge and his decrees, with regard to Necessity of future events. In his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 474, &c.) he says, "God's Prescience has no influence at all on our actions.—Should God, says he, by immediate Revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all.—Our knowledge doth not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more future, than they would be without it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of election is powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably produce the end.—Hence God's Prescience renders no actions necessary." And to this purpose, (p. 473.) he cites ORIGEN, where he says, "*God's Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God's Prescience that they will be:*" and LE BLANC, where he says, "*This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen.*" In like manner, Dr. CLARK, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, (p. 95—99.) And the Author of the *Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature*, speaking to the like purpose with Dr. WHITBY, represents "*Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them necessary, than After-knowledge*," or to that purpose.

To all which I would say; that what is said about Knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the least

affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether Prescience be the thing that *makes* the event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible Foreknowledge may *prove* the Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which *causes* the Necessity.* If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this *proves*

* This distinction is of great importance in the present controversy; and the want of attending to the true ground on which it stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. WHITBY's objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argument, no other *necessity* but the *decretive*, as maintained by their opponents; and therefore infer, that to allow *any* kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible *decree*. From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion, viz. that if *any thing* is foreknown *because* it is decreed, *every* thing is foreknown on the same ground, or for the same reason.—And then, this proving *too much*—the decretive appointment of all the *evil* in the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the divine character, and therefore impossible—they reject the whole doctrine of *necessity* as a ground of foreknowledge; and suppose that, though they cannot clearly *disprove* what is advanced against them, they infer that there is somehow a *sophism* in the reasoning of their opponents, or some false principle assumed, were they but happy enough to detect it.

But our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connection by which *every* event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so because *decreed*. The truth is, that *some* events are foreknown to be certain *because* foreordained; and *others*, because of the tendency there is in the *nature* of the things themselves.—Should any, in the way of objection, assert, that the nature of things is itself derived from the divine *will*, or decree; we apprehend there is no evidence to support such an assertion. For instance, is it owing to a *decree* that the nature of any created being is *dependent* on the first cause? That a creature, however exalted, is not *infinite*? That any *relation* should subsist between the Creator and a creature? Or that, if equal quantities be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be equal? Is there any room, in thought, for a supposition of any decree in the case? Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have made such things *otherwise*?

Let it be observed, however, that God is the Almighty Sovereign over nature—not indeed so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object of power, any more than to make spirit to be the *same thing* as matter, and *vice versa*, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but—by the position of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed, IF God create a world, that world *must* depend upon him, as a *necessary* consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and identity of things. For what is it to create, but for an independent cause to impart, *ad extra*, a dependent existence? So that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But though the *consequence* be *necessary*, if the antecedent be established; yet the antecedent itself is not necessary, except from decree; for there is not, *in the nature of things*, any antecedent necessity that a world be created. That is, to suppose its non-existence implies no contradiction, it being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the consequence, on supposition of the antecedent, is to deny the nature of things, and to assert a contradiction, though the antecedent itself be not necessary. And hence also, in the instance now specified among others innumerable, the antecedent is an object of *decree*, but not the consequence. It is as absurd to say, that God *decreed* the dependence of the world upon himself, as it is to say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to *four*, rather than to *five*.

These remarks, duly considered in their just consequences, will abundantly shew, that *some things* are necessary because decreed,—as the creation, the preservation, and the government of the world; the redemption, the purification, and the salvation of the church:—and that other things—as all imperfections, dependence, relations, and especially moral evils—come to be necessary, and so capable of being foreknown, only by connection, or consequence. That is, IF the antecedent, which is under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the consequence follows infallibly *from the nature of things*. But IF ane-

the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way: because, as was said before, it is absurd to say that a proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge does not *cause* an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not *prove* it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can *prove*, or *be an evidence* of a thing being necessary, but that which has *a causal influence to make it so.* But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of an event be not the thing which first *makes* it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does *demonstrate*, that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident as any thing can be, that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true; therefore there is a *Necessity* that it should be otherwise; whether the Knowledge be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the Knowledge.

All certain knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true.——I freely allow, that foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-knowledge: but then After-knowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true. Certain After-knowledge proves that it is *now*, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates *past* existence on the event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge

ther antecedent be established, *another consequence* will follow, with equal certainty, also from the nature of things. For instance; IF *holiness* be given and continued to a redeemed creature, as an antecedent; excellence, honour, and happiness are the *necessary* consequences. But IF *sin* operate without control, as the antecedent, dishonour and misery must be the necessary consequence from the same cause.—W.

prove, that *now*, in the time of the Knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates *future* existence on the event, should be true. The necessity of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the present impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge; there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.

There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or which is the same thing, known to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of Knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain. And there is nothing but the necessity of truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true; or in other words, the firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition that contains that truth. All certainty of Knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event; the predicate is its future existence, but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then He sees a firm connection between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction.

I allow what Dr. WHITBY says to be true, that *mere Knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future.* But yet, I say, it *supposes* and *proves* the thing to be *already* both *future* and *certain;* i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of *futurity* supposes *futurity;* and a *certain Knowledge* of futurity supposes *certain futurity* antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of Knowledge than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or which is the same thing, the *Necessity* of the event.

I would observe one thing further; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far from shewing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather shews the contrary the more plainly. Because it shews the existence of the event to be so settled

and firm, that it is as if it had already been; in as much as *in effect* it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual *influence* and *efficiency*, and has *produced an effect*, viz. Prescience: the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.

To illustrate this matter; let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass, for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they resemble: if it be so then, as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed; so they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the existence of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and necessary, as the existence of these effects; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other.—Now let us suppose future existences, some way or other, to have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their cause. These effects and images having already had actual existence, render that matter of their existence perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise: and this proves, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is also equally sure, firm and necessary; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind which have existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered.

Another thing which has been said by some *Arminians*, to take off the force of what is urged from God's Prescience, against the Contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose; "That when we talk of Foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect Knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as *before* and *after* in God, but He sees all things

by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession."—To this I answer,

1. It has been already shown, that all certain Knowledge proves the Necessity of the truth known; whether it be *before*, *after*, or *at the same time*.—Though it be true, that there is no succession in God's Knowledge, and the manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible Knowledge of it; He always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees things just as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is because those things which are future to us, are as present to God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that future events are always in God's view as evident, clear, sure and necessary, as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass.

God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably, as that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment, does not hinder but that there is properly *now*, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect Knowledge of the moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years hence: yea the objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral actions should not come to pass.

We know, that God Foreknows the future voluntary actions of men, in such a sense, as that he is able particularly to foretell them and cause them to be recorded, as He often has done; and therefore that necessary connection which there is between God's Knowledge and the event known, as much proves the event to be *necessary* beforehand, as if the Divine Knowledge were in the same sense before the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible connection between the written prediction and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise, than that the prediction and the event should agree: and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event should come to pass: and this is the same as to say that its coming to pass is *necessary*. So that it is manifest, that there being no proper succession in God's mind, makes no

alteration as to the Necessity of the existence of the events known. Yea,

2. This is so far from weakening the proof given of the impossibility of future events known not coming to pass, as that it establishes the foregoing arguments, and shews the clearness of the evidence. For,

(1.) The very reason, why God's Knowledge is without succession is, because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty. All things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness: future things being seen with as much clearness, as if they were present; the view is always in absolute perfection; and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession; the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase, or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known: God calls the things that are not, as though they were; they are all one to him as if they had already existed. But herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given; that it is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This objection, instead of weakening the argument, sets it in the strongest light; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his Knowledge of them.

(2.) The objection is founded on the *immutability* of God's Knowledge: for it is the immutability of Knowledge that makes it to be without succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on, *viz.* that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if that were possible, then a change in God's Knowledge and view of things were possible. For if the known event should not come into being, as God expected, then He would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and succession in his Knowledge. But as God is immutable, and it is infinitely impossible that his view should be changed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree; and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is *vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio.*

On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of

strict demonstration, than that God's certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity; and so is inconsistent with the *Arminian* notion of liberty.

Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the *Calvinists*, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more *fatality* in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most *Arminian* divines, who acknowledge God's omniscience, and universal Prescience. Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the *Calvinists*, as implying HOBBES' doctrine of Necessity, or the *stoical* doctrine of *fate*, lie no more against the doctrine of *Calvinists*, than their own doctrine: and therefore it doth not become those divines to raise such an outcry against the *Calvinists*, on this account.

Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of *Arminians*, who own God's omniscience, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the *Calvinistic* doctrine of efficacious grace; on this ground that those doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or co-action, yet suppose them under *Necessity*, must fall to the ground. And their arguments against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the *Calvinists* as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer *Necessity*; I say, all these arguments and objections must be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being levelled against their own doctrine, as well as against that of the *Calvinists*.*

* In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated, that foreknowledge *infers* necessity; such a necessity as exists in the connection of a consequent with its antecedent; and has represented, in various lights, how the most contradictory and absurd conclusions follow from the opposite hypothesis. But as his argument, strictly speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinction of the *principles* on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be improper in this place briefly to enquire into the *rationale* of those principles; by which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence, and the radical principles themselves confirmed by their connection with others. As these remarks are presented in the form of a series analytically disposed, we shall prefix to them the corresponding ordinal numbers.

1. *Any* kind of NECESSITY is a sufficient ground of foreknowledge, in the view of omniscience; but as is the *kind* of necessity, or the *nature* of the *connection* between cause and effect, so is the *nature* of the foreknowledge. But this difference in the nature of the connection affects—not the *certainty* of the event, but the *mode* of causation; or from what CAUSE the certainty arises.

2. All necessity, or certainty of connection between antecedent and consequent, must arise from one of these two sources, viz. the NATURE OF THINGS, or, the DECREE OF GOD. Chance is *nothing*; and nothing has no properties, consequently has no causal influence.

SECT. XIII.

Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

Every act of the will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then, according to what has already been demon-

3. The necessity which arises from the NATURE OF THINGS, is either *absolute* or *hypothetical*. ABSOLUTE NECESSITY belongs only to the *first* cause, or God. He exists ABSOLUTELY; and to *suppose* him not to exist, or not to have existed, is a contradiction. For the *supposition* itself is made by a confessedly contingent being; but a contingent being necessarily implies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies a cause; and consequently a *first* cause.

4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or mode of being, or any event whatever, is only of HYPOTHETICAL NECESSITY. Any event is necessary, only on account of its *relation* to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connection, between an event and the first cause is either in the way of *contrast*, or in the way of *dependence*.

5. There are two things *necessarily related* to the first cause by way of CONTRAST; *passive power*, which is a *natural* evil—if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, *in their necessary tendency*, may be so called—and *sin*, which is a *moral* evil; or some thing which, in point of *obligation*, *ought not* to be.

6. The other mode of *necessary relation* to the first cause, arising from the nature of things, is that of DEPENDENCE. Every contingent being and event must necessarily depend upon God, as an effect depends upon its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and absurdity, that any contingent being should *continue* to exist, any more than begin to exist, independent of the first cause. *Sublata causa, tollitur effectus*, is justly entitled to be called an *axiom* in metaphysical science.

7. It was before observed, that all necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature of things, as a consequence, has for its *antecedent*, either an *efficient* or a *deficient* cause.

8. A DEFECT, no less than active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as *founded in the nature of things*, from whence a corresponding consequence must follow; but there is no defect in any antecedent but *may* be counteracted by a decree; so far counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative cause.

9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents, from whence follow, by the very *nature of things*, corresponding good consequences, and good only: but the *defect* which is inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is also a *cause* in the sense of an *antecedent*; otherwise a created existence would be as *indefectible* as the creating or first cause, which involves the most absurd consequences.

10. Defect is either *natural* or *moral*; and each arises from the nature of things, as contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. NATURAL DEFECT arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God's *natural perfections*: which contrast forms the primary *difference* between creator and creature.

11. This *natural defect* is different from *defectibility*: for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an *effect* not a cause; a *liableness* to defection. But the question returns, WHAT renders a creature *liable* to *defect*? To say, Its *liableness* to defect, or its *defectibility*, assigns no true cause; for the question returns as before, WHAT makes it liable, WHAT makes it defectible?

strated, it is not contingent, but necessary; the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause, let that

12. Perhaps there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent circumlocution, than PASSIVE POWER, to express that *natural defect*, which exists in a created nature as a *contrast* to the *natural* (not the moral) *perfections* of God.

13. Passive power is as *inapplicable* to God, as it is *applicable* to a creature; for natural perfection is as applicable to him, as natural imperfection is to us.—— Therefore to say, that a creature is not the subject of passive power, is the same as to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is; which is the grossest pantheism—the deification of every creature, of every atom that exists.

14. All *antecedents* originate in either *passive power* or the *divine decrees*. From the former proceed, according to the nature of things, all evil consequents; from the latter, all good.

15. MORAL DEFECT is a contrast to the *moral perfections*, excellence, or holiness of God; and arises, as a *necessary consequence*—not from the divine decree as its antecedent, but—from the *hypothetical nature of things;* that is, passive power, IF not aided by a decretive interposition, and IF also united to liberty of choice in an accountable being.

16. The *removal* of the antecedent is the prerogative of the supreme Lord of nature; but IF the antecedent be not *removed*, that is, altered from what it was as to its *causal influence*, the consequence can no more be prevented, than the nature of things can be changed.

17. That *nature* of things, or that *necessity* of consequence, whereby the effect is *infallibly connected* with its cause, is nothing else but the *essence of* TRUTH, emanating from the first cause, the GOD OF TRUTH, or the TRUE GOD.

18. We now observe, that an event may be necessarily connected with its cause by a divine *decree*. If the divine will contemplate an *end*, and decree accordingly, it necessarily implies that the *means*, or the *antecedents* to this consequence, are decreed.

19. Hence, an event may be *necessary*, either because virtually *determined* by the divine *will*, IN a series of antecedents; or because the *nature of things* operates without being affected, as to their causal influence, by decretive antecedents.

20. To suppose any sort, or any degree of *defect*, to be *decreed*, is absurd in different ways. It is contrary to an established axiom, that *from good nothing but good can proceed*—and it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antecedently arises from the nature of things.

21. In reality, DIVINE DECREES (as before hinted) are nothing else than a wonderful chain or *series of positions*, which are so many antecedents, *counteracting defects* arising from the hypothetical nature of things. Whence it necessarily follows, that *if there were no* PASSIVE POWER *there could be no* DIVINE DECREES. For if good, and only good, arose from the nature of things; the decree, which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and therefore unworthy of divine volition.

22. Hence also, whatever event is *in itself good*, is an object of divine decree *in its antecedent*; and the event itself is connected with the decretive position by the very essence of truth. But whatever is *in itself evil* arises from the hypothetical nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions.

23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite and unchangeable *nature*, is to be regarded as an *antecedent;* from which all possible happiness is the necessary consequence. Such an antecedent is not the result of mere, arbitrary, or decretive *will*, but of *absolute necessity*, but all antecedents in a creature, or every causal influence, of which good, or happiness, whether natural or moral, is the consequence, must be the positions of decretive will, as the only possible mode of securing a good result.

24. As is the antecedent, so is the consequent; for the connection is formed by eternal truth. If therefore a *good event*,—for instance, a virtuous or holy choice —be the consequent, the antecedent is a *decretive position*.

25. In reference to God, the proper and only ground of *infallible certainty* that his choice is *good* and praiseworthy, is the GOODNESS OF HIS NATURE. Were we to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible nature in him, in the same proportion must we admit a possible failure in the goodness of his choice. And in

cause be what it will. If the cause is the will itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining; still the *determined caused* act must be a necessary effect. The act, that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause; but must be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as the motions of the hands and feet. The consequent commanded acts of the will are as passive and as necessary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts, as the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the will are all determined effects determined by the will itself, that is by antecedent choice, then they are all necessary; they are all subject to, and de-

reference to a created being, the proper and only *ground of certainty* that his choice will be good, is the antecedent goodness of his nature or *disposition*. This alone is a sufficient causal influence; but the goodness of a creature's disposition can be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by DECRETIVE INFLUENCE of a nature corresponding with the nature of the effect.

26. From these principles and considerations, which can here be but briefly stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we infer, that God foresees ALL GOOD, in every created being, in every mode, in every event, by the evidence of a DECRETIVE NECESSITY; a necessity resulting from *actual influx*, or perpetual *energy*, in the position of *antecedents*, and the essence of *truth* connecting the causal influence with the effect.

27. From the same principles we learn, that God foresees or foreknows ALL EVIL—however blended with the good, as the different colours in a pencil of light are blended—in every being, and in every event where found, by that necessity which is HYPOTHETICAL only; a necessity resulting from the nature of things left to their own causal influence; which influence, in any given circumstances, will manifest itself either in the way of contrast, of dependence, or both united.

28. Again: *Volitions* are *acts* of the mind, and each voluntary act is compounded of a *natural* and *moral* quality. The NATURAL quality of a voluntary act proceeds from *decretive necessity;* for there is nothing in it but what is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The MORAL quality of a voluntary act is either good or evil.

29. A voluntary act *morally* GOOD, is *altogether* of *decretive* necessity, both as to its physical and moral quality; and is therefore foreknown *because* of decretive appointment and energy. But a voluntary act *morally* BAD, is partly of decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of consequence.

30. The PHYSICAL QUALITY of a voluntary act *morally bad*, is of decretive necessity, and is foreknown *because* foreappointed; but the MORAL QUALITY of the same act, or its *badness*, is foreknown only by relation, connection, or consequence. Thus *deformity* is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the standard of beauty from which it deviates. *Weakness* is the absence of strength, and may be known by relation. A *shadow* is known by the interception of rays, and may be known in the same manner. *Darkness* is caused by the absence of light, and may be known by the light excluded.

31. How the BAD *quality* of a moral act may be foreknown by the evidence of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For what is moral evil, or sin, but WHAT OUGHT NOT TO BE, in point of *moral obligation?* Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what *ought not* to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the knowledge of [illegible]

[illegible] *to be*, is known to the omniscient by constituted [illegible] *what ought not to be*, may be known by evi-

cisively fixed by the foregoing act, which is their cause: yea, even the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another act preceding, if it be a free and voluntary act; and so must be necessary. So that by this, all the free acts of the will are necessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary: because they cannot be free, according to the *Arminian* notion of freedom unless they are determined by the will; and this is to be determined by antecedent choice, which being their cause, proves them necessary. And yet they say, Necessity is utterly inconsistent with Liberty. So that, by their scheme, the acts of the will cannot be free, unless they are necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be necessary!

But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, that the free acts of the will have no cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and absolute Contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible; still it will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to pass by perfect Contingence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain no act of the will, no prior act of the soul was the cause, no determination or choice of the soul had any hand in it. The will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of what happened to it accidentally, but was not the cause. The will is not active in causing or determining, but purely the passive subject; at least, according to their notion of action and passion. In this case, Contingence as much prevents the determination of the will, as a proper cause; and as to the will, it was necessary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose that it could have been otherwise, if the will or soul had pleased, is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleasure; contrary to what is now supposed; it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise, if its cause had ordered it otherwise. But this does not agree to it having no cause or orderer at all. That must be necessary as to the soul, which is dependent on no free act of the soul: but that which is without a cause, is dependent on no free act of the soul; because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing, and is connected with nothing. In such a case, the soul is necessarily subjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the earth, that is inactive, is necessarily subjected to what falls upon it. But this does not consist with the *Arminian* notion of liberty, which is the will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly active in it, without passiveness, and without being subject to Necessity.—Thus, Contingence belongs to the *Arminian* notion of Liberty, and yet is inconsistent with it.

I would here observe, that the author of the *Essay on the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature*, (p. 76, 77,) says as follows: "The word *Chance* always means something done without design. Chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other: and Chance can never be properly applied to acts of the will, which is the spring of all design, and which designs to choose whatsoever it doth choose, whether there be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses, or no; and it designs to determine itself to one thing, where two things, perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it will." But herein appears a very great inadvertence. For if *the will be the spring of all design*, as he says, then certainly it is not always the *effect* of design; and the acts of the will themselves must sometimes come to pass, when they do not *spring from* design; and consequently come to pass by Chance, according to his own definition of Chance. And if the *will designs to choose whatsoever it does choose*, and *designs to determine itself*, as he says, then it designs to determine all its designs. Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing design determining that, and to another determining that; and so on *in infinitum*. The very first design must be the effect of foregoing design, or else it must be by Chance, in his notion of it.

Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the connection of the acts of the will with something foregoing that is their cause, not much unlike to the other; which is this: either human liberty may well stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the understanding, and so is consistent with Necessity; or it is inconsistent with, and contrary to such a connection and Necessity. The former is directly subversive of the *Arminian* notion of liberty, consisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be chosen, and it be said, that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary connection of volition with foregoing views of the understanding, it consisting in freedom from any such Necessity of the will as that would imply; then the liberty of the soul consists, partly at least, in freedom from restraint, limitation, and government, in its actings, by the understanding, and in liberty and liableness to act contrary to the views and dictates of the understanding: and consequently the more the soul has of this disengagedness in its acting, the more liberty. Now let it be considered to what this brings the noble principle of human liberty, particularly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, *viz.* a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random, without the least connection with, or restraint or government by, any dictate of reason, or any thing whatsoever apprehended, considered or viewed by the under-

standing; as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the will over its own determinations.—The notion mankind have conceived of liberty, is some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is there in being given up to such a wild Contingence as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind!

PART III.

WHEREIN IS ENQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS HOLD, BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, &c.

SECT. I.

God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.

HAVING considered the *first* thing proposed, relating to that freedom of will which *Arminians* maintain; namely, Whether any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, I come now to the *second* thing proposed to be the subject of enquiry, *viz.* Whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, &c.

I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agency and Virtue.

Dr. WHITBY in his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 14.) says, "If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?" To the like purpose he speaks in places innumerable; especially in his Discourse on the *Freedom of the Will;* constantly maintaining, that a *freedom not only from coaction, but necessity*, is absolutely requisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of *Arminian* writers, who, in general, hold that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. WHITBY, (p. 300,) allows, that God is without this freedom; and *Arminians*, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally acknowledge, that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily determined to that which is good.

So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy God—who always used to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, in the most absolute purity and perfection, brightness and amiableness; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun; and who has been supposed to be, (being thus every where represented in Scripture,) on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, extolled, and praised, than any creature—this Being, according to this notion of Dr. WHITBY, and other *Arminians*, has no virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to Him, is but *an empty name;* and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity. He cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it. It seems the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c. of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent; as the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determining power.

There needs no other confutation of this notion, to Christians acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly representing it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is represented as in every respect in the highest manner virtuous, and supremely praiseworthy, would be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have been brought up in the light of the Gospel.

It were to be wished, that Dr. WHITBY and other divines of the same sort had explained themselves, when they have asserted, that *that* which is necessary, is *not deserving of praise;* at the same time that they have owned God's perfection to be necessary, and so in effect representing God as not deserving praise. Certainly, if their words have any meaning at all, by *praise*, they must mean the exercise or testimony of esteem, respect, or honourable regard. And will they then say, that men are worthy of that esteem, respect, and honour for their virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousness, holiness and goodness? If so, it must be because of some sort of peculiar Excellency in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference; some dignity, that is entirely distinguished from any Excellency or amiableness in God; not in dependence, but in pre-eminence; which, therefore, he does

not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competition with him, as the object of honour and regard; but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation and glory, to which God can have no pretension. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holiness, to intermeddle with that grateful respect and praise, due to the virtuous man, who chooses virtue in the exercise of a freedom *ad utrumque*; any more than a precious stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.

And if it be so, let it be explained what that peculiar respect is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and kind, in some way of pre-eminence, from all that is due to God. What is the name or description of that peculiar affection? Is it esteem, love, admiration, honour, praise, or gratitude? The Scripture every where represents God as the highest object of all these: there we read of the soul magnifying the Lord, of "loving Him with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength;" *admiring* him, and *his righteous acts*, or greatly regarding them, as *marvellous and wonderful; honouring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, blessing, thanking* and *praising* him; *giving unto him all the glory* of the good which is done or received, rather than unto men; "that no flesh should glory in his presence; but that he should be regarded as the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is that respect? What passion, affection, or exercise is it, that *Arminians* call *praise*, diverse from all these things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which God is not worthy of in any degree?

If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions, be as inconsistent with being worthy of praise, as a necessity of co-action; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from Dr. WHITBY's discourse; then why should we thank God for his goodness, any more than if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow-creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity? *Arminians* suppose that God is necessarily a good and gracious Being; for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments against many doctrines maintained by *Calvinists;* they say these are *certainly* false, and it is *impossible* they should be true, because they are not consistent with the goodness of God. This supposes, that it is *impossible* but that God should be good: for if it be possible that He should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases, according to their own argument.

That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, *rewardable*, is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and

actions, sufficient to deserve rewards from his creatures; but because He is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward. He is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is worthy of our supreme benevolence for his virtue: and would be worthy of our beneficence, which is the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness could extend to Him. If God deserves to be thanked and praised for his goodness, He would for the same reason, deserve that we should also *requite* his kindness if that were possible. "What shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits?" is the natural language of thankfulness: and so far as in us lies, it is our duty to *render again according to benefits received.* And that we might have opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to God as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach; He has appointed others to be his receivers, and to stand in his stead as the objects of our beneficence: such are especially our indigent brethren.

SECT. II.

The acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, &c.

I have already considered how Dr. WHITBY insists upon it, that a freedom not only from co-action but necessity, is *requisite either to virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward or punishment.* He also insists on the same freedom as absolutely requisite to a person being the subject of a *law*, of *precepts*, or *prohibitions;* in the book before-mentioned, (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And of *promises* and *threatenings*, (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340, 363.) And as requisite to *a state of trial*, p. 297, &c.

Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would enquire into the moral conduct and practices of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he exhibited in his human nature, in his state of humiliation. And *first*, I would shew, that his holy behaviour was *necessary;* or that it was *impossible* it should be otherwise, than that He should behave himself holily, and that he should be perfectly holy in each individual act of his life. And *secondly*, that his holy behaviour was properly of the nature of *virtue*, and was *worthy of praise;* and that he was the subject of *law*, *precepts* or *commands*, *promises* and *rewards;* and that he was *in a state of trial.*

I. It was *impossible*, that the Acts of the Will of Christ's human soul should, in any instance, degree or circumstance, be

otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will. The following things make this evident.

1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and uphold Him by his Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not fail of the end for which he came into the world; but he would have failed, had he fallen into sin. We have such a promise, (Isai. xliii. 1, 2, 3, 4.) "Behold my Servant, whom I uphold; mine Elect, in whom my soul delighteth: I have put my Spirit upon him: He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles: He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street.—He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail, nor be discouraged, till He have set judgment in the earth; and the isles shall wait his law." This promise of God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up his voice, *&c.* relates to the time of Christ's appearance on earth; as is manifest from the nature of the promise, and also the application of it in the New Testament, (*Matt.* xii. 18.) And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's Spirit, that he should be preserved from sin; particularly from pride and vainglory; and from being overcome by any temptations he should be under to affect the glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and praise of men: and that he should be so upheld, that he should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into the world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the following verses, this promise is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable solemnity. "Thus saith the LORD, HE that created the heavens, and stretched them out; He that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it; He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein: I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand; and will keep thee, and give thee for a Covenant of the people, for a Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-house. I am JEHOVAH, that is my name, &c."

Very parallel with these promises is another (*Isai.* xlix. 7, 8, 9.) which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation on earth.—"Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers; kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship; because of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard thee; in a day of salvation have I helped thee; and I will preserve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth, &c."

And in *Isai.* l. 5—6. we have the Messiah expressing his assurance that God would help him, by so opening his ear, or inclining his heart to God's commandments that he should not be rebellious, but should persevere, and not apostatize, or turn his back: that through God's help he should be immoveable in obedience, under great trials of reproach and suffering; setting his face like a flint: so that he knew he should not be ashamed, or frustrated in his design; and finally should be approved and justified, as having done his work faithfully. "The Lord hath opened mine ear; so that I was not rebellious, neither turned away my back: I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me; therefore shall I not be confounded: therefore have I set my face as a flint, and I know that I shall not be ashamed. He is near that justifieth me: who will contend with me? Let us stand together. Who is mine adversary? Let him come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me: who is he that shall condemn me? Lo, they shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat them up."

2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom, and success, in his office and character of a Mediator: which glory could not have been obtained, if his holiness had failed, and he had been guilty of sin. God's absolute promise makes the things promised *necessary* and their failing to take place absolutely *impossible:* and, in like manner, it makes those things necessary, on which the thing promised depends, and without which it cannot take effect. Therefore it appears that it was utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail from such absolute promises as these, (*Psal.* cx. 4.) "The Lord hath sworn, and will not repent, thou art a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedec." And from every other promise in that psalm, contained in each verse of it. (And *Psal.* ii. 6, 7.) "I will declare the decree: The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee: Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, &c." (*Psal.* xlv. 3, 4, &c.) "Gird thy sword on thy thigh, O most mighty, with thy glory and thy majesty; and in thy majesty ride prosperously." And so every thing that is said from thence to the end of the psalm. (See *Isai.* iii. 13—15. and liii. 10—12.) And all those promises which God makes to the Messiah, of success, dominion and glory in the character of a Redeemer, (*Isai.* chap. xlix.)

3. It was often promised to the church of God of old, for their comfort, that God would give them a righteous, sinless Saviour. (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6.) "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous branch;

and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days shall Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely. And this is the name whereby He shall be called, The Lord our righteousness." (So Jer. xxxiii. 15.) I will cause the branch of righteousness to grow up unto David; and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land." (Isai. xi. 6, 7.) "For unto us a child is born;—upon the throne of David and of his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice, from henceforth, even for ever: the zeal of the Lord of hosts will do this." (Chap. xi. 1. &c.) "There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots: and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him,—the spirit of knowledge, and the fear of the Lord:—with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity:—Righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." (Chap. lii. 13.) "My servant shall deal prudently." (Chap. liii. 9.) "Because he had done no violence, neither was guile found in his mouth." If it be impossible that these promises should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one jot or tittle of them to pass away, then it was impossible that Christ should commit any sin.——Christ himself signified, that it was impossible but that the things which were spoken concerning him, should be fulfilled. (Luke xxiv. 44.) "That all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning me." (Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.) "But how then shall the scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" (Mark xiv. 49.) "But the scriptures must be fulfilled." And so the apostle, (Acts i. 16, 17.) "This scripture must needs have been fulfilled."

4. All the promises, which were made to the church of old, of the Messiah as a future Saviour, from that made to our first parents in paradise, to that which was delivered by the prophet *Malachi*, shew it to be impossible that Christ should not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient predictions given to God's church, of the Messiah as a Saviour, were of the nature of promises; as is evident by the predictions themselves, and the manner of delivering them. But they are expressly, and very often called *promises* in the New Testament; (as in *Luke* i. 54, 55, 72, 73. *Acts* xiii. 32, 33. *Rom.* i. 1—3. and chap. xv. 8. *Heb.* vi. 13, &c.) These promises were often made with great solemnity, and confirmed with an oath; as (Gen. xxii. 16, 17.) "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, that in blessing, I will bless thee, and in multiplying, I will multiply thy seed as the stars of heaven and as the sand which is upon the sea-shore:——And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." (Compare *Luke*

i. 72, 73. and *Gal.* iii. 8, 15, 16.) The Apostle in *Heb.* vi. 17, 18. speaking of this promise to *Abraham*, says, "Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two IMMUTABLE things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE for God to lie, we might have strong consolation." In which words, the *necessity* of the accomplishment, or (which is the same thing) the *impossibility* of the contrary, is fully declared. So God confirmed the promise of the Messiah's great salvation, made to *David*, by an oath; (Psal. lxxxix. 3, 4.) "I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant; thy seed will I establish forever, and build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing so abundantly set forth in scripture, as sure and irrefragable, as this promise and oath to *David*. (See *Psalm* lxxxix. 34—36. 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 5. *Isai.* lv. 4. *Acts* ii. 29, 30. and xiii. 34.) The scripture expressly speaks of it as utterly *impossible* that this promise and oath to *David*, concerning the everlasting dominion of the Messiah should fail. (Jer. xxxiii 15, &c.) "In those days, and at that time, I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto David.—For thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the House of Israel." (Ver. 20, 21.) "If you can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in their season; then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that He should not have a son to reign upon his throne." (So in ver. 25, 26.) Thus abundant is the Scripture in representing how *impossible* it was, that the promises made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah should fail: which implies, that it was impossible that this Messiah, the second *Adam*, the promised seed of *Abraham* and of *David*, should fall from his integrity as the first *Adam* did.

5. All the promises that were made to the Church of God under the Old Testament, of the great enlargement of the Church, and advancement of her glory in the days of the Gospel, after the coming of the Messiah; the increase of her light, liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, &c. of which so great a part of the Old Testament consists; which are repeated so often, are so variously exhibited, so frequently introduced with great pomp and solemnity, and are so abundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations; I say all these promises imply that the Messiah should perfect the work of redemption: and this implies, that he should persevere in the work, which the Father had appointed Him, being in all things conformed to his Will. These promises were often confirmed by an oath. (See *Isai.* liv. 9. with the context; *chap.* lxii. 18.) And it is represented as utterly impossible that these

promises should fail. (*Isa.* xlix. 15. with the context, *chap.* liv. 10. with the context; *chap.* li. 4—8. *chap.* xl. 8. with the context.) And therefore it was *impossible*, that the Messiah should fail, or commit sin.

6. It was *impossible* that the Messiah should fail of persevering in integrity and holiness, as the first *Adam* did, because this would have been inconsistent with the promises, which God made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her husband; implying, that he should "save his people from their sins," that God would "give Him the throne of his Father David," that he should "reign over the house of Jacob for ever;" and that "of his kingdom there shall be no end."—These promises were sure, and it was *impossible* they should fail. And therefore the Virgin *Mary*, in trusting fully to them, acted reasonably, having an immoveable foundation of her faith: as *Elizabeth* observes, (ver. 45) "And blessed is she that believeth: for there shall be a performance of those things, which were told her from the Lord."

7. That it should have been possible that Christ should sin, and so fail in the work of our redemption, does not consist with the eternal purpose and decree of God, revealed in the Scriptures, that He would provide salvation for fallen man in and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to sinners through the preaching of the Gospel. Thus much is implied in many Scriptures, (as 1 *Cor.* ii. 7.—*Eph.* i. 4. 5. and chap. iii. 9—11.—1 *Pet.* i. 19, 20.) Such an absolute decree as this, *Arminians* allow to be signified in many texts: their election of nations and societies, and general election of the Christian Church, and conditional election of particular persons, imply this. God could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save all that should believe in and obey Christ, unless he had absolutely decreed, that salvation should be provided, and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the *Arminians* themselves strenuously maintain,) a decree of God infers *necessity;* hence it became *necessary* that Christ should persevere and actually work out salvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of sin.

8. That it should have been possible for Christ's Holiness to fail, is not consistent with what God promised to his Son, before all ages. For that salvation should be offered to men, through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers, is at least implied in that certain and infallible promise spoken of by the apostle (Tit. i. 2.) "In hope of eternal life; which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began." This does not seem to be controverted by *Arminians.**

9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his

* See Dr. WHITBY on the five Points, p. 48, 49, 50.

Father's Will, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son, the *Logos* that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took the human nature: as may be seen in *Psa.* xl. 6—8, compared with the apostle's interpretation, *Heb.* x. 5—9.) "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire: mine ears hast thou opened, (or bored;) burnt-offering and sin-offering Thou hast not required. Then said I, Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy Will, O my God, yea, thy law is within my heart." Where is a manifest allusion to the covenant, which the willing servant, who loved his master's service, made with his master, to be his servant for ever, on the day wherein he had his ear bored; which covenant was probably inserted in the public records, called the VOLUME OF THE BOOK, by the judges who were called to take cognizance of the transaction; (*Exod.* xxi.) If the *Logos*, who was with the Father before the world, and who made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father in the human nature, and the promise was as it were recorded, that it might be made sure, doubtless it was *impossible* that it should fail; and so it was *impossible* that Christ should fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human nature.

10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the Will of his Father, and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for sinners, then the salvation of all the saints who were saved from the beginning of the world to the death of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation. The Messiah, and the redemption which He was to work out by his obedience unto death, was the saving foundation of all that ever were saved. Therefore, if when the Old Testament saints had the pardon of their sins and the favour of God promised them, and salvation bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he came, might commit sin, then all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable, but liable to fail; something which it was possible might never be. God did, as it were, trust to what his Son had engaged and promised to do in future time, and depended so much upon it, that He proceeded actually to save men on the account of it, as though it had been already done. But this trust and dependence of God, on the supposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a staff that was weak, and might possibly break. The saints of old trusted on the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and completed by the Messiah, and built their comfort upon it: *Abraham* saw Christ's Day, and rejoiced; and he and the other Patriarchs died in the faith of the promise of it. (*Heb.* xi. 13.) But on this supposition, their faith, their comfort, and their salvation, was built on a fallible foundation; Christ was not to them "*a*

tried stone, a sure foundation;" (*Isai.* xxviii. 16.) *David* entirely rested on the covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious dominion and salvation of the Messiah; and said it was all his salvation, and all his desire, and comforts himself that this covenant was an "everlasting covenant, ordered in all things and sure," (2 Sam. xxiii. 5.) But if Christ's virtue might fail, he was mistaken: his great comfort was not built so sure," as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the determinations of the Free-Will of Christ's human soul; which was subject to no necessity, and might be determined either one way or the other. Also the dependence of those who "*looked for redemption in Jerusalem, and waited for the consolation of Israel,*" (*Luke* ii. 25 and 38.) and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and followed him, that they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom, were built on a sandy foundation.

11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his course of obedience, and while in the midst of temptations and trials, was abundant in positively predicting his own future glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church, the salvation of the Gentiles through him, &c. and in promises of blessings he would bestow on his true disciples in his future kingdom; on which promises he required the full dependence of his disciples. (*John* xiv.) But the disciples would have no ground for such dependence, if Christ had been liable to fail in his work: and Christ himself would have been guilty of presumption, in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things, which depended on a mere contingence; viz. the determinations of his Free Will, consisting in a freedom *ad utrumque*, to either sin or holiness, standing in indifference, and incident, in thousands of future instances, to go either one way or the other.

Thus it is evident, that it was *impossible* that the Acts of the Will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father; or, in other words, they were necessarily so conformed.

I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it being a thing denied by some of the greatest *Arminians*, by *Episcopius* in particular; and because I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between *Calvinists* and *Arminians*, concerning the necessity of such a freedom of will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit or demerit. I now therefore proceed,

II. To consider whether CHRIST, in his holy behaviour on earth, was not thus a *moral agent*, subject to *commands, promises, &c.*

Dr. WHITBY very often speaks of what he calls a freedom ad utrumlibet, without necessity, as requisite to *law and commands;* and speaks of necessity as entirely inconsistent with *injunctions and prohibitions.* But yet we read of Christ being the subject of his Father's commands. (*John* x. 18. and xv. 10.) And Christ tells us, that every thing that he *said* or *did*, was in compliance with "commandments he had received of the Father;" (John xii. 49, 50. and xiv. 31.) And we often read of Christ's *obedience* to his Father's commands, (*Rom.* v. 19. *Phil.* ii. 18. *Heb.* v. 8.)

The forementioned writer represents *promises offered as motives* to persons to do their duty, or *a being moved and induced by promises*, as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein persons have not a liberty *ad utrumlibet*, but are necessarily determined to one. (See particularly, p. 298, and 311.) But the thing which this writer asserts, is demonstrably false if the Christian religion be true. If there be any truth in Christianity or the holy scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had his Will infallibly and unalterably determined to good, and that alone; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to him, on condition of his persevering in, and perfecting the work which God had appointed him; (*Isa.* liii. 10, 11, 12. *Psa.* ii. and cx. *Isai.* xlix. 7, 8, 9.) In *Luke* xxii. 28, 29, Christ says to his disciples, "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me." The word most properly signifies to appoint by covenant or promise. The plain meaning of Christ's words is this: "As you have partaken of my temptations and trials, and have been steadfast, and have overcome; I promise to make you partakers of my reward, and to give you a kingdom; as the Father has promised me a kingdom for continuing steadfast and overcoming in those trials." And the words are well explained by those in Rev. iii. 21. "To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me on my throne; even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne." And Christ had not only promises of glorious success and rewards made to his obedience and sufferings, but the scriptures plainly represent him as using these promises for motives and inducements to obey and suffer; and particularly that promise of a kingdom which the Father had appointed him, or sitting with the Father on his throne; (as in Heb. xii. 1, 2.) "Let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith; who for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down on the right hand of the throne of God."

And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert that the holy and excellent temper and behaviour of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such great trials, was not *virtuous* or *praiseworthy;* because his Will was not free *ad utrumque*, to either holiness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one; that upon this account there is no virtue at all in all Christ's humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world, heavenly-mindedness, submission to the Will of God, perfect obedience to his commands unto death, even the death of the cross, his great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his faithfulness to God and man under such great trials; his praying for his enemies even when nailing him to the cross; that *virtue*, when applied to these things *is but an empty name;* that there was no merit in any of these things; that is, that Christ was *worthy* of nothing at all on account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honour or respect from God and man; because his Will was not indifferent, and free either to these things or the contrary; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it *impossible* that he should choose the contrary; that upon this account, to use Dr. WHITBY's language, *it would be sensibly unreasonable* that the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things.

According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently set forth in scripture as the *first-born of every creature*, as having *in all things the pre-eminence*, and as the highest of all creatures in virtue, honour, and worthiness of esteem, praise and glory, on account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or praise, than the very least of saints; yea, no more worthy than a clock or mere machine that is purely passive, and moved by natural necessity.

If we judge by scriptural representations of things, we have reason to suppose that Christ took on him our nature, and dwelt with us in this world in a suffering state, not only to satisfy for our sins, but that he being in our nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and proper *example*, leader and captain, in the exercise of glorious and victorious virtue, and might be a visible instance of the glorious end and reward of it; that we might see in him the beauty, amiableness, and true honour and glory, and exceeding benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to practise; and might thereby learn, and be animated to seek the like glory and honour, and to obtain the like glorious reward. (See *Heb.* ii. 9,—14, with v. 8, 9. and xii. 1, 2, 3. *John* xv. 10. *Rom.* viii. 17. 2 *Tim.* ii. 11, 12. 1 *Pet.* ii. 19, 20. and iv. 13.) But if there was nothing of any virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise, or commendation at

all, in all that he did, because it was all necessary, and he could not help it; then how is here any thing so proper to animate and incite us, free creatures, *by patient continuance in well-doing, to seek for honour, glory, and virtue?*

God speaks of himself as peculiarly well pleased with the righteousness of this distinguished servant. (Isai. xlii. 21.) "The Lord is well pleased for his righteousness sake." The sacrifices of old are spoken of as a sweet savour to God, but the obedience of Christ as far more acceptable than they. (Psal. xl. 6, 7.) "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire: Mine ear hast thou opened [as thy servant performing willing obedience;] burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required: then said I, Lo, I come [as a servant that cheerfully answers the calls of his master:] I delight to do thy will, O my God, and thy law is within mine heart." (Matt. xvii. 5.) "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well-pleased." And Christ tells us expressly, that the Father loves him for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his voluntary yielding himself to death, in compliance with the Father's command, (John x. 17, 18.) "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life:—No man taketh it from me; but I lay it down of myself—This commandment received I of my Father."

And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious rewards, the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mistaken, by the account that is given of them, (*Rev.* v. 8—12.) "The four beasts and the four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours:—and they sung a new song, saying, Thou art WORTHY to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain.—And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands, saying with a loud voice, worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing."

Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive, as the reward of his obedience to the Father's commandments. (John xii. 49, 50.) "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak: and I know that his commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak."—God promises to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his being his righteous servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and afflictions, (Isa. liii. 11, 12.) "He shall see the travail of his soul and be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant

justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto death." The scriptures represent God as rewarding him far above all his other servants, (Phil. ii. 7—9.) "He took on him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name." (Psal. xlv. 7.) "Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness; therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows."

There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits bestowed in consequence of Christ's obedience, are not properly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward, in the most proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent in quality or behaviour, in testimony of well-pleasedness in that moral excellency, and of respect and favour on that account? If we consider the nature of a reward most strictly, and make the utmost of it, and add to the things contained in this description proper merit or worthiness, and the bestowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise; still it will be found, there is nothing belonging to it but what the scripture most expressly ascribes to the glory bestowed on Christ, after his sufferings; as appears from what has been already observed: there was a glorious benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent, being called *Righteousness* and *Obedience;* there was great favour, love, and well pleasedness, for this righteousness and obedience, in the bestower; there was proper merit, or worthiness of the benefit, in the obedience; it was bestowed in fulfilment of promises, made to that obedience; and was bestowed *therefore*, or *because* he had performed that obedience.

I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here in the flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last *Adam*, as Christ is called, (1 *Cor.* xv. 45. *Rom.* v. 14.) taking on him the human nature, and so the form of a servant, and being under the law to stand and act for us, was put into a state of trial, as the first *Adam* was.—Dr. WHITBY mentions these three things as evidences of persons being in a state of trial (on the Five Points, p. 289, 299.) namely, their afflictions being spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each of these. Concerning promises made to him, I have spoken already. The difficulties and *afflictions* he met with in the course of his obedience, are called his *temptations* or *trials*,

(Luke xxii. 28.) "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations *or* trials." (Heb. ii. 18.) "For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted [or tried] he is able to succour them that are tempted." And (chap. iv. 15.) "We have not an high-priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." And as to his being tempted by *Satan*, it is what none will dispute.

SECT. III.

The case of such as are given up of God to Sin, and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with Blameworthiness.

Dr. WHITBY asserts freedom, not only from coaction, but necessity, to be essential to any thing deserving the name of sin, and to an action being *culpable;* in these words, (Discourse on Five Points, edit. 3. p. 348.) "If they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission or commission could deserve that name: it being essential to the nature of sin, according to St. AUSTIN's definition, that it be an action *à quo liberum est abstinere.* Three things seem plainly necessary to make an action or omission culpable; 1. That it be in our power to perform or forbear it: for, as ORIGEN, and all the Fathers say, no man is blameworthy for not doing what he could not do." And elsewhere the doctor insists, that "when any do evil of necessity, what they do is no vice, that they are guilty of no fault,* are worthy of no blame, dispraise,† or dishonour,‡ but are unblameable."§

If these things are true, in Dr. WHITBY's sense of Necessity, they will prove all such to be blameless, who are given up of God to sin, in what they commit after they are thus given up——That there is such a thing as men being judicially given up to sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly informs us; such a thing being often there spoken of: as in Psal. lxxxi. 12. "So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they walked in their own counsels." (Acts vii. 42.) "Then God turned, and gave them up to worship the host of heaven." (Rom. i. 24.) "Wherefore, God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves." (Ver. 26.) "For this cause God gave them up to vile affections." (Ver. 28.) "And even as they did

* Discourse on the Five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377, † 303, 326, 329, and many other places. ‡ 371. § 304, 361.

not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient."

It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's "giving men up to their own hearts' lusts" signifies, it is sufficient to observe, that hereby is certainly meant God so ordering or disposing things, in some respect or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the consequence should be men continuing in their sins. So much as men are given up *to*, so much is the consequence of their being given up, whether that be less or more. If God does not order things so, by action or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the event proves that they are not given up to that consequence. If good be the consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in that good; which mercy must be contrary to God's judgment in giving up to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given up to evil as the consequence, then the persons who are the subjects of this judgment, must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.

If not only *coaction*, but *all necessity*, will prove men blameless, then *Judas* was blameless, after Christ had given him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and that he should *verily* betray him. He was guilty of no sin in betraying his Master, on this supposition; though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin, more heinous than the sin of *Pilate* in crucifying him. And the *Jews* in *Egypt*, in *Jeremiah's* time, were guilty of no sin in their not worshipping the true God, after God had "sworn by his great name, that his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judah, in all the land of Egypt." (Jer. xliv. 26.)

Dr. WHITBY (Disc. on Five Points, p. 302, 303) denies, that men in this world are ever so given up by God to sin, that their wills should be necessarily determined to evil; though he owns, that hereby it may become *exceeding difficult* for men to do good, having a strong bent and powerful inclination to what is evil.—But if we should allow the case to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essential to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of sin *impossible*. For if an *impossibility* of avoiding sin wholly excuses a man; then for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it excuses him in part; and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty.—If the influence of *moral* impossibility or inability be the same to excuse persons in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as that of *natural* inability, (which is supposed) then undoubtedly, in like man-

ner, *moral difficulty* has the same influence to excuse with *natural difficulty*. But all allow, that natural impossibility wholly excuses, and also that *natural difficulty* excuses in part, and makes the act or omission less blameable in proportion to the difficulty. All *natural difficulty*, according to the plainest dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blameable as if there had been no difficulty in the case: and so the greater the difficulty is, still the more excusable, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as *natural* impossibility wholly excuses and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossibility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proportion to that approach. And if the case of *moral* impossibility or necessity be just the same with *natural* necessity or coaction, as to its influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of natural difficulty does not differ in influence to excuse a neglect, from moral difficulty arising from a strong bias or bent to evil, such as Dr. WHITBY owns in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be lessened, in proportion to the difficulty and approach to impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of difficulty, the person is in great part excused, and is nine degrees in ten less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all; and he has but one degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain, on *Arminian* principles; *viz.* because as difficulty, by antecedent bent and bias on the will, is increased, liberty of indifference, and self-determination in the will, is diminished: so much hindrance, impediment is there, in the way of the will acting freely by mere self-determination.—And if ten degrees of such hindrance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of blameableness, *cæteris paribus*, in the neglect; the man being no further blameable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that affair; for blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a good use or abuse of liberty.

From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all more exposed to sin, or any thing blameable: because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is required and expected. Though in one respect exposedness to sin is increased, *viz.* by an increase of exposedness to the evil action or omission; yet it is diminished in another respect to balance it; namely, as the sinfulness or blameableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same proportion.—

So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was.

To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a self-moving power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a certain degree, *ex. gr.* to move itself up or down with a force equal to a weight of ten pounds; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move itself down with that force; for which it has power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed of it.—But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in the opposite scale, which in force entirely counter-balances its self-moving power, and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all; and therefore wholly excuses it from any such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not impossible, but yet more difficult; so that it can now only move down with the force of one pound: but however, this is all that is required of it under these circumstances; it is wholly excused from nine parts of its motion: and if the scale under these circumstances neglect to move and remain at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion; for which it had as much liberty and advantage, as in usual circumstances it has for the greater motion which in such a case would be required. So that this new difficulty does not at all increase its exposedness to any thing blameworthy.

And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's *duty* or proclivity to sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever, is an inconsistence according to Dr. WHITBY's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding of sin and blame, and the doing of what is virtuous and praiseworthy, must be always equally easy.

Dr. WHITBY's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin, &c. led him into another great inconsistence. He abundantly insists that necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or fault. He says in the forementioned treatise, (p. 14.) *Who can blame a person for doing what he could not help?* And (p. 15.) *It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid.* And (p. 341.) to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, saying, *Why doth God command if man hath not free will and power to obey?* And again, in the same and next page, *Who will not cry out that it is folly to command him that hath not liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn him that has it not in his power to do what is required?* And (p. 373.) he cites another saying, *A law is given to him*

that can turn to both parts; i. e. obey or transgress it: but no law can be against him who is bound by nature.

And yet the same Dr. WHITBY asserts, that fallen Man is not able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words. "The nature of *Adam* had power to continue innocent and without sin; whereas, it is certain our nature never had." But if we have not power to continue innocent and without Sin, then Sin is not inconsistent with Necessity, and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid; and those things cannot be true which he asserts elsewhere, namely, "That if we be necessitated, neither Sins of omission nor commission would deserve that name." (p. 348.) If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blameless: and if so, we are under a *Necessity* of being blameworthy. And how does this consist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsistent with blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience to all the commands of God, then we are under a Necessity of breaking some commands in some degree; having no power to perform so much as is commanded. And if so, why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to do?

Arminians in general are very inconsistent with themselves, in what they say of the inability of fallen Man in this respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God to require any thing of us beyond our present power and ability to perform; and also hold that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to satisfy for the *imperfections of our obedience*, and has made way that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect: wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the grossest inconsistence. For, (as I have observed elsewhere) "they hold that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law that they were under originally, and instead of it has introduced a more mild constitution, and put us under a new law, which requires no more than imperfect sincere obedience, in compliance with our poor infirm impotent circumstances since the fall."

Now how can these things be made consistent? I would ask, of what law are these imperfections of our obedience a breach? If they are a breach of no law that we were ever under, then they are not Sins. And if they be not Sins, what need of Christ dying to satisfy for them? But if they are Sins, and the breach of some law, what law is it? They cannot be a breach of their new law, for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with imperfections: and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot

be a breach of their old law: for that, they say, is entirely abolished; and we never were under it.—They say it would not be just in God to require of us *perfect* obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And, therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ dying to satisfy for them? What need of his *suffering* to satisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no *suffering?* What need of Christ dying, to purchase that our *imperfect* obedience should be accepted, when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience than *imperfect* should be required? What need of Christ dying to make way for God's accepting of such obedience, as it would be unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously?—If it be said that Christ died to satisfy that old law for us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law; still I would inquire, what need of Christ dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we should be under, whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present state, we are not able to keep it?

So the *Arminians* are inconsistent with themselves, not only in what they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those imperfections which we cannot avoid, but also in what they say of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of the new law. "I grant indeed (says Dr. STEBBING*) that by reason of original Sin, we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition, without new grace from God. But I say, then, that he gives such a grace to all of us, by which the performance of the condition is truly possible; and upon this ground he may, and doth most righteously require it." If Dr. STEBBING intends to speak properly, by *grace* he must mean that assistance which is of grace, or of free favour and kindness. But yet in the same place he speaks of it as very *unreasonable*, *unjust*, and *cruel*, for God to require that as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by original Sin. If it be so, what *grace* is there in giving assistance and ability to perform the condition of pardon? Or why is that called by the name of grace, that is an absolute debt, which God is bound to bestow, and which it would be unjust and cruel in Him to withhold, seeing he requires that *as the condition of pardon*, which he cannot perform without it?

* Treatise of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 edit. p. 112. 113.

SECT. IV.

*Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.**

It being so much insisted on by *Arminian* writers, that necessity is inconsistent with law or command, and particularly,

* The subject of "obligation to obedience," or MORAL OBLIGATION, though expressed in the title of this section, is not professedly handled by our author, either here or in any other part of the work. His professed object in this place is to prove that obligation to obey commands is not weakened by moral inability. But though this conclusion is established by many considerations, yet the *nature* and *grounds* of obligation are not pointed out, which might afford evidence WHY moral *obligation* is consistent with moral *inability?* The subject is confessedly profound; but, perhaps, the following series of remarks may contribute, in some degree, to assist our enquiries, and to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion.

1. *Obligation*, if we regard the term, is a *binding power*, or an *irresistible force*; but, in reference to morality and voluntary actions, obligation is expressive of a *hypothetical indispensable connection between an antecedent and a consequent;* or between an end proposed, and the means of obtaining it. Thus, IF a moral agent would attain the *end*, he is *obliged*, or bound indispensably, to use the required *means*. And, on the contrary, IF a moral agent adopt a *different* antecedent from what is required, not only he shall not attain to the proposed consequent, but *another* consequent is to follow, indispensably connected with the antecedent actually adopted, by a necessity of consequence. Therefore,

2. The *consequent*, or the *end*, which is proposed by the moral Governor, is always a supposed *good;* for it would be unworthy of a governor wise and good to propose any other, especially as the antecedent prescribed and required is indispensably connected with it. But if the connection be broken by the free agent, by the adoption of an antecedent naturally connected with a different consequent, he then becomes *naturally* obliged, or forced, to sustain a proportionable *evil*.

3. In the system of moral government, it is the prerogative of the supreme Governor to propose the *consequent* of the indispensable connection; and it is the part of the moral agent, who in the *act of choice* is left *free*, to choose the antecedent, which the governor has objectively furnished, and indispensably required. To this choice he is *morally*, or hypothetically bound, yet is *naturally* free; and IF the required choice be made, the *good* follows; but IF NOT, the corresponding evil follows. For instance; if the forgiveness of sin be the consequent proposed, and repentance the antecedent required: the agent is *morally bound* to repent, but *naturally free*. If, however, he break through the moral bond, which is done by abusing his natural freedom, or continuing his wrong choice, forgiveness does not follow, but he stands exposed to the natural and threatened consequence of that wrong choice, or impenitence.

4. Hence it is obvious, that in the system of providence, and the execution of all decretive designs, it is the prerogative of the Sovereign of the Universe to *establish* the chain of all *antecedents*, and the consequents follow from the nature of things: but in the system of moral government, it is equally obvious, the reverse takes place; for here the supreme Governor proposes, and *establishes* objectively, the chain of *consequents*, while the moral agent, or the obligee, establishes *optionally* the antecedents; and as the *actual* choice of an antecedent is, such will be the *actual* consequence. When the moral agent chooses that antecedent which is required, or which is conformable to rectitude, the proposed consequent is obtained by the nature of things; but when that which is not required, or is not

that it is absurd to suppose God, by his command, should require that of men which they are unable to do; not allowing, in this

conformable to rectitude, is chosen for an antecedent, the evil consequence flows from the same nature of things, that is, from the essence of eternal truth.

5. *Required* antecedents are either *a state of mind*, or *voluntary actions*; according as the particular consequent proposed may be. For example, if *happiness* be the end, or consequent proposed, *holiness*, or a *holy state of mind* is the mean, or antecedent required. If we would *see the Lord*, we must be *holy*, or *pure in heart*, by a new birth unto righteousness. If *justification* be the end proposed, *believing* is a mean required. For to us *righteousness shall be imputed*, IF we *believe*. If a subsequent *favourable treatment* of the obligee be the end proposed; *obedience*, or conformity to rule, is the mean required.

6. When an agent is said to be obliged *in* or *by* any thing or consideration, that thing or consideration *in* or *by* which he is obliged, is to be considered as the *consequent* proposed; and the state or act leading to it is the antecedent required. To be obliged *in conscience, in duty, in law, in honour, &c.* expresses the *end* to be obtained by a certain state or conduct as the mean or antecedent required. Thus, for instance, if *conscience* be *satisfied*, if *duty* be *discharged*, if *law* be *conformed to*, or if *honour* be *secured*, the required antecedent means *must* be adopted, or such acts *must* be performed.

7. If the *required* antecedents be not performed, it is manifest that the free agent has voluntarily established *other* antecedents, and the *injurious consequents* of these last flow (as before observed) from the nature of things; which consequents will be similar or dissimilar to those proposed by the supreme Governor, in proportion as the antecedent established voluntarily by the agent, is similar or dissimilar to what was required. Hence we may see the *true standard* and measure of guilt, and of the different *gradations* of praise or blame.

8. Having considered the NATURE of moral obligation, let us now advert to the SUBJECT of it. This enquiry has more immediately for its object the *qualifications* of the moral agent, or those *considerations* whereby he stands *obliged*, in contradistinction to those beings in the universe that are not moral agents. An attentive and long continued investigation of the subject has taught us, that they are included in these three particulars: (1.) A natural *capacity* of moral enjoyment. (2.) A sufficiency of suitable *means*. And (3.) A *freedom* from compulsion in the choice of means.—Whatever being is possessed of these qualifications is morally obliged; for he has a *suitable* ability to establish his own antecedents as required, in order that the proposed consequents may follow.

9. The *first* qualification is *a* NATURAL CAPACITY *of moral enjoyments*. This belongs to no being that is not a free agent: but to every being who is so, it inseparably belongs. This, more than any superior degree of reason, (however great, and however forcible the influence from that superiority) constitutes the chief and *most essential* difference between men and brutes. That such a *capacity* is an indispensably requisite qualification, is clear. For free agency necessarily implies a consequent moral advantage, or a natural good to be morally enjoyed, either explicitly proposed by the moral Governor, or fairly implied in the system of moral government; but this could not be proposed if there were no capacity of enjoyment as now stated. And this consequent advantage may properly be called the perpetual *enjoyment of God*, the chief good; because the *chief end* of all subordinate enjoyments, as well as of all obedience, and the sum total of all *happiness*, is the conscious enjoyment of *divine favour and excellence*.

10. The *second* qualification is *a sufficiency of suitable* MEANS. This is indispensably requisite; for to require an *end* while the *means* are out of the agent's reach, or *physically out of his power*, and that under the forfeiture of the Governor's displeasure, is of the very essence of injustice. But the divine Governor is "a God of truth, and without iniquity; just and right is he." And that these means ought to be *sufficient* and *suitable* in their own nature to attain the end; in other words, that the antecedents required to be adopted by the agent, are *infallibly connected* with the proposed consequent, is equally plain, for the same reason that there should be any means at all. For means *in themselves* insufficient and unsuitable have no true connection with the end proposed; even as a law *in itself* bad, has morally no obliging power.

11. The *third* qualification is *a* FREEDOM *from constraint and compulsion in the*

case, for any difference between natural and moral Inability; I would, therefore, now particularly consider this matter.—And for greater clearness, I would distinctly lay down the following things.

1. The will *itself*, and not only those *actions* which are the effects of the will, is the proper object of Precept or Command. That is, such a state or acts of men's wills are in many cases properly required of them by Commands; and not only those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest; for it is the soul only that is properly and directly the subject of Precepts or Commands; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving Commands. The motions or state of the body are matter of Command, only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any Command, but the faculty of the

choice of means, or in the voluntary establishment of antecedents. By "constraint" and "compulsion," we mean a physical interference with the free agent in his *act of choice*, in such a sense, as that the choice would not be *the genuine effect of the motive;* or, that the nature of the fruit should not *correspond* with the nature of the tree; but some extraneous force interposing would make the nature of the volition to be different from the nature of the mind or disposition, which otherwise would be its immediate cause.

12. Divine influence is admitted to be requisite, in order to prepare *the state of the mind* for a right choice, even as a good tree is requisite for good fruit; but this is no interference with *the act of choice* itself, nor has it the least tendency to break the connection between motive and choice, or between the mind and its volition.—Such *influence*, indeed, forms one glorious link of the decretive chain, which the sovereign Governor has established as so many antecedents; and a *right choice*, in a free agent thus divinely influenced, or formed anew, is the unrestrained and unimpelled *effect* which follows by a *necessity* of consequence. In other words, no bad *choice* can possibly follow, but by a failure in the *cause*, the mind or disposition itself.

13. On this principle it is, that the sovereign Being himself *never errs* in his choice. The *source* from which the act of choice proceeds is perfectly good, (an infinitely holy nature) and the *connection* between this cause and the effect, which is a right choice, is infallibly and in the nature of things necessarily secure. Hence it is that we never admit, or suspect, an error in his choice, however great his freedom; and hence we have a firm ground of confidence, that the Judge of the whole earth will do *right*.

14. The three qualifications mentioned belong to man as a *free agent;* but we must not confound this idea with that of *a subject of moral government* An infant may be the subject of government, both human and divine; but cannot be, properly speaking, a free agent. Here it follows, that the *first* of the qualifications mentioned *alone* is essential to constitute a subject of *moral government*, in the most extensive sense of the term, but in order to constitute that class of subjects who are *also free agents*, the other two are essential.

15. When these *three* qualifications are found in any free agent, *nothing more* is requisite to constitute *moral obligation*. An *end* is proposed—*means* firmly connected with that end are afforded, and required to be used—these means are physically *in the power* of the agent—who is also *free* from all constraint and compulsion in his *act of choice*. If these qualifications are not sufficient *morally to oblige*, we are fully persuaded nothing can be sufficient.—As to the notion, that *moral ability* is necessary to constitute moral obligation, which is maintained alike by many Arminians and most Antinomians, (for extremes will sometimes meet) our author abundantly demonstrates its futility and absurd contradictions.—W.

will; and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey, or refuse compliance: for the very notions of *consenting*, *yielding*, *accepting*, *complying*, *refusing*, *rejecting*, &c. are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of the will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another. Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the will of the commanded, to the manifested will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the soul, are Obedience or Disobedience only indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions of the will according to an established law of nature. So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required: and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct, and immediate subject of Command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by Command or Precept, nothing can; for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good will.

Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the will, or a series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the *first and determining act* is properly the subject of Command, and not only the consequent acts, which are dependent upon it. Yea, this more especially is that to which Command or Precept has a proper respect; because it is this act that determines the whole affair: in this act the Obedience or Disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all governed and determined by it. This governing act must be the proper object of Precept, or none.

Corol. 2. It also follows from what has been observed, that if there be any act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of choice in the case, directing and determining what the acts of the will shall be; that act of the soul cannot properly be subject to any Command or Precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to Commands *directly*, because they are no acts of the will; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will, determining and giving rise to all its acts: they not being acts of the will, there can be in them no consent to, or compliance with any Command. Neither can they be subject to Command or Precept *indirectly* or *remotely*; for they are not so much as the *effects* or *consequences* of the will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any Obedience in that original act of the soul, determining all volitions, it is an act of Obedience wherein the will has no concern at all; it preceding every act of will. And therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing Obedience or rebellion, no compli-

ance or opposition of the will in the affair: and what sort of Obedience or rebellion is this?

And thus the *Arminian* notion of the freedom of the will consisting in the soul's determining its own acts of will, instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men being the subjects of moral government, is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the soul determines *all* its acts of will, it is therein subject to no Command or moral government, as has been now observed; because its original determining act is no act of will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition, to *every act* of will. And the soul cannot be the subject of Command in the act of the will itself, which depends on the foregoing determining act and is determined by it; in as much as this is necessary, being the necessary consequence and effect of that prior determining act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be the subject of Command or government in his external actions; because these are all necessary, being the necessary effects of the acts of the will themselves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of Command or moral government in nothing at all; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world.

So that the *Arminian* scheme, and not that of the *Calvinists*, is utterly inconsistent with moral government, and with all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises, or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatsoever to make their principles consist with these things. For if it be said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul, preceding the acts of the will, but that volitions are events that come to pass by pure accident, without any determining cause, this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts; for nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate perfect accident: which, by the supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case regulated by any thing preceding; but happens this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect uselessness of laws and precepts also follows from the *Arminian* notion of indifference, as essential to that liberty which is requisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to *bind to one side*; and the end of Commands is to turn the will one way: and therefore they are of no use, unless they turn or bias the will that way. But if liberty consists in indifference, then their biassing the will one way only, destroys liberty; as it puts the will out of equilibrium. So that the will having a bias, through the influence of binding law laid upon it, is not wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it will, without influence from without.

II. Having shewn that the will itself, especially in those acts which are original, leading and determining in any case, is the proper subject of Precept and Command—and not only

those alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects of the will—I now proceed in the *second* place to observe, that the very opposition or defect of the will itself, in its *original and determining act* in the case, to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral inability to that thing: or, in other words, whenever a Command requires a certain state or act of the will, and the person commanded, notwithstanding the Command and the circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds and will oppose [illegible] Command.

This is manifest from what was observed in the first part, concerning the nature of *moral* inability, as distinguished from *natural*: where it was observed, that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of inclination, under such circumstances and views. It is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the will is always, and in every individual act, necessarily determined by the strongest motive*; and so is always unable to go against the motive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the will.—But not further to insist on these things, the truth of the position now laid down, *viz.* that when

* Our author does not mean by "motive," the *object* presented to the mind according to its intrinsic worth; but he takes into the account also the *state* of the mind itself, in reference to that object, according to which will be the *appearance* of it. Therefore, strictly speaking, the *motive*, as he has intimated at the commencement of this work, denotes *the object as it stands in the view of the mind.* If we do not maintain this distinction, the dispute will soon degenerate into a confused logomachy; and we should be forced, in defending this position—that the will is "necessarily determined by the strongest motive"—to adopt this, the most absurd of all conclusions, that the will of every man in the present state always chooses what is really best, or *never errs* in its elections. Whereas the world is full of errors and delusions; things the most excellent in themselves, are commonly rejected, and others the most worthless are preferred. But this could not happen, except on this principle, that the *reality* of worth differs, in those instances, from the *appearance* of it. In such cases, the *difference* is not in the object, but in the mind, when the choice takes place. For instance; suppose the blessed God in his true character as revealed in the scriptures, the chief and an unchangeable good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked man, and his will *rejects* that good. Now, as the mind is incapable of rejecting a good, or of choosing an evil, *as such*; it is plain, that the proper and immediate cause of difference between the reality and the appearance of good, is in the *state* of the mind. Here lies the essence of an erroneous choice,—the will preferring an object which is *apparently* but not *really* preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably, that the *state of the mind* is the true and proper source of a right and wrong choice. This is it that influences the *appearance* of an object, so as to stand in the apprehension and practical judgment of the mind as worse or better than it *really* is. Therefore, the *true state of the mind* and the *real state of the object of choice*, united, are the genuine parents of the *objective appearance* in the mind, morally considered, or according to the qualities of good and evil; and this offspring—OBJECTIVE APPEARANCE—is what our author calls "the strongest motive."—W.

the will is opposite to, or failing of a compliance with a thing *in its original determination or act*, it is not able to comply, appears by the consideration of these two things.

1. The will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination, and when actually under its influences, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to [illegible] simplifies Present choice cannot at present [illegible] otherwise; for that would be at present [illegible] from what is at present chosen. If the [illegible] now considered, inclines or chooses to go that [illegible] it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way. To suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The will may oppose some future remote act that it is exposed to, but not its own present act.

2. As it is impossible that the will should comply with the thing commanded with respect to its *leading act*, by any act of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite *leading and original act*, or after it has actually come under the influence of that *determining choice or inclination;* so it is impossible it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing act; for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act; the opposite or non-complying act being that act which is *original* and *determining* in the case. Therefore it must be so, that if this *first determining act* be found non-complying, on the proposal of the command, the mind is morally unable to obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it to be able to determine and cause its *first determining act* to be otherwise, and that it has power better to govern and regulate its *first governing and regulating act*, which is absurd; for it is to suppose a prior act of the will, determining its first determining act; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading and governing the original and governing act of all; which is a contradiction.

Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not any ability to will contrary to what it does will, in the original and leading act of the will, because there is supposed to be no prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the will cannot immediately change itself, because it cannot at present incline to a change; yet the mind has an ability for the present to *forbear* to proceed to action, and taking time for deliberation; which may be an occasion of the change of the inclination.

I answer, (1.) In this objection, that seems to be forgotten which was observed before, *viz.* that the determining to take the matter into consideration is itself an act of the will: and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by precept. And if this act be the commanding act, then all that has been observed concerning the commanding act of the will remains true, that the very want of it is a moral inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are speaking concerning the first and leading act of the will about the affair; and if determining to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act; or whether it be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines that; or whatever be the original and leading act; still the foregoing proof stands good, that the non-compliance of the leading act implies moral inability to comply.

If it should be objected, that these things make all moral inability equal, and suppose men morally unable to will otherwise than they actually do will, in all cases, and equally so in every instance.—In answer to this objection, I desire two things may be observed.

First, That if by being *equally* unable, be meant, as *really* unable; then, so far as the inability is merely moral, it is true; the will, in every instance, acts by moral necessity, and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one case as another; as, I humbly conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding part of this essay. But yet, in some respect, the inability may be said to be greater in some instances than others: though the man may be truly unable, (if moral inability can truly be called inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do some things than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do. A person, whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and so, according to the common use of speech, has a greater inability for it. So it is in moral inability. A man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree prevails; or, contrary to that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and advantage now to move the will, in the least degree, superior to all other motives in view: but yet he is further from ability to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. And again, the Inability may, in some respects, be called

greater in some instances than others, as it may be *more general* and *extensive to all acts of that kind.* So men may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further from moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is *general* and *habitual*, than they who have only that Inability which is *occasional* and *particular.** Thus in cases of natural Inability; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects, further from being able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud or mist.

And besides, that which was observed in the first part of this discourse, concerning the Inability which attends a *strong and settled habit*, should be here remembered; *viz.* that a fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from *occasional volition*, namely, that endeavours to avoid future volitions of that kind which are agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For though it is impossible there should be any sincere endeavours against a present choice, yet there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person may desire and use means to prevent future exercises of a certain inclination; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be removed; but his desires and endeavours may be ineffectual. The man may be said in some sense to be unable; yea, even as the word *unable* is a *relative term*, and has relation to ineffectual endeavours; yet not with regard to present, but remote endeavours.

Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed before, that indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of *Inability;* and that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said to have a thing *in his power*, if he has it at his election; and he cannot be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct, and immediate desire for it. As to those desires and endeavours that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with regard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises, they are remote desires and endeavours in two respects. *First*, as to *time;* they are never against present volitions, but only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a distance. *Secondly*, as to their *nature;* these opposite desires are not directly and properly against the habit and inclination itself, or the volitions in which it is exercised; for these, in themselves considered, are agreeable; but against something else that attends them, or is their consequence; the opposition of the mind is levelled entirely against this; the vo-

* See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part I. Sect. IV.

litions themselves are not at all opposed directly, and for their own sake; but only indirectly and remotely, on the account of something foreign.

III. Though the opposition of the will itself, or the very want of will to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing; yet, if it be, as has been already shown, that the being of a good state or act of will is a thing most properly required by Command; then, in some cases, such a state or act of will may properly be required, which at present is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore those things may properly be commanded for which men have a moral Inability.

Such a state, or act of the will, may be required by Command, as does not already exist. For if that volition only may be commanded to be, which already is, there could be no use of Precept: Commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may such a will be required as is wanting before the Command is given, but also such as may possibly be wanting afterwards: such as the exhibition of the Command may not be effectual to produce or excite. Otherwise, no such thing as disobedience to a proper and rightful Command is possible in any case: and there is no case possible, wherein there can be a faulty disobedience. Which *Arminians* cannot affirm, consistently with their principle: for this makes Obedience to just and proper Commands always *necessary*, and disobedience impossible. And so the *Arminian* would overthrow himself, yielding the very point we are upon, which he so strenuously denies, viz. that Law and Command are consistent with necessity.

If merely that Inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in the opposition or defect of inclination, remaining after the Command is exhibited, then wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it. By how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so much is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more, therefore, has he of moral Inability, to the good required. His moral Inability consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness consists: and yet, according to *Arminian* principles, it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness; and by how much the more he has of it, by so much is he the further from wickedness.

Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inability alone (which consists in disinclination) never renders any thing improperly the subject matter of Precept or Command, and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or want of conformity to a command.

Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capacity, or external hindrance (which alone is properly called Inability) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing improperly the matter of Command. If men are excused from doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be commanded, it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the will itself, but either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances.—Here two or three things may be observed,

1. As to spiritual acts, or any good thing in the state or imminent acts of the will itself, or of the affections, (which are only certain modes of the exercise of the will) if persons are justly excused, it must be through want of capacity in the natural faculty or understanding. Thus the same spiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be required of men, as may be of angels; the capacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men cannot be required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no opportunity to see, or hear of, or know in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But the insufficiency of motives will not excuse; unless their being insufficient arises not from the moral state of the will or inclination itself, but from the state of the natural understanding. The great kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insufficient to excite gratitude in the person that receives the kindness, through his vile and ungrateful temper: in this case, the insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the will or inclination of heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of information adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a natural Inability, which entirely excuses it.

2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which do not consist in the imminent acts or state of the will itself—but are supposed to be required as effects of the will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding—that Inability, and that only, excuses, which consists in want of connection between them and the will. If the will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused; he has a natural Inability to the thing required. For the will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by Command; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the will. If therefore, there be a full compliance of will, the person has done his duty: and if other things do not prove

to be connected with his volition, that is not criminally owing to him.

3. Both these kinds of natural Inability, and all Inability that excuses, may be resolved into one thing; namely, want of natural capacity or strength; either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength.

Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability may properly be the matter of Precept or Command, then they may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing; the difference is only circumstantial: Commands are as much a manifestation of the will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between Command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his *kindness*, the goodness from which his will arises: in the former it is his *authority*. But whatever be the *ground* of will in him that speaks, or the *enforcement* of what he says, yet seeing neither his will nor his expectation is any more testified in the one case than the other; therefore, a person being directed *by invitation*, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs—in manifesting either a will, or expectation which he has not—than a person being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed *by command*, *is* an evidence of insincerity. So that all this grand objection of *Arminians* against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual duties, from the sincerity of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.*

* On the subject of Sincerity or Insincerity in prohibitions, commands, counsels, invitations, and the like, in cases where God foreknows that the event will not take place by the compliance of the moral agent addressed, we may remark a few particulars in addition to our author's reasoning:

1. The *sincerity* of prohibitions and commands, counsels and invitations, and the like, is *founded*—not in the *event* of things as good or bad, or the *knowledge* of events, or the *purpose* that secures some, or the *necessity* of consequence from which others flow, nor in the *moral ability* of the agent, but—in the *very nature and tendency* of the things themselves which are prohibited, commanded, or proposed, as *good* or *evil*, either *intrinsically*, if of a moral nature, or else *relatively*, if of positive appointment. Therefore,

2. Whether the *event* be compliance or non-compliance, the command, or invitation, &c. is *perfectly sincere*. For, in truth, these are neither more nor less than *testimonies* respecting the goodness or badness of the things in question, in the sense before mentioned, and the consequent *obligations* of the agent respecting them, under a forfeiture either declared or implied. Consequently,

3. *Insincerity* can attach to a command only on supposition that the goodness or badness of the *event* were the ground of the *signified* will, while at the same time *another event*, diverse from that which actually takes place, was *purposed* the same will. But,

SECT. V.

That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to excuse in the Non-performance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered.

It is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as repentance of sin, love to God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel, &c. yet may sincerely desire and endeavour after these things; and therefore must be excused; it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavour to do but cannot. Concerning this matter the following things may be observed.

1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross absurdity; even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. consisting in the exercise of the will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his inclination: for that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a man, in the state and acts of his will and inclination, properly and directly falls in with those duties, he therein performs them: for the duties themselves consist in that very thing; they consist in the state and acts of the will being so formed and directed. If the

4. Strictly speaking, *no events*, as such, are the objects of purpose; but rather, the purpose respects the good *antecedents*, whereby good events, following by necessity of consequence, are infallibly secured. Besides,

5. It is highly absurd, as must appear from the nature of law and obligation, to suppose that the sincerity of legislative or inviting will should depend on the *event* of compliance or non-compliance. Surely the *sincerity* of a lawgiver is not affected, whether all obey, or only some, or even none. Legislation is a *testimony* with sanctions, that the thing prohibited is evil, or the thing commanded is good, *to the party*. Hence,

6. The *consequent*, whether good or bad, is *objectively established*, or hypothetically proposed, by the legislator; and the *antecedent* is supposed to be within the reach, or, physically considered, *placed within the power*, of the agent. Therefore,

7. The agent's *abuse* of his physical power, in reference to the antecedent, constitutes the criminality, and the *right use* of it constitutes the virtue of an action. And then alone is physical power, in fact, *used aright* when it is the instrument of moral rectitude, or a *right state of mind*. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so, every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree (as such) cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree (as such) bring forth good fruit.—W.

soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move in that direction.

2. That which is called a *desire* and *willingness* for those inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has respect to these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly so called; not only because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in a distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because evermore, not these things themselves, but something else that is foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and desires.

A drunkard who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of a violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue; but being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort *desire* the virtue of temperance; and though his present will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperance, and forsake his excesses, through an unwillingness to part with his money: but still he goes on with his drunkenness; his wishes and endeavours are insufficient and ineffectual; such a man has no proper, direct, *sincere willingnesss* to forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it: for he acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess: his desire is very improperly called a willingness to be temperate; it is no true desire of that virtue; for it is not that virtue that terminates his wishes; nor have they any direct respect at all to it. It is only *the saving of his money*, or the avoiding of poverty, that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the vice of covetousness.

So a man of an exceedingly corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that from one generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption; and so having little hope of living long; and having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery; if under these circumstances he should, through fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposition: but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he continues still in his habitual distaste *of*, and enmity *to* God

and religion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and gratitude, (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell:) in this case, there is no sincere Willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good: these holy dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the will: they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul; but all is terminated on deliverance from torment: and these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as in themselves undesirable; as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, in order to save his life. From these things it appears,

3. That this indirect Willingness is not that exercise of the will which the command requires; but is entirely a different one; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of will to which the command has respect.

4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is commanded; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly destitute of the virtue which the command seeks.

Further to illustrate this matter. If a child has a most excellent father that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degree, merited his love and dutiful regard, and is withal very wealthy; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to those abject circumstances, which are exceedingly adverse to his avarice and ambition; he, therefore, wishes it were otherwise: but yet remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his settled hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect willingness to love and honour his father at all acquits or excuses before God, for his failing of actually exercising these dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either, That it answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the supposition; because the thing commanded is love and honour to his worthy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and so nothing else but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be, at least, because there is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required; and so balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willingness the son has merely from a regard

to money and honour, has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial respect required.

Sincerity and reality in that indirect willingness, which has been spoken of, does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called sincere; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some persons are sincerely *bad;* others are sincerely *good;* and others may be sincere and hearty in things which are in their own nature *indifferent;* as a man may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry. But being sincere, hearty, and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and besought Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pretence; they were very hearty in their desires not to be tormented; but this did not make their will or desire virtuous. And if men have sincere desires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required virtue.

And as a man's sincerity in such an indirect desire or *willingness* to do his duty as has been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of performance: so it is with *Endeavours* arising from such a willingness. The Endeavours can have no more goodness in them than the will of which they are the effect and expression. And therefore, however sincere and real, and however great a person's Endeavours are; yea, though they should be to the utmost of his ability: unless the will from which they proceed be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail or weight whatsoever in a moral respect. That which is not truly virtuous is, in God's sight, good for nothing: and so can be of no value, or influence, in his account, to make up for any moral defect. For nothing can counterbalance evil, but good. If *evil* be in one scale, and we put a great deal into the other of sincere and earnest Desires, and many and great Endeavours; yet, if there be no real *goodness* in all, there is no weight in it; and so it does nothing towards balancing the real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like subtracting a thousand noughts from before a real number, which leaves the sum just as it was.

Indeed such Endeavours may have a *negatively* good influence. Those things which have no positive virtue, have no positive moral influence; yet they may be an occasion of persons avoiding some positive evils. As if a man were in the water with a neighbour to whom he had ill will, and who could not swim, holding him by his hand; this neighbour was much in debt to him,—the man is tempted to let him sink and drown —but refuses to comply with the temptation; not from love to his neighbour, but from the love of money, and because by his drowning he should lose his debt; that which he does

in preserving his neighbour from drowning, is nothing good in the sight of God: yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had designedly let his neighbour sink and perish. But when *Arminians*, in their disputes with *Calvinists*, insist so much on sincere Desires and Endeavours, as what must excuse men, must be accepted of God, &c. it is manifest they have respect to some positive moral weight or influence of those Desires and Endeavours. Accepting, justifying, or excusing on the account of sincere Endeavours (as they are called) and men doing what they can, &c. has relation to some moral value, something that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing some defect.

But there is a great and unknown deceit, arising from the ambiguity of the phrase, *sincere Endeavours*. Indeed there is a vast indistinctness and unfixedness in most, or at least very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mistakes, strong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and endless controversy.—The word *sincere* is most commonly used to signify something that is good: men are habituated to understand by it the same as *honest* and *upright;* which terms excite an idea of something good in the strictest and highest sense; good in the sight of Him, who sees not only the outward appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men think that if a person be *sincere*, he will certainly be accepted. If it be said that any one is sincere in his Endeavours, this suggests, that his heart is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to virtuous inclination; he *honestly* and *uprightly* desires and endeavours to do as he is required; and this leads them to suppose, that it would be very hard and unreasonable to punish him, only because he is unsuccessful in his Endeavours, the thing endeavoured after being beyond his power.—Whereas it ought to be observed, that the word *sincere* has these different significations.

1. *Sincerity*, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no more than *reality of Will and Endeavour*, with respect to any thing that is professed or pretended; without any consideration of the nature of the principle or aim, whence this real Will and true Endeavour arises. If a man has some *real* desire either direct or indirect to obtain a thing, or does *really* endeavour after it, he is said *sincerely* to desire or endeavour, without any consideration of the goodness of the principle from which he acts, or any excellency or worthiness of the end for which he acts. Thus a man who is kind to his neighbour's wife who is sick and languishing, and very helpful in her case, makes a shew of desiring and endeavouring her restoration to health and vigour; and not only makes such a shew, but there

is a reality in his pretence, he does heartily and earnestly desire to have her health restored, and uses his true and utmost Endeavours for it; he is said *sincerely* to desire and endeavour after it, because he does so truly or really; though perhaps the principle he acts from is no other than a vile and scandalous passion; having lived in adultery with her, he earnestly desires to have her health and vigour restored, that he may return to his criminal pleasures. Or,

2. By *sincerity* is meant, not merely a *reality* of Will and Endeavour of some sort, and from some consideration or other, but a *virtuous sincerity*. That is, that in the performance of those particular acts that are the matter of virtue or duty, there be not only the matter, but the form and essence of virtue, consisting in the aim that governs the act, and the principle exercised in it. There is not only the reality of the act, that is, as it were, the *body* of the duty; but also the *soul*, which should properly belong to such a body. In this sense, a man is said to be sincere, when he acts with a *pure intention*; not from sinister views: he not only in reality desires and seeks the thing to be done, or qualification to be obtained, for some end or other; but he wills the thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed; the virtue of the thing is properly the object of the will.

In the former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to a mere pretence, and *shew of the particular thing to be done or exhibited*, without any real desire or endeavour at all. In the latter sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to that *shew of virtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty*, without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul. A man may be sincere in the former sense, and yet in the latter be in the sight of God, who searches the heart, a vile hypocrite.

In the latter kind of sincerity, only, is there any thing truly valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is what in scripture is called *sincerity*, *uprightness*, *integrity*, "truth in the inward parts," and "being of a perfect heart." And if there be such a sincerity, and such a degree of it as there ought to be, and there be any thing further that the man is not able to perform, or which does not prove to be connected with his sincere desires and endeavours, the man is wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God; his will shall surely be accepted for his deed: and such a sincere will and endeavour is all that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God. But as to the other kind of sincerity of desires and endeavours, having no virtue in it, (as was observed before) it can be of no avail before God, in any case, to recommend, satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral weight or influence whatsoever.

Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the reason and nature of things appears from the consideration of any moral weight in the former kind of sincerity, leading us to suppose, that God has made any positive Promises of salvation, or grace, or any saving assistance, or any spiritual benefit whatsoever, to any Desires, Prayers, Endeavours, Striving, or Obedience of those, who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in their hearts; though we should suppose all the Sincerity, and the utmost degree of Endeavour, that is possible to be in a person without holiness.

Some object against God requiring, as the condition of salvation, those holy exercises which are the result of a supernatural renovation; such as a supreme respect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its own sake, &c. that these inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power, as they are by nature; and therefore that we may conclude, that when men are brought to be sincere in their Endeavours, and do as well as they can, they are accepted; and that this must be all that God requires, in order to their being received as the objects of his favour, and must be what God has appointed as the condition of salvation. Concerning this, I would observe, that in such manner of speaking as "men being accepted because they are sincere, and do as well as they can," there is evidently a supposition of some virtue, some degree of that which is truly good; though it does not go so far as were to be wished. For if men *do what they can*, unless their so doing be from some good principle, disposition, or exercise of heart, some virtuous inclination or act of the will; their so doing what they can, is in some respect not a whit better than if they did nothing at all. In such a case, there is no more positive moral goodness in a man doing what he can, than in a windmill doing what it can; because the action does no more proceed from virtue: and there is nothing in such sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that should render it any more a fit recommendation to positive favour and acceptance, or the condition of any reward or actual benefit, than doing nothing; for both the one and the other are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or value.

Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, there is nothing that appears in the reason and nature of things, which can justly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the necessary means of salvation, or some way or other bestow true holiness and eternal life on those *Heathens*, who are sincere, (in the sense above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the will of the Deity, and to please him, according to their light, that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in the future state, through his favour.

SECT. VI.

Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency.

To suppose such a freedom of will as *Arminians* talk of to be requisite to Virtue and Vice, is many ways contrary to common sense.

If Indifference belong to Liberty of Will, as *Arminians* suppose, and it be essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Liberty, as they also suppose; it will follow, that it is essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Indifference: and if it be performed in a *state* of Indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in the *time* of Indifference. And so it will follow, that in order to the virtue of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act performed, so much the better; because the act is performed with so much the greater Liberty. But is this agreeable to the light of nature? Is it agreeable to the notions which mankind in all ages have of Virtue, that it lies in what is contrary to Indifference, even in the *Tendency* and *Inclination* of the heart to virtuous action; and that the stronger the Inclination, and so the further from Indifference, the more virtuous the *heart*, and so much the more praiseworthy the *act* which proceeds from it?

If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an act of will in a state of Indifference; for instance, this act, viz. The will determining to put itself out of a state of Indifference, and to give itself a preponderation one way: then it would follow, on *Arminian* principles, that this act or determination of the will is that alone wherein Virtue consists, because this only is performed while the mind remains in a state of Indifference, and so in a state of Liberty; for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state; and therefore all the acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the thing which the will can do, while yet in a state of Indifference, and so of Liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the matter into consideration; then this determination is that alone wherein Virtue consists, and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it

will follow, from these principles, that whatever is done after the mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium, and arises from an Inclination, has nothing of the nature of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame nor praise. But how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of sincerely virtuous actions?—Which is, that they proceed from a heart *well disposed* and *well inclined*; and the *stronger*, the more *fixed and determined*, the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of Virtue, and so the more of its truth and reality. But if there be any acts which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect Indifference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in the heart; and, consequently, according to common sense, have no sincere goodness in them, having no Virtue of heart in them. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.

And besides, the actions that are done in a state of Indifference, or that arise immediately out of such a state, cannot be virtuous, because, by the supposition, they are not determined by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state of Indifference; which is contrary to the supposition of the act arising immediately out of Indifference. But those acts which are not determined by preceding choice, cannot be virtuous or vicious, by *Arminian* principles, because they are not determined by the will. So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be virtuous or vicious, according to those principles. If the action *be determined* by a preceding act of choice, it cannot be virtuous; because the action is not done in a state of Indifference, nor does immediately arise from such a state, and so is not done in a state of Liberty.—If the action be *not determined* by a preceding act of choice, then it cannot be virtuous; because then the will is not self-determined in it. So that it is made certain that neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find any place in the universe!

Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action that it be performed in a state of indifference, under a notion of that being a state of Liberty, is contrary to common sense; as it is a dictate of common sense, that Indifference itself, in many cases, is vicious, and so to a high degree. As if when I see my neighbour or near friend, and one who has in the highest degree merited of me, in extreme distress and ready to perish, I find an Indifference in my heart with respect to any thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief. So if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or kill my

father, or do numberless other things which might be mentioned, the being indifferent for a moment would be highly virtuous and vile.

And it may be further observed, that if supposed the Liberty of Indifference is essential to Virtue and Vice, destroys the great difference of degrees of the guilt of different crimes, and takes away the heinousness of the most flagrant moral iniquities; such as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blasphemy, &c. For, according to these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect Indifference with respect to these crimes; nay, it is absolutely necessary in order to any Virtue in avoiding them, or vice in doing them. But for the mind to be in a state of Indifference with respect to them, is to be next door to doing them: it is then infinitely near to choosing, and so committing the fact: for equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation: and one, even the least degree of preponderation (all things considered) is choice. And not only so, but for the will to be in a state of perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes, is for the mind to be in such a state as to be full as likely to choose them as to refuse them, to do them as to omit them. And if our minds must be in such a state, wherein it as near to choosing as refusing, and wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely to commit them as to refrain from them: where is the exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing them? If there be no harm in often being in such a state, where in the probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one than the other: then, according to the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be expected, as an *inevitable* consequence of such a disposition of things, that we should choose them as often as reject them: that it should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the cause, or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to blame, if it does so fall out?

It is many ways apparent, that the *Arminian* scheme of Liberty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such things as either virtuous or vicious Habits or Dispositions. If Liberty of *Indifference* be essential to moral agency, then there can be no Virtue in any habitual Inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their nature the very destruction and exclusion of it. They suppose nothing can be virtuous in which no Liberty is exercised; but how absurd is it to talk of exercising Indifference under bias and preponderation!

And if *self-determining power* in the will be necessary to

moral agency, praise, blame, &c. then nothing done by the will can be any further praiseworthy or blameworthy, than so far as the will is moved, swayed and determined by itself, and the scales turned by the sovereign power the will has over itself. And therefore the will must not be out of its balance, preponderation must not be determined and effected beforehand; and so the self-determining act anticipated. Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with that Liberty which *Arminians* suppose to be necessary to Virtue or Vice; and so it follows that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or vicious.

The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the Inconsistence of *Necessity* with Liberty, Praise, Dispraise, &c. None will deny that Bias and Inclination may be so strong as to be invincible, and leave no possibility of the will determining contrary to it; and so be attended with Necessity. This Dr. WHITBY allows concerning the will of God, Angels, and glorified Saints, with respect to good; and the will of Devils with respect to evil. Therefore, if Necessity be inconsistent with Liberty, then when fixed Inclination is to such a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, Praise, or Blame. And if so, then the nearer Habits are to this strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and so diminish Praise and Blame. If very strong Habits destroy Liberty, the lesser ones proportionably hinder it, according to their degree of strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the act most virtuous or vicious, when performed without any Inclination or habitual Bias at all; because it is then performed with most Liberty.

Every prepossessing fixed Bias on the mind brings a degree of moral Inability for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biassed and prepossessed, so much *hinderance* is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be inconsistent with moral agency, or the nature of Virtue and Vice, then, so far as there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart, or habitual depravity of Inclination, whether covetousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else, so much the more excusable persons are; so much the less have their evil acts of this kind the nature of Vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent Dispositions and Inclinations they have, so much are they the less virtuous.

It is evident that no habitual disposition of heart can be in *any degree* virtuous or vicious; or the actions which proceed from them *at all* praiseworthy or blameworthy. Because, though we should suppose the Habit not to be of such strength as wholly to take away all moral ability and self-determining power; or may be partly from Bias, and in part from self-determination; yet in this case, all that is from antecedent

Bias must be set aside, as of no consideration; and in estimating the degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be considered than what arises from self-determining power, without any influence of that Bias, because Liberty is exercised in no more: so that all that is the exercise of habitual Inclination is thrown away, as not belonging to the morality of the action. By which it appears, that no exercise of these Habits, let them be stronger or weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of either Virtue or Vice.

Here if any one should say, that notwithstanding all these things, there may be the nature of Virtue and Vice in the Habits of the mind; because these Habits may be the effects of those acts, wherein the mind exercised Liberty; that however the forementioned reasons will prove that no Habits, which are natural, or that are born or created with us, can be either virtuous or vicious; yet they will not prove this of Habits which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts.

To such an objector I would say, that this evasion will not at all help the matter. For if freedom of will be essential to the very *nature* of Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or Vice but only in that very thing, wherein this Liberty is exercised. If a man in one or more things that he does, exercises Liberty, and then by those acts is brought into such circumstances that his Liberty ceases, and there follows a long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily; those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punishable; but only the free acts that established this necessity; for in them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are necessary, have no more of the nature of Virtue or Vice, than health or sickness of body have properly the nature of Virtue or Vice, being the effects of a course of free acts of temperance or intemperance; or than the good qualities of a clock are of the nature of Virtue, which are the effects of free acts of the artificer; or the goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral Virtues, being the effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If Liberty be absolutely requisite to the morality of actions, and necessity wholly inconsistent with it, as *Arminians* greatly insist; then no *necessary effects* whatsoever, let the cause be never so good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious; but the virtue or vice must be only in the *free cause*. Agreeably to this, Dr. WHITBY supposes the necessity that attends the good and evil Habits of the saints in heaven and damned in hell, which are the consequence of their free acts in their state of probation, are not rewardable or punishable.

On the whole it appears, that if the notions of *Arminians* concerning liberty and moral agency be true, it will follow

that there is no virtue in any such Habits or qualities as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing at all praiseworthy in loving Christ above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives; or in delight in holiness, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies, universal benevolence to mankind: and on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish dispositions; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and things sacred and holy; or in being most treacherous, envious, and cruel towards men. For all these things are *Dispositions* and *Inclinations* of the heart. And in short, there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious *quality of mind;* no such thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sin: and the stronger those Habits or Dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being so indeed; the more violent men's lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude, and maliciousness, still the further are they from being blameworthy. If there be a man that by his own repeated acts, or by any other means, is come to be of the most hellish Disposition, desperately inclined to treat his neighbours with injuriousness, contempt, and malignity; the further they should be from any Disposition to be angry with him, or in the least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person who is of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. so much is he further from any thing rewardable or commendable. On which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very far from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and kindness which He performed, these propensities being strong in his heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commendable, his good Inclinations being infinitely strong, and He, therefore, at the utmost possible distance from being at liberty. And in all cases, the stronger the Inclinations of any are to Virtue, and the more they love it, the less virtuous, and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious they are.——Whether these things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Christian, and every man who has read the Bible, judge: and whether they are agreeable to common sense, let every one judge, that has human understanding in exercise.

And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that Virtue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the world; and that there never was, nor ever can be any such thing as one or the other, either in God, angels, or men. No Propensity, Disposition, or Habit, can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shewn; because they, so far as they take place, destroy the freedom of the will, the foundation of all moral agency, and

exclude all capacity of either Virtue or Vice.—And if Habits and Dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the exercise of these Dispositions be so: for the exercise of *Bias* is not the exercise of *free self-determining will*, and so there is no exercise of liberty in it. Consequently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or ill disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad Disposition. And whether this Bias or Disposition be habitual or not, if it exists but a moment before the act of will which is the effect of it, it alters not the case as to the necessity of the effect. Or, if there be no previous Disposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it; it is, therefore, a contingence that happens to the man, arising from nothing in him; and is necessary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his; and therefore cannot make him either the better or worse, any more than a tree is better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lighted upon by a nightingale: or a rock more vicious than other rocks, because rattlesnakes have happened oftener to crawl over it. So that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad Dispositions, either fixed or transient; nor any Virtue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous Inclination; nor yet any virtue or vice in acting wholly without any previous Inclination. Where then shall we find room for Virtue or Vice?

SECT. VII.

Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious Actions.

As *Arminian* notions of that liberty which is essential to virtue or vice, are inconsistent with common sense in their being inconsistent with all virtuous or vicious habits and dispositions; so they are no less inconsistent with all influence of *Motives* in moral actions.—Such influence equally against those notions of liberty, whether there be, previous to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a preponderancy of those circumstances which have a tendency to move the inclination. And indeed it comes to just the same thing: to say, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its *inclination* one way, is the same thing as to say, the inclination of the mind, as under such *circumstances*, tends that way.

Or if any think it most proper to say, that Motives do alter the inclination, and give a new bias to the mind, it will not alter the case as to the present argument. For if Motives operate by giving the mind an inclination, then they operate by destroying the mind's indifference, and laying it under a bias. But to do this, is to destroy the *Arminian* freedom: it is not to leave the will to its own self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the power of something extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to its own determination. So that what is done from Motive, cannot be either virtuous or vicious. Besides, if the acts of the will are excited by Motives, those Motives are the *causes* of those acts of the will; which makes the acts of the will necessary; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause. And if the influence and power of the Motive causes the volition, then the influence of the Motive determines volition, and volition does not determine itself; and so is not free in the sense of *Arminians* (as has been largely shewn already), and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.

The supposition which has already been taken notice of as an insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like manner, impertinently alledged in this case; namely, the supposition that liberty consists in a power of suspending action for the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said, Though it be true, that the will is under a necessity of finally following the strongest Motive; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the Motive presented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare its real weight with the merit of other Motives. I answer as follows:

Here again it must be remembered, that if determining thus to suspend and consider be the act of the will, wherein alone liberty is exercised, then in this all virtue and vice must consist; and the acts that follow this consideration, and are the effects of it, being necessary, are no more virtuous or vicious than some good or bad events, which happen when they are fast asleep, and are the consequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore, I would here observe two things:

1. To suppose that all virtue and vice, in every case, consists in determining, whether to take time for consideration or not, is not agreeable to common sense. For, according to such a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, sodomy, blasphemy, &c. do not at all consist in the horrid nature of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of thorough consideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all crimes equal. If

it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous evils are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases: I answer, this is inconsistent, as it supposes the very thing to be, which, at the same time, is supposed not to be; it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness, does not consist merely in the want of consideration. It supposes some crimes *in themselves*, in their *own nature*, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to consideration or inconsideration, which lays the person under a previous obligation to consider in some cases more than others.

2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted only in the act of the will whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it would not alter the case in the least as to the present argument. For still in this act of the will on this determination, it is induced by some Motive, and necessarily follows the strongest Motive; and so is necessarily, even in that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.

One thing more I would observe concerning the inconsistence of *Arminian* notions of moral agency with the influence of Motives.—I suppose none will deny, that it is possible for such powerful Motives to be set before the mind, exhibited in so strong a light, and under such advantageous circumstances, as to be invincible; and such as the mind cannot but yield to. In this case, *Arminians* will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if Motives are exhibited with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength, and go halfway towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees of Motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half away. If one degree of the influence of Motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees; for nothing doubled, is still nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the will's liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing however multiplied comes to but nothing. If there be nothing in the nature of motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite to liberty, then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be somewhat, in the nature of the thing, against liberty, then the *least* degree of it hurts in *some* degree; and consequently diminishes virtue. If invincible Motives to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and so all the virtue of it; then the more forcible the Motives are, so much the worse, so much the less virtue; and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the cause of virtue; and none is best of all.

Now let it be considered, whether these things are agreeable to common sense. If it should be allowed, that there are some instances wherein the soul chooses without any Motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice? I am sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no

good end; being made for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view of the end would be the Motive exciting to the act; and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it; and, therefore, according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor wherefore, it is moved.

Corol. 1. By these things it appears that the argument against the *Calvinists*, taken from the use of counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by *Arminians*, is truly against themselves. For these things can operate no other way to any good effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and determine the acts of the will.* But it follows, on their prin-

* The *true reason* WHY counsels, exhortations, &c. commonly called motives, are consistent with the doctrine of necessity held by Calvinists, may be here noticed, in addition to some hints before given. In order to this, we must guard against ambiguity in the word 'motive,' which at one time is intended for the object exhibited, *abstractedly* considered; at another, the object *concretively*, as it stands in the view of the mind. The opposers of that necessity for which our author pleads, must, in order to make even a show of consistency, understand the word 'motive' in the *first* of these acceptations. And if so, it is nothing marvellous that they should maintain the existence of a power in the human mind which can, on the one hand, successfully oppose the *strongest possible motive;* and on the other, be determined by a weaker, and even sometimes by the weakest motive. For how often is the most insignificant bawble preferred to infinite excellence! But consistent Calvinists do not understand the term in any such manner, but rather as an *effect* compounded of the *state of the mind* and the real *object*. And, seeing the object in itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the *difference* of the effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the *mind itself*. Hence *one motive*, in the Arminian sense, may produce, in the *other* acceptation of the term, a thousand different motives, according to the different *mental states* to which the object is presented.

Therefore counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c. are most rationally employed by Calvinists; for that which determines the human will to action, is the motive *as it is perceived*, or that which results from an *application* of the object to the mind. According to them, without an *object* presented there can be no *motive*, any more than there can be a *motive* without a *mind* to which it is presented.—Without evangelical truth, and an evangelical mind or disposition, there can be no evangelical *determining* motive. Consequently, if the mind be at all roused from ignorance and apathy, *determining* motives must be produced in it by a representation of *objects*, by counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. These will succeed or fail of success, morally, according to the state of the mind. But as the agent is free from co-action, constraint, and compulsion, *in the act* of choosing, the true inference is—not that such use of the means is unsuitable or inconsistent, but—that here is clearly implied the great necessity, the rationality, and the perfect consistency of *prayer* to the God of grace, for success on the use of means. Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God giveth the increase.—To *influence* the mind *without* moral motives, is the prerogative of God All hearts are in his hand to form them as he pleases. If the tree be good by sovereign influence, or a new birth, the fruit of love to God and hatred to sin, holy fear, unfeigned faith, humble hope, &c. will follow, according to the objects presented.—A crop will not follow without the *union* of two things, *seed* and *soil*. If both be good, the crop will be good, but not otherwise. That motive which determines the will, cannot arise from any other cause than *the object and the disposition united*. And then only can the *determining* motive be *good*, when it results from a *good*

ciples, that the acts of will excited by such causes, cannot be virtuous; because, so far as they are from these, they are not from the will's self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth while to offer any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action; it is in vain to set before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice.—This notion of liberty and moral agency frustrates all endeavours to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion, precept or example: for though these things may induce them to what is *materially* virtuous, yet at the same time they take away the *form* of Virtue, because they destroy Liberty: as they by their own power put the will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the work of self-determining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instructions given, the more powerful the arguments used, and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to frustrate their own design; because they have so much the greater tendency to put the will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom of self-determination; and so to exclude the very form of virtue, and the essence of whatsoever is praiseworthy.

So it clearly follows from these principles, that God has no hand in any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral influence; that none of the moral methods he uses with men to promote virtue in the world have any tendency to the attainment of that end; that all the instructions he has given men from the beginning of the world to this day, by prophets or apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ; that all his counsels, invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings and expostulations; that all means he has used with men in ordinances, or providences; yea, all influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency at all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any thing morally good and commendable in any respect.—For there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue, but one of these three. Either (1.) By a physical operation on the heart. But all effects that are wrought in men in this way, have no virtue in them, by the concurring voice of all *Arminians*.—Or, (2.) Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the understanding, to excite good acts in the will. But it has been demonstrated, that volitions excited by Motives, are necessary, and not excited by a self-moving power; and therefore, by their principles, there is no Virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving

object applied to a *good disposition*, or state of mind. These things duly considered, will sufficiently prove *why* Calvinists use counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c.—W.

the will an opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects proposed, either to choose or reject, by its own uncaused, unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all, then all those means do no more to promote virtue than vice: for they do nothing but give the will opportunity to determine itself *either way*, either to good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either: and so there is really as much of an opportunity given to determine in favour of evil as of good.

Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly follow from the *Arminian* doctrine, which they charge on others; namely, that God acts an inconsistent part in using so many counsels, warnings, invitations, intreaties, &c. with sinners, to induce them to forsake sin, and turn to the ways of virtue; and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he knows, at the same time, that they have no manner of tendency to promote the effect he seems to aim at; yea, knows that if they have any influence, this very influence will be inconsistent with such an effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputation of insincerity would this fix on him, who is infinitely holy and true!—So that theirs is the doctrine which, if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the Most High, and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy; and not the doctrine of the *Calvinist* according to their frequent and vehement exclamations and invectives.

Corol. 2. From what has been observed in this section, it again appears, that *Arminian* principles and notions, when fairly examined and pursued in their demonstrable consequences, do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing, in any case; or that any such thing should ever be conceived of. For, by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and contradiction. For it is absurd in itself, and contrary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind without any good intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention or aim; for to act for an end, is to act from a Motive. So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act with a good design and end; and it is self-evident, there can be none without: consequently there can be no virtuous act at all.

Corol. 3. It is manifest, that *Arminian* notions of moral agency, and *the being* of a faculty of will, cannot consist together; and that if there be any such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act, it cannot be an act of the will; no will can be at all concerned in it. For that act which is performed without inclination, without Motive, without end, must be performed without any concern of the will. To suppose an act

of the will without these, implies a contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to any thing; and this implies, that in that act it desires nothing, and chooses nothing; so that there is no act of choice in the case: and that is as much as to say, there is no act of will in the case. Which very effectually shuts all vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe; in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the will is concerned: and according to the plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the principles of *Arminians* themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act wherein the will is not concerned. And therefore there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all.

Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, another strange thing will follow; and this is, that God not only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning them. For, all conjecture in things of this nature, must depend on some discerning or apprehension of these two things, *previous Disposition* and *Motive*, which, as has been observed, *Arminian* notions of moral agency, in their real consequence, altogether exclude.

PART IV.

WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF THE FOREMENTIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, &c. AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED.

SECT. I.

*The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.**

ONE main foundation of the reasons which are brought to establish the forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice,

* This may appear to some to be an identical proposition—"The essence of a thing lies in its nature;" but it is not wholly so, and the whole of the proposition is exceedingly important, on account of the *negative* part, or the incidental proposition it contains, viz. The *essence* of virtue and vice lies *not* in their *cause*. A single consideration may be sufficient to shew the truth and importance of one part of this last proposition. If the essence of *virtue* lay in its *cause*, how could the *first* cause, or the *uncaused* nature, be virtuous? If therefore the *first* cause be virtuous, or have the essence of virtue, as all theists will allow, it is plain, *that* essence must lie in the *nature* of that cause itself. Hence, as God is the standard of all moral excellence, created natures are morally excellent in proportion as they resemble him. And as virtue is an *imitable* excellence, and as no good reason can be assigned why the resemblance should not hold in this particular, it is highly probable, *a priori*, that, in reference to created natures, the essence of *their* virtue lies not in its cause. To demonstrate this last, is the design of the present section.

Again, as the essence of *virtue* lies not in its cause, so neither does the essence of *vice* lie in its *cause*. But the philosophical ground of this part of the general proposition demands more particular attention. And as this proposition—"the essence of vice lies not in its cause," affects the whole system of morals, and indeed of theology, we beg leave to propose a series of remarks which, it is hoped, will cast some light on the subject.

1. Causes are of two kinds, and of two only, either *positive* or *negative*. Positive causes produce positive effects, from the first cause through all secondary causes; and these positive secondary causes are nothing else but so many decretive antecedents, which act *physically*, and their consequences follow from the nature of things; even as number follows the repetition of units, or happiness results from true virtue.

&c. is a supposition, that the virtuousness of the dispositions, or acts of the will, consists not in the nature of these dispo-

2. The term "cause" is applied less properly to express a *negative* idea; for it expresses merely an antecedent of a consequent. For instance, if we say that a man cannot read *because* he is blind, or cannot walk *because* he has no legs, or cannot go to heaven *because* he does not love God, and the like; it is manifest that *blindness*, *want of legs*, and *want of love* to God, are "causes" only as antecedents are causes to their consequents, without positive influence.

3. Negative causes, though they have no positive operation in producing their consequents, are no less the ground of *certainty* than those causes, properly so called, which exist in physical operations. For the consequent follows the antecedent with equal certainty, whether the connection be formed by decretive will and energy, as in all positive causes, or by the nature of things only, which is essential truth, as in all negative causes.

4. The cause of vicious *acts*, is a vicious disposition; in other words, it is the *want*, or the *absence* of a virtuous disposition. The essence of the vicious *act*, however, is not in the *cause*, or disposition. The vice of the disposition is one thing, and the vice of the act is another. For as the *nature* of the disposition, and the nature of the act, are different; so the vice, or moral badness of the one, is a different badness from that of the other. The one and the other is a *bad thing* whatever be the cause, and irrespective of any. Hence,

5. Evil dispositions or acts should be denominated such, not from their cause, but from their *nature*. Were it otherwise, *personal* fault, or blame, could never exist; for the vicious *act* would transfer the blame to the *disposition*, and the disposition to the *cause* of that; whereby *persons* would be free from blame, and this would attach to *principles* only. But to suppose a moral agent *incapable* of blameworthiness, which on the supposition would be the case, is a gross absurdity. It would be to suppose an accountable being, who at the same time can be accountable for nothing; and it would be to impute blame to principles, or a principle, which is incapable of moral agency.

6. The *cause* of virtuous *acts*, or, if we may so speak, the soil in which they grow, is a previous inclination or disposition to good, before any actual choice takes place. This may be called a *virtuous inclination*, or disposition. But the original and predisposing cause of *that*, is divine energy, influx, or influence; in other words, an assimilating emanation from the holy nature and decretive will of God.

7. Nevertheless, this is not a good, or a virtue, attributable to *man*, until he is actually *possessed* of it, or it becomes *his*, as a quality of his nature. God, the Father of lights, from whom every good and perfect gift proceedeth, is the *cause* of that virtuous disposition; but while the virtue remained in the *cause*, and not in the man, it was no *human* virtue. Nor does the essence of human virtue lie in the *communication* itself, for this was the effect of divine will; but no will can alter the *nature* of virtue: therefore, the essence of virtue consists not in the cause, whether we understand by "cause," the *will* that communicates the virtuous disposition, or the *communication* itself. Consequently, the *absence* of virtue is so completely confined to the *disposition* of the agent, and the consequent *acts*, as to exclude every thing else that may be termed its *cause*.

8. The cause of vicious acts, whatever it be, is *opposite* to the cause of virtuous acts; for these acts have diametrically opposite effects. That vicious acts have a *cause*, as well as virtuous ones, cannot be denied by any reflecting person, for this plain reason, that there is nothing in the universality of things, beings, qualities, *&c.* but has a cause, either positive or negative, as before explained. Neither agency, liberty, nor any thing else, considered as an effect or a consequent, can exist without a cause, or antecedent. The denial of this, and universal scepticism, are the same thing. Then all reasoning, and all common sense, vanish. Then body and spirit, cause and effects, good and evil, *&c.* are huddled up in endless confusion, without either first or last, great or small, order or proportion.

9. The original predisposing cause of a vicious disposition, is the very opposite of the original, predisposing cause of a virtuous disposition. This last, it has been shewn, is divine energy, which is a positive cause; the other, the opposite of this, is a negative cause. The cause of good, as before observed, is a cause

sitions, or acts of the will, but wholly in the Origin or Cause of them: so that if the disposition of the mind, or acts of the will, be

properly so called, in the way of physical influence; but the cause of evil is called "a cause" improperly, as it implies no physical influence, but only stands as an antecedent to a consequent; from which however the consequent may be inferred with as much *certainty* as if the influence were physical and mechanical. Whether you suppose positive quantities, or negative quantities, consequences are equally *certain*, it is no less true that 5—2=3, than 3+3=6. Whether you say, If the sun *were not*, it would cause darkness; or say, If the sun *shine*, it will cause light; the difference is only in the *nature* of the cause, as either positive or negative, not in the certainty of the consequence.

10. It would be very absurd and contradictory to say that the *cause* of vice is *vicious*. For that would be the same as to say, that a thing was before it existed. To be vicious is to *have vice;* and for this to be the *cause* of vice, is for it to be the cause of *itself*, or *self-caused*, which is absurd. It is therefore impossible that the cause of vice should be vicious; consequently the essence of *vice* is no where but in its *own proper nature*, to the exclusion of every cause whatever. And yet, as it is an effect, it must have *a cause*.

11. The principal question to be determined in this investigation is, What is precisely the original, predisposing, *negative cause* of a vicious disposition? The answer is plain and short; it is that property of a creature which renders it *absolutely dependent* for its being and well-being. Or, it is that property which is the very *opposite* to independence, self-sufficiency, and immutability: and therefore is a property peculiar to a creature, and cannot belong to God.

12. Nor can this be said to be an *actually existing* property from eternity: since it cannot belong to God, and nothing, the only alternative, has no property. It is not therefore the Manichean eternal evil principle, if by this be meant any thing actually existing, as coeval with a good principle. Good is a principle *positively eternal;* but what we speak of is a mere *negative* principle, and owes its *existence as* a property to a *created* nature; and were every *creature* annihilated, this property would also cease to be.

13. But what shall we call this principle, property, or *predisposing cause* of vice? Shall we call it *defectibility*, *defect*, *limitation*, or *imperfection* of existence? Not the first: for the question would return, What *makes* a creature *defectible?* Not the second; for the term is ambiguous, as there are several *kinds* of defect, natural and moral, and therefore, as the word is of common use, and of frequent occurrence, it would require perpetual explanations. Not the third, or the fourth; for the same reason. A term therefore not ambiguous, and sufficiently expressive should be employed; as we employ technical terms to express a specific object. For this purpose, no term, perhaps, is less exceptionable or more suitable than PASSIVE POWER; for it is free from ambiguity, and is sufficiently expressive of the idea already explained. The idea of *passivity* is clearly implied in the name, as in the thing; and the term *power* seems preferable to *property*, or *quality*, because less ambiguous, and yet more expressive to convey the intended idea of *metaphysical influence* of cause and effect.

14. To which we may add, That "passive power" is by no means a new-coined expression; but has often been used to express the very idea to which it is here applied. Thus, above a century and a half ago, that eminently pious and profoundly learned divine, THEOPHILUS GALE, in his "Court of the Gentiles," says: "The root and origin of all creatural dependence, is the creature's *passive power* and God's absolute dominion over it.—Now all limits as to nature and essence speak a mixture of nihility, *passive power*, and dependence resulting therefrom; whence DAMASCENE adds, 'Μονον γαρ το θειον απαθες εστι, *The deity only is impassible;*' namely, because exempt from nihility, *passive power*, and dependence. This *nihility*, or *nothingness* of the creature, is the same with its *passive power* either physic or metaphysic, natural or obediental: whereby it is limited, and confined to such or such a degree of *entity*, *existence*, and *operation*. (Court of Gent. Part IV. b. ii. ch. xi. § 4.)

15. Now that the essence of vice consisteth not in this property is plain, in that passive power is essential to a creature, which vice neither is nor can be. It is the soil in which vice grows, and without which it could not grow, or have existence, but is not itself *vicious;* otherwise we should be forced to seek the cause

never so good, yet if the Cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it;

of that cause in perpetual retrogradation, and move from one difficulty to another into endless absurdity. The predisposing *cause* of vice, therefore, is *passive power*, which in itself is not vicious, or morally evil. But how moral evil came to *exist*, and what is its true *origin*, will be more conveniently considered in a subsequent part of this work.

16. As the essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions and acts lies not in their cause, so neither does it lie in their *effects*: that is, dispositions and acts are not to be denominated virtuous or vicious on account of their effects or consequences, such as their being productive of happiness or misery. For as the properties of any thing must be different from those of its cause, however similar, so must those properties differ from their effects. The *immediate effect* of virtue is—not *happiness* to the individual, for instance, but—that the agent is *approvable*, or *praiseworthy*. But were the essence of virtue to consist in "its tendency to ultimate happiness," as some have affirmed, *immediate* approbation and praise could not be safely given to any individual act or disposition, as its relation to ultimate happiness could not be ascertained but by the final event. If the essence of the virtue or vice were not in the act or disposition, but to be denominated from its *effects*, many other absurdities would follow. For instance,

17. On that supposition, the supreme excellence of Jehovah would not be *approvable* and *praiseworthy* on its own account, or its intrinsic excellency, but only because of its effects and consequences. On that principle, to *hate* God would be nothing bad, it would have no intrinsic demerit; or to *love* God would be nothing good, nothing in itself praiseworthy, were it not for consequences. Which is not only absurd, but blasphemous also and shocking.

18 That sentiment is evidently founded on the supposition that every thing, property, quality and event, is the fruit of *divine will;* and therefore that every thing must be equally good *in itself*, though *relatively* good or bad to the individual: even as matter and motion, and their laws, are equally good *in themselves*, but not relatively so to the individuals who suffer from them. But this is a great mistake, as it confounds things totally distinct in their nature, such as positive and negative causes, natural necessity and moral certainty. *Decretive positions* and their consequences are one ground of certainty; *negative causes* and their consequences are another; therefore, from the certainty of result in the divine view we cannot rightly infer that all results are decreed. Decretive positions comprehend neither *negative* causes, nor the *nature of things*. For an intelligent being to *love God*, is agreeable to the *nature of things;* it is what *ought to be* independent of any decretive position or legal demand in reference to the case. In like manner, for an intelligent being to *hate* God, is a voluntary contradiction to the *nature of things*—or the essence of eternal truth, which is above all will, or is not founded in will—as well as to constituted law. Again,

19. To deny the "intrinsic merit and demerit of voluntary actions independent on their consequences," as some do,* is to deny the nature of things; and this is nothing less than an attempt to divide eternal unity, to give the lie direct to essential truth, and to convert the first uncaused essence into contradictory contingencies. The nature of things is nothing else, radically, but the nature of God, which is essential truth as well as essential goodness. Decretive positions, or an arbitrary constitution of these things by divine will, therefore can no more alter the *intrinsic* merit or demerit of actions, affections, habits, or characters, than divine will can alter the character of essential truth, or choose real contradictions. Moreover,

20. Ultimate happiness is the effect or consequence of virtue as a *reward*. Now to make the merit or *excellence* of virtue to depend on ultimate happiness, while happiness is the *reward* of virtue, is most inconsistent; it is to *reward* for nothing *rewardable*. If virtue be not of *intrinsic* worth, it must be a *mere moral nothing* as to *rewardableness*, and therefore ultimate happiness would be a *reward* for a mere moral *nothing;* that is, *happiness* would be *no reward*, which is contradictory.

* BELSHAM'S Elements, p. 309.

and, on the contrary, if the will, in its inclinations or acts, be never so bad, yet, unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it. Hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or self-evidence, against any virtue or commendableness, or vice and blame-worthiness, of those habits or acts of the will, which are not from some virtuous or vicious determination of the will itself.

Now, if this matter be well considered, it will appear to be altogether a mistake, yea, a gross absurdity; and that it is most certain, that if there be any such thing as a virtuous or vicious disposition, or volition of mind, the virtuousness or viciousness of them consists not in the Origin or Cause of these things, but in the Nature of them.

If the Essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the Nature of the dispositions or acts of mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their Cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a *vicious* act of will, lies not in the Nature of the act, but the Cause; so that its being of a bad Nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours as its Cause, or something in us that is our fault; then, for the same reason, neither can the viciousness of that Cause lie in the Nature of the thing itself, but in *its* Cause: that evil determination of ours is not our fault, merely because it is of a bad Nature, unless it arises from some Cause in us that is our fault. And when we are come to this higher Cause, still the reason of the thing holds good; though this Cause be of a bad Nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that account, unless it arises from something faulty in us. Nor yet can blameworthiness lie in the Nature of *this Cause*, but in the Cause of *that*. And thus we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a lower Cause to a higher, *in infinitum*: and that is thoroughly to banish it from the

21. As to vice, its consequence is *punishment*. If indeed this consequence were the mere effect of arbitrary positions, or sovereign appointment; if it were the plan of God first to *cause* the existence of vice, and then to *punish* the subject of it, as what the good of the whole required, there would be great plausibility in the sentiment we oppose. But the assumption itself is fundamentally erroneous. It confounds hypothetical antecedents, as the whole of decretive plans may be termed, with that eternal truth which connects them with their consequences. To suppose the hatred of God, for instance, to have no *intrinsic* demerit in it, or that it is bad only as dependent on its *consequences*; is the same as to say, it is *agreeable* to the nature of things, *conformable* to eternal truth, that God should be hated, and therefore that he must *approve* of it—only to the agent it is attended with *bad consequences*. That is, on the supposition, God has *appointed misery* as the consequent, for doing nothing that is in itself bad; yea for doing what is perfectly innocent, agreeable to the nature of things, conformable to eternal truth, and acceptable to God, as every thing which he *appoints* must be. Whether such a sentiment be nearest a-kin to "profound philosophy," or to something else, let the competent reader judge.—W.

world, and to allow it no possibility of existence any where in the universality of things. On these principles, vice, or moral evil, cannot consist in any thing that is an *effect*; because *fault* does not consist in the Nature of things, but in their Cause; as well as because effects are necessary, being unavoidably connected with their Cause: therefore the Cause only is to blame. And so it follows, that faultiness can lie *only in that Cause* which is a *Cause only*, and no effect of any thing. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie in the Nature of the thing itself; not in its being from any determination of ours, nor any thing faulty in us which is the Cause, nor indeed from any Cause at all; for, by the supposition, it is no effect, and *has no Cause*. And thus, he that will maintain it is not the Nature of habits or acts of will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the Cause, must immediately run himself out of his own assertion; and in maintaining it, will insensibly contradict and deny it.

This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature or from any thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad Cause, it must be on account of the *badness* of the Cause: a bad effect in the will must be bad, because the Cause is *bad*, or *of an evil Nature*, or *has badness* as a quality inherent in it: and a *good* effect in the will must be *good*, by reason of the *goodness* of the Cause, or its being *of a good Kind and Nature*. And if this be what is meant, the very supposition of fault and praise lying not in the Nature of the thing, but the Cause, contradicts itself, and does at least resolve the Essence of virtue and vice into the Nature of things, and supposes it originally to consist in that.—And if a caviller has a mind to run from the absurdity, by saying, "No, the fault of the thing, which is the Cause, lies not in this that the Cause itself is *of an evil Nature*, but that the Cause is evil in that sense, that it is from another bad Cause." Still the absurdity will follow him; for, if so, then the Cause before charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to the higher Cause, and must consist in that being *evil*, or *of an evil Nature*. So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the thing blameworthy to the Nature of the thing, and not to the Cause. And if any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from step to step, till he is come to that which is the first Cause concerned in the whole affair, and will say, all the blame lies in that; then at last he must be forced to own, that the faultiness of the thing, which he supposes alone blameworthy, lies wholly *in the Nature* of the thing, and not in the Original or Cause of it; for the supposition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no act of ours, is caused by nothing faulty in us, being absolutely *without any Cause*.—

And so the race is at an end, but the evader is taken in his flight.

It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill deservings, consists in a certain *deformity* in the *Nature* of certain dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will; and not in the deformity of *something else*, diverse from the very thing itself, which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the Cause of it. Which would be absurd, because that would be to suppose a thing that is innocent and not evil, is truly evil and faulty, because another thing is evil. It implies a contradiction: for it would be to suppose the very thing which is morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent and not blameworthy; but that something else, which is its Cause, is only to blame. To say, that vice does not consist in the thing which is vicious, but in its Cause, is the same as to say, that vice does not consist in vice, but in that which produces it.

It is true a Cause may be to blame, for being the Cause of vice: it may be wickedness in the Cause that it produces wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction to suppose that these two are the same individual wickedness. The wicked act of the Cause in producing wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore the wickedness of the latter does not lie in the former, but is distinct from it; and the wickedness of both lies in the *evil Nature* of the things which are wicked.

The thing which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred.—And that which renders virtue lovely, is that on account of which it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful Nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are *inherent* in that good or evil will, which is the *soul* of virtue and vice (and not in the *occasion* of it) which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind. If the Cause or occasion of the rise of an hateful disposition or act of will, be also hateful; suppose another antecedent evil will; that is entirely another sin, and deserves punishment by itself, under a distinct consideration. There is worthiness of dispraise in the Nature of an evil volition, and not wholly in some foregoing act, which is its Cause; otherwise the evil volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than sickness, or some other natural calamity, which arises from a Cause morally evil.

Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise, according to common sense; not because something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the Cause that produced it, but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable and worthy of praise, not merely because something else went before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place there—for instance our own choice; we chose to love virtue, and, by some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of it—but because of the amiableness and condescendency of such a disposition and inclination of heart. If that *was* the case, that we *did* choose to love virtue, and so produced that love in ourselves, this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or praiseworthy, than as love to virtue, or some other amiable inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that choice was amiable at all, it must be so on account of some amiable quality in the Nature of the choice. If we choose to love virtue, not in love to virtue, or any thing that was good, and exercised no sort of good disposition in the choice, the choice itself was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praise, according to common sense, because the choice was not of a *good Nature.*

It may not be improper here to take notice of something said by an author, that has lately made a mighty noise in *America.* "A necessary holiness (says he*) is no holiness.—*Adam* could not be originally created in righteousness and true holiness, because he must *choose* to be righteous, *before* he could be righteous. And therefore he must exist, he must be created, yea, he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." There is much more to the same effect. (p. 437, 438, 439, 440.) If these things are so, it will certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice; there is no righteousness or holiness in it; because no choosing to be righteous goes before it. For he plainly speaks of *choosing to be righteous*, as what *must go before righteousness;* and that which follows the choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness or holiness: for an effect is a thing necessary, and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its Cause: and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the Cause: and he says *a necessary holiness is no holiness.* So that neither can a choice of righteousness be righteousness or holiness, nor can any thing that is consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be righteousness or holiness; nor can any thing that is without choice, be righteousness or holiness. So that by his scheme, all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world, and no

* Scrip. Doc. of *Original Sin.* p. 180, 3d. Edit.

door left open, by which it can ever possibly enter into the world.

I suppose the way that men came to entertain this absurd notion—with respect to *internal inclinations and volitions* themselves, (or notions that imply it,) *viz.* that the essence of their moral good or evil lies not in their Nature, but their Cause—was, that it is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that it is so with respect to all *outward actions* and sensible motions of the body; that the moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions themselves, which, taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature; and the Essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them lies in those internal dispositions and volitions which are the Cause of them. Now, being always used to determine this, without hesitation or dispute, concerning *external Actions*, which in the common use of language are signified by such phrases as men's *actions* or their *doings*; hence, when they came to speak of volitions, and *internal exercises* of their inclinations, under the same denominations of their *actions*, or *what they do*, they unwarily determined the case must also be the same with these as with *external actions*; not considering the vast difference in the Nature of the case.

If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that the cause should be considered, in order to determine whether any thing be worthy of blame or praise? is it agreeable to reason and common sense, that a man is to be praised or blamed for that of which he is not the Cause or author?

I answer, such phrases as *being the Cause*, *being the author*, and the like, are ambiguous. They are most vulgarly understood for being the designing voluntary Cause, or Cause by antecedent choice: and it is most certain, that men are not, in this sense, the Causes or authors of the first act of their wills, in any case; as certain as any thing is, or ever can be; for nothing can be more certain, than that a thing is not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind before the first thing of that kind; and so no choice before the first choice.—As the phrase, *being the author*, may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will; but as a person may be said to be the author of the act of will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being that *is acting*, or *in exercise* in that act; if the phrase of *being the author*, is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men being the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them. And common sense teaches that they must be the authors of *external actions* in the former sense, namely, their being the Causes of them by an act of will or choice, in order to their being justly blamed or praised: but it teaches no such thing with respect

to the acts of the will themselves—But this may appear more manifest by the things which will be observed in the following section.

SECT. II.

The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical Notion of Action, and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.

One thing that is made very much a ground of argument and supposed demonstration by *Arminians*, in defence of the forementioned principles, concerning moral Agency, Virtue, Vice, &c. is their metaphysical notion of *Agency* and *Action.* They say, unless the soul has a self-determining power, it has no power of *Action;* if its volitions be not caused by itself, but are excited and determined by some extrinsic cause, they cannot be the soul's own *acts;* and that the soul cannot be *active*, but must be wholly *passive*, in those effects of which it is the subject necessarily, and not from its own free determination.

Mr. CHUBB lays the foundation of his scheme of liberty and of his arguments to support it, very much in this position, that *man is an Agent and capable of Action.* Which doubtless is true: but *self-determination* belongs to his notion of *Action*, and is the very essence of it. Whence he infers, that it is impossible for a man to act and be acted upon, in the same thing, at the same time; and that no Action can be the effect of the Action of another: and he insists, that a *necessary Agent*, or an Agent that is necessarily determined to act, is a *plain contradiction.**

* Were the human mind, indeed, not the subject of either passive power, on the one hand, as the predisposing cause of vice; or of divine holy influence, on the other, as the predisposing cause of real virtue; and were the *determining motive* what some have represented it to be, the *object itself*, irrespective of the changeable state of the mind perceiving it; the objection, that "a necessary agent is a plain contradiction," or, in other words, that man is *no proper agent*, would be unanswerable. For the rank and place of man in creation, and his relative circumstances in the arrangement of providence, being the result of decretive appointment, if he himself were not liable to any change but by the same appointment, it would follow, that if the objects themselves determined him to choose, and to choose always according to the strongest motive, his very volitions in the acts themselves would be *necessitated decretively*, to the exclusion of all *hypothetical* or moral *possibility* of failure; and therefore could never be erroneous, any more than the first cause could act erroneously. On such principles, moral evil, vice or fault, could have no existence. No *effect* could be otherwise than good, amiable, and perfectly innocent; a moral possibility of failure being ex-

But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which men build on the meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a word;

cluded by natural necessity. For the *volition itself* to be *so* necessitated, and not in a moral or hypothetical manner only, is the same thing as giving it no opportunity of choice or preference, or *constraining* it to choose one way by a *settled purpose*, with a natural impossibility of acting otherwise. But if every act of man be *thus* the result of settled purpose, why should he be *blamed* for any one act whatever? He does nothing but what he is constrained, or decretively necessitated to perform, the contrary being rendered naturally impossible; and if he deserves no *praise*, he can incur no blame, any more than a clock for not keeping time. *Such* a *necessary agent* would be indeed a *plain contradiction*. There is much reason to apprehend that some *philosophical necessarians* have no better notion of *agency* than that which Mr. CHUBB charges, and justly charges, with "a plain contradiction." For those who hold the sentiment, that *every act*, even as to its *moral* quality, and every event, are of *decretive* appointment, in subserviency to ultimate good, must allow, in order to be tolerably consistent, that the supreme Being is "the only proper agent in the universe;* and thus reduce *human agency*, and every thing else called agency in a creature, to *an appointed necessary choice*, however odious in its nature, mischievous in its tendency, or painful in experience. Thus, according to them, God is the *only proper agent* in all foul crimes and horrid blasphemies, on earth and in hell! They have a right to define their terms, and to say what they mean by *agency* in God, or in a creature, and to state their hypothesis accordingly; but others also have a right to deduce the genuine consequences of that hypothesis, and to shew wherein its error lies.—The design of these notes is not to excite a spirit of unprofitable controversy, but to assist the serious enquirer in detecting errors and recognizing truths of radical importance in Ethics and Theology; and, it is hoped, that to promote these ends the following observations may conduce.

1. It is granted, that in reference to *natural acts*, the supreme Being is the "only proper agent in the universe," as they all spring from his energy. In this respect he is the first cause of all causes, *efficiently;* and the description of the poet is philosophically just: He

"Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent."—POPE.

2. It is also granted, that, in all acts *morally good*, the created agent is the subject of *necessity* several ways. He has an active *nature* from decretive necessity, which it is not in his power to alter. He is also, accordingly, *compelled* to *some* act of choice, from the activity of his nature. He is, moreover, the *subject* of physical influence of a holy and purifying nature, whereby the goodness of his choice is infallibly secured; and without which there could be no assignable ground of *certainty* that any action would be morally good. There is also a necessity of connection, arising from the nature of things, or the essence of truth, *first*, between the disposition and the act, or that the act will be of the same nature, morally considered, with the disposition from which it proceeds; and, *secondly*, between the act and the end or consequent, which is happiness.

3. It is moreover allowed, that in all acts *morally evil*, the soul is *passive* in reference to that *necessity* of dependence which is inseparable from a created nature, which may be called *passive power;* without which the existence of moral evil would be impossible. This necessity also arises from the nature of things, not from decree; for no decree can alter its existence, (though it may, and actually does counteract it) any more than it can alter the state of a creature from dependence into independence on the first cause. A creature without passive power involves the most palpable absurdities. For its very definition is "*that* property in a creature whereby it differs essentially from the *independence*, *self-sufficience*, and *indefectibility* of the Creator;" and to deny it, is to suppose that a creature may be independent, self-sufficient, and indefectible—that in these respects the

* BELSHAM's Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, p. 254.

especially when that meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the original sense of the word in common speech.

creature and the Creator are on a par—that a necessary and a contingent being are the same, in those very things which constitute their essential difference! Were it not for this property in an agent, he could never *sin;* for all his acts would be *physically necessary*, without any *hypothetical* medium, or moral alternative.

4. *He* is a moral agent, whose volitions might have been otherwise than they are, *if* the motives, and consequently the *state of his mind*, had been otherwise. But to suppose that his volitions might have been otherwise than they are, the motives and state of the mind being the same, would be to make him in his volitions the sport of chance, or a mere nonentity.

5. *He* then is a moral agent who has, in reference to volition, a *moral alternative*, or a hypothetical possibility of a different choice. Where this alternative, or this possibility, is not, there the agent (if he may be so called) is not morally obliged, and therefore is not accountable.

6. But if so, where does the *ground* of such an alternative lie? It lies in the agent's *mind* or the *disposition* whence the volition springs, and whence its character is derived. *If* God influence the mind so as to make it, in a given degree, to resemble his own moral nature; in that degree would the choice made be morally good But *if* passive power be not counteracted by such influence, (which being *gracious*, God is not bound in *equity* to do) in any given degree, the nature of things, the essence of truth, connects, in a corresponding degree, the state of mind with the volition.

7. Hence it is plain that *moral influence*, as such, effects nothing certain; but always requires a previous state of mind, in order to ensure a certainty of *good* effect; and that previous state of mind is effected by no other possible means but a *physical* energy or agency, producing assimilation. There must be a virtuous mind before a virtuous choice; the quality of the act is derived from the agent.

8. One thing, which has been a source of much obscurity and confusion in reference to moral agency, is the supposition that the mind is *equally free* in *all* respects, when choosing good and when choosing evil; in other words, that the one volition and the other become morally certain, from the *same sort* of necessity. But this is not the real case. Indeed the necessity of *connection* between the previous state of the mind and the corresponding volition, is the same; for it is in each case nothing else but the nature of things; but *that necessity* which effects a state of mind previous to good volitions, is as different from the *other necessity* which effects a state of mind previous to volitions morally evil, as light is from darkness. They proceed from opposite quarters, and operate in contrary directions. A holy disposition is generated by decretive holy influence; the other disposition (which ought not however to be called *unholy*) proceeds from the hypothetical nature of things. Such a disposition, though not morally vicious, yet generates vice in union with free agency.

9. It is highly worthy of remark, that though a good volition must proceed from a good heart, morally considered; yet a bad *volition* does not, *originally* and necessarily, proceed from a *morally* bad heart. The reason is, that the one state of heart proceeds from God, from his decretive holy will; the other proceeds from passive power, which is only a *natural* evil, and not a moral. Besides were the disposition which immediately precedes a bad volition necessarily, or in every case, evil, in a moral sense, either moral evil could have no place at all in the universe, no origin whatever, or else it must be the same as passive power. But passive power is a contrast, not to the *moral* perfections of God, but his *natural;* and has, when alone, no *moral* quality. And seeing it belongs as a property to every creature, as such, were it any thing morally evil, moral evil would be essential to the very being of every creature; which is absurd.

10. Hence it is plain, that freedom is experienced in a higher sense, or a greater degree, in bad volitions, than in good ones; in such a sense, and to such a degree, as to justify this mode of expression—that man is necessitated to good, but free to evil. This however may need some explanatory qualification: for

That the meaning of the word *Action*, as Mr. CHUBB and many others use it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, is manifest, because it belongs to their notion of an Action, that it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness; that is (according to their sense of passiveness) it is under the power, influence, or Action of no cause. And this implies that Action has no cause, and is no effect; for to be an effect implies *passiveness*, or the being subject to the power and Action of its cause. And yet they hold that the mind's *Action* is the effect of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and voluntary determination; which is the same with free choice. So that Action is the effect of something preceding, even a preceding act of choice: and consequently, in this effect the mind is passive, subject to the power and Action of the preceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be active. So that here we have this contradiction, that Action is always the effect of foregoing choice; and therefore cannot be action; because it is *passive* to the power of that preceding causal choice; and the mind cannot be active and

he is not so necessitated to good, as not to be morally, or hypothetically free; nor so free to evil as not to be subject to a necessity of consequence. He who *acts* or *chooses amiss* without constraint, compulsion, or interfering voluntary force in that act, notwithstanding his passive power, is *properly* a *free agent*; for in the moral quality of the act, there is properly and strictly no *will* concerned but his *own*. But he who *acts* or *chooses aright*, is subject to a physical, decretive necessity as to his disposition, and a physical concourse of divine energy in the natural act of the will. He is indeed *morally* free, in as much as his volition *might have been of a different*, yea, of an opposite *moral* quality, if the state of his mind had been different. Hence it is evident, that in a *good will*, choice, or act, man is an agent in a less proper or secondary sense; but in a *bad will*, choice, or act, man is an *agent*, a *moral* agent, a *free* agent, in the most proper and strict sense. And in the production of an act morally good *two wills* are concerned, that of the agent, and the decretive will of God; in that of evil, only *one*, the agent's own will.

11. If the Supreme Being is the only proper agent in the universe, either *moral* agency is no *proper* agency; or else, man is not a moral agent; and if so, he is not accountable, and has no concern in religion or morals. Besides, if God be the only proper agent in the universe, how come there to exist *evil deeds*? God's agency is *good*, else we have no evidence that he is a good being; but there are in the world *evil deeds* proceeding from *evil minds*, which common sense and universal consent allow, and the nature of the thing proves, to be properly *evil agencies*; consequently man is an *agent*, a *moral agent*, properly so called.

12. If there be no proper agent in the universe but the Supreme Being, there is no evil in the *nature* of bad volitions, but only in their *effects*. Sin, on that supposition, is not bad in its own nature, but only injurious in its effects on the sinner. Sin is not to be *hated*, it seems, on its own account, as odious, but only *shunned* as dangerous. But as this must arise, according to the system of its abettors, from a sovereign *appointment*, it follows, that millions of beings are *by this very appointment* doomed to the *greatest sufferings* in the universe, for that in which they had no *proper agency*—no *possible* alternative! Where is equity, or benevolence?

13. The only clue out of this labyrinth, and out of many others formed by writers on human agency, is, we are fully persuaded, a right view of *passive power*, in its nature, origin, and tendency, in conjunction with a morally or hypothetically *free choice*.—W.

passive in the same thing, at the same time. Again they say, necessity is utterly inconsistent with Action, and a necessary Action is a contradiction; and so their notion of Action implies contingence, and excludes all necessity. And therefore, their notion of Action implies, that it has no necessary dependence on, or connection with, any thing foregoing; for such a dependence or connection excludes contingence, and implies necessity. And yet their notion of Action implies necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot be contingent. For they suppose, that whatever is properly called Action, must be determined by the will and free choice; and this is as much as to say, that it must be necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by something foregoing; namely, a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of Action, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion of power; but yet it is implied in their notion of Action, that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is consequent and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, *viz.* the power of will and choice: for they say there is no proper Action but what is freely *chosen*, or, which is the same thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall see cause to deny this, and say they hold no such thing as that every Action is chosen or determined by a foregoing choice; but that the very first exertion of will only, undetermined by any preceding act, is properly called Action; then I say, such a man's notion of Action implies necessity; for what the mind is the subject of, without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair; and without any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any will or election of its own; because by the supposition it precludes all previous acts of the will or choice in the case, which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of act, that it is both necessary and not necessary. Again, it belongs to their notion of an *act*, that it is no effect of a predetermining bias or preponderation, but springs immediately out of indifference; and this implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation; if it be not habitual, but occasional, yet if it causes the act, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the same time, it is essential to their notion of the act, that it is what the Agent is the Author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previous choice and design.

So that, according to their notion of the act, considered with regard to its consequences, these following things are all essential to it; *viz.* That it should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit

of choice and design; that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else; that it is what the mind causes itself, of its own will, and can produce or prevent according to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair.

So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute nonentity; and that in two respects: (1.) There is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description, according to what they suppose to be essential to it. And (2.)There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy itself. But it is impossible any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence, which constitutes it, destroys it.—If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, "He had been in *Terra del Fuego*, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite, and was hungry before it had a being; that his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step: that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost; and this, though he had neither head nor tail:" it would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no idea of such an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.

As the forementioned notion of Action is very inconsistent, so it is wholly diverse from the original meaning of the word. The more usual signification of it, in vulgar speech, seems to be some *motion* or *exertion of power*, that is voluntary, or that is *the effect of the will;* and is used in the same sense as *doing:* and most commonly it is used to signify *outward Actions.* So *thinking* is often distinguished from *acting;* and *desiring* and *willing*, from *doing*.

Besides this more usual and proper signification of the word *Action*. there are other ways in which the word is used.

that are less proper, which yet have place in common speech. Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to some object and effect. So the spring of a watch is said to *act* upon the chain and wheels; the sunbeams, to act upon plants and trees; and the fire, to act upon wood. Sometimes the word is used to signify motions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in corporeal things, *considered absolutely;* especially when these motions seem to arise from some internal cause which is *hidden;* so that they have a greater resemblance of those motions of our bodies, which are the effects of natural volition, or invisible exertions of will. So the fermentation of liquor, the operations of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the *action* of these things. And sometimes, the word *action* is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of will and inclination; so meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing, and refusing, may be sometimes called acting; though more rarely (unless it be by philosophers and metaphysicians) than in any of the other senses.

But the word is never used in vulgar speech for the self-determinate exercise of the will, or an exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary connection with any thing foregoing. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice, then in the most proper sense, and as the word is most originally and commonly used, he is said to *act;* but whether that choice or volition be self-determined or no, whether it be connected with a foregoing habitual bias, whether it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some intrinsic cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the word.

And if the word *action* is arbitrarily used by some men otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no argument can reasonably be founded on such an use of this term to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though they were sufficient to support and demonstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow. And though it may now perhaps, through custom, have become natural for them to use the word in this sense (if that may be called a sense or meaning which is inconsistent with itself) yet this does not prove that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are so far from experiencing any such thing, that it is impossible for them to have any conception of it.

If it should be objected, that *action* and *passion* are doubtless words of a contrary signification; but to suppose that the agent in its action, is under the power and influence of something intrinsic, is to confound action and passion, and make them the same thing.

I answer, that Action and Passion are doubtless, as they are sometimes used, words of opposite signification; but not as signifying opposite *existences*, but only opposite *relations*. The words *cause* and *effect* are terms of opposite signification; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that the same thing may, at the same time, in different respects and relations, be both *cause* and *effect*, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The soul may be both *active* and *passive* in the same thing in different respects; *active* with relation to one thing, and *passive* with relation to another.* The word *Passion*, when set in opposition to *Action*, or rather *Activeness*, is merely a relative; it signifies no effect or cause, nor any proper existence; but is the same with *Passiveness*, or a being passive, or a being acted upon by some thing. Which is a mere relation of a thing to some power or force exerted by some cause, producing some effect in it, or upon it. And *Action*, when set properly in opposition to *Passion*, or *Passiveness*, is no real existence; it is not the same with *AN Action*, but is a mere relation: it is the *Activeness* of something on another thing, being the opposite relation to the other, *viz.* a relation of power, or force, exerted by some cause, towards another thing, which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the word *Action* is frequently used to signify something not merely *relative*, but more *absolute*, and a real existence; as when we say *an Action;* when the word is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind, without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus, it is not properly the opposite of *Passion;* which ordinarily signifies nothing absolute, but merely the *relation* of *being acted upon*. And therefore if the word *Action* be used in the like relative sense, then action and Passion are only two contrary relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may belong to the same thing, at the same time, with respect to different things. So to suppose

* This distinction is of considerable moment. The soul is *passive*, for instance, in reference to that *necessity of dependence* which is inseparable from a created nature; and when the subject of *providential energy* in natural acts; and also when the subject of that *divine influence* which purifies and enables the mind, and whereby holy effects are secured; and in all these respects it is *passive* at the very time that it is *active* in its choice or preference. In other words, the mind is *necessitated* in some respects; as, to exist, to think, to will, to suffer, or to enjoy; at the same instant that it is *free* in other respects, as, from contingence, (understanding thereby an event without any cause) and from compulsion, or *physical* necessity in its acts as *moral*.—W.

that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are effects of something else, and wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon and influencing that, do not at all confound Action and Passion. The words may nevertheless be properly of opposite signification: there may be as true and real a difference between *acting* and being *caused to act*, though we should suppose the soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between *living* and *being quickened*, or *made to live*. It is no more a contradiction to suppose that Action may be the effect of some other cause besides the Agent, or Being that acts, than to suppose that life may be the effect of some other cause, besides the Being that lives.

What has led men into this inconsistent notion of Action, when applied to volition—as though it were essential to this internal Action, that the Agent should be self-determined in it, and that the will should be the cause of it—was probably this; that according to the sense of mankind, and the common use of language, it is so, with respect to men's *external* Actions; which originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, are called *Actions*. Men in these are self-directed, self-determined, and their wills are the cause of the motions of their bodies, and external things done; so that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no Action or Doing of theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but exceeding absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition itself, that *that* also must be determined by the will; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not considering the contradiction it implies.

But it is very evident that in the metaphysical distinction between Action and Passion (though long since become common and in general vogue) due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to any distinct clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other philosophical metaphysical terms used in these disputes; which has occasioned inexpressible difficulty, contention, error and confusion.

And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity was inconsistent with action, as these terms are applied to volition. First, these terms *Action* and *Necessity* are changed from their original meaning, as signifying external voluntary Action and Constraint, (in which meaning they are evidently inconsistent) to signify quite other things, *viz. volition* itself, and *certainty* of existence. And when the change of signification is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of sense: but still the same

things are unwarily attributed to *Action* and *Necessity*, in the new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them in their first sense; and on this ground, maxims are established without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.

But however strenuously it is maintained, that what is necessary cannot be properly called Action, and that a necessary Action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few *Arminian* divines, who, thoroughly tried, would stand to these principles. They will allow, that God is, in the highest sense, an active Being, and the highest Fountain of Life and Action; and they would not probably deny, that what are called God's acts of righteousness, holiness and faithfulness, are truly and properly God's *acts*, and God is really a holy *Agent* in them; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God necessarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for him to act unrighteously and unholily.

SECT. III.

The Reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense to suppose those Things which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

It is abundantly affirmed and urged by *Arminian* writers, that it is contrary to *common sense*, and the natural notions and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than that necessity (making no distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent with Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not a little perplexing to many who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures: it has seemed to them indeed difficult to reconcile *Calvinistic* doctrines with the notions men commonly have of justice and equity. The true reasons of it seem to be the following:

I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Sense, that *natural* necessity is wholly inconsistent with just Praise or Blame. If men do things which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and attended with very happy effects, properly *against* their wills; or do them from a necessity that is *without* their wills, or with which their wills have no concern or connection; then it is a plain dictate of common sense, that such doings are none of their virtue, nor have they any moral good in them; and that the persons are not worthy to be rewarded or praised; or at all esteemed, honoured or loved on that account. And on the other hand, that if, from

like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it; the necessity is such, that it is all one whether they will them or no; and the reason why they are done is from necessity only, and not from their wills: it is a very plain dictate of common Sense that they are not at all to blame; there is no vice, fault or moral evil at all in the effect done; nor are they who are thus necessitated in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least disrespected on that account.

In like manner, if things in themselves good and desirable are absolutely impossible, with a *natural* impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this *wholly and perfectly* excuses persons in their not doing them.

And it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if doing things in themselves good, or avoiding things in themselves evil, is not *absolutely impossible*, with such a natural impossibility, but very *difficult*, with a natural difficulty; that is, a difficulty prior *to*, and not at all consisting *in* will and inclination itself, and which would remain the same let the inclination be what it will; then a person's neglect or omission is excused *in some measure*, though not wholly; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy. And if instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural propensity in the state of things to the thing to be done or effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any consideration of the inclination of the heart; though the propensity be not so great as to amount to a natural necessity, yet being some approach to it, so that the doing of the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good inclination; then it is a dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what is done; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason is easy, *viz.* because such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural necessity; and the greater the propensity, still so much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And therefore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out *all* virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue; that is, it *diminishes* it. And on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state of things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and absolute, *wholly* takes away Blame; so such difficulty takes away *some* Blame, or diminishes Blame, and makes the thing done to be less worthy of punishment.

II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, *must*, *cannot*, *cannot help it*, *cannot avoid it*, *necessary*, *unable*, *impossible*, *unavoidable*, *irresistible*, *&c.* use them to signify a necessity of constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or im-

possibility; or some necessity that the will has nothing to do in: which may be, whether men will or no; and which may be supposed to be just the same, let men's inclinations and desires be what they will. Such kind of terms in their original use, I suppose among all nations, are relative; carrying in their signification (as was before observed) a reference or respect to some contrary will, desire or endeavour, which, it is supposed, is, or may be, in the case. All men find, and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things that cannot be done, which they desire to do; and innumerable things, which they are averse to, that must be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men so soon and so often find, and which so greatly and early affects them in innumerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed: and it is to signify such a necessity, that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used in the common affairs of life; and not to signify any such metaphysical, speculative and abstract notion, as that connection in the nature or course of things, which is between the subject and predicate of a proposition, and which is the foundation of the certain truth of that proposition; to signify which, they who employ themselves in philosophical enquiries into the first origin and metaphysical relations and dependences of things, have borrowed these terms for want of others. But we grow up from our cradles in the use of terms and phrases entirely different from this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from that in which they are commonly used in the controversy between *Arminians* and *Calvinists*. And it being, as was said before, a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity signified by these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them, does excuse persons, and free them from all Fault or Blame; hence our ideas of excusableness or faultlessness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom, the connection growing stronger and stronger.

The habitual connection which is in men's minds between Blamelessness and those forementioned terms, *must*, *cannot*, *unable*, *necessary*, *impossible*, *unavoidable*, &c. becomes very strong, because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason and speech, they have occasion to excuse themselves from the natural necessity signified by these terms, in numerous instances.—*I cannot do it*—*I could not help it.*—And all mankind have constant and daily occasion to use such phrases in this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns of life, with respect to disappointments, and things

that happen, which concern and affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them, or things desirable, that we or others fail to obtain.

That our being accustomed to an union of different ideas from early childhood, makes the habitual connection exceeding strong, as though such connection were owing to *nature*, is manifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by such an habitual connection of ideas that men judge of the bigness or distance of the objects of sight from their appearance. Thus it is owing to such a connection early established, and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain, which he sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, or further off than the end of it. Having been used so long to join a considerable distance and magnitude with such an appearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense: whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened, who had been born blind: he would have the same visible appearance, but natural sense would dictate no such thing concerning the magnitude or distance of what appeared.

III. When men, after they had been so habituated to connect ideas of Innocency or Blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be the effect of mere nature, come to hear the same terms used, and learn to use them in the forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to a contrary supposable will and endeavour; the notion of plain and manifest Blamelessness, by this means, is, by a strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to which it by no means belongs: the change of the use of the terms to a signification which is very diverse not being taken notice of or adverted to. And there are several reasons why it is not.

1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in their meaning: few use them in a fixed determinate sense. On the contrary, their meaning is very vague and confused, which commonly happens to the words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and to express what Mr. LOCKE calls *mixt modes*. If men had a clear and distinct understanding of what is intended by these metaphysical terms, they would be able more easily to compare them with their original and common Sense; and so would not be easily led into delusion by words of this sort.

2. The change of the signification of terms is the more insensible, because the things signified, though indeed very different, yet do in some generals agree. In *necessity*, that which is *vulgarly* so called, there is a strong connection between the thing said to be necessary, and something antece-

dent to it, in the order of nature; so there is also a *philosophical necessity*. And though in both kinds of necessity, the connection cannot be called by that name, with relation to an opposite will or endeavour to which it is *superior;* which is the case in vulgar necessity; yet in both the connection is *prior* to will and endeavour, and so, in some respect, *superior*. In both kinds of necessity, there is a foundation for some certainty of the proposition that affirms the event.—The terms used being the same, and the things signified agreeing in these and some other general circumstances, and the expressions as used by philosophers being not well defined, and so of obscure and loose signification; hence persons are not aware of the great difference; the notions of innocence or faultiness which were so strongly associated with them, and were strictly united in their minds ever since they can remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were altogether natural and necessary; and they that go about to make a separation, seem to them to do great violence even to nature itself.

IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason that men should be blamed for that which is necessary with a moral necessity (which, as was observed before, is a species of philosophical necessity) is, that for want of due consideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehension, that this necessity may be against men's wills and sincere endeavours. They go away with that notion, that men may truly will, and wish and strive that it may be otherwise, but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus concerning themselves: some wicked men think they wish that they were good, and that they loved God and holiness: but yet do not find that their wishes produce the effect.—The reasons why men think thus, are as follow:

1. They find what may be called an *indirect willingness* to have a better will, in the manner before observed. For it is impossible and a contradiction to suppose the will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not consider that this indirect willingness is entirely a different thing from properly willing what is the duty and virtue required; and that there is no virtue in that sort of willingness which they have. They do not consider that the volitions which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the will at all against the moral evil of not loving God; but only some disagreeable consequences. But the making of the requisite distinction requires more care of reflection and thought than most men are used to. And men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are disposed to think well of their own desires and dispositions, and to account them good and

virtuous, though their respect to virtue be only *indirect* and *remote*, and that it is nothing at all virtuous that truly excites or terminates their inclinations.

2. Another thing that insensibly leads and beguiles men into a supposition that this moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be against men's wills and true endeavours, is the derivation of the terms often used to express it. Such words for instance, as *unable*, *unavoidable*, *impossible*, *irresistible*; which carry a plain reference to a supposable power exerted, endeavours used, resistance made, in opposition to the necessity; and the persons that hear them not considering nor suspecting but that they are used in their proper sense: that sense being therefore understood, there does naturally, and as it were necessarily arise in their minds a supposition, that it may be so indeed, that true desires and endeavours may take place, but that invincible necessity stands in the way and renders them vain and to no effect.

V. Another thing which makes persons more ready to suppose it to be contrary to reason, that men should be exposed to the punishments threatened to sin for doing those things which are morally necessary, or not doing those things which are morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens the argument, and adds greatly to the power and influence of the seeming reasons against it, from the greatness of that punishment. To allow that they may be justly exposed to a small punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such necessity was inconsistent with faultiness or just punishment, the demonstration would be equally certain with respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all, as a very great one: but it is not equally easy to the imagination. They that argue against the justice of *damning* men for those things that are thus necessary, seem to make their argument the stronger, by setting forth the greatness of the punishment in strong expressions:—"That a man should be cast into eternal burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all eternity for those things which he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible necessity of doing, &c."

SECT. IV.

It is agreeable to common Sense, and the natural Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.

Whether the reasons that have been given, why it appears difficult to some persons to reconcile with common Sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing those things which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory or not; yet it most evidently appears by the following things, that if this matter be rightly understood, setting aside all delusion arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconsistent with the natural apprehensions of mankind, and that sense of things which is found every where in the common people; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel by metaphysical and philosophical subtilties; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable *to*, and the very voice and dictate *of* this natural and vulgar Sense.

I. This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar Notion of *blameworthiness* is. The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this; *a person being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure;* containing these two things; 1. *His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases.* 2. *His pleasure being wrong.* Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their Notion; *a person having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart.* And this is the sum total of the matter.

The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations and dependencies of things, in order to form their Notion of faultiness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings what first determines the will, whether it be determined by something extrinsic or intrinsic; whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the will; whether there be any such thing as metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning;) whether there be a sort of a strange unaccountable sovereignty in the will, in the exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own sovereign acts. They do not take any part of their Notion of fault or blame from the resolution of any such questions. If this were the case, there are multi-

tudes, yea the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die without having any such Notion as that of fault ever entering into their heads, or without so much as once having any conception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. If this were the case, it would be a long time before men came to have such Notions. Whereas it is manifest, they are in fact some of the first Notions that appear in children; who discover, as soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational creatures, a Sense of desert. And certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon consists in these two things; *experience*, and a *natural sensation* of a certain fitness or agreeableness which there is in uniting such moral evil as is above described, *viz. a being or doing wrong with the will*, and resentment in others, and pain inflicted on the person in whom this moral evil is. Which *natural Sense* is what we call by the name of *conscience*.

It is true, the common people and children, in their Notion of any faulty act or deed of any person, do suppose that it is the person's *own act and deed*. But this is all that belongs to what they understand by a thing being a person's *own deed or action*; even that it is something done by him of *choice*. That some exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong to their Notion of *an action* or *doing*. If so, it would belong to their Notion of it that it is the cause of its own beginning: and that is as much as to say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of *an action* some motion or exercise, that begins accidentally without any cause or reason; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common Sense, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is.

The common people, in their Notion of a faulty or praiseworthy work done by any one, do suppose, that the man does it in the exercise of *liberty*. But then their Notion of liberty is only a person having an opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no Notion of liberty consisting in the will first acting, and so causing its own acts; determining, and so causing its own determinations; or choosing, and so causing its own choice. Such a Notion of liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with confused metaphysical speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous terms. If a man is not restrained from acting as his will determines, or constrained to act otherwise; then he has liberty, according to common Notions of liberty, without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a man's free will being the effects of the determinations of his free will.—Nor have men commonly any Notion of freedom

consisting in indifference. For if so, then it would be agreeable to their Notion, that the greater indifference men act with, the more freedom they act with; whereas, the reverse is true. He that in acting proceeds with the fullest inclination, does what he does with the greater freedom, according to common Sense. And so far is it from being agreeable to common Sense that such liberty as consists in indifference is requisite to praise or blame, that, on the contrary, the dictate of every man's natural sense through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his acting good or evil, and the more he does either with full and strong inclination, the more is he esteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.

II. If it were inconsistent with the common Sense of mankind, that men should be either blamed or condemned in any volitions, in case of moral necessity or impossibility; then it would surely also be agreeable to the same Sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the case approaches to such a moral necessity or impossibility—either through a strong antecedent moral propensity, on the one hand,* or a great antecedent opposition and difficulty, on the other—the nearer does it approach to a person being neither blameable nor commendable; so that acts exerted with such preceding propensity, would be worthy of proportionably less praise; and when omitted, the act being attended with such difficulty, the omission would be worthy of the less blame. It is so, as was observed before, with natural necessity and impossibility, propensity and difficulty: as it is a plain dictate of the sense of all mankind, that natural necessity and impossibility take away *all* blame and praise; and therefore, that the nearer the approach is to these, through previous propensity or difficulty, so praise and blame are proportionably *diminished*. And if it were as much a dictate of common Sense that moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, takes away *all* praise and blame, as that natural necessity or impossibility does; then by a perfect parity of reason, it would be as much the dictate of common Sense, that an *approach* of moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, *diminishes* praise and blame, as that an approach to natural necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice of common Sense, that persons are *excusable in part*, in neglecting things *difficult* against their wills, as that they are *excusable wholly* in neglecting things *impossible* against their wills. And if it made no difference, whether the impossibility were natural and against the will, or moral, lying in the will, with regard to excusableness; so neither would it make any dif-

* It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral necessity, but only some very high degree; which none will deny.

ference, whether the difficulty, or approach to necessity be natural against the will, or moral, lying in the propensity of the will.

But it is apparent that the reverse of these things is true. If there be an approach to a moral necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of will, they being the exercise of a strong propensity to good and a very powerful love to virtue; it is so far from being the dictate of common Sense that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved and praised, that it is agreeable to the natural Notions of all mankind, that he is so much the better man, worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to necessity in that respect; or to impossibility of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one; still the more virtuous, and worthy of higher commendation. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind; as, for instance. acts of pride or malice from a rooted and strong habit or principle of haughtiness and maliciousness, and a violent propensity of heart to such acts; according to the natural Sense of men he is so far from being the less hateful and blameable on that account, that he is so much the more worthy to be detested and condemned by all that observe him.

Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of the Notion which mankind commonly have of a blameable or praiseworthy act of the will, that it is an act which is not determined by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign power of the will itself; because, if so, the greater hand such causes have in determining any acts of the will, so much the less virtuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the less hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverse is true: men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy for the agent being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if good inclination, or motive, has but little influence in determining the agent, they do not think his act so much the more virtuous, but the less. And so concerning evil acts, which are determined by evil motives or inclinations.

Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases) yet it is not commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such dispositions; although what is natural is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the will whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar Notion, no dictate of the common Sense and apprehension of men, that

such dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium and dishonour; or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an *aggravation* of the wicked acts that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them. It being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the height of their indignation: they will say, "It is his very nature: he is of a vile natural temper; it is as natural to him to act so, as it is to breathe; he cannot help serving the devil, &c." But it is not thus with regard to hurtful mischievous things, that any are the subjects or occasions of, by *natural necessity*, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse.—Thus it is very plain, that common Sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions.

And these dictates are so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted whether the *Arminians* themselves have ever got rid of them; yea, their greatest doctors, that have gone furthest in defence of their metaphysical Notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to their greatest strength, and as they suppose to a demonstration, against the consistence of virtue and vice with any necessity: it is to be questioned whether there is so much as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not, from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise than if as great sufferings came upon him from the wind that blows, and the fire that burns by natural necessity; and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a man perfectly delirious; yea, though he first brought his distraction upon him some way by his own fault.

Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make between *natural* and *moral necessity*, as though it were altogether impertinent in this controversy: "that which is necessary, say they, is necessary; it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible, and cannot be done: and, therefore, none can be to blame for not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk who has lost his legs, and condemning him and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man, who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But, in these things *Arminians* are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there be not a great difference between those two cases; the one, that of a

man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison; and after he has lain there awhile, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth; and tells him, that if he will do so, and will fall down before him and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, and also be greatly enriched, and advanced to honour: the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept of the king's offer; but is confined by strong walls, with gates of brass and bars of iron. The other case is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition; and moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles; and has his heart possessed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign; and for his rebellion is cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy chains, and in miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison doors to be set wide open; calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness; he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is so stout and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to accept the offer: his rooted strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart: the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far superior to the king's grace and condescension and to all his kind offers and promises. Now is it agreeable to common sense to assert and stand to it, that there is no difference between these two cases as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the required act in each case is impossible? It is true, a man's evil dispositions may be as strong and immoveable as the bars of a castle. But who cannot see, that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be *unable* to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally and in common speech? and that it may *properly* be said to be in the rebel's *power* to come out of prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases; though by reason of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it should please him?

Upon the whole, I presume there is no person of good understanding who impartially considers these things, but will allow, that it is not evident, from the dictates of common sense or natural notions, that moral necessity is inconsistent with praise and blame. And, therefore, if the *Arminians* would

prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.

There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration of *Arminians* from common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arises through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such terms as *liberty*, *able*, *unable*, *necessary*, *impossible*, *unavoidable*, *invincible*, *action*, *&c.* from their original and vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense, entirely diverse; and the strong connection of the ideas of blamelessness, &c. with some of these terms, by a habit contracted and established, while these terms were used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delusion are the foundation of all those positions they lay down as maxims, by which most of the scriptures they alledge in this controversy are interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations from scripture and reason depend. From this secret delusion and prejudice they have almost all their advantages: it is the strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbours in so assuming a manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as "weak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their eyes against the noon-day light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first-born of absurdities, &c. &c." But perhaps an impartial consideration of the things which have been observed in the preceding parts of this enquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge whose doctrine is indeed *absurd*, *abstruse*, *self-contradictory*, and inconsistent with common sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind.

Corol. From the things which have been observed it will follow, that it is agreeable to common Sense to suppose that the glorified saints have not their freedom at all diminished in any respect; and that God himself has the highest possible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term; and that he is, in the highest possible respect, an agent, and active in the exercise of his infinite holiness; though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily: and his actions of this kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect manner virtuous and praiseworthy; and are so for that very reason, because they are most perfectly necessary.

SECT. V.

Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavours for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Happiness, vain, and to no Purpose; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion, answered.

Arminians say, If sin and virtue come to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure connection of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never be worth while to use any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one and avoid the other; seeing no endeavours can alter the futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a connection already established.

But I desire that this matter may be fully considered; and that it may be examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on the supposition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents, than if the contrary be supposed.

For endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be successful; that is to say, for them not eventually to be the Means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be but in one of these two ways; either, *first*, That although the Means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow; or, *secondly*, If the event does follow, it is not because of the Means, or from any connection or dependence of the event on the Means, the event would have come to pass as well without the Means as with them. If either of these two things are the case, then the Means are not properly successful, and are truly in vain. The success or non-success of Means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists in those Means being connected, or not connected, with the effect, in such a manner as this, *viz.* That the effect is *with* the Means, and not *without* them; or, that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with Means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the Means. If there be such a connection as this between Means and end, the Means are not in vain: the more there is of such a connection, the further they are from being in vain; and the less of such a connection, the more they are in vain.

Now, therefore, the question to be answered—in o determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the sary connection between foregoing things, and consequen

that means used in order to any effect are more in vain than they would be otherwise—is, whether it follows from it, that there is less of the forementioned connection between means and effect; that is, whether on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connection between Means and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection between antecedent things and consequent ones: and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed without the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things: And if there were no connection between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it is only by virtue of some connection that they become successful: It is some connection observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, between antecedent things and following ones, that directs in the choice of means. And if there were no such thing as an established connection, there could be no choice as to means; one thing would have no more tendency to an effect than another; there would be no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things, which are successful means of other things, do therein prove connected antecedents of them: and therefore to assert that a fixed connection between antecedents and consequents makes means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connection between means and end, is just so ridiculous as to say, that a connection between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents and consequents.

Nor can any supposed connection of the succession or train of antecedents and consequents from the very beginning of all things, the connection being made already sure and necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of divine power on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be;) I say, no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the series; and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavours which we use, are things that exist; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected: and so Endeavours are supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are

connected with may be those which we aim at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connection with those events, from the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine Revelation.

Let us suppose a real and sure connection between a man having his eyes open in the clear daylight, with good organs of sight, and seeing; so that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connection between such a man attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it: the supposed established connection between these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be never so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing: his aiming at that event, and the use of the Means, being the effect of his will, does not break the connection or hinder the success.

So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connection and consequence: On the contrary, it is truly forcible against the *Arminian* doctrine of contingence and self-determination, which is inconsistent with such a connection. If there be no connection between those events wherein virtue and vice consists, and any thing antecedent: then, there is no connection between these events and any Means or Endeavours used in order to them: and if so, then those means must be in vain. The less there is of connection between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less there is between Means and end, Endeavours and success; and in the same proportion are Means and Endeavours ineffectual and in vain.

It will follow from *Arminian* principles, that there is no degree of connection between virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing: or, in other words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least depend on the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently, as its cause, Means, or ground; because, so far as it is so, it is not from self-determination: and, therefore, so far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And so it follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or Means. And if so, then all foregoing Means must be totally in vain.

Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence with the *Arminian* scheme, be any reasonable ground of so much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to escaping vice or obtain-

ing virtue, or any choice or preference of Means, as having a greater probability of success by some than others; either from any natural connection or dependence of the end on the Means, or through any divine constitution or revealed way of God bestowing or bringing to pass these things, in consequence of any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjectures, in this latter case, depend on a supposition that God himself is the giver, or determining Cause of the events sought: but if they depend on self-determination, then God is not the determining or disposing Author of them: and if these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made from any revelation he has given, concerning any method of his disposal of them.

Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture that their means and Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice will be successful, but they may be sure they will not; they may be certain that they will be in vain; and that if ever the thing which they seek comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the Means they use. For Means and Endeavours can have no effect at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these two ways: either (1.) Through a natural tendency and influence to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by causing the disposition of the heart to be more in favour of such acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements: or, (2.) By putting persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the benefit. But neither of these can be the case. *Not the latter;* for, as has been just now observed, it does not consist with the *Arminian* notion of self-determination, which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the Bestower, or (which is the same thing) the determining, disposing Author of Virtue. *Not the former;* for natural influence and tendency suppose causality, connection, and necessity of event, which are inconsistent with *Arminian* liberty. A tendency of Means, by biassing the heart in favour of virtue, or by bringing the will under the influence and power of motives in its determinations, are both inconsistent with *Arminian* liberty of will consisting in indifference, and sovereign self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.

But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all Endeavours as vain; the following things may be considered.

The question is not, Whether men may not thus improve this doctrine: we know that many true and wholesome doctrines are abused: but, whether the doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement; or whether, on the suppo-

sition of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of it would not be unreasonable? If any shall affirm, that it would not, but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition; namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already settled, must render the interposition of all Means, Endeavours, Conclusions or Actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly insignificant; because they cannot in the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any event or circumstance; all being already fixed unalterably by necessity: and that therefore it is folly for men to use any Means *for any end;* but their wisdom to save themselves the trouble of Endeavours, and take their ease. No person can draw such an inference from this doctrine, and come to such a conclusion without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very principles he pretends to act upon: for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course *in order to an end*, even *his ease*, or saving himself from trouble; he seeks something future, and uses Means in order to a future thing, even in his drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing and use no Means in order to any thing in future; he seeks his future ease, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior necessity that determines all things, makes vain all actions or conclusions of ours in order to any thing future; then it makes vain all conclusions and conduct of ours in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time, manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed by all-determining necessity as much as any thing else. If he says within himself, "What future happiness or misery I shall have, is already in effect determined by the necessary course and connection of things; therefore I will save myself the trouble of labour and diligence, which cannot add to my determined degree of happiness, or diminish my misery; but will take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence." Such a man contradicts himself: he says, the measure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one nor add to the other: but yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this; for he takes up this conclusion, *to add to his future happiness*, by the ease and comfort of his negligence; and to diminish his future trouble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using Means and taking Pains.

Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improvement of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of Means for their own happiness.—For the principles they must go upon, in order to this, are inconsistent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine: for to make some improvement of it is to be influ-

enced by it, to come to some voluntary conclusion, in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim: but this, as has been shown, is inconsistent with the principles they pretend to act upon. In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon at all, or in any respect, consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or making any improvement at all of them, there is a self-contradiction.

As to that Objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavoured to prove, that it makes men no more than mere Machines; I would say, that notwithstanding this doctrine, Man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from a mere Machine, in that he has reason and understanding, with a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition and choice; in that his will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding; and in that his external actions and behaviour, and in many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his will; so that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases; and by Means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions as, according to the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love and reward; or on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indignation and punishment.

In these things is all the difference from mere Machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity or privilege in any respect: all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the *Arminians* themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves; though their explications overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained. For they are forced to explain a self-determining power of will by a power in the soul to determine as it chooses or wills; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing, and in many instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice in the case.

Or, if their scheme make any other difference than this between Men and Machines, it is for the worse: it is so far from supposing Men to have a dignity and privilege above Machines, that it makes the manner of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas, Machines are guided by an intelligent cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner; the will of Man is left to the guidance of nothing but absolute blind contingence!

SECT. VI.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the opinions of Mr. HOBBES.

When *Calvinists* oppose the *Arminian* notion of the freedom of will and contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the will, nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity; their opposers exclaim against them, as agreeing with the ancient *Stoicks* in their doctrine of *Fate*, and with Mr. HOBBES in his opinion of *Necessity*.

It would not be worth while to take notice of so impertinent an Objection had it not been urged by some of the chief *Arminian* writers.—There were many important truths maintained by the ancient *Greek* and *Roman* philosophers, and especially the *Stoicks*, that are never the worse for being held by them. The *Stoic* philosophers, by the general agreement of Christian divines, and even *Arminian* divines, were the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christianity of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of *Arminian* divines produced, not as arguments for the falseness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the Christian Religion, relating to the Unity and Perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and happiness of mankind, &c. and how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and best of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. WHITBY, that although he alledges the agreement of the *Stoicks* with us, wherein he supposes they maintained the like doctrine, as an argument against the truth of ours; yet this very Dr. WHITBY alledges the agreement of the *Stoicks* with the *Arminians*, wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So that, when the *Stoicks* agree with *them*, it is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as shewing that our opinions are contrary to the natural sense and common

* *Whitby* on the Five Points, Edit. 3. p. 325, 326, 327.

reason of mankind: nevertheless, when the *Stoicks* agree with *us*, it argues no such thing in our favour; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shews our doctrine to be heathenish!

It is observed by some *Calvinistic* writers, that the *Arminians* symbolize with the *Stoicks*, in some of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the *Calvinists;* particularly in their denying an original, innate, total corruption and depravity of heart; and in what they held of man's ability to make himself truly virtuous and conformed to God; and in some other doctrines.

It may be further observed, that certainly it is no better Objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the ancient *Stoic* philosophers; than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees in some respects with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of EPICURUS, that father of atheism and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of the *Sadducees* and *Jesuits*.

I am not much concerned to know precisely what the ancient *Stoic* philosophers held concerning *Fate*, in order to determine what is truth; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems that they differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of *Fate*, as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a Fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a Fate. If they held any such Fate as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice; I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated, that the scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the *Stoicks*, by *Fate*, meant any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of advantage and of benefit in use of means and endeavours, or would make it less worth while for men to desire, and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever; and by no means so much as the *Arminian* scheme of contingence; as has been shewn. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of Fate, as is inconsistent with the world being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise

agent, that presides—not as the *soul* of the world, but—as the Sovereign *Lord* of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above or without himself; I wholly renounce any such doctrine.

As to Mr. HOBBES maintaining the same doctrine concerning necessity, I confess it happens I never read Mr. HOBBES. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, "that Jesus is the Son of God," was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the pen of some ill minded, mischievous man, that it must never be received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the most precious and evident truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. HOBBES has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be lamented: but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejection on that account. It is common for the corrupt hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile purposes.

I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the *Arminians* agree with Mr. HOBBES* in many more things than the *Calvinists*. As, in what he is said to hold concerning original sin, in denying the necessity of supernatural illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone; and other things.

SECT. VII.

Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.

Some may possibly object against what has been supposed of the absurdity and inconsistence of a self-determining power in the will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise than that the will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive which (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing on the other side; that if these things are true, it will follow that not only the will of created minds, but the will of *God Himself* is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which, the Author of the *Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature*, (pag. 85, 86.) says: "What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God? does

*Dr. GILL, in his Answer to Dr. WHITBY, Vol. III. p. 183, &c.

it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and Sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom? does it not seem to make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. HOBBES's doctrine of fatality and Necessity into all things that God hath to do with? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God as a Being of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency, but still to leave him without a will to choose among all the objects within his view? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty Minister of Fate, under its universal and supreme influence; as it was the professed sentiment of some of the ancients, that Fate was above the gods.

This is declaiming rather than arguing, and an application to men's imaginations and prejudices rather than to mere reason. I would now calmly endeavour to consider whether there be any reason in this frightful representation. But before I enter upon a particular consideration of the matter, I would observe, that it is reasonable to suppose it should be much more difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical truth, relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understanding and Will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our view, more proportionate to the measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate to the use and import of human speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of terms to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to express external things; and those that are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are, most of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties, and confusions, in enquiries and controversies about things of this nature. But language is much less adapted to express things existing in the mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.

We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls. And notwithstanding all the progress which has been made in past ages and the present in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphysics, as it relates to these things, is brought to greater perfection than once it was; yet here is still work enough left for future enquiries and researches, and room for progress still to be made for many ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely able metaphysicians to conceive with clearness, according to strict, proper, and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine

Essence, and the modes of action and operation in the powers of the Divine Mind.

And it may be noted particularly, that though we are obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and dependent on others, and of some things pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and so before others in the order of nature: as, we must conceive of the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness; the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; the holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determinations. And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded and liable to perpetual mutation and succession.

Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned Author's exclamation about the *necessary Determination of God's Will* in all things, by what he sees to be *fittest* and *best*.

That all the seeming force of such objections and exclamations must arise from an imagination, that there is some sort of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral Necessity as will make it impossible to do any other than always choose what is wisest and best; as though there were some disadvantage, meanness and subjection, in such a Necessity; a thing by which the will was confined, kept under, and held in servitude by something which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held him fast, and from which he could, by no means, deliver himself. Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonour to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority, or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege, or ascendency.* It is not in-

* "It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve *Spinoza's* purpose; for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and wisdom; a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of will and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise being to act foolishly." *Clark's* Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God." Edit. 6. p. 64.

"Though God is a most perfect free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as Necessity

consistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to

itself; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was, indeed, no Necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all; because he is, in Himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was, also, no Necessity in nature, that he should preserve and continue things in being after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was fit, and wise, and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and Infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made *at such a time*, and continued *so long*, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should." *Ibid.* p. 112, 113.

"It is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination.—This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side.—It is as much a perfection, that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will: and the certainer such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. This very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the good we choose; and, therefore, every man is brought under a Necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.—If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good. *The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.*—But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a changeling, because he is less determined by wise determination than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I think, no body would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already." LOCKE's Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7. p. 215, 216.

"This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always, and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, must will all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this con-

do whatever pleases him; whereby "he doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what dost thou?"—The following things belong to the *sovereignty* of God; *viz.* (1.) Supreme, Universal, and Infinite *Power;* whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without controul, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power; and so without any hindrance or restraint, that it should be either impossible or at all difficult for him to accomplish his Will; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it should be derived or of which it should stand in any need; so far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely dependent on him. (2.) That He has supreme *authority;* absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without subjection to any superior authority, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority; and also without restraint by any obligation, implying either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) That his *Will* is supreme, underived, and independent on any thing without Himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wisdom; his will not being subject to, or restrained by the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his *Wisdom*, which determines his will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isai. xl. 14. "With whom took He counsel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the path of judgment, and taught Him knowledge, and showed him the way of

sequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the will without error. *Here then is the origin of moral Necessity; and that is, really, of freedom*—Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were possible. But it is unskilfulness to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once established, *viz.* That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: it is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutably determined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with power, without discerning and reason. *It is the beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness.*—It is strange to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his will is determined by reason and truth."—*Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul.* Edit. 3. Vol. II. p. 403, 404.

understanding ?" There is no other Divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly *absolute sovereignty*; no other is desirable; nor would any other be honourable or happy; and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that his Will is determined by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdom in every thing; and is in nothing at all directed either by inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end.

If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every thing by *supreme* wisdom, then it is in every thing necessarily determined to that which is *most* wise, and certainly, it would be a disadvantage and indignity to be otherwise; for if the Divine Will was not necessarily determined to what in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contingence which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate whatsoever, (if any such thing were possible) would certainly argue a great degree of imperfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disadvantage for the Divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And consequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely at random, would be the supreme glory!

It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low for the Supreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to will in the highest degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happiness determined by Necessity? It is no more to God's dishonour to be necessarily wise than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be to his dishonour, then it is not to his dishonour necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonourable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonourable, necessarily to act holy and wisely in the highest possible degree; or which is the same thing, to do that, in every case, which above all other things is wisest and best.

The reason why it is not dishonourable to be necessarily *most* holy is, because holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable thing. For the same reason it is no dishonour to be necessarily *most* wise, and in every case to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all: for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honourable.

The forementioned Author of the *Essay on the Freedom of Will, &c.* as has been observed, represents that doctrine of the Divine Will being in every thing necessarily determined by superior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate: he insists,(p. 93, 94,) that this moral Necessity and impossibility is in effect the same thing with physical and natural Necessity and impossibility: and says, (p. 54, 55.) "The scheme which determines the will always and certainly by the understanding, and the understanding by the appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature of vice and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present situation of persons and things; for this existence and situation necessarily makes such an appearance to the mind; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and judgment concerning these things; this judgment necessarily determines the will: and thus, by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and become natural ideas and necessary things, instead of moral and free actions."

And yet this same Author allows, (p. 30, 31.) That a perfectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose what is most fit; and says, (p. 102, 103.) "I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent superior fitness of things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and, particularly, in all his judicial proceedings as a governor, and Distributer of rewards and punishments." Yea, he says expressly, (p. 42.) "That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and goodness in things."

So that according to this Author, putting these several passages of his Essay together, there is *no virtue, nor any thing of a moral nature*, in the most sublime and glorious acts and exercises of God's holiness, justice, and faithfulness; and he never does any thing which is in itself supremely worthy, and above all other things fit and excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate; and in *what he does as the Judge and moral Governor of the world*, he exercises no moral excellency; exercising no freedom in these things, because he acts by moral Necessity, which is, in effect, the same with physical or Natural Necessity; and therefore he

only acts by an *Hobbistical* fatality; "as a Being indeed of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency (as he said before) but without a will to choose, being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its supreme influence." For he allows, that in all these things God's will is determined constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and that it is not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent course, in any one instance? Whereas, according to the scriptures, and also the common sense of mankind, it does not in the least derogate from the honour of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature, he necessarily acts with supreme wisdom and holiness; but on the contrary his praise is the greater: herein consists the height of his glory.

The same author, (p. 56,) supposes, that herein appears the excellent "character of a wise and good man, that though he can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not, but suffers himself to be directed by fitness;" and that, in this conduct, "he imitates the blessed God." And yet he supposes it is contrariwise with the blessed God: not that he suffers himself to be directed by fitness, when "*he can choose, contrary to the fitness of things*;" but that "*he cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things*," as he says, p. 42, "That it is not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things." Yea, he supposes (p. 31.) That if a man "were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the fitness of things."

One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section; and that is, that if it derogate nothing from the glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all things; from any thing in the nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from God's freedom, independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state or manner of acting; or as implying any infirmity, restraint or subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory too much.

SECT. VIII.

Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions considered.

The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is, in effect, confessed that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishonour, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the agreement of such a Necessity with the fate of the *Stoicks*, and the Necessity maintained by Mr. HOBBES. From which it will follow, that if in all the different things among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness or preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonour, or any thing unbecoming, for God's will to be necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is giving up entirely the argument from the unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the liberty, supremacy, independence, and glory of the Divine Being; and resting the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point wholly diverse; *viz. Whether it be so indeed*, that in all the various possible things, objects of his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing above another. This is denied by this author; who supposes that, in many instances between two or more possible things which come within the view of the Divine Mind, there is a perfect indifference and equality, as to fitness or tendency, to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his designs. Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident.

The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that, in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of choice, which God has in view: and (2.) that the difference between many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any consequence; or to suppose that any of God's wise designs would not be answered in one way as well as the other.

Therefore,

I. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference, between different objects of choice that are proposed to the Divine Understanding?

And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the contradiction there is in the *terms* of the question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is an inconsistence in the *thing* supposed. It is inquired whether *different* objects of choice may not be absolutely *without difference?* If they are absolutely *without difference*, then how are they *different* objects of choice? If there be absolutely *no difference*, in any respect, then there is *no variety* or *distinction*: for distinction is only by some difference. And if there be no *variety* among proposed *objects of choice*, then there is no opportunity for *variety of choice*, or difference of determination. For that determination of a thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but the same. That this is no quibble may appear more fully in a short time.

The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly without difference, are two.

I. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another: and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space, rather than others, he determined and preferred among various objects, between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.

Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so; or a succession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely long series: which must needs be a groundless imagination. The eternal duration which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's existence; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once; *Vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio.* Which is so generally allowed that I need not stand to demonstrate it.*

* "If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or succession, of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One minute to another, perhaps, *velut unda supervenit undam.* But when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately existing. This is the common notion; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is nothing but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity the necessary existence of the Deity.—Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no change or succession in his nature, his existence must, of course, be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case; *first*, we find succession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself: which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And *then* we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the Eternal Being; and suppose it, one knows not what, a thing subsisting

So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable as that now mentioned, of absolute and infinite duration. It is as improper to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another, as that the infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after another. A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case as the other; and there is equal reason in each case to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine Existence, as of square miles of Deity: and we equally deceive ourselves, when we talk of the world being differently fixed with respect to either of these sorts of measures. I think we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity: and all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air.

2. The second argument, to prove that the Most High wills one thing rather than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned author says, (p. 78, &c.) "If one would descend to the minute specific particles, of which different bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason to believe, that there are thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct deter-

by itself, and flowing, one minute after another. This is the work of pure imagination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the common metaphorical expressions; *Time runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute*, and the like. The philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustration. They compare eternity to the motion of a point running on for ever, and making a traceless infinite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present minute; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it: that is, they ascribe motion to a mere nonentity, to illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up of finite successive parts.—If once we allow an all-perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite comprehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind.—In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be *Vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio*; how much soever this may have been a paradox hitherto." *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul.* Vol. ii. 409, 410. 411. Edit. 3.

mination to the Will of God, where to place them." He there instances in particles of water, of which there are such immense numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this world; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles, which compose the body of the Sun; so many, that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.

Answ. (1.) To this I answer: that as we must suppose matter to be infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two of all these particles are exactly equal and alike; so unlikely, that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwise: and that although we should allow a great similarity between the different particles of water and fire, as to their general nature and figure; and however small we suppose those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quantity of matter.—If we should suppose a great many globes of the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the same number of particles of dust and water in them. But infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should have just the same quantity of matter. For a particle of light, according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more assignable parts than there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles should be *equal*; so it is, that they should be *alike* in other respects: to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If there were very many globes of the nature of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same number of particles of dust, water, and stone, in their surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with respect to another, without any difference, in any part discernible either by the naked eye or microscope; but infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should be perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real parts on the surface of a particle of light, than there are particles of dust, water, and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial Globe.

Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two particles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different parts of the creation; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places; yet it will not follow, that two different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power have exactly the same fitness for the same ends. For these two different bodies are not different or distinct, in any other respects than those wherein they *differ*: they are two in no

other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike *in themselves*, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct; only in those things which are called *circumstances ;* as place, time, rest, motion, or some other present or past circumstances or relations. For it is difference only that constitutes distinction. If God makes two bodies, *in themselves* every way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations, but only *their place ;* then in this only is there any distinction or duplicity. The figure is the same, the measure is the same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and every thing the same, but only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines is this, that there should be the same figure, the same extension, the same resistance, &c. in two different places. And for this determination he has some reason. There is some end, for which such a determination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts. Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing without a fitness for that end, superior to any thing else. If it be the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance, and the same figure, to be in two different places and situations, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some determination or act of God's will that is wholly without motive or end, than we can argue, than whenever in any case it is a man's will to speak the same words or make the same sounds at two different times ; there must be some determination or act of his will, without any motive or end. The difference of place, in the former case, proves no more than the difference of time does in the other. If any one should say, with regard to the former case, that there must be something determined without an end, *viz.* that of those two similar bodies, this in particular should be made in this place, and the other in the other, and should enquire, why the Creator did not make them in a transposition, when both are alike, and each would equally have suited either place ? The enquiry supposes something that is not true ; namely, that the two bodies differ and are distinct in other respects besides their place. So that with this distinction *inherent* in them, they might, in their first creation, have been transposed, and each might have begun its existence in the place of the other.

Let us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both perfect spheres, and perfectly solid, without pores, and perfectly alike in every respect, and placed them near one to another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards the left, without any difference as to time, motion or rest, past or present, or any circumstance, but only their place ; and the qeustion should be asked, why God in their creation placed

them so? Why that which is made on the right hand, was not made on the left, and *vice versa?* Let it be well considered, whether there be any sense in such a question; and whether the enquiry does not suppose something false and absurd. Let it be considered, what the Creator must have done otherwise than he did, what different act of will or power he must have exerted, in order to the thing proposed. All that could have been done, would have been to have made two spheres, perfectly alike, in the same places where he has made them, without any difference of the things made, either in themselves or in any circumstance; so that the whole effect would have been without any difference, and, therefore, just the same. By the supposition, the two spheres are different in no other respect but their place; and therefore in other respects, they are the same. Each has the same roundness; it is not a distinct rotundity, in any other respect but its situation. There are, also, the same dimensions, differing in nothing but their place. And so of their resistance, and every thing else that belongs to them.

Here, if any chooses to say, "that there is a difference in another respect *viz.* that they are not NUMERICALLY the same: that it is thus with all the qualities that belong to them: that it is confessed they are in some respects the same; that is, they are both exactly alike; but yet *numerically* they differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the same *numerical, individual* roundness with that of the other." Let this be supposed; then the question about the determination of the Divine Will in the affair, is, why did God will, that this *individual* roundness should be at the right hand, and the other *individual* roundness at the left? why did not he make them in a contrary position? Let any rational person consider, whether such questions be not words without a meaning; as much as if God should see fit for some ends, to cause the same sounds to be repeated, or made at two different times: the sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect, but only one was a minute after the other; and it should be asked upon it, why God caused these sounds, numerically different, to succeed one the other in such a manner? Why he did not make that individual sound, which was in the first minute, to be in the second? And the individual sound of the last minute to be in the first: which enquiries would be even ridiculous; as I think every person must see, in the case proposed of two sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely without any difference, but that one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some good end, that the same sound be made thunder at two distinct times, and therefore wills that it should be so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is some act of God's will without any mo-

tive or end? God saw fit often, at distant times, and on different occasions, to say the very same words to *Moses;* namely, those, *I am Jehovah.* And would it not be unreasonable to infer as a certain consequence from this, that here must be some act or acts of the Divine Will, in determining and disposing the words exactly alike, at different times, wholly without aim or inducement? But it would be no more unreasonable than to say, that there must be an act of God without any inducement, if he sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines that there shall be the same resistance, the same dimensions, and the same figure, in several distinct places.

If in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God might have made them in a contrary position; that which is made at the right hand, being made at the left; then I ask, Whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is and numerically different from what he did make it; though perfectly alike, and in the same place; and at the same time, and in every respect, in the same circumstances and relations? Namely, Whether he might not have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand; and so have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a state of non-existence? And, if so, whether it would not have been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these, and yet numerically differing from both? And let it be considered, whether, from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies perfectly equal and alike, which numerical difference is something inherent in the bodies themselves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any circumstance whatsoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically different possible bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining power, when he goes about to create bodies.

Therefore let us put the case thus: Supposing that God, in the beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain place, and it should be enquired, Why God created that individual sphere, in that place, at that time?—And why he did not create another sphere perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place, at the same time?—Or why he chose to bring into being there, that very body, rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, perfectly like it; either of which he could have made there as well, and would have answered his end as well? Why he caused to exist at that place and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the infinite number of individual rotundities just like it? Why that individual resistance, rather

than any other of the infinite number of possible resistances just like it? And it might as reasonably be asked, Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he caused that individual sound then to be made, and not another just like it? Why did he make choice of this very sound, and reject all the infinite number of other possible sounds just like it, but numerically differing from it, and all differing one from another? I think every body must be sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what is supposed in such enquiries. And, if we calmly attend to the matter, we shall be convinced that all such kind of objections as I am answering, are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of clearness and precision in the signification of terms.

If any should find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great length into metaphysical niceties and subtilties; I answer, the objection to which they are a reply is a metaphysical subtilty, and must be treated according to the nature of it.*

II. Another thing alledged is, that innumerable things which are determined by the Divine Will, and chosen and done by God rather than others, differ from those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any consequence, or that there is any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have respect to in the determination.

To which I answer, it is impossible for us to determine, with any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and appears to us of no consideration, therefore there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable end, which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of the world, in ordering such a difference. The forementioned author mentions many instances. One is, there being one atom in the whole universe, more or less. But I think it would be unreasonable to suppose that God made one atom in vain, or without any end or motive. He made not one atom but what was a work of his Almighty Power, as much as the whole globe of the earth, and requires as much of a constant exertion of Almighty Power to uphold it; and was made and is upheld with understanding and design, as much as if no other had been made but that. And it would be as unreasonable to suppose, that he made it without any thing really aimed at in so doing, as much as to suppose, that he made the planet *Jupiter* without aim or design.

* "For men to have recourse to subtilities in raising difficulties, and then complain, that they should be taken off by minutely examining these subtilities, is a strange kind of procedure." *Nature of the Human Soul*, Vol. II, p. 331.

It is possible that the most minute effects of the Creator's power, the smallest assignable difference between the things which God has made, may be attended, in the whole series of events, and the whole compass and extent of their influence, with very great and important consequences. If the laws of motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir ISAAC NEWTON, hold universally, there is not one atom, nor the least assignable part of an atom, but what has influence every moment throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part to be otherwise than it would be if it were not for that particular corporeal existence. And however the effect is insensible for the present, yet it may, in length of time, become great and important.

To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the same way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one to another; but to be diverted from this parallel course, and drawn one from another, as much as might be by the attraction of an atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars from the earth; these bodies being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and further distant, one from the other; and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less elliptical, and so its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence of the least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it would have done; which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the least particle may, for ought we know, have such effect on something in the constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the mind at a certain time, than otherwise would have been; which, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind. And so innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.*

Another *argument*, which the fore-mentioned author brings against a necessary determination of the Divine Will by a superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the *freeness* of God's *grace* and *goodness*, in choosing the objects of his favour and bounty, and from the *obligation* upon men to *thankfulness* for special benefits. (p. 89, &c.) In answer to this objection, I would observe,

* On this subject see DODDRIDGE's Works, Vol. iv. p. 391, and the note there by the Editor.

1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom, than to suppose it determined by chance, and that his favours are bestowed altogether at random, his will being determined by nothing but perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever; which must be the case, as has been demonstrated, if Volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a wise end.

2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines the will of God in the choice of the objects of his favours, be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is not so great a manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessity for supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his favours on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the *merit of the object of God's favour*, or a moral qualification of *the object* attracting that favour and recommending to it, and the *natural fitness* of such a determination *of the act of God's goodness*, to answer some wise design of his own, some end in the view of God's omniscience.—It is God's own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his Volition.

3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts from wise design in determining the particular subjects of his favours: none will say, I presume, that when God distinguishes by his bounty particular societies or persons, He never, in any instance, exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances, then I would enquire, whether, in these instances, God's goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all? And whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness? And if so, who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not? It is very manifest, with respect to the apostle *Paul*, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a christian and an apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The apostle himself mentions one end. (1 *Tim.* i. 15, 16.) "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might shew forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on

him to life everlasting." But yet the apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of divine grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe,

4. Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of God's will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favour, that, in many instances, this moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs and inclinations of his goodness; being more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others; the inclinations of infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God in sending his Son into the world may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another.

One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the Necessity of the acts of God's will; and that is, that something much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to fatal Necessity will follow from *Arminian* principles, than from the doctrines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the Volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate: I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his about them. And if so, they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his, and independent on them, and to which his volitions must be subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's Will, arising from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessedness of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and entirely independent on these things, and which they have no hand in, because they are prior to them; and to which God's Will is truly subject, being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every thing he does in his disposals and government of the world: the moral world being the end of the natural; so that all is in vain that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world, which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly

argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy of the Supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his will; and really subjects the will of the Most High to the will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them.

SECT. IX.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes God the Author of Sin.

It is urged by *Arminians*, that the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions, or their necessary connection with antecedent events and circumstances, makes the first cause, and supreme orderer of all things, the author of sin; in that he has so constituted the state and course of things, that sinful volitions become necessary, in consequence of his disposal. Dr. WHITBY, in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will,* cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this opinion of the necessity of the will "absolves sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world upon God, and upon his providence, if that were admitted by the asserters of this fate; whether he himself did necessitate them to do these things, or ordered matters so that they should be constrained to do them by some other cause." And the doctor says, in another place,† "In the nature of the thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, *causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est.* In things necessary, the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient. And in this case the reason is evident; because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden, being a defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause of that deficiency."—Concerning this, I would observe the following things.

I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to this scheme; it is no difficulty or disadvantage wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of *Arminians*; and, therefore, not reasonably objected by them.

* On the Five Points, p. 361.

† *Ibid.* p. 486.

Dr. WHITBY supposes, that if sin necessarily follows from God withholding assistance, or if that assistance be not given which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil; then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From whence, according to what he himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: he must be the efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God has so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assistance from them, that they are incapacitated from doing good, and determined only to evil.* Our doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of men's sin in this world, no more, and in no other sense, than his doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubtless the latter is as odious an effect as the former.

Again, if it will *follow at all* that God is the author of sin, from what has been supposed of a sure and infallible connection between antecedents and consequents, it will *follow because of this, viz.* that for God to be the author or orderer of those things which he knows beforehand, will infallibly be attended with such a consequence, is the same thing, in effect, as for him to be the author of that consequence. But if this be so, this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of *Arminians* themselves; at least of those of them who allow God's certain foreknowledge of all events. For, on the supposition of such a foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed: God knew that if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins would infallibly follow. As for instance, God certainly foreknew, long before *Judas* was born, that if he ordered things so, that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and at such a place, and that his life should be preserved, and that he should, in divine providence, be led into acquaintance with Jesus; and that his heart should be so influenced by God's Spirit or Providence as to be inclined to be a follower of Christ; and that he should be one of those twelve, which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family; and that his health should be preserved, so that he should go up to *Jerusalem* at the last passover in Christ's life; and it should be so ordered, that *Judas* should see Christ's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at *Bethany*, and have that reproof from Christ which he had at that time, and see and hear other things which excited his enmity against his Master, and other circumstances should

* On the Five Points, p. 302, 305.

be ordered as they were ordered; it would most certainly and infallibly follow, that *Judas* would betray his Lord, and would soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell for his horrid wickedness.

Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection against the scheme which has been maintained, as *disagreeing* with the *Arminian* scheme, seeing it is no difficulty owing to such a *disagreement*; but a difficulty wherein the *Arminians* share with us. That must be unreasonably made an objection against our differing from them, which we should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with them.—And therefore I would observe,

II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the Author of Sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, *The Author of Sin*. I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very ill. If by *the Author of Sin*, be meant *the Sinner*, *the Agent*, or *Actor of Sin*, or *the Doer of a wicked thing*; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the Author of Sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin; rejecting such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if, by *the Author of Sin*, is meant the permitter, or *not a hinderer* of Sin; and, at the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that Sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin, (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense) it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the Author of Sin. This is not to be the *Actor of Sin*, but on the contrary, *of holiness*. What God doth herein, is holy; and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his nature. And I do not deny, that God being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is maintained by most of the *Arminian* divines.

That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a manner the Disposer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any credit is to be given to the Scripture; as well as because it is impossible, in the nature of things, to be otherwise. In such a manner God ordered the obstinacy of *Pharaoh*, in his refusing to obey God's Commands to let the people go. (Exod. iv. 21.) "I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the people go."—(Chap. vii. 2—5.) "Aaron thy brother shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land.—

And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay my hand upon Egypt, by great judgments, &c." (Chap. ix. 12.) "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had spoken unto Moses." (Chap. x. 1, 2.) "And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might show these my signs before him, and that thou mayst tell it in the ears of thy son, and thy son's son, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst them, that ye may know that I am the Lord." (Chap. xiv. 4.) "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them: and I will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his Host." (Ver. 8.) "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he pursued after the children of Israel." And it is certain, that in such a manner God, for wise and good ends, ordered that event, *Joseph* being sold into *Egypt*, by his brethren. (Gen. xlv. 5.) "Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life." (Ver. 7, 8.) "God did send me before you to preserve a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance: so that now it was not you that sent me hither, but God." (Psal. cvii. 17.) "He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant." It is certain that thus God ordered the Sin and Folly of *Sihon* King of the *Amorites*, in refusing to let the people of *Israel* pass by him peaceably. (Deut. ii. 30.) "But Sihon King of Heshbon would not let us pass by him; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thine hand." It is certain that God thus ordered the Sin and Folly of the Kings of *Canaan*, that they attempted not to make peace with *Israel*, but with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set themselves violently to oppose them and their God. (Josh. xi. 20.) "For it was of the Lord, to harden their hearts that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." It is evident that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of *Zedekiah* against the King of *Babylon*. (Jer. lii. 3.) "For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem, and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babylon. (So 2 Kings xxiv. 20.) And it is exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages of *Nebuchadnezzar*, in spoiling and ruining the nations round about. (Jer. xxv. 9.) "I will send and take all the families of the north.

1. : Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and will bring them against this land, and against all the nations round about; and will utterly destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and an hissing, and perpetual desolations."—(Chap. xliii. 10, 11.) "I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant: and I will set his throne upon se stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavi- over them. And when he cometh, he shall smite the land Egypt, and deliver such as are for death to death, and such s are for captivity to captivity, and such as are for the sword to the sword." Thus God represents himself as *sending* for *Nebuchadnezzar*, and *taking* him and his armies, and *bringing* him against the nations which were to be destroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and make them desolate; and as appointing the work that he should do so particularly, that the very persons were designated that he should kill with the sword; and those that should be killed with famine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity; and that in doing all these things he should act as his servant; by which less cannot be intended, than that he should serve his purposes and designs. And in *Jer.* xxvii. 4—6. God declares, how he would cause him thus to serve his designs, viz. by bringing this to pass in his sovereign disposals, as the great Possessor and Governor of the Universe that disposes all things just as pleases him. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel; I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me; and now I have given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar MY SERVANT, and the beasts of the field have I given also to serve him."—And *Nebuchadnezzar* is spoken of as doing these things, by having his *arms strengthened* by God, and having God's *sword put into his hands, for this end.* (Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26.) Yea, God speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and cruelly destroying all sorts, without distinction of sex or age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the instrument of his indignation, which God makes use of to fulfil his own purposes, and execute his own vengeance. (Jer. li. 20. &c.) "Thou art my battle axe, and weapons of war. For with thee I will break in pieces the nations, and with thee I will destroy kingdoms, and with thee I will break in pieces the horse and his rider, and with thee I will break in pieces the chariot and his rider; with thee also will I break in pieces man and woman; and with thee I will break in pieces old and young; and with thee will I break in pieces the young man and the maid, &c." is represented, that the designs of *Nebuchadnezzar* and those at destroyed *Jerusalem*, never could have been accomplish-

ed, had not God determined them. (Lam. iii. 37.) "Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not?" And yet the king of *Babylon* thus destroying the nations, and especially the *Jews*, is spoken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally destroyed him. *Isa.* xiv. 4—6, 12. *Hab.* ii. 5—12, and *Jer.* chap. l. and li.) It is most manifest that God, to serve his own designs, providentially ordered *Shimei's* cursing of *David.* (2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11.) "The Lord hath said unto him, curse David.—Let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him."

It is certain that God thus for excellent, holy, gracious ends, ordered the fact which they committed, who were concerned in Christ's death; and that therein they did but fulfil God's designs; as I trust no Christian will deny it was the design of God, that Christ should *be crucified*, and that for this end he came into the world. It is very manifest by many scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of *Judas* that made way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in pursuance of his purpose; notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain scriptures, to obscure and pervert the sense of them, (Acts ii. 23.) "Him being delivered, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God* ye have taken, and with wicked hands have crucified and slain." Luke xxii. 21, 22†. "But behold the hand of him that betrayeth me, is with me on the table: and truly the Son of Man goeth, as it was determined." (Acts iv. 27, 28.) "For of a truth, against the holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done," (Acts iii. 17, 18.) "And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers; but these things, which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer he had so fulfilled." So that what these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.

* "*Grotius*, as well as *Beza*, observes, ωρισμενη must here signify decree; and *Elsner* has shewn that it has that signification in approved Greek writers. And it is certain παραδοσις signifies one given up into the hands of an enemy:"—DODD in *Loc.*

† "As this passage is not liable to the ambiguities which some have apprehended in *Acts* ii. 23. and iv. 28, (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their most natural construction) I look upon it as an evident proof, that those things are, in the language of scripture, said to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God, as the word ωρ'ζω most naturally signifies) which he sees in fact will happen, in consequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency; as well as those events of which he is properly the author." DODD in *Loc.*

In Rev. xvii. 17. "The agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their kingdom to the beast;" though it was a very wicked thing in them, is spoken of as "fulfilling God's will," and what "God had put into their hearts to do." It is manifest, that God sometimes permits sin to be committed, and at the same time orders things so, that if he permits the fact, it will come to pass, because on some accounts he sees it needful and of importance that it should come to pass. (Matt. xviii. 7.) "It must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh. (With 1 Cor. xi. 19.) "For there must also be heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you."

Thus it is certain and demonstrable, from the holy Scriptures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles of *Arminians*, that God permits sin; and at the same time so orders things in his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of his permission. I proceed to observe in the next place,

III. That there is a great difference between God being concerned thus, by his *permission*, in an event and act, which in the inherent subject and agent of it, is sin, (though the event will certainly follow on his permission) and his being concerned in it by *producing* it and exerting the act of sin; or between his being the *orderer* of its certain existence by *not hindering* it, under certain circumstances, and his being the proper *actor* or *author* of it, by a *positive agency* or *efficiency*. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. WHITBY offers about a saying of philosophers, that *causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est*. As there is a vast difference between the sun being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient or producer of them; though they are necessarily consequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of the Divine Being the cause of the evil of men's wills. If the sun were the proper *cause* of cold and darkness, it would be the *fountain* of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are black and frosty. But from its being the cause no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the conse-

quence of its withdrawment; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with, and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High, but on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil; but, on the contrary, that he, and his agency, are altogether good and holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them *to themselves*, and necessarily sin when he does so, and therefore their sin is not *from themselves*, but from God; and so, that God must be a sinful being: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black.

IV. It properly belongs to the supreme and absolute governor of the universe, to order all important events within his dominion by his wisdom: but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind; such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their consequences.

These events will be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and could be called a disposal. Is it not better that the good and evil which happen in God's world should be ordered, regulated, bounded, and determined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise Being, who perfectly comprehends within his understanding and constant view, the universality of things, in all their extent and duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with respect to every individual thing and circumstance throughout the grand system, and the whole of the eternal series of consequences; than to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding or aim? Doubtless, in these important events, there is a better and a worse, as to the time, subject, place, manner, and circumstances of their coming to pass, with regard to their influence on the state and course of things. And if there be, it is certainly best that they should be determined to that time, place, &c. which is best. And therefore it is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and not chance, should order these things. So that it belongs to the Being who is the possessor of infinite wisdom, and is the creator and owner of the whole system of created existences, and has the care of all: I say, it belongs to him. to

, of this matter; and he would not do what is proper , if he should neglect it. And it is so far from being unnoly in him to undertake this affair, that it would rather have been unholy to neglect it; as it would have been a neglecting what fitly appertains to him; and so it would have been a very unfit and unsuitable neglect.

Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to this matter: especially considering, that if God should leave men's volitions and all moral events to the determination and disposition of blind unmeaning causes, or they should be left to happen perfectly without a cause; this would be no more consistent with liberty, in any notion of it, and particularly not in the *Arminian* notion of it, than if these events were subject to the disposal of divine providence, and the will of man were determined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed by Divine Wisdom; as appears by what has been already observed. But it is evident, that such a providential disposing, and determining of men's moral actions, though it infers a moral necessity of those actions, yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind; the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with such necessity.

On the whole it is manifest that God may be, in the manner which has been described, the Orderer and Disposer of that event, which, in the inherent subject and agent, is moral Evil; and yet His so doing may be no moral Evil. He may will the disposal of such an event, and its coming to pass for good ends, and his will not be an immoral or sinful will, but a perfect, holy will. And he may actually, in his Providence, so dispose and permit things, that the event may be certainly and infallibly connected with such disposal and permission, and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that there should be such a disposal and permission, as that it should come to pass, may be a good thing. This is no contradiction or inconsistence. *Joseph's* brethren selling him into *Egypt*, consider it only as it was acted by them and with respect to their views and aims which were evil, was a very bad thing; but it was a good thing, as it was an event of God's ordering, and considered with respect to his views and aims which were good. (Gen. l. 20.) "As for you, ye thought Evil against me; but God meant it unto Good." So the crucifixion of Christ, if we consider only those things which belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are comprehended within the compass of the affair considered as their act, their principles, dispositions, views, and aims; so it was one of the most heinous things that ever was done; in many respects

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There is no inconsistence in supposing that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is no person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world.* And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if so, then that providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy providence. Men do *will* sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it: they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of any thing evil; though it be his pleasure so to

* Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him will suspect to be very favourable to *Calvinism*. "It is difficult," says he, "to handle the *necessity of evil* in such a manner as not to stumble on such as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will find that consistently with the unlimited power of the supreme cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system *evils* must have place."—*Turnbull's* PRINCIPLES *of moral Philosophy*, (p. 327, 328.) He is there speaking of *moral* evils, as may be seen.

Again the same author, in his *second Vol.* entitled *Christian Philosophy*, p. 35, has these words: "If the author and governor of all things be infinitely *perfect*, then whatever is, is *right;* of all possible systems he hath chosen the *best:* and, consequently, there is *no absolute evil* in the universe.—This being the case, all the seeming *imperfections* or *evils* in it are such only in a *partial* view; and with respect to the *whole* system, they are *goods*.

Ibid. p. 37. "*Whence then comes evil?* is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the *Gordian* knot in philosophy. And indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world in an *absolute* sense, we diametrically contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any *evil* in the system, that is not good with respect to the *whole*, then is the *whole* not good, but evil; or, at best, very imperfect: and an *author* must be as his *workmanship* is; as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this difficulty is at hand; *That there is no evil in the universe.* What! Are there no pains, no imperfections?—Is there no misery, no vice in the world? or are not these *evils?* Evils indeed they are: that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful and abominable: but they are *not* evil or mischievous with respect to the *whole*.

Ibid. p. 42. "But he is, at the same time, said to *create* evil, darkness, confusion; and yet to do no evil, but to be the author of good only. He is called the "Father of lights," the author of "every perfect and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning," who "tempteth no man," but "giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not." And yet by the prophet (*Isa.* xlv. 7.) he is introduced saying of himself, "I form light and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord, do all these things." What is the meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord delighteth in goodness, and (as the scripture speaks) evil is "his strange work?" He intends and pursues the universal *good* of his creation: and the *evil* which happens is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure in evil, but because it is requisite to the *greater good* pursued."

order things that, he permitting, sin will come to pass; for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate evil as evil: and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such.

The *Arminians* themselves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a distinction of God's Will, amounting to just the same thing that *Calvinists* intend by their distinction of a *secret and revealed Will.* They must allow a distinction of those things which God thinks best should be, considering all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to his disposing Will, and those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered. Who is there that will dare to say that the hellish pride, malice and cruelty of devils are agreeable to God, and what he likes and approves? And yet, I trust, there is no Christian divine but will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will so to order and dispose things concerning them, so to leave them to themselves, and give them up to their own wickedness, that this perfect wickedness should be a necessary consequence. Doctor WHITBY's words plainly suppose and allow it.* These following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth and indisputable evidence.

1. That God is a *perfectly happy* Being, in the most absolute and highest sense possible.

2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing that is *contrary to happiness;* and so, that in strict propriety of speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief, or trouble in God.

3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is the *less pleased*, or has *less pleasure*, his *pleasure and happiness are diminished*, and he suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief.†

From this last axiom, it follows, that if no distinction is to be admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his Will with respect to the event and the existence of sin, as the all-wise Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequences through the whole compass and series of things; I say, then

* *Whitby* on the Five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.

† Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable to talk of God's Will and Desires being truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is talk of something that may be called a *revealed Will*, which may, in some respect, be different from a *secret* purpose, which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.

it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every individual act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crossed in it; and this in proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is infinite, by reason of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nature to sin; so his Will is infinitely crossed in every act of sin that happens. Which is as much as to say, He endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin that He sees committed. And, therefore, as appears by the preceding positions, He endures truly and really infinite grief or pain from every sin. And so He must be infinitely crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of instances: He must continually be the subject of an immense number of *real*, and truly infinitely *great* crosses and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of all Beings.

If any objector should say; all that these things amount to, is, that *God may do evil that good may come;* which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all.—In order to a thing being morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging to it, either it must be a thing *unfit* and *unsuitable* in its own nature; or it must have a *bad tendency;* or it must proceed from an *evil disposition*, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends. (1.) It is not *unfit in its own nature*, that He should do so. For it is in its own nature *fit*, that *infinite wisdom*, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And it is *fit*, that the Being who has *infinite wisdom*, and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme Governor of the World, should take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no *unfitness*, or unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair; because they are not possessed of a wisdom that in any manner fits them for it; and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the universe.

We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew with absolute certainty it would be best, all things considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be so. It is no evil desire to desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is best. And it is no unwise choice to choose that

that should be, which it is best should be; and to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this is known, *viz.* that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him not to choose it. And the reason why he might not *order* it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for Him who is, by right, and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every thing in such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in Him to choose that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a being, not to choose that that should be, which He certainly knows it would, all things considered, be best should be (as was but now observed) then it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of wisdom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be; and that for this very reason, because He is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of all things supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom and goodness to order that it should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be good. It can be no harm in one to whom it belongs "to do his Will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth," to execute a good volition. If this Will be good, and the object of his Will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing or willing it is not *willing evil* that good may come. And if so, then his ordering accordingly to that Will, is not *doing evil*, that good may come.

2. It is not of a *bad tendency*, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the very thing supposed in the point now in question.—Christ's Crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that perpetrated it, was of a most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered of God.

3. Nor is there any need of supposing it *proceeds from any evil disposition or aim;* for by the supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the final result of things.*

* From the whole strain of our author's defence of his principles, in reference to the existence of sin in the universe, though there are many excellent remarks interspersed, and sound reasoning as far as his data would admit, yet he is evidently embarrassed; makes concessions which his general principles of moral necessity did not require, and shelters himself under covers that afford him in reality no effectual protection. To say, that the existence of sin is only a *common difficulty*, which belongs to every hypothesis—that though God is the *author of sin*,

SECT. X.

Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.

The things which have already been offered, may serve to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be

in some sense, yet he is not the agent, therefore the phrase should be disliked and rejected, that though God *wills the event* of sin, yet he wills it not as an evil, but for excellent ends—that the events of moral evils are *disposed by wisdom*—that God may be the *orderer* and *disposer* of moral evil, which in the agent is infinitely evil, but in the orderer of it no evil at all—that in order to a thing being morally evil, it must be *unfit* and *unsuitable*, or of a *bad tendency*, or from an *evil disposition*[1]; but that in *willing the event* of sin neither can be attributed to God—that if a wise and good man *knew*, with absolute certainty, that it would be *best*, all things considered, there should be moral evil, he might *choose* that it should be so—that the reason why he might not *order* it, if he were able, would not be because he might not *desire*, but only the ordering of that matter does not *belong* to him—and that in the language of TURNBULL, "there is *no evil in the universe*,—no absolute evil; sins are evils only in a *partial* view, but with respect to the *whole* system they are *not* evil or mischievous, but *goods*, &c." to say these things and more of a similar cast, is not calculated to satisfy a mind that wants the best evidence which the nature of the case will admit; and we strongly suspect, from his manner of writing, that our author's own mind was not satisfied with the solution which he has attempted.

In former notes we have had occasion only to *explain* principles adopted, or to point out others either more evident or more radical, on which those of the author were founded, or with which they stood inseparably connected. But at the close of the present section we feel ourselves obliged to attempt, at least, the *rectification* of his principles; or, perhaps more properly, to point out *other principles* which we conceive are attended with no such embarrassment, are exposed to no self-contradiction, and which represent the great Supreme in a much more amiable light. The task is indeed arduous; but let it not be thought impossible, nor let the imperfection of language be confounded with the inadequacy of principles. And while we solicit the *candour* of the reader—whereby he will be prepared to make such allowances as the nature of the subject requires, be prevented from drawing hasty conclusions of the impracticability of bringing the subject of enquiry to a satisfactory issue, or of presumption in attempting it—we no less demand a *strictness* of examination. The real enquirer after truth, the christian divine, and the moral philosopher, should be solicitous, not to have the "last word" in controversy, but to make all possible advances in ascertaining the genuine grounds of acknowledged truths, in discovering radical principles, and in ascertaining their just bearings and tendencies.

1. The true point of enquiry is—not whether they *be* moral evil, or whether God *be* just? but—how the actual existence of sin, or moral evil, in the universe, is to be *reconciled* with the moral perfections and character of God? Therefore, the thing wanted is a middle term, or argumentative medium, whereby it may be shewn that this proposition is *true*, viz There is *no real inconsistence* between the existence of sin and the moral perfections of God.

2. We may therefore consider the following propositions as first principles:

AXIOMS.

I. There does exist in the universe moral evil.

II. God is infinitely free from injustice, unholiness, and all imperfections.—Hence,

COROLLARY.

There is *no real inconsistence* between the existence of moral evil and the moral perfections of God.

3. Now the question returns, What is the *best evidence* that there is no such inconsistency? Those who are satisfied with these plain propositions, the axioms

raised concerning sin's first coming into the world; as though it would follow from the doctrine maintained, that God must

and corollary, may have the evidence of *faith*, that there is no inconsistence between the subject and predicate of the last proposition. They may know so much of God as to be *assured* that the existence of sin in the world is no impeachment of the moral character of the Most High. For such evidence it behoves us to be thankful. Millions are now in heaven, who enjoyed no other evidence while on earth than that of faith. But this is no sufficient reason why those who have opportunity should make no further enquiries into the subject. Some, indeed, suppose that no *rational evidence* is in the present state *attainable* by man. But why any should so conclude it is difficult to say, except it be, that they wish to make their own minds the standard of all others, or their own attainments the *ne plus ultra* of moral philosophy. Such persons are not likely to acknowledge or perceive the real evidence, on supposition that it is laid before them, as their minds will be strongly prejudiced against all reasoning on the subject.

4. One thing however is incontrovertible, as necessarily connected with the axioms, that the existence of moral evil, and the spotless and infinitely excellent moral character of God are *perfectly consistent;* and therefore there must be *somewhere good evidence* of it. And another thing is equally plain, that the brighter the evidence we have of the truth of the proposition which asserts the *consistency* of the two axioms, the more will be our acquaintance with God's real character, and the real nature of sin, which all must allow to be advantageous. To which we may add; that increased evidence of such a proposition is far from being injurious, may be further inferred from this consideration, that the higher any beings arise in holiness and happiness, the more *clear* will be that evidence to their view.

5. The *terms* of the question are so plain, and so generally understood, that it is scarcely necessary to notice them; we may however briefly observe, that moral evil is what stands in direct opposition to the moral character of God; and that this latter includes *universal rectitude* or holiness and *perfect benevolence*. Therefore,

POSTULATE.

Whatever is perfectly consistent with universal rectitude, and perfect benevolence, is consistent with the moral perfections of God. The reader will observe, that what is asserted of rectitude and benevolence is different; the one is said to be *universal* and the other *perfect* only. Every attribute of Jehovah is in ITSELF both perfect and universal; but not RELATIVELY SO. Thus his *rectitude* is both *perfect* in itself, and *universal* with respect to its object; but his *benevolence* however infinitely perfect, is *restricted* as to its objects, both in *extent* and in *degree*. And this *restriction* is *necessary* two ways:

6. *First*, the objects of benevolence, at least in this world, compose a *system;* and every system, whether natural or moral implies a *subordination* and *comparative superiority* of parts; therefore the very idea of a *systematic* whole implies a *restriction* of benevolence as to extent and degree.

7. *Secondly*, the exercise of benevolence is an exercise of *will;* and the exercise of will implies *diversity* of objects, and a *preference* of some rather than others, to occupy the more excellent parts of the whole system; so that perfect universality or a strict equality of benevolence, without a distinguishing preference, is necessarily excluded by the *very nature* of benevolence in exercise.

8. Divine *benevolence*, therefore, admits of *gradations*, from the smallest degree conceivable to the utmost extent of the system; while *rectitude* admits of no such degree. Were we to attempt an illustration of so abstract a subject by mental images, we might say, that *rectitude* in its exercise towards the creatures, may be compared to a plain surface as widely extended as the universe, of infinitely perfect polish, and without a flaw in any part. Hence, in its exercise, it is *universal* as its objects; and can no more admit of *degrees*, than a perfect polish can admit of flaws. On the contrary, *benevolence* may be compared to a cone, in an inverted form, the vertex of which is in contact with a point of that plane, and which, from the least possible degree, is capable of rising at sovereign pleasure, in its exercise towards the universe, to such a height, as that the base of it *may* be, or *may* not be, of equal extent with the plane below.

9. From just views of benevolence we may infer, that its exercise is purely free, and undeserved by the creature; being the fruit of will, choice, and sove-

be the author of the first sin, through his so disposing things, that it should necessarily follow from his permission, that the

reign pleasure. The absence of it, with respect to creatures, implies no flaw in perfect rectitude. Every degree of benevolence, from the least to the greatest, must be altogether optional. Perfect rectitude, with respect to created beings and each individual creature, may subsist, without any more benevolence than what is necessarily included in mere existence.

10. This being the case, the state of the universe in reference to perfect rectitude, and irrespective of benevolence, may be further compared to a balance in perfect equilibrium. The least weight of benevolence makes it preponderate, proportionally, in favour of virtue and happiness; but without which weight neither could take place.

11. But, according to what has been said in a former note, every created being is the subject of *passive power;* which, with respect to its influence on the creature, is, in some respect, the opposite of benevolence. In *some*, not in *all* respects. Benevolence is an exercise of *will*, and implies an agent; but passive power is a quality or principle inseparable from every creature, and from the universe at large. In reference to a former illustration, this may be compared to another cone exactly opposite, the vertex of which, from below, meets that of the other in the same plane. The intermediate point, and indeed every point in the same plane, may represent the perfect rectitude of God towards every individual; the inverted cone above, divine benevolence; the cone below, passive power, with its base *necessarily* equal to the whole plane, as it respects the created universe.

12. Hence we may say that the *neutral* state of any being is placed in the plane; his degree of influence from passive power, the predisposing cause of vice, is represented by a corresponding given part of the cone below; and his degree of predisposition to virtue from divine benevolence, is represented by a corresponding given part of the cone above. Or, to change the comparison, if a perfectly poised balance be made to represent perfect rectitude, then we may suppose weights at each end in all possible proportions, from the smallest to the greatest. Passive power not being the effect of will, but of the relative nature of things, and inseparably connected with one end of the balance, it is evident, that it can be counteracted in its tendency only by the weight of benevolence, or sovereign pleasure. Therefore, whoever on earth or in heaven, rises to, and is confirmed in virtue, his attainment must be the *effect* of mere benevolence. And whoever on earth or in hell, falls into, and is confirmed in vice, his deterioration must be the *effect* of passive power, as the predisposing cause of vice, which nothing in the universe can counteract but sovereign, free, unmerited, benevolence.

13. Consequently, all the good and happiness in the universe is the effect of benevolence, or sovereign pleasure, and exists above the plane of perfect rectitude; but all the evil and misery in the world is the effect of passive power, in union with free agency, and exists below the plane of rectitude. The one generates virtue, and raises to happiness and heaven; the other generates vice, and sinks to misery and hell.

14. Every thing in the universe planned, decreed, and effected by Jehovah, is a structure of benevolence. All He effects is good, and only good. The *evil* that exists is not his work. Benevolence has decreed an endless chain of *antecedents*, including the natural and moral worlds; and the consequents peculiar to them result therefrom with infallible certainty. But *other* antecedents, in *this* world and in *hell*, are constantly interposed by free agents under the influence of passive power, whose consequences also follow with equal infallible certainty. To the eye of created intelligence these counter positions, and opposite consequents appear blended in an inextricable manner, like the different rays of light in the same pencil, different gases in a given space, and different subtle fluids in the same body. But to the eye of omniscience they appear perfectly distinct, in their proper nature, in all their directions and bearings, in all their tendencies and effects.

15. Instead, therefore, of saying, "There is *no evil* in the universe," we should say, "There is *much evil* in the universe; there is much on earth, and more in hell; but none of God's *appointment*. It is demonstrable, that passive

sinful act should be committed, &c. I need not, therefore, stand to repeat what has been said already, about such a ne-

power can no more be an object of appointment, than the most direct contradictions; and yet it is equally demonstrable that such a principle is the inseparable concomitant of every creature It is of prior consideration to moral agency; for whatever is a *property* of a created nature as such, is of prior consideration to the *agency* of that creature. Consequently it is a property neither divinely appointed, nor yet a *moral* evil.

16. Liberty, in one sense, bears the same relation to good and evil, as rectitude does to benevolence and passive power. Liberty in itself is equally a medium between good and evil, as rectitude is between benevolence and passive power; and the medium is of a nature perfectly distinct from both extremes. To which we may add, that Liberty united to, or under the influence of sovereign benevolence, generates virtue; but Liberty united to, or under the influence of passive power, generates vice.

17. From the premises it may be seen, that the existence of *all evil*, and especially *moral evil*, in the universe, is not inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. It is evident also that *in no sense whatever*, except by a total misapplication of terms, can God be said to be "the author of sin." Nor can it be said that God "wills the event of sin;" but the contrary is plain, that he *does not will* it, either in a decretive, a legislative, or any other sense.

18. The great source of confusion into which many authors have plunged themselves, is, that they draw too hasty an inference in attempting to make *not hindering* an event to be ultimately the same as *willing* it. Upon their *data*, indeed, it may be true, while they regard every event alike to be the effect of divine energy, and even the *worst*, in order to answer a *good end*. And this will always be the case, for self-consistency requires it, until we see and acknowledge a metaphysical *negative cause* of moral evil, and an eternal *nature of things* antecedent to all will, with their infallible effects, when not counteracted by sovereign benevolence.

19. Let us now view the subject in the light of terms a little different. Much error often arises through the defect of language; and where there is danger of misapprehension, it may be of use to change expressions. Hereby a difficult subject may be taken by different handles, or a reader may apprehend it by one handle, which he could not by another. Let us then substitute the word *Equity* instead of *Rectitude*, and undeserved *favour* instead of benevolence.

POSTULATE.

Whatever is perfectly consistent with *equity* is also perfectly consistent with the *moral character* of God.

20. Whatever is the *pure effect* of *equity* and *the nature of things*, or essential truth, united, cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God the existence of moral evil in the universe is the pure effect of these: therefore the existence of moral evil in the universe cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God.

21. The only ground of hesitation here is, *How* moral evil is the effect of equity and the nature of things? *Liberty* itself is a *natural* good, and therefore is the fruit of divine favour; and the mere *exercise* of liberty must be ascribed to the same cause. But he who is hypothetically free to good, must be in like manner free to evil. For this hypothetical freedom either to good or to evil is what constitutes the *morality* of his acts of choice. Take away this hypothetical freedom, and you take away the essence of moral agency It is plain, then, that to possess this freedom and consequent moral agency, is not inconsistent with the equity, rectitude, or moral perfections of God. Yet it is demonstrable that freedom *cannot* be influenced in its choice, so as to constitute it virtuous or vicious, holy or sinful, morally right or wrong, good or evil, but from two causes radically; divine favour and passive power. If the agent be under the influence of divine favour, a happy result, in the same proportion, is secured by the same essential truth as renders the choice of the great I AM infallibly good; which no one will say is inconsistent with the divine perfections. For though favour raises the agent *above* what rigid or pure equity can do, there is no *inconsistence* between them, any more than between paying a just debt and bestowing also a free gift

cessity not proving God to be the Author of Sin, in any ill sense, or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt, and punishment.

[illegible] But is the agent be not under the influence of undeserved favour, [illegible] necessarily be under the influence of passive power. [illegible] nothing can possibly secure a happy result but undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, a negative cause becomes an infallible ground of certainty, as to opposite result. Again,

[illegible] When God gives to creatures what is their due, he deals with them in equity; but when God gives them the grace that is actually sufficient to secure their [illegible] he will do, that he has [illegible] given them their due. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible, [illegible] to be. If he give them so much favour or benevolent influence as would actually preserve them from sin, were their due, it is plain that the Good he actually would give them their due, and preserve them from sin [illegible] But the fact is widely otherwise. They are not all preserved from sin, though all might be, through the interposition of sovereign favour; therefore it is not their due, or equity does not require it.

[illegible] It is owing to their *own fault*; it is very true. But how came any creatures to be *faulty*? God made angels and men *upright*: and in his [illegible] dealt with every creature, however debased by sin, in equity. He has also given to every creature, capable of sinning, *liberty* unconstrained. He often influences the disposition by benevolence; and the goodness of God, by providential and gracious dispensations, leadeth to repentance. But never has he dealt with any unjustly, or given them *less* than their due. Not a fallen spirit, however deeply sunk, can verify such a charge. Assuredly, they have *destroyed themselves*: but in God is the only help. A principle of which God is not the author, as before explained, in union with the abuse of their liberty, satisfactorily accounts for the fact. Our *evil* is of *ourselves*; but all our good is from God.

24. From what has been said we may safely draw this inference, that the existence of moral evil in the universe is not inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. And the proposition would be equally true had the proportion of moral evil been greater than it is. But some will continue to cavil, it is probable, because *every* objection is not professedly answered; and *some* difficulties, or divine *arcana*, will always remain. They will still be asking, *why* benevolence is not more universal, and thereby moral evil *altogether* prevented? Why the cone (to which benevolence has been compared) is not a cylinder, whose base is commensurate with the plane of creatural existence, and whose top rises *ad infinitum*? They might as well enquire, Why is not every atom a sun? Why not every drop an ocean? Why not every moment an age? Why not every worm an angel? Why not the solar system as large as all material systems united? Why the number of angels and men not a thousand times greater? And to complete the absurdity of demanding evidence for every thing, as an objection against demonstrable truth, Why is not any given part on the surface of a cone, a cylinder, or a globe, not in the centre? To all such inquiries—and if advanced as objections, *impertinent* enquiries—it is sufficient to reply, Infinite Wisdom has planned a universe, in which divine benevolence appears wonderfully conspicuous, and even the evils—whether natural or moral, which are intermixed, and which in their origin are equally remote from divine causation and from chance—are overruled, to answer purposes the most benevolent and the most wonderfully sublime.

COROLLARIES.

1. The only possible way of avoiding the most ruinous consequences—moral evil and misery—is to direct the will, through the instrumentality of its freedom, to a state of union to God, submission to his will, and an imitation of his moral perfections, according to his most merciful appointment.

2. To creatures fallen below the line of rectitude, and yet the subjects of hope, prayer to God for grace, undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, is an exercise the most becoming, a duty the most necessary and important, and a privilege of the first magnitude.—W.

But should it nevertheless be said, that if God, when he had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from these, together with his withholding further assistance and Divine Influence, his Sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first made man with a fixed prevailing principle of Sin in his heart?

I answer, 1. It was meet, if Sin did come into existence and appear in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should appear so to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been made at first with Sin in his heart; nor unless the abiding principle and habit of Sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If Sin had not arisen from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did not arise from God as the positive cause and real source of it.—But it would require room that cannot be here allowed, fully to consider all the difficulties which have been started concerning the first entrance of Sin into the world.—And therefore,

2. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been laid down in opposition to the *Arminian* notion of liberty, from these difficulties, are altogether impertinent; because no additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a scheme in this manner differing from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that the *Arminians* say about the contingence or self-determining power of man's will, can serve to explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame of it. To say, the will was self-determined, or determined by free choice, in that sinful volition—which is to say, that the first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sinful volition—is no solution of the difficulty. It is an odd way of solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To say, two and two make nine; or, that a child begat his father, solves no difficulty: no more does it to say, the first sinful act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any better solution to say, the first sinful volition chose, determined, and produced itself; which is to say, it was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty to say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally, without any cause at all; any more than it will solve that difficult question, *How the world could be made out of nothing?* to say, it came into being out of nothing, without any cause; as has been already observed. And if we should allow that the first evil volition should arise by perfect accident, without

any cause; it would relieve no difficulty, about God laying the blame of it to man. For how was man to blame for perfect accident which had no cause, and which, therefore, he was not the cause of, any more than if it came by some external cause?—Such kind of solutions are no better than if some person, going about to solve some of the strange mathematical paradoxes about infinitely great and small quantities—as, that some infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than some other infinitely great quantities; and also that some infinitely small quantities are infinitely less than others, which yet are infinitely little—should say, that mankind have been under a mistake, in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a smaller; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but a single unit.*

* On the subject of the *origin* of moral evil, our author is more concise than usual. His design, in this very short section, is merely to shew, that the difficulties which have been started, concerning the first entrance of sin into the world, are such as cannot be discussed in a small compass; and, that the Arminian cause gains nothing by urging them. That cause has been sufficiently examined in several parts of this Enquiry; but the true and precise *origin* of moral evil, requires further notice. It is indeed of infinitely greater importance to be acquainted with that celestial art, and that sacred influence, whereby we may emerge from the gulf of sin to holiness and heaven, than to be accurately versed in the science of its origination. And so it is far more important to see objects, and improve sight, than to be able to demonstrate the theory of vision; to recover health, and to use it aright, than to have skill to ascertain the cause and the symptom of disease; to contribute vigorously in extinguishing a fire that threatens to destroy our dwellings and ourselves, than to know the author of the calamity; to participate the effects of varied seasons, than to understand, astronomically, the precise reason of those variations. The mariner may navigate without knowing *why* his needle points to the north; and the celestial bodies in the solar system were as equally regular in their motions before Sir ISAAC NEWTON had existence, as they have been since he has ascertained those *laws* and *properties* according to which they move. And yet the science of optics is not useless, the healing art is not to be despised, to discover an incendiary is desirable, and never is that philosopher, who attempts to ascertain the *causes* of *natural* phenomena, held up as blameworthy. In like manner, though millions are delivered from the influence of sin, and raised to the most exalted eminence of happiness, who never knew, or even sought to know, scientifically, the origination of sin; this is no good reason that such knowledge is useless, or even unimportant. As we do not wish to swell these notes unnecessarily, we beg leave to refer to what we have said elsewhere on the subject, particularly in notes on the former part of this Treatise, on Dr. DODDRIDGE's Lectures, and on a Sermon, concerning "Predestination to Life," second edition, in connection with what we now add. (See DODDR. Works, vol. iv. p. 333, &c. vol. v. p. 208, &c. *Notes.*)—As the basis of our present demonstration, we begin with proposing a few axioms.

AXIOMS.

1. No effect can exist without an adequate cause. On this truth are founded all reasonings and all metaphysical evidence.

2. Sin is an effect and has a cause. On this truth are founded all moral means and all religious principles.

3. The origin of moral evil cannot be moral evil; or, the cause of sin cannot be sin itself. Except we admit this, the same thing may be and not be, at the same time, and in the same respect—the same thing may be sin and no sin—cause and no cause—or, contrary to the first axiom, a contingent event may be the cause of itself, or may exist without an adequate cause.

SECT. XI.

Of a supposed Inconsistence between these Principles and God's moral Character.

The things which have been already observed, may be sufficient to answer most of the objections, and silence the

4. There is no *positive* cause but what is ultimately from God. If otherwise, something positive may *begin* to be *without* a positive cause; or, something may exist without an *adequate* cause; which is the same as an effect to exist without a cause, contrary to the first axiom.

5. There may be a *negative* metaphysical cause, where there is no decretive divine operation to effect it. Were there no negative metaphysical causes, such ideas as absence, ignorance, folly, weakness, and the like, could have no metaphysical effects, contrary to universal experience. And we must renounce all ideas of congruity to suppose that such things are the mere effects of divine decree and operation.

Having premised these positions as axioms not to be disputed, we proceed to make a few observations, which, though equally true, may not be equally obvious.

6. The origin of moral evil cannot be *one* principle. For were it one, it must be either a positive or negative cause. If *positive*, it would be ultimately from God, but this would exclude a *moral alternative*, the very essence of moral agency, and consequently be incompatible with the existence of *moral* evil. But if a *negative* cause, it must ultimately be referred to the *prime* negative cause, which can be no other than passive power, as before explained; which is nothing independent of positive existence; and consequently can have no effect but in *union* with positive existence.

7. It remains, then, that the origin of moral evil is a compound of *two* causes at least. Yet not more than two; because, as we shall see, these are sufficient, and more would be superfluous in order to produce the effect.

8. Now the question remains, What are these compounded principles? Are they two positive causes, two negatives, or one of each? They cannot be *two positive* causes; for then they might be ultimately reduced to *one*, the first cause; as before proved, gr. 4, 6. Nor can they be *two negative* ones; for ultimately there is but *one* cause properly negative. Consequently,

9. The first entrance of sin into the world, or the true and precise origin of moral evil, may be found in *two* causes *united*: the one positive and the other negative. But neither of which is morally good or morally evil; if the cause were morally good, the effect could not be morally bad; and if morally evil, it would be contrary to the third axiom, and to common sense. These two causes are, first, *Liberty*, a cause *naturally* good; secondly, *passive power*, a cause *naturally* evil.—And these two causes are as necessary for the production of moral evil, as two parents for the production of a human being according to the laws of nature.

9. Dr. CLARKE, whose brief account has been more implicitly admitted than any other, says, that moral evil "arises *wholly* from the ABUSE of *Liberty*; which God gave to his creatures for other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit to give them for the perfection and order of the whole creation, only they, contrary to God's intention and command, have *abused* what was necessary for the perfection of the whole, to the corruption and depravation of themselves." This extract from Dr. CLARKE (in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 113, 5th edit.) has been advanced by celebrated writers, as "containing all that can be advanced with certainty" on the subject. But surely those minds must be easily satisfied who can be satisfied with such evidence. Dr. CLARKE allows and proves, that liberty is a *perfection* rather than an evil. How came it then to *produce* evil? He answers, "This arises wholly from the *abuse* of liberty." But what is the *cause* of this *effect* called "the abuse of liberty?" This in fact is the

moral perfections of God, as exercised in his government of mankind. The consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as has been maintained, with the fitness and reasonableness of

Hence, when the prince of this world came, he found nothing in him; and hence he rose to the greatest height of glory, having "a name above every name."

14. There is no end of objections and cavils, however demonstrative the proof; for such there have been against all the first principles of religion—the being of God—a revelation of his will to the human race—the doctrine of a future state, &c. &c. Some may say, Why should sin be made to originate in these two things, liberty and passive power? We answer, It has been demonstrated, that all metaphysical, positive and negative, causation, in reference to moral evil, is reducible to these two; and therefore they might as well ask, Why one and one make two, rather than any other number?

15. Others may say, Why not proceed from *God alone?* They might as well ask, Why is not the sun the cause of darkness? Love, the cause of enmity? Wisdom, the cause of folly? Happiness, the cause of misery? Order, the cause of confusion? But the *effect*, it may be said, is the *same*. We reply, the assignation of a *cause*, whether true or false, does not alter the nature of phenomena. It would be, indeed, a strange phenomenon, hitherto unknown, and unknowable, for an *hypothesis*, however demonstrable, to alter the *nature* of the things in question. *The effects are the same.* Very true. But the question is not about the EFFECTS; the enquiry is about the *true cause* of those effects, in opposition to false philosophy. The *effect* of moral evil is misery, or deserved suffering. Now does it make no difference, in justifying the ways of God to men, whether a rational, immortal being suffer *deservedly* or *undeservedly?* To suffer for moral evil, is to suffer *deservedly;* but were sin and suffering from God alone, or the effect of constituted laws, this could not be the case. To say, that this partial suffering may be ultimately counterbalanced by a restoration, is begging the question, that there will be a restoration. And if there were, what is it better than an apology for past injustice? To suffer *undeservedly*. is to suffer *unjustly;* and to punish *at all* is an act of injustice, if undeserved, as well as to punish for ever.

16. It may be again asked, What advantage is there in fixing on this origin of moral evil, rather than another? We reply by putting another question. Why should we put up with a false cause assigned for any thing? Surely, phenomena more interesting, more alarming in their nature, and more awful in their consequences, than moral evils, cannot arrest human observation. And it would be passing strange to suppose, that the ascertaining of their true cause and origin is not an important part of philosophy, and deserving of the closest investigation. What can be more dishonourable to the moral character of Deity, than to make sin originate in his will alone? Or, if *this* be its origin, how preposterous to call it *moral* evil, as distinguished from natural? How cruel and unjust, beyond precedent, to punish it; and how absurd the idea of *threatening* punishment for what was irreversibly *appointed.*

17. Some may say, Why may we not be satisfied with the idea of *permission?* If properly understood, we acknowledge that this goes a considerable way. But we suspect, few seem acquainted with the full implication of the term. *God permits.* True; if by it we mean he *does not hinder.* The free agent acts amiss when *he is not hindered.* This only shews, that God might hinder if he pleased; but it assigns no *cause* hy the agent acts amiss. *Permitting*, or *not hindering*, IMPLIES a *cause* distinct from divine causation. And the question returns, *what is* the cause of sin taking place when not hindered? In vain do we fix on chance, or a self-determining power; these explain nothing, and in fact are nothing, as our author has demonstrated various ways. In vain do we say, sin arises from the *abuse* of liberty. For the question recurs, What is the *cause* of that abuse? If this be not explained, nothing is effected. In vain shall we say, It proceeds from the cause of causes. For that cause is *good only.* From such a cause only good can proceed; and to ascribe sin to this cause is as proper as to say that *moral evil* is a *good thing*, and ought to be rewarded rather than punished. If this be not a reproachable mode of calling "evil good, and good evil." (Isai. v. 20.) we know not what is

God's commands, promises and threatenings, rewards and punishments, has been particularly considered. The cavils of our opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made God the author of sin, have been answered; and also their objections against these principles, as inconsistent with God's sincerity, in his counsels, invitations, and persuasions, has been already obviated, in what has been observed respecting the consistence of what *Calvinists* suppose, concerning the secret and revealed will of God. By that it appears, there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret will of God, that his ordination and permission of events should be such, that it shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which yet it is man's duty to do, and so God's preceptive will, that he should do; and this is the same thing as to say, God may sincerely command and require him to do it. And if he may be sincere in commanding him, he may, for the same reason, be sincere in counselling, inviting and using persuasions with him to do it. Counsels and invitations are manifestations of God's preceptive will, or of what God loves, and what is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable to his heart; and not of his disposing will, and what he chooses as a part of his own infinite scheme of things. It has been particularly shewn, Part III. Sect. IV. that such a necessity as has been maintained, is not inconsistent with the propriety and fitness of divine commands; and for the same reason, not inconsistent with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in the Corollary at the end of that Section. Yea, it hath been shewn, Part III. Sect. VII. Corol. 1. that this objection of *Arminians*, concerning the sincerity and use of divine exhortations, invitations and counsels, is demonstrably against themselves.

Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the difficulty of reconciling the sincerity of counsels, invitations and persuasions with such an antecedent known fixedness of all events as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme.

COROLLARIES.

18. Those who renounce the idea of passive power, as before explained, and its influence on the mind of a free agent, as a negative metaphysical cause; can never find the true, philosophical cause of vice and sin, and consequently of *deserved* suffering. As soon might they ascertain the laws of the planetary motions, while rejecting the principle of gravitation. If it be asked, What is the link of connection between this principle and the event? We reply, Essential truth, the same truth as connects $2+2=4$, or $2-1=1$.

19. Those who renounce a sovereign, benevolent, physical, holy influence on the mind can never find the true, philosophical origin of virtue and holiness, and consequently happiness.

20. From the premises we infer, that the highest wisdom, the best interest, and the greatest honour of a rational and accountable being, is to employ his liberty, and all his powers, in the way of absolute *submission* to the divine will; in supreme *affection*, fear and love, to the infinite majesty and self-existent excellence of God; and in the way of humble and diligent *obedience*, according to the manifestation which God has made of himself.—W.

as distinguished from that of the generality of *Arminians*, which acknowledge the absolute foreknowledge of God: and therefore, it would be unreasonably brought as an objection against my differing from them. The main seeming difficulty in the case is this: that God, in counselling, inviting and persuading, makes a shew of aiming at, seeking and using endeavours for the thing exhorted and persuaded to; whereas, it is impossible for any intelligent being truly to seek, or use endeavours for a thing, which he at the same time knows, most perfectly, will not come to pass; and that it is absurd to suppose he makes the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counsels, which he, at the same time, infallibly knows will not be obtained by these means. Now, if God knows this, in the utmost certainty and perfection, the way by which he comes by this knowledge makes no difference. If he knows it is by the necessity which he sees in things, or by some other means; it alters not the case. But it is in effect allowed by *Arminians* themselves, that God's inviting and persuading men to do things, which he, at the same time, certainly knows will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity; because they allow, that God has a certain foreknowledge of all sinful actions and omissions. And as this is implicitly allowed by most *Arminians*, so all that pretend to own the scriptures to be the word of God, must be constrained to allow it. - God commanded and counselled *Pharaoh* to let his people go, and used arguments and persuasions to induce him to it; he laid before him arguments taken from his infinite greatness and almighty power, (*Exod.* vii. 16.) and forewarned him of the fatal consequences of his refusal from time to time; (*chap.* viii. 1, 2, 20, 21. *chap.* ix. 1,—5. 13,—17. and x. 3, 6.) He commanded *Moses*, and the elders of *Israel*, to go and beseech *Pharaoh* to let the people go; and at the same time told them, he knew surely that he would not comply with it. (Exod. iii. 18, 19.) "And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and you shall say unto him; the Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God:" and, "I am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go." So our blessed Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed, knew that *Peter* would shamefully deny him before the morning: for he declares it to him with asseverations, to shew the certainty of it; and tells the disciples, that all of them should be offended because of him that night; (*Matt.* xxvi. 31, —35. *John* xiii. 38. *Luke* xxii. 31,—34. *John* xvi. 32.) And yet it was their duty to avoid these things; they were very sinful things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty to watch and pray against; and they were obliged to do so from the *counsels* and *persuasions* Christ used with them, at

that very time, so to do; (*Matt.* xxvi. 41.) "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." So that whatever difficulty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection against any principles which have been maintained in opposition to the principles of *Arminians;* nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty, than it does them, or indeed all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge the divine authority of the scriptures.—Nevertheless, this matter may possibly (God allowing) be more particularly and largely considered in some future discourse on the doctrine of *predestination.**

But I would here observe, that however the defenders of that notion of liberty which I have opposed, exclaim against the doctrine of *Calvinists*, as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral perfections of God: it is *their* scheme, and not the scheme of *Calvinists*, that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For it is one of their most fundamental points, that a freedom of will consisting in self-determination, without all necessity, is essential to *moral agency*. This is the same thing as to say, that such a determination of the will, without all necessity, must be in all intelligent beings, in those things, wherein they are *moral agents*, or in their *moral acts:* and from this it will follow, that God's will is not necessarily determined, in any thing he does, as a *moral agent*, or in any of his *acts* that are of a *moral nature:* So that in all things wherein he acts *holily*, *justly* and *truly*, he does not act necessarily; or his will is not necessarily determined to act holily and justly; because, if it were necessarily determined, he would not be a *moral agent* in thus acting: his will would be attended with necessity; which, they say, is inconsistent with *moral agency:* "He can act no otherwise; he is at no liberty in the affair; he is determined by unavoidable invincible necessity: therefore such agency is no moral agency; yea, no agency at all, properly speaking: a necessary agent is no agent: he being passive, and subject to necessity, what he does is no act of his, but an effect of a necessity prior to any act of his." This is agreeable to their manner of arguing. Now then, what is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God? How can we prove, that God certainly will, in any one instance, do that which is just and holy; seeing his will is determined in the matter by no necessity? We have no other way of proving that any thing *certainly* will be, but only by the necessity of the event. Where we can see no necessity, but that the thing may be, or may not be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss.

* It does not appear that the author did any thing more towards accomplishing this design, than to pen some thoughts, probably with a view to an elaborate treatise, which are included in his Miscellaneous Remarks and Observations. —W.

We have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr. CHUBB proves them, (p. 252, 261—263, of his Tracts,) *viz.* that God must, necessarily, perfectly know, what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which, in the nature of things, is best and fittest to be done. And, as this is most eligible in itself, he, being omniscient, must see it to be so; and being both omniscient and self-sufficient, cannot have any temptation to reject it; and so must necessarily will that which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the determination of God's will to what is good and best, we demonstrably establish God's moral character.

Corol. From what has been observed, it appears, that most of the arguments from scripture which *Arminians* make use of to support their scheme, are no other than *begging the question.* For in these they determine in the first place, that without such a freedom of will as they hold, men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the subjects of command, counsel, persuasion, invitation, promises, threatenings, expostulations, rewards and punishments; and that without such freedom it is to no purpose for men to take any care, or use any diligence, endeavours or means, in order to their avoiding sin, or becoming holy, escaping punishment, or obtaining happiness: and having supposed these things, which are grand things in question in the debate, then they heap up scriptures, containing commands, counsels, calls, warnings, persuasions, expostulations, promises and threatenings; as doubtless they may find enough such; (the bible being confessedly full of them, from the beginning to the end) and then they glory, how full the scripture is on their side, how many more texts there are that evidently favour their scheme, than such as seem to favour the contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in question, which they suppose and take for granted, and shew them to be consistent with themselves; and produce clear evidence of their truth; and they have gained their point, as all will confess, without bringing one scripture. For none denies, that there are commands, counsels, promises, threatenings, &c. in the bible. But unless they do these things, their multiplying such texts of scripture is insignificant and vain.

It may further be observed, that such scriptures as they bring, are really against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated, that it is *their* scheme, and not ours, is inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of virtue, or abstaining from wickedness. Their principles, and not ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and inconsistent with moral government, with law or precept, with the nature of virtue or

vice, reward or punishment, and with every thing whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral governor, or in the state, actions or conduct of the subject.

SECT. XII.

Of a supposed Tendency of these Principles to Atheism and Licentiousness.

If any object against what has been maintained, that it tends to *Atheism*; I know not on what grounds such an objection can be raised, unless it be, that some Atheists have held a doctrine of necessity which they suppose to be like this. But if it be so, I am persuaded the *Arminians* would not look upon it just that their notion of freedom and contingence should be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ever any embraced, who have held such opinions. The *Stoick* philosophers, whom the *Calvinists* are charged with agreeing with, were no Atheists, but the greatest Theists, and nearest akin to Christians in their opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the Godhead, of all the heathen philosophers. And *Epicurus*, that chief father of Atheism, maintained no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest maintainer of contingence.

The doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary connection of all events, on some antecedent ground and reason of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove the being of God. And the contrary doctrine of contingence, even as maintained by *Arminians* (which certainly implies or infers, that events may come into existence, or begin to be, without dependence on any thing foregoing, as their cause, ground or reason) takes away all proof of the being of God; which proof is summarily expressed by the apostle, in *Rom.* i. 20. And this is a tendency to *Atheism* with a witness. So that, indeed, it is the doctrine of *Arminians*, and not of the *Calvinists*, that is justly charged with a tendency to *Atheism*; it being built on a foundation that is the utter subversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof of a Deity; as has been shewn, Part II. Sect. III.

And whereas it has often been said, that the *Calvinistic* doctrine of necessity saps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to the greatest licentiousness of practice: this objection is built on the pretence, that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavours, in order to be virtuous and religious. Which pretence has been already particularly considered in the fifth Section of this Part; where it has been demonstrated, that this doctrine has no such tendency; but

that such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doctrine: inasmuch as the notion of contingence which their doctrine implies in its certain consequences, overthrows all connection in every degree, between endeavour and event, means and end.

And besides, if many other things, which have been observed to belong to the *Arminian* doctrine, or to be plain consequences of it, be considered, there will appear just reason to suppose, that it is *that* which must rather tend to licentiousness. Their doctrine excuses all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; because, in such inclinations, they are not self-determined, as such inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own wills. Which leads men wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, so far as natural inclination has had a hand in determining their wills to the commission of them. Yea, these notions, which suppose moral necessity and inability to be inconsistent with blame or moral obligation, will directly lead men to justify the vilest acts and practices, from the strength of their wicked inclinations of all sorts; strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity; yea, to excuse every degree of evil inclination, so far as this has evidently prevailed, and been the thing which has determined their wills: because, so far as antecedent inclination determined the will, so far the will was without liberty of indifference and self-determination. Which, at last, will come to this, that men will justify themselves in all the wickedness they commit. It has been observed already, that this scheme of things exceedingly diminishes the guilt of sin, and the difference between the greatest and smallest offences;* and if it be pursued in its real consequences, it leaves room for no such thing as either virtue or vice, blame or praise, in the world. And again, how naturally does this notion of the sovereign self-determining power of the will, in all things virtuous or vicious, and whatsoever deserves either reward or punishment, tend to encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turning from sin to God; since they have a sovereign power to determine themselves, just when they please; or if not, they are wholly excusable in going on in sin, because of their inability to do any other.

If it should be said, that the tendency of this doctrine of necessity to licentiousness appears, by the improvement many at this day actually make of it, to justify themselves in their dissolute courses; I will not deny that some men do unreasonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other things

* Part III. Sect. VI.

† Part III. Sect. VI. Ibid. Sect. VII. Part IV. Sect. I. Part III. Sect. III. *Corol.* 1. after the first head.

which are true and excellent in their own nature; but I deny, that this proves the doctrine itself has any tendency to licentiousness. I think the tendency of doctrines, by what now appears in the world, and in our nation in particular, may much more justly be argued from the general effect which has been seen to attend the prevailing of the principles of *Arminians*, and the contrary principles; as both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed, as is pretended, that *Calvinistic* doctrines undermine the very foundation of all religion and morality, and enervate and disannul all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice; and that the contrary doctrines give the inducements to virtue and goodness their proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light, tending to recommend it to the reason of mankind, and enforce it in a manner that is agreeable to their natural notions of things: I say, if it be thus, it is remarkable, that virtue and religious practice should prevail most, when the former doctrines, so inconsistent with it, prevailed almost universally: and that ever since the latter doctrines, so happily agreeing with it, and of so proper and excellent a tendency to promote it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, profaneness, luxury and wickedness of all sorts, and contempt of all religion, and of every kind of seriousness and strictness of conversation, should proportionably prevail; and that these things thould thus accompany one another, and rise and prevail one with another, now for a whole age together! It is remarkable, that this happy remedy (discovered by the free enquiries, and superior sense and wisdom of this age) against the pernicious effects of *Calvinism*, so inconsistent with religion, and tending so much to banish all virtue from the earth, should, on so long a trial, be attended with no good effect; but that the consequence should be the reverse of amendment; that in proportion as the remedy takes place, and is thoroughly applied, so the disease should prevail; and the very same dismal effect take place, to the highest degree, which *Calvinistic* doctrines are supposed to have so great a tendency to; even the banishing of religion and virtue, and the prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of manners! If these things are truly so, they are very remarkable, and matter of very curious speculation.

SECT. XIII.

Concerning that Objection against the Reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.

It has often been objected against the defenders of *Calvinistic* principles, that in their reasonings they run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtilties, and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is possible, that after the former manner, it may be alledged against the Reasoning by which I have endeavoured to confute the *Arminian* scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. Concerning this, I would observe the following things:

1. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is *metaphysical*, or may properly be reduced to the science of *metaphysics*, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to enquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are *metaphysical*, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in *French* or *Latin*. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, *Latin*, *French*, *English*, or *Mohawk?* But whether the Reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alledging it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal, that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to shew their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphysics only that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed, we have no strict demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof that is properly demonstrative of any one

proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct, and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet *metaphysical*.

II. If the reasoning which has been made use of, be in some sense metaphysical, it will not follow that therefore it must need be abstruse, unintelligible, and akin to the jargon of the schools. I humbly conceive the foregoing reasoning, at least to those things which are most material belonging to it, depends on no abstruse definitions, or distinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined signification, or any points of such abstraction and subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and darkness. There is no high degree of refinement and abstruse speculation in determining that a thing is not before it is, and so cannot be the cause of itself; or that the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice going before that to excite or direct it; or in determining that no choice is made while the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference; that preference and equilibrium never co-exist; and that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, consisting in indifference: and that so far as the will is determined by motives, exhibiting and operating previous to the act of the will, so far it is not determined by the act of the will itself; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause, or some antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their causes, and are connected with them; that virtue is not the worse, nor sin the better, for the strength of inclination, with which it is practised, and the difficulty which thence arises of doing otherwise; that when it is already infallibly known that the thing will be, it is not contingent whether it will ever be or no; or that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the like might be observed of many other things which belong to the foregoing reasoning.

If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning is nothing but mere metaphysical sophistry: and that it must be so, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy, and while that is hid in the obscurity, which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and refinement; and shall be ready to say, "Here is indeed some-

thing tends to confound the mind, but not to satisfy it: for who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men are fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded for those volitions which are not from themselves, and of whose existence they are not the causes. Men may refine, as much as they please, and advance the abstract notions, and make out a thousand seeming contradictions, to puzzle our understandings; yet there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this: the natural sense of the mind of man will always resist it.* I humbly conceive, that such an objector, if he has capacity, and humility, and calmness of spirit sufficient, impartially and thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not really what he would be at; and indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary

* A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for *necessity* are nothing but *quibbling, or logomachy, using words without a meaning, or begging the question.*—I do not know what kind of necessity any authors to whom he may have reference, are advocates for; or whether they have managed their arguments well or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are *quibbles* they may be shewn to be so: such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have just occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined; and if there be nothing but *begging the question*, or mere *logomachy*, or dispute of words, let it be made manifest, and shewn how the seeming strength of the argument depends on my *using words without a meaning*, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons rest mainly on such a foundation: and then I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy.

The same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls *logomachy and sophistry*, to *experience*.—A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well suppose, that all men have the same human faculties; so a man may well argue from his own experience to that of others, in things that shew the nature of these faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good a right to alledge his experience as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning those motions; and that my will has some command of my thoughts; and that the acts of my will are my own, *i. e.* that they are acts of my will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I will; which, I presume, is the sum of what others experience in this affair But as to finding, by experience, that my will is originally determined by itself; or that, my will first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and that this is the first rise of the determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition arises in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature, and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect, and this, for ought I know, may make some imagine that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a cause, because I first found myself possessed of being before I had knowledge of a cause of my being.

use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly understood, nor carefully reflected upon. Let the objector reflect again, if he has candour and patience enough, and does not scorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair.—He would have a man's volition be *from himself*. Let it be *from himself* most primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that is, from his own choice; how will that help the matter as to his being justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blameworthy or praiseworthy? And how is the choice itself (an ill choice, for instance) blameworthy according to these principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner; that is, from his own choice? But the original and first determining choice in the affair is not from his choice: his choice is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the matter. If it be not from himself of choice, then it is not from himself voluntarily: and if so, he is surely no more to blame, then if it were not from himself at all. It is vanity to pretend it is a sufficient answer to this to say, that it is nothing but metaphysical refinement and subtility, and so attended with obscurity and uncertainty.

If it be the natural sense of our minds that what is blameworthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be from something *bad* in himself, a *bad choice*, or *bad disposition*. But then our natural sense is, that this bad choice or disposition is evil *in itself*, and the man blameworthy for it *on its own account*, without taking into our notion of its blameworthiness, another bad choice, or disposition going before this, from whence this arises: for that it is ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction, which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As was demonstrated before, natural sense does not place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature of them. An evil thing being FROM a man, or from something antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of blameworthiness: but it is its being the choice of the heart; as appears by this, that if a thing be *from* us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our natural sense.—When a thing is *from* a man, in that sense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his will is IN IT: so far as the will is *in it*, blame is *in it*, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame to enquire whether the bad will be FROM a bad will: there is no consideration of the original of that bad will; because, according to our natural apprehension, blame *originally consists in it*. Therefore a

thing being *from* a man, is a secondary consideration in the notion of blame or ill desert. Because those things, in our *external* actions, are most properly said to be *from* us, which are *from* our choice; and no other *external* actions, but those that are from us in this sense, have the nature of blame; and they indeed, not so properly because they are *from us*, as because we are *in them*, i. e. our wills are in them; not so much because they are from some *property* of ours, as because they are our *properties*.

However, all those external actions being truly *from us*, as their cause; and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of life, to speak of men's actions and conduct which we see, and which affect human society, as deserving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, above these *overt acts* of men; to the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion. And, therefore, I observe,

III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the proof of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the *Arminian* scheme, without needing such clouds and darkness for its defence, is supported by the plain dictates of common sense; that the very reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not we, have confounded things with metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them from the light of plain truth into the gross darkness of abstruse metaphysical propositions, and words without a meaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as *self-determination* and *sovereignty of the will;* and the metaphysical sense they put on such terms as *necessity*, *contingency*, *action*, *agency*, &c. quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech; and which, as they use them, are without any consistent meaning, or any manner of distinct consistent ideas; as far from it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic philosophers, or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what they use without knowing what they mean themselves; they are pure metaphysical sounds, without any ideas whatsoever in their minds to answer them; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expressions, as they pretend to explain them; because their explanations destroy themselves. No such notions as imply

self-contradiction, and self-abolition and this a great many ways, can subsist in the mind; as there can be no idea of a whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension without dimensions, or of an effect which is before its cause.—*Arminians* improve these terms, as terms of art, and in their metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things which are contrary to common sense, in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages, have; consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases; they have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity, and manifold gross inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue and vice, as common sense places them very much, in fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination; these, through their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in indifference, to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame, praise, reward, and punishment, which are, as has been shewn, exceeding contrary to the common sense of mankind; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common life.

SECT. XIV.

The Conclusion.

Whether the things which have been alledged, are liable to any tolerable answer in the way of calm, intelligible and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge: but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not unlikely that some, who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, about the *fate of the heathen*, HOBBES' *Necessity*, and *making men mere machines;* accumulating the terrible epithets of *fatal*, *unfrustrable*, *inevitable*, *irresistible*, &c. and it may be, with addition of *horrid* and

blasphemous; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things which have been said, in colours which shall be shocking to the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those, who have either too little capacity or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination.* Or difficulties may be stated and insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy; because, let them be more or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that of the *Arminians*, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things may be picked out which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on with tart and contemptuous words; and from thence, the whole discourse may be treated with triumph and insult.

It is easy to see how the decision of most of the points in controversy between *Calvinists* and *Arminians*, depends on the determination of this grand article concerning *the Freedom of the Will requisite to moral agency;* and that by clearing and establishing the *Calvinistic* doctrine in this point, the chief arguments are obviated by which *Arminian* doctrines in general are supported, and the contrary doctrines demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings, expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards and punishments, is not inconsistent with a *determining disposal* of all events, of every kind, throughout the universe, *in his Providence;* either by positive efficiency or permission. Indeed such an *universal determining Providence*, infers some kind of necessity of all events, such a necessity as implies an infallible previous fixedness of the futurity of the event: but no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of intelligent agents, is needful in order to this, than *moral necessity;*

* A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of *Necessity* as scarcely worthy of the name of *philosophers*. I do not know whether he has respect to any particular notion of necessity that some may have maintained; and, if so, what doctrine of necessity it is that he means. Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher or not would be a question little to the present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it, I should not think it worth while to enter into a dispute on that question: though, at the same time, I might expect some better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be considered whether it does not become those who are *truly worthy* of the name of philosophers to be sensible that there is a difference between *argument* and *contempt*; yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the *person* that argues and the inconclusiveness of the *arguments* he offers.

which does as much ascertain the futurity of the event, as any other necessity. But, as has been demonstrated, such a necessity is not at all repugnant to moral agency, and a reasonable use of commands, calls, rewards, punishments, &c. Yea, not only are objections of this kind against the doctrine of an universal *determining Providence*, removed by what has been said, but the truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated. As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is established by previous necessity, either natural or moral; so it is manifest, that the sovereign Creator and Disposer of the world has ordered this necessity, by ordering his own conduct, either in designedly acting, or forbearing to act. For, as the being of the world is from God, so the circumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways; and all the necessary consequences of these circumstances, must be ordered by him. And God's active and positive interpositions, after the world was created, and the consequences of these interpositions; also every instance of his forbearing to interpose, and the sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according to his pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the consequence of any thing whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstances, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be ordered of God; either by a designing efficiency and interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose. But, as has been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily connected with something foregoing, either positive or negative, which is the ground of its existence. It follows, therefore, that the whole series of events is thus connected with something in the state of things either positive or negative, which is *original* in the series; *i. e.* something which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate conduct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it follows, that as God designedly orders his own conduct, and its connected consequences, it must necessarily be, that he designedly orders all things.

The things which have been said, obviate some of the chief objections of *Arminians* against the *Calvinistic* doctrine of the *total depravity and corruption of man's nature*, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do any thing that is truly good and acceptable in God's sight. For the main objection against this doctrine, that it is inconsistent with the freedom of man's will, consisting in indifference and self-determining power; because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and that God requires things of him, in order to his avoiding eter-

nal damnation, which he is unable to do; and that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the sincerity of counsels, invitations, &c. Now, this doctrine supposes *no other necessity* of sinning, than a moral necessity; which, as has been shewn, does not at all excuse sin; and supposes *no other inability* to obey any command, or perform any duty even the most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability, which, as has been proved, does not excuse persons in the non-performance of any good thing, or make them not to be the proper objects of commands, counsels and invitations. And, moreover, it has been shewn, that there is not, and never can be, either in existence, or so much as in idea, any such freedom of will, consisting in indifference and self-determination, for the sake of which, this doctrine of original sin is cast out; and that no such freedom is necessary, in order to the nature of sin, and a just desert of punishment.

The things, which have been observed, do also take off the main objections of *Arminians* against the doctrine of *efficacious grace;* and, at the same time, prove the grace of God in a sinner's conversion (if there be any grace or divine influence in the affair) to be *efficacious*, yea, and *irresistible* too, if by irresistible is meant, that which is attended with a moral necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any resistance. The main objection of *Arminians* against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their self-determining freedom of will; and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being owing to a self-moving power; that, in that case, the good which is wrought, would not be *our* virtue, but rather *God's* virtue; because not the person in whom it is wrought is the determining author of it, but God that wrought it in him. But the things which are the foundation of these objections, have been considered; and it has been demonstrated, that the liberty of moral agents does not consist in self-determining power; and that there is no need of any such liberty, in order to the nature of virtue; nor does it at all hinder but that the state or act of the will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not from self-determination, but the determination of an intrinsic cause; even so as to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of it.—And as it has been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of the will of man is contingent; but that, on the contrary, every event of this kind is necessary, by a moral necessity; and has also been now demonstrated, that the doctrine of an universal determining providence, follows from that doctrine of necessity, which was proved before: and so that God does decisively in his providence, order all the volitions of moral agents. either by positive influence or permission: and it

being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by some positive influence, and not by mere permission, as in the affair of a sinful volition: if we put these things together, it will follow, that God's assistance or influence must be determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event; and so that God gives virtue, holiness and conversion to sinners, by an influence which determines the effect, in such a manner, that the effect will infallibly follow by a moral necessity: which is what *Calvinists* mean by efficacious and irresistible grace.

The things which have been said, do likewise answer the chief objections against the doctrine of God's *universal* and *absolute decree*, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine; and of the doctrine of *absolute*, *eternal*, *personal election* in particular. The main objections against these doctrines are, that they infer a necessity of the volitions of moral agents, and of the future moral state and acts of men; and so are not consistent with those eternal rewards and punishments, which are connected with conversion and impenitence: nor can be made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the precepts, calls, counsels, warnings and expostulations of the word of God; or with the various methods and means of grace, which God uses with sinners to bring them to repentance; and the whole of that moral government, which God exercises towards mankind: and that they infer an inconsistence between the *secret* and *revealed will of God*; and make God the author of sin. But all these things have been obviated in the preceding discourse. And the certain truth of these doctrines, concerning God's eternal purposes, will follow from what was just now observed concerning God's universal providence; how it infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God orders all events, and the volitions of moral agents amongst others, by such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For if God disposes all events, so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things *knowingly*, and *on design*. God does not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accidentally and unawares; either *without* or *beside* his intention. And if there be a foregoing *design* of doing and ordering as he does, this is the same with a *purpose* or *decree*. And as it has been shewn, that nothing is new to God, in any respect, but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity; hence it will follow, that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or appearances, but are all eternal purposes. And as it has been now shewn, how the doctrine of determining efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in

the foregoing discourse; hence will necessarily follow the doctrine of *particular*, *eternal*, *absolute election.* For if men are made true saints no otherwise than as God makes them so and distinguishes them from others, by his efficacious power and influence, that decides and fixes the event; and God thus makes some saints, and not others, on design or purpose, and (as has been now observed) no designs of God are new; it follows, that God thus distinguished from others, all that ever become true saints, by his eternal design or decree. I might also shew, how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree, and how such a decree can be proved to a demonstration from it: but that this discourse may not be lengthened out too much, that must be omitted for the present.*

From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to *die for all*, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole world by his death; yet there must be something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should actually be saved thereby. As appears by what has been now shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper absolute design, and of a certain number only; and therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking; for it is impossible that God should prosecute any other design than only such as he has: he certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And indeed, such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For it is impossible, in strictness of speech, that God should prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which he at the same time most perfectly knows will not be accomplished, as that he should use endeavours for that which is beside his decree.†

* Certain foreknowledge does imply *some* necessity. But our author is not sufficiently guarded, or else not sufficiently explicit, when he says, that foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree. For certainty or hypothetical necessity, may arise from the *nature of things*, and from *negative causes*, as well as from a decree. If, indeed, the remark be limited to the subject immediately preceding it is an important truth.—W.

† The terms *design* and *endeavours* are not sufficiently discriminating. It is here supposed that it is unworthy of God to use *endeavours* which are *beside his decree*, or to prosecute a *design* which he knows will not be *accomplished*. Is it not a matter of plain fact that he uses *endeavours* which are beside his decree, and prosecutes a *design* which he knows will not be accomplished, through the whole system of legislation and government? Is it not the very *design* of legislation and government to *prevent* crimes as well as to punish them, and to *promote* obedience.

By the things which have been proved, are obviated some of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible and necessary *perseverance* of saints, and some of the main foundations of this doctrine are established. The main prejudices of *Arminians* against this doctrine seem to be these; they suppose such a necessary infallible perseverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the will; that it must be owing to man's own self-determining power he *first becomes* virtuous and holy: and so, in like manner, it must be left a thing contingent, to be determined by the same freedom of will, whether he will *persevere* in virtue and holiness; and that otherwise his continuing stedfast in faith and obedience would not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable; nor could his perseverance be properly the matter of divine commands, counsels and promises, nor his apostacy be properly threatened, and men warned against it. Whereas, we find all these things in scripture: there we find stedfastness and perseverance in true Christianity, represented as the virtue of the saints, spoken of as praiseworthy in them, and glorious rewards promised to it; and also find, that God makes it the subject of his commands, counsels and promises; and the contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the foundation of these objections has been removed, by shewing that moral necessity and infallible certainty of events is not inconsistent with these things; and that, as to freedom of will lying in the power of the will to determine itself, there neither is any such thing, nor is there any need of it, in order to virtue, reward, commands, counsels, &c.

And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute election do certainly follow from the things proved in the preceding discourse; so some of the main foundations of the doctrine of perseverance are thereby established. If the beginning of true faith and holiness, and a man becoming a true saint at first, does not depend on the self-determining power of the will, but on the determining efficacious grace of God; it may well be argued, that it is also with respect to men being continued saints, or persevering in faith and holiness. The conversion of a sinner being not owing to a man's self-determination, but to God's determination, and eternal election, which is absolute, and depending on the sovereign will of God, and not on the free will of man; as is evident from what has been said: and it being very evident from the

and conformity to law? *Legislative design*, therefore, is *not accomplished* in the commission of crimes, otherwise the legislator, as such, could not find fault for breach of law. Our Lord used *endeavours* with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, &c. *beside* his decree, yet with perfect propriety. If we keep in mind that the divine *will* subsists under two relations, according to the two-fold state of man, who is at once a subject of decree and a subject of government, we shall see the propriety of calling it *decretive* and *rectoral*.—W.

scriptures, that the eternal election of saints to faith and holiness, is also an election of them to eternal salvation: hence their appointment to salvation must also be absolute, and not depending on their contingent, self-determining will. From all which it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree, that all true saints shall persevere to actual eternal salvation.

But I must leave all these things to the consideration of the impartial reader; and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propose it to his consideration, whether many of the first reformers, and others that succeeded them, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church, and the greatest instruments of their deliverance from error and darkness, and of the support of the cause of piety among them, have not been injured, in the contempt with which they have been treated by many late writers, for their teaching and maintaining such doctrines as are commonly called *Calvinistic*. Indeed, some of these new writers, at the same time that they have represented the doctrines of these ancient and eminent divines as in the highest degree ridiculous, and contrary to common sense, in an ostentation of a very generous charity, have allowed that they were honest well-meaning men; yea, it may be some of them, as though it were in great condescension and compassion to them, have allowed, that they did pretty well for the day in which they lived, and considering the great disadvantages they laboured under; when, at the same time, their manner of speaking has naturally and plainly suggested to the minds of their readers, that they were persons, who—through the lowness of their genius, and the greatness of the bigotry with which their minds were shackled, and their thoughts confined, living in the gloomy caves of superstition—fondly embraced, and demurely and zealously taught the most absurd, silly, and monstrous opinions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age of light and enquiry. When, indeed, such is the case that we might, if so disposed, speak as big words as they, and on far better grounds. And really all the *Arminians* on earth might be challenged without arrogance or vanity, to make these principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom they so much despise, consistent with common sense; yea, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever embraced by the blindest bigot of the church of *Rome*, or the most ignorant *Mussulman*, or extravagant enthusiast, that might be reduced to more demonstrable inconsistencies, and repugnancies to common sense, and to themselves; though their inconsistencies indeed may not lie so deep, or be so artfully veiled by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate signification of phrases. I will not deny, that these gentlemen, many of them, are men of great abilities, and have

been helped to higher attainments in philosophy, than those ancient divines, and have done great service to the Church of God in some respects: but I humbly conceive, that their differing from their fathers, with such magisterial assurance, in these points in divinity, must be owing to some other cause than superior wisdom.

It may also be worthy of consideration, whether the great alteration which has been made in the state of things in our nation, and some other parts of the Protestant world, in this and the past age, by exploding so generally *Calvinistic* doctrines—an alteration so often spoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth, learning, and virtue, as an instance of the great increase of light in the Christian Church—be indeed a happy change, owing to any such cause as an increase of true knowledge and understanding in the things of religion; or whether there is not reason to fear, that it may be owing to some worse cause.

And I desire it may be considered, whether the boldness of some writers may not deserve to be reflected on, who have not scrupled to say, that if these and those things are true (which yet appear to be the demonstrable dictates of reason, as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the Most High) then God is unjust, and cruel, and guilty of manifest deceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, some have gone so far as confidently to assert, that if any book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches such doctrines, that alone is sufficient warrant for mankind to reject it, as what cannot be the word of God. Some, who have not gone so far, have said, that if the Scripture seems to teach any such doctrines, so contrary to reason, we are obliged to find out some other interpretation of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be exhibited. Others express themselves yet more modestly: they express a tenderness and religious fear, lest they should receive and teach any thing that should seem to reflect on God's moral character, or be a disparagement to his methods of administration, in his moral government; and therefore express themselve as not daring to embrace some doctrines, though they seem to be delivered in Scripture, according to the more obvious and natural construction of the words. But indeed it would shew a truer modesty and humility, if they would more entirely rely on God's wisdom and discernment, who knows infinitely better than we what is agreeable to his own perfections, and never intended to leave these matters to the decision of the wisdom and discernment of men; but by his own unerring instruction, to determine for us what the truth is; knowing how little our judgment is to be depended on, and how extremely prone vain and blind men are to err in such matters.

The truth of the case is, that if the Scripture plainly taught the opposite doctrines to those that are so much stumbled at, *viz.* the *Arminian* doctrine of free will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greatest of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any, even the most mysterious of those doctrines of the first reformers, which our late freethinkers have so superciliously exploded. Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach such doctrines, which in one age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and strong prejudices of their hearts are rejected, as most absurd and unreasonable, by the wise and great men of the world; which yet, when they are most carefully and strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain, and natural dictates of reason. By such things it appears, that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men." (1. Cor. i. 19, 20.) "For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise; I will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise! Where is the scribe! Where is the disputer of this world! Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? And as it was in time past, so probably it will be in time to come, as it is also written, (ver. 27—29.) "But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise: and God hath chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are mighty: and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen: yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are; that no flesh should glory in his presence." Amen.

APPENDIX.

SECT. XV.

*Containing Remarks on "Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion," in a letter to a Minister of the Church of Scotland.**

REV. SIR,

The intimations you have given me of the use which has by some been made of what I have written on the *Freedom of the Will*, &c. to vindicate what is said on the subject of liberty and necessity, by the Author of "*Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*," has occasioned my reading this Author's Essay on that subject with particular care and attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that has read both his *Essay* and my *Enquiry*, that our schemes are exceedingly different from each other. The wide difference appears particularly in the following things.

This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to all men's actions as is inconsistent with liberty,† and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus (p. 168.) after he had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations, as connected with motives, he concludes with saying, "In short, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at bottom have NO LIBERTY." Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty; and that the moral necessity which universally takes place, is not in the least inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of.

I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity of men's volitions, which I suppose to be universal, at least some degree of liberty is denied; that though it be true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-determining power in the will, and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold an higher sort of freedom than I do: but I think this is certainly a great mistake.

* The "Essays" to which this Appendix relates, were the production of Lord Kames.

† P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.

Liberty, as I have explained it, is *the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting himself* IN ANY RESPECT *according to his pleasure;* without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and I think has been demonstrated, that no necessity of men's volitions that I maintain is inconsistent with this liberty: and I think it is impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than this: If any imagine they desire, and that they conceive of a higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words instead of ideas. If any one should here say, "Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting himself in any respect as he pleases, *viz.* a liberty of *choosing* as he pleases." Such an one if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own proposal. For is not choosing as he pleases, conducting himself IN SOME RESPECT according to his pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that pleasure? If he says, "Yes I came by that pleasure by my own choice." If he be a man of common sense, by this time he will see his own absurdity: for he must needs see that his notion or conception even of this liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception how he comes by that choice, which first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own will respecting the affair. Or if any shall say, "That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice, preference, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;" this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty: as such a determination of the will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according to its pleasure, what advantage would it give? and what liberty worth contending for would be exercised in it? Therefore no *Arminian*, *Pelagian*, or *Epicurean*, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained; which notion is perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's actions which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of *sovereignty of the will*, *self-determining power*, *self-motion*, *self-direction*, *arbitrary decision*, *liberty*, *ad utrumvis*, *power of choosing differently in given cases*, *&c.* as long as they will. It is apparent that these

men in their strenuous dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused unmeaning words, instead of things and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have; but they never can answer the challenge.

The author of the *Essays*, through his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, goes on the supposition, that in order to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity: and yet he supposes, (p. 175,) that "*such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of acting without any view, purpose or design, and even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions, and to all our principles of actions; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature.*" Now who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a higher sort or degree of freedom than a liberty of following one's own views and purposes, and acting agreeably to his own inclinations and passions? Who will ever reasonably suppose, that a liberty which is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature, is above that which is consistent with the nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent?

The Author of the *Essays* seem to suppose such a necessity to take place, as is inconsistent with some supposable POWER OF ARBITRARY CHOICE,* or that there is some liberty conceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more PROPERLY IN THEIR POWER,† and by which events might be more DEPENDENT ON OURSELVES:‡ contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my *Inquiry*. What way can be imagined of our actions being more *in our power from ourselves*, or *dependent on ourselves*, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act from our own inclination, pursue our own views, and execute our own designs? Certainly to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power and dependent on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subject of acts and events contingently and fortuitously, *without desire, view, purpose or design, or any principle of action* within ourselves; as we must be, according to this Author's own declared sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is opposed to moral necessity.

This author seems every where to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms *necessary, unavoidable, impossible*, &c. are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In p. 173, he says, *The idea* of necessary and unavoidable *equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity.* And in p. 184,

* P. 169. † P. 191, 195, 197, 206. ‡ P. 183.

All things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike necessary. P. 174, *This inclination and choice is* unavoidable, *caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions, that in such circumstances it was* impossible *we* could *act otherwise.* He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men's actions as *unavoidable*, what they *cannot* forbear, having *no power* over their own actions, the order of them being *unalterably* fixed and *inseparably* linked together, &c.*

On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of *Necessity* improperly; and that all such terms as *must*, *cannot*, *impossible*, *unable*, *irresistible*, *unavoidable*, *invincible*, &c when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically and with perfect insignificance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning and their use in common speech: and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's will is more properly called *certainty* than *necessity;* it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence.

Agreeably to what is observed in my *Inquiry*, I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice, arising from an insensible habitual perversion and misapplication of such like terms as *necessary*, *impossible*, *unable*, *unavoidable*, *invincible*, &c. that they are ready to think, that to suppose a certain connection of men's volitions without any foregoing motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose a strong irrefragable chain of causes and effects, as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain, *opposite desires* and endeavours, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron: whereas, all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth as the east is from the west. Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make some persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it: for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms *necessary*, *must*, *cannot*, *impossible*, &c. the association with these terms of

* P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206.

certain ideas inconsistent with liberty, is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straitened, will return to its former curvity again and again.

The author of the *Essays* most manifestly supposes, that if men had the truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves or one another, as at all praiseworthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions:* which supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any of their actions, and are not under any obligations nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by reason of this necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove throughout the *third part* of my *Inquiry*. I humbly conceive it is there shown, that this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of men's actions which truly take place is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praiseworthy or culpable: that the liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is inconsistent with the being of these; as it would suppose that men are not determined in what they do by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions or aims whatsoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting.—And is it not remarkable that this author should suppose, that in order to men's actions truly having any desert, they must be performed *without any view, purpose, design, or desire* or *any principle of action*, or any thing *agreeable to a rational nature?* As it will appear that he does, if we compare p. 206, 207, with p. 175.

The author of the *Essays* supposes, that God has deeply implanted in man's nature a strong and invincible apprehension, or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty and contingence of his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth does not agree with real fact,† is not agreeable to strict philosophic truth,‡ is contradictory to the truth of things,§ and which truth contradicts‖, not tallying with the real plan:¶ and that therefore such feelings are deceitful,** and are in reality of the delusive kind.†† He speaks of them as a wise delusion,‡‡ as nice artificial feelings, merely that conscience may have a commanding power:§§ meaning plainly, that these feelings are a cunning artifice of the author of Nature, to make men believe they are free when they are not.‖‖ He supposes that by these feelings the moral world has a disguised appearance,¶¶ &c. He supposes that all self-approbation, and all remorse of conscience, all commenda-

* P. 207, 209, and other places.
† P. 200. ‡ P. 152. § P. 183. ‖ P. 186. ¶ P 205. ** P. 203, 204, 211.
†† P. 183. ‡‡ P. 209. §§ P. 211. ‖‖ P. 153. ¶¶ P. 214.

tion or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at present are suggested by the words *ought*, *should*, arise from this delusion, and would entirely vanish without it*.

All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and endeavoured to demonstrate in my *Inquiry*; where I have largely shewn that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that attends men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment:† and that it is agreeable to our natural notions that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and not in the evil of something else, diverse from these supposed to be their cause or occasion.‡

I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of mankind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling naturally and deeply rooted in his mind, that in order to a man's performing any action that is praiseworthy or blameworthy, he must exercise a liberty that implies and signifies a power of acting without any motive, view, design, desire, or principle of action? For such a liberty, this author supposes, that must be which is opposed to moral necessity, as I have already observed. Supposing a man should actually do good, independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or end, is it a dictate of invincible natural sense, that his act is more meritorious or praiseworthy, than if he had performed it for some *good end*, and had been governed in it by *good principles* and *motives?* and so I might ask, on the contrary, with respect to evil actions.§

The author of the *Essays* supposes that the liberty without necessity of which we have a natural feeling, implies *contingence:* and, speaking of this contingence, he sometimes calls it by the name of *chance.* And it is evident, that his notion of it, or rather what he says about it, implies things happening *loosely*, *fortuitously*, by *accident*, and *without a cause.*‖ Now I conceive the slightest reflection may be sufficient to satisfy any one, that such a contingence of men's actions, according to our natural sense, is so far from being essential to the morality or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it; and that on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on such causes, as inward inclinations, incitements and ends, is essential to the being of it. Natural sense teaches men, when

* P. 160, 194, 199, 205, 206, 207, 209. † *Inquiry* Part IV. Sect. 4. throughout.
‡ *Idem*, Part IV. Sect. 1. throughout.
§ See this matter illustrated in my *Inquiry*, Part IV. Sect. 4. ‖ P. 156—159 177, 178, 181, 183—185.

they see any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire what their *intention* was; what principles and views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be justified or condemned: and not to determine, that, in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action must be performed altogether *fortuitously*, proceeding from nothing, arising from no cause. Concerning this matter, I have fully expressed my mind in the *Inquiry*.

If the liberty of which we have a natural sense as necessary to desert, consists in the mind's self-determination, without being determined by previous inclination or motive, then indifference is essential to it, yea absolute indifference; as is observed in my *Inquiry*. But men naturally have no notion of any such liberty as this, as essential to the morality or demerit of their actions; but, on the contrary, such a liberty, if it were possible, would be inconsistent with our natural notions of desert, as is largely shown in the *Inquiry*.* If it be agreeable to natural sense that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions; then, according to the same, the more they are determined by inclination, either good or bad, the less they have of desert: the more good actions are performed from good disposition, the less praiseworthy; and the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions, the less culpable; and, in general the more men's actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or condemned: which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.

Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occasional, excited by motive: but according to natural and common sense, the more a man does anything with full inclination of heart, the more is to be charged to his account for his condemnation if it be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him for his praise if it be good.

If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a state of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or else the fault would be in being so perfectly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to be a bad or good determination. And if this indifference be liberty, then the very essence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itself, or the wickedness would, primarily and summarily, lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in being indifferent, then there could be no fault in the determination being agreeable to such a state of indifference: that is, there could be no fault found, that opposite determinations actually happen to take place *indifferently*, sometimes good and sometimes bad, as contingence governs and decides. And if

* Especially in Part III. Sect. 6 and 7.

it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil, then such indifference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a determination to evil, or to a fault; and such an indifferent disposition would be an evil disposition, tendency, or determination of mind. So inconsistent are these notions of liberty, as essential to praise or blame.

The author of the *Essays* supposes men's natural delusive sense of a liberty of contingence to be, in truth, the foundation of all the labour, care and industry of mankind;* and that if men's "practical ideas had been formed on the plan of universal necessity, the ignava ratio, the inactive doctrine of the Stoics, would have followed, and that there would have been no ROOM for forethought about futurity, or any sort of industry and care:†" plainly implying, that in this case, men would see and know that all their industry and care signified nothing, was in vain, and to no purpose, or of no benefit; events being fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all DEPENDING on their care and endeavour; as he explains himself particularly, in the instance of men's use of means to prolong life:‡ not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my *Enquiry*,§ but also very inconsistently with his own scheme, in what he supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature; in which he manifestly supposes men's care and industry not to be in vain and of no benefit, but of great use, yea of absolute necessity, in order to their obtaining the most important ends and necessary purposes of human life, and to fulfil the ends of action to the BEST ADVANTAGE; as he largely declares.‖ Now, how shall these things be reconciled? That if men had *a clear view of real truth*, they would see that there was *no* ROOM for their care and industry, because they would see it to be in vain and of no benefit; and yet that God, by having a clear view of real truth, sees their being excited to care and industry will be of excellent use to mankind and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea absolutely necessary in order to it: and that therefore the great wisdom and goodness of God to men appears, in artfully contriving to put them on care and industry for their good, which good could not be obtained without them; and yet both these things are maintained at once, and in the same sentences and words by this author. The very reason he gives, *why* God has put this deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and destroys itself; that God in his great goodness to men gave them such a deceitful feeling, because it was very useful and necessary for them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and

* P. 184. † P. 189. ‡ P. 184, 185. § Especially Part IV. Sect. 5. ‖ P. 189—192. and in many other places,

industry for their own good, which care and industry is useful and necessary to that end; and yet the very thing for which, as a reason, this great benefit of care and industry is given, is God's deceiving men in this very point in making them think their care and industry to be of great benefit to them, when indeed it is of none at all; and if they saw the real truth, they would see all their endeavours to be wholly useless, that there was NO ROOM for them, and that the event does not at all DEPEND upon them.*

And besides, what this author says plainly implies (as appears by what has been already observed,) that it is necessary men should be deceived, by being made to believe that future events are contingent, and their own future actions free, with such a freedom as signifies that their actions are not the fruit of their own desires or designs, but altogether contingent, fortuitous, and without a cause. But how should a notion of liberty consisting in accident or loose chance, encourage care and industry? I should think it would rather entirely discourage every thing of this nature. For surely if our actions [illegible]t depend on our desires and designs, then they do not de- [illegible] on our endeavours flowing from our desires and designs.

[illegible] Author himself seems to suppose, that if men had, indeed, such a liberty of contingence, it would render all endeavours to determine or move men's future volitions in vain: he says that in this case, *to exhort, to instruct, to promise, or to threaten*, would be to no purpose.† Why? Because (as he himself gives the reason), "then our will would be capricious and arbitrary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and our arbitrary power could do us good or ill only by accident." But if such a loose fortuitous state would render vain others' endeavours upon us, for the same reason would it make useless our endeavours on ourselves: for events that are truly contingent and accidental, and altogether loose from, and independent of, all foregoing causes, are independent on every foregoing cause within ourselves, as well as in others.

I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds are naturally possessed with a notion of such liberty as this so strongly that it is impossible to root it out, that indeed men have no such notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly impossible, by any means whatsoever to implant or introduce such a notion into the mind. As no such notions as imply self-contradiction and self-abolition can subsist in the mind, as I have shewn in my *Inquiry*; I think a mature sensible consideration of the matter is sufficient to satisfy any one, that even the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for liberty of indifference and self-determination have no such notion; and that indeed they mean something wholly inconsistent with

* P. 188, 189, &c. † P. 178, 213, 214.

and directly subversive of, what they strenuously affirm and earnestly contend for. By a man having a power of determining his own will, they plainly mean a power of determining his will as he pleases, or as he chooses; which supposes that the mind has a choice, prior to its going about to confirm any action or determination to it. And if they mean that they determine even the original or prime choice by their own pleasure or choice, as the thing that causes and directs it; I scruple not most boldly to affirm, that they speak they know not what, and that of which they have no manner of idea; because no such contradictory notion can come into, or have a moment's subsistence in the mind of any man living, as an original or first choice being caused or brought into being, by choice. After all, they say, they have no higher or other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I contend for, viz. *a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chooses*: or if they had a notion that every act of choice was determined by choice, yet it would destroy their notion of the contingence of choice; for then no one act of choice would arise contingently, or from a state of indifference, but every individual act, in all the series, would arise from foregoing bias or preference, and from a cause predetermining and fixing its existence, which introduces at once such a chain of causes and effects, each preceding link decisively fixing the following, as they would by all means avoid.

And such kind of delusion and self-contradiction as this, does not arise in men's minds by nature: it is not owing to any natural feeling which God has strongly fixed in the mind and nature of man; but to false philosophy, and strong prejudice, from a deceitful abuse of words. It is *artificial*; not in the sense of the Author of the *Essays*, supposing it to be a deceitful artifice of God; but artificial as opposed to natural, and as owing to an artificial deceitful management of terms, to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such thing when they first begin to exercise reason; but must have a great deal of time to blind themselves with metaphysical confusion, before they can embrace and rest in such definitions of liberty as are given, and imagine they understand them.

On the whole I humbly conceive, that whosoever will give himself the trouble of weighing what I have offered to consideration in my *Inquiry*, must be sensible that such a moral necessity of men's actions as I maintain, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty that any creature has, or can have, as a free, accountable, moral agent, and subject of moral government; and that this moral necessity is so far from being inconsistent with praise and blame and the benefit and use of men's own care and labour, that, on the contrary, it implies the very ground and reason why men's

THE

GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

OF

ORIGINAL SIN

DEFENDED;

EVIDENCES OF ITS TRUTH

PRODUCED,

AND

ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ANSWERED.

CONTAINING, IN PARTICULAR,

A REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS

OF

DR. JOHN TAYLOR,

IN HIS BOOK, ENTITLED

"THE SCRIPTURE-DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN PROPOSED TO FREE AND CANDID EXAMINATION, &c."

Matt. ix. 12. They that be whole, need not a Physician; but they that are sick.

—Et hæc non tantum ad Peccatores referenda est; quia in omnibus Maledictionibus primi Hominis omnes ejus Generationes conveniunt.—*R. Sal. Jarchi.*

Propter Concupiscentiam, innatam Cordi humano, dicitur, In Iniquitate genitus sum, atque Sensu est, quod a Nativitate implantatum Cordi sit humano *Jetzer harang*, Figmentum malum.
Aben-Ezra.

—Ad Mores Natura recurrit
Damnatos, fixa et mutari nescia.—
—Dociles imitandis
Turpibus et pravis omnes sumus.—*Juv.*

actions are to be ascribed to them as their own, in such a manner as to infer desert, praise, and blame, approbation and remorse of conscience, reward and punishment; and that it establishes the moral system of the universe and God's moral government in every respect, with the proper use of motives, exhortations, commands, counsels, promises, and threatenings; and the use and benefit of endeavours, care and industry. There is therefore no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed; nor is there any danger in *contemplation* and *profound discovery* in these things. So far from this, that the truth in this matter is of vast importance, and extremely needful to be known; and the more clearly and perfectly the real fact is known, and the more constantly it is in view, the better. More particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that which is the true system of the universe in these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true Christian scheme of Divine administration in the city of God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ in its most important articles. Indeed these things never can be well established, and the opposite errors—so subversive of the whole gospel, which at this day so greatly and generally prevail—be well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained answered, till these points are settled. While this is not done, it is to me beyond doubt, that the friends of those great gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controversy with the adversaries of those truths; they will be obliged often to shuffle, hide, and turn their backs; and the latter will have a strong fort from whence they never can be driven, and weapons to use from which those whom they oppose will find no shield to screen themselves: and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of sound doctrine, and glory and vaunt themselves in their advantage over them; and carry their affairs with a high hand, as they have done already for a long time past.

I conclude, Sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you with so much in vindication of myself from the imputation of advancing a scheme of necessity, like that of the author of the *Essays on the principles of Morality and Natural Religion.* Considering that what I have said is not only in vindication of myself, but as I think, one of the most important articles of moral philosophy and religion; I trust in what I know of your candour that you will excuse

Your obliged friend and brother,

J. EDWARDS.

STOCKBRIDGE, JULY 25th, 1757.

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ADVERTISEMENT,

CONTAINING A

BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THIS BOOK AND ITS AUTHOR,

BY THE FIRST EDITOR.

THE Reverend Author of the following piece was removed by death before its publication. But ere his decease, the copy was finished and brought to the press; and a number of sheets passed his own review. They who were acquainted with the author or know his just character, and have any taste for the serious theme, will want nothing to be said in recommendation of the ensuing tract, but only that Mr. EDWARDS wrote it.

Several valuable pieces on this subject have lately been published upon the same side of the question. But he had no notice of so much as the very first of them, till he had wholly concluded what he had in view: nor has it been thought that any thing already printed should supersede this work; being designed on a more extensive plan —comprising a variety of arguments and answers to many objections that fell not in the way of the other worthy writers—and the whole done with a care of familiar method and language as well as clear reasoning, accommodated very much to common capacities. It must be a sensible pleasure to every friend of truth, that so masterly a hand undertook a reply to Dr. TAYLOR; notwithstanding the various answers already given him both at home and abroad.

Since it it has been thought unfit that this posthumous book should go unattended with a respectful memorial of the author, it is hoped the reader will candidly accept the following:*

As he lived cheerfully resigned in all things to the will of Heaven, so he died, or rather, as the Scripture emphatically expresses it in relation to the saint in Christ Jesus, he *fell asleep* without the least appearance of pain and with great calm of mind. Indeed when he first perceived the symptoms upon him to be mortal, he is said to have been a little perplexed for a while about the meaning of this mysterious conduct of Providence, in calling him out from his beloved privacy to a public scene of action and influence; and then so suddenly, just upon his entrance into it, translating him from thence, in such a way, by mortality! However, he quickly got believing and composing views of the wisdom and goodness of God in this surprising event: and readily yielded to the Sovereign Disposal of Heaven, with the most placid submission. Amidst the joy of faith, he departed this world to go and see JESUS whom his soul loved; to be with him, to behold his glory, and rejoice in his kingdom.

* As we have given a full Memoir in the first volume, those particulars which were contained in this brief account, and which are more fully and accurately narrated there, are omitted in order to avoid needless repetitions.

In person he was tall of stature, and of a slender make. There was something extremely delicate in his constitution; which always obliged him to observe the exactest rules of temperance, and every method of cautious and prudent living. By such means he was helped to go through incessant labours, and to bear up under much study, which, Solomon observes, is a weariness to the flesh. Perhaps never was a man more constantly retired from the world; giving himself to reading and contemplation. And a wonder it was that his feeble frame could subsist under such fatigues, daily repeated and so long continued. Yet upon occasion of some remark upon it by a friend, which was only a few months before his death, he told him, "He did not find but he was then as well able to bear the closest study as he was thirty years before; and could go through the exercises of the pulpit with as little weariness or difficulty." In his youth he appeared healthy and with a good degree of vivacity; but was never robust. In middle life he appeared very much emaciated (I had almost said mortified) by severe studies, and intense applications of thought. Hence his voice was a little languid, and too low for a large assembly; though much relieved and advantaged by a proper emphasis, just cadence, well-placed pauses, and great distinctness in pronunciation.

He had a piercing eye, the truest index of the mind. His aspect and mien had a mixture of severity and pleasantry. He had a natural turn for gravity and sedateness; ever contemplative; and in conversation usually reserved, but always observant of a genuine decorum in his deportment; free from sullen, supercilious and contemptuous airs, and without any appearance of ostentation, levity, or vanity. As to imagination, he had enough of it for a great and good man; but the gaieties of a luxuriant fancy, so captivating to many, were what he neither affected himself, nor was much delighted with in others. He had a natural steadiness of temper and fortitude of mind; which being sanctified by the Spirit of God, was ever of vast advantage to him to carry him through difficult services, and support him under trying afflictions in the course of his life. Personal injuries he bore with a becoming meekness and patience, and a disposition to forgiveness. The humility, modesty, and serenity of his behaviour, much endeared him to his acquaintance; and made him appear amiable in the eyes of such as had the privilege of conversing with him. He was a true and faithful friend; and shewed much of a disinterested benevolence to his neighbour. The several relations sustained by him he adorned with an exemplary conduct; and was solicitous to fill every station with its proper duty. He kept up an extensive correspondence with ministers and others in various parts; and his letters always contained some significant and valuable communications. In his private walk as a christian, he appeared an example of truly rational, consistent, uniform religion and virtue; a shining instance of the power and efficacy of that holy faith to which he was so firmly attached, and of which he was so strenuous a defender. He exhibited much of spirituality and a heavenly bent of soul. In him one saw the loveliest appearance, a rare assemblage of christian graces united with the richest gifts, and mutually subserving and recommending one another.

As a scholar, his intellectual furniture exceeded what is common, considering the disadvantages we labour under in this remote corner of the world. He very early discovered a genius above the ordinary size: which gradually ripened and expanded by daily exertion and application. He was remarkable for the penetration and extent of his understanding, for his powers of criticism and accurate distinction, quickness of thought, solidity of judgment, and force of reasoning: which made him an acute and strong disputant. By nature he was formed for a logician and a metaphysician; but by speculation, observation, and converse, greatly improved. He had a good insight into the whole circle of liberal arts and sciences; possessed a very valuable stock of classic learning, philosophy, mathematics, history, chronology, &c. By the blessing of God on his indefatigable studiousness, to the last he was constantly treasuring up useful knowledge, both human and divine.

Thus he appears uncommonly accomplished for the arduous and momentous province to which he was finally called. And had heaven indulged us with the continuance of his precious life, we have reason to think he would have graced his new station, and been a signal blessing to the college, and therein extensively served his generation, according to the will of God.

After all, it must be owned, divinity was his favourite study; and the ministry his most delightful employment. Among the luminaries of the church in these American regions, he was justly reputed a star of the first magnitude; thoroughly versed in all the branches of theology, didactic, polemic, casuistic, experimental, and practical. In point of divine knowledge and skill, he had few equals, and perhaps no superior, at least in these parts. On the maturest examination of the different schemes of principles obtaining in the world, and on comparing them with the sacred scriptures, the oracles of God and the great standard of truth, he was a Protestant and a Calvinist in judgment; adhering to the main articles of the reformed religion with an unshaken firmness and with a fervent zeal, but tempered with charity and candour, and governed by discretion. He seemed as little as most men under the bias of education or the influence of bigotry. As to practical and vital christianity, no man appeared to have a better acquaintance with its nature and importance; or to understand true religion, and feel its power, more than he; which made him an excellently fit guide to inquiring souls, and qualified him to guard them against all false religion. His internal sense of the intercourse between God and souls being brought by him to the severe test of reason and revelation, preserved him both in sentiment and conduct, from the least tincture of enthusiasm. The accomplished divine enters deep into his character.

As a preacher, he was judicious, solid, and instructive. Seldom was he known to bring controversy into the pulpit: or to handle any subject in the nicer modes and forms of scholastic dissertation. His sermons in general seemed to vary exceedingly from his controversial compositions. In his preaching, usually, all was plain, familiar, sententious, practical; and very distant from any affectation of appearing the great man, or displaying his extraordinary abilities

as a scholar. But still he ever preserved the character of a skilful and thorough divine. The common themes of his ministry were the most weighty and profitable; and especially, the great truths of the gospel of Christ in which he himself lived by faith. His method in preaching was, first to apply to the understanding and judgment, labouring to enlighten and convince them; and then to persuade the will, engage the affections, and excite the active powers of the soul. His language was with propriety and purity, but with a noble negligence; nothing ornamented. Florid diction was not the beauty he preferred. His talents were of a superior kind. He regarded thoughts, rather than words. Precision of sentiment and clearness of expression are the principal characteristics of his pulpit style. Neither quick nor slow of speech, there was a certain *pathos* in his utterance, and such skill of address, as seldom failed to draw the attention, warm the hearts, and stimulate the consciences of the auditory. He studied to shew himself approved unto God, a workman that needed not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth. And he was one who gave himself to prayer, as well as to the ministry of the word. Agreeably it pleased God to put great honour upon him, by crowning his labours with surprising successes, in the conversion of sinners, and the edification of saints, to the advancement of the kingdom and glory of God our Saviour Jesus Christ.

As a writer, Mr. Edwards distinguished himself in controversy, to which he was called on a variety of occasions. Here the superiority of his genius eminently appeared. He knew to arrange his ideas in an exact method; and close application of mind, with the uncommon strength of his intellectual powers, enabled him in a manner to exhaust every subject he took under consideration. He deligently employed the latter part of his life in defending Christianity, both in its doctrinal and practical views, against the errors of the times. Besides his excellent writings in behalf of the power of godliness, which some years ago happily prevailed in many parts of the British *America*, he made a noble stand against enthusiasm and false religion, when it threatened to spread, by his incomparable treatise upon religious affections. And more lately in opposition to Pelagian, Arminian, and other false principles, he published a very elaborate Treatise upon the Liberty of the human Will. A volume that has procured him the elogy of eminent divines abroad. Several professors of divinity in the Dutch universities very lately sent him their thanks, for the assistance he had given them in their enquiry into some controverted points; having carried his own further than any author they had ever seen. And now this volume of his, on the great Christian doctrine of original sin, is presented to public view; which, though studiously adapted to lower capacities, yet carries in it the evident traces of his great genius, and seems with superior force of argument to have entirely baffled the opponent.

His writings will perpetuate his memory and make his name blossom in the dust. The blessing of heaven attending the perusal of them, will make them effectually conducive to the glory of God, and the good of souls; which will brighten the author's crown and add to his joy, in the day of future retribution.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The following Discourse is intended, not merely as an answer to any *particular book* written against the doctrine of *Original Sin*, but as a *general defence* of that great important doctrine. Nevertheless, I have in this defence taken notice of the main things said against this doctrine by such of the more noted opposers of it as I have had opportunity to read; particularly those two late writers, Dr. Turnbull and Dr. Taylor, of Norwich; but especially the latter, in what he has published in those two books of his, the first entitled, *The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin proposed to free and candid Examination*; the other, his *Key to the Apostolic Writings*, with *a Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistle to the* Romans. I have closely attended to Dr. Taylor's *Piece on Original Sin* in all its parts, and have endeavoured that no one thing there said, of any consequence in this controversy, should pass unnoticed, or that any thing which has the appearance of an argument, in opposition to this doctrine, should be left unanswered. I look on the doctrine as of *great importance*, which every body will doubtless own it is, if it be *true*. For if the case be such indeed, that all mankind are by *nature* in a state of *total ruin*, both with respect to the *moral evil* of which they are the subjects, and the *afflictive evil* to which they are exposed, the one as the consequence and punishment of the other; then doubtless, the great *salvation* by Christ stands in direct relation to this *ruin*, as the remedy to the disease; and the whole *Gospel*, or doctrine of salvation, must *suppose* it; and all real belief, or true notion of that gospel, must be built upon it. Therefore as I think the doctrine is most certainly both true and important, I hope my attempting a *vindication* of it will be *candidly* interpreted; and that what I have done towards its defence will be *impartially* considered by all that will give themselves the trouble to read the ensuing discourse: in which it is designed to examine every thing material throughout the doctor's *whole* book, and many things in that other book, containing his *Key* and Exposition on *Romans*; as also many things written in opposition to this doctrine by some *other* modern authors. Moreover, my discourse being not only intended for an *answer* to Dr. Taylor, and other opposers of the doctrine of original sin, but for a *general defence* of that doctrine; producing the *evidence* of the truth of the doctrine, as well as answering *objections* made against it, I hope this attempt of mine will not be thought needless, nor be altogether useless, notwithstanding other publications on the subject.

I would also hope that the *extensiveness* of the plan of the following treatise will excuse the *length* of it. And that when it is considered how *much* was absolutely requisite to the full executing of a design formed on such a plan; how much has been written *against*

the doctrine of original sin, and with what plausibility; how strong the *prejudices* of many are in favour of what is said in *opposition* to this doctrine—and that it cannot be expected any thing short of a *full* consideration of almost *every* argument advanced by the main opposers, especially by this late and specious writer, Dr. TAYLOR, will satisfy many readers—how much must unavoidably be said in order to a full handling of the arguments in *defence* of the doctrine; and how *important* the doctrine must be, if true; I trust the length of the following discourse will not be thought to exceed what the case really required. However this must be left to the judgment of the intelligent and candid reader.

Stockbridge, May 26, 1757.

Note.—When the *page* is referred to in this manner, p. 40, p. 50, without mentioning the *book*, thereby is to be understood such a page in Dr. TAYLOR'S *Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin.* S. intends the Supplement. When the word *Key* is used to signify the book referred to, thereby is to be understood Dr. TAYLOR'S *Key to the Apostolic Writings.* This mark [§] with figures or a number annexed, signifies such a section or paragraph in his *Key.* When after mentioning *Preface to Par. on Epist. Romans,* there is subjoined p, 145, 47, or the like, thereby is intended page and paragraph, page 145, paragraph 47. The letter *T.* alone, is used to signify Dr. TAYLOR'S name, and no other.

THE

GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

OF

ORIGINAL SIN DEFENDED.

PART I.

WHEREIN ARE CONSIDERED SOME EVIDENCES OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM FACTS AND EVENTS, AS FOUNDED BY OBSERVATION AND EXPERIENCE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIONS AND TESTIMONIES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, AND THE CONFESSION AND ASSERTION OF OPPOSERS.

CHAP. I.

The Evidence of Original Sin from what appears in Fact of the Sinfulness of Mankind.

SECT. I.

All Mankind constantly, in all Ages, without Fail in any one Instance, run into that moral Evil, which is in effect their own utter and eternal Perdition in a total privation of GOD's Favour, and suffering of his Vengeance and Wrath.

By *Original Sin* as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the *innate sinful depravity of the heart.* But yet when the *doctrine* of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, which includes not only the *depravity of nature*, but the *imputation* of Adam's first sin; or, in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that sin. So far as I know, most of those who have held

one of these, have maintained the other; and most of those who have opposed one, have opposed the other: both are opposed by the Author chiefly attended to in the following discourse, in his book against original sin: And it may perhaps appear in our future consideration of the subject, that they are closely connected; that the arguments which prove the one establish the other, and that there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one, than the other.

I shall in the first place, consider this doctrine more especially with regard to the *corruption of nature;* and as we treat of this the other will naturally come into consideration, in the prosecution of the discourse, as connected with it. As all moral qualities, all principles either of virtue or vice, lie in the disposition of the heart, I shall consider whether we have any evidence that the heart of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil disposition. This is strenuously denied by many late writers who are enemies to the doctrine of original sin; and particularly by Dr. TAYLOR.

The way we come by the idea of any such thing as disposition or *tendency* is by observing what is constant or general in *event;* especially under a great variety of circumstances; and above all, when the effect or event continues the same through great and various opposition, much and manifold force and means used to the contrary not prevailing to hinder the effect. I do not know that such a prevalence of effects is denied to be an evidence of prevailing tendency in causes and agents; or that it is expressly denied by the opposers of the doctrine of original sin, that if, in the course of events, it universally or generally proves that mankind are actually corrupt, this would be an evidence of a prior corrupt propensity in the world of mankind; whatever may be said by some, which, if taken with its plain consequences, may seem to imply a denial of this; which may be considered afterwards. But by many the fact is denied; that is, it is denied, that corruption and moral evil are commonly prevalent in the world: on the contrary, it is insisted on, that good preponderates, and that virtue has the ascendant.

To this purpose, Dr. TURNBULL says,* "With regard to the prevalence of vice in the world, men are apt to let their imagination run out upon all the robberies, piracies, murders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations they have either heard of, or read in history; thence concluding all mankind to be very wicked. As if a court of justice were a proper place to make an estimate of the morals of mankind, or an hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. But ought they not to consider that the number of honest citizens and farmers far sur-

* Moral Philos. p. 289, 290.

passes that of all sorts of criminals in any state, and that the innocent and kind actions of even criminals themselves surpass their crimes in numbers; that it is the rarity of crimes in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our attention to them and makes them to be recorded in history, while honest, generous domestic actions are overlooked only because they are so common? as one great danger, or one month's sickness shall become a frequently repeated story during a long life of health and safety.—Let not the vices of mankind be multiplied or magnified. Let us make a fair estimate of human life, and set over against the shocking, the astonishing instances of barbarity and wickedness that have been perpetrated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave actions with which history shines, but the prevailing innocency, good-nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind at all times; and we shall not find reason to cry out, as objectors against Providence do on this occasion, that all men are vastly corrupt and that there is hardly any such thing as virtue in the world. Upon a fair computation the fact does indeed come out, that very great villanies have been very uncommon in all ages and looked upon as monstrous; so general is the sense and esteem of virtue."—It seems to be with a like view that Dr. TAYLOR says, "We must not take the measure of our health and enjoyments from a lazar-house, nor of our understanding from *Bedlam*, nor of our morals from a jail." (p. 77. S.)

With respect to the propriety and pertinence of such a representation of things, and its force as to the consequence designed, I hope we shall be better able to judge, and in some measure to determine whether the natural disposition of the hearts of mankind be corrupt or not, when the things which follow have been considered. But for the greater clearness, it may be proper here to premise one consideration that is of great importance in this controversy, and is very much overlooked by the opposers of the doctrine of original sin in their disputing against it.

That it is to be looked upon as the *true* tendency of the innate disposition of man's heart, which appears to be its tendency, when we consider things as they are in themselves, or in their own nature, without the *interposition of divine grace*.—Thus, that state of man's nature, that disposition of the mind, is to be looked upon as evil and pernicious, which, as it is in itself, tends to extremely pernicious consequences, and would certainly end therein, were it not that the free mercy and kindness of God interposes to prevent that issue. It would be very strange if any should argue that there is no evil tendency in the case, because the mere favour and compassion of the Most [illegible] may step in and oppose the tendency and pre-

vent the sad effect. Particularly, if there be any thing in the nature of man whereby he has an universal unfailing tendency to that moral evil which, according to the real nature and true demerit of things as they are in themselves, implies his utter ruin, that must be looked upon as an evil tendency or propensity; however divine grace may interpose to save him from deserved ruin, and to over-rule things to an issue contrary to that which they tend to of themselves. Grace is sovereign, exercised according to the good pleasure of God, bringing good out of evil. The effect of it belongs not to the nature of things themselves, that otherwise have an ill tendency, any more than the remedy belongs to the disease; but is something altogether independent on it, introduced to oppose the natural tendency, and reverse the course of things. But the event to which things tend, according to their own *demerit*, and according to divine *justice*, is the event to which they tend in their own nature; as Dr. *T.'s* own words fully imply (*Pref to. Par. on Rom.* p. 131.) "God alone (says he) can declare whether he will pardon or punish the ungodliness and unrighteousness of mankind, which is in ITS OWN NATURE punishable." Nothing is more precisely according to the truth of things than divine justice: it weighs things in an even balance; it views and estimates things no otherwise than they are truly in their own nature. Therefore undoubtedly that which implies a tendency to ruin, according to the estimate of divine *justice*, does indeed imply such a tendency in its *own nature*.

And then it must be remembered, that it is a *moral depravity* we are speaking of; and therefore when we are considering whether such depravity do not appear by a tendency to a bad effect or issue, it is a *moral tendency* to such an issue that is the thing to be taken into the account. A moral tendency or influence is by *desert*. Then may it be said man's nature or state is attended with a pernicious or destructive tendency in a *moral* sense, when it tends to that which *deserves* misery and destruction. And therefore it *equally* shews the moral depravity of the nature of mankind in their present state, whether that nature be universally attended with an effectual tendency to destructive vengeance *actually executed*, or to their *deserving* misery and ruin, or their just *exposedness* to destruction, however that fatal consequence may be prevented by grace, or whatever the actual event be.

One thing more is to be observed here, that the topic mainly insisted on by the opposers of the doctrine of original sin, is the *justice* of God; both in their objections against the *imputation* of *Adam's* sin, and also against its being so ordered, that men should come into the world with a *corrupt* and ruined nature, without having merited the displeasure of their Creator by any personal fault. But the latter is not repugnant to God's

justice, if men *actually are* born into the world with a tendency to sin, and to misery and ruin for their sin, which actually will be the consequence unless *mere grace* steps in and prevents it. If this be allowed, the argument from *justice* is given up: for it is to suppose, that their liableness to misery and ruin comes in a way of justice; otherwise there would be no need of the interposition of divine grace to save them. Justice alone would be sufficient security, if exercised, without grace. It is all one in this dispute about what is just and righteous, whether men are born in a miserable state by a tendency to ruin which *actually follows*, and that *justly*; or whether they are born in such a state as tends to a *desert* of ruin, which *might justly* follow, and *would actually follow* did not grace prevent. For the controversy is not what grace *will* do, but what justice *might* do.

I have been the more particular on this head, because it enervates many of the reasonings and conclusions by which Dr. *T.* makes out his scheme; in which he argues from that state which mankind are in *by divine grace*, yea, which he himself supposes to be by divine grace; and yet not making any allowance for this, he from hence draws conclusions against what others suppose of the deplorable and ruined state mankind are in by the fall.* Some of his arguments and conclusions to

* He often speaks of death and affliction as coming on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin; and in p. 20, 21. and many other places, he supposes that these things come in consequence of his sin, not as a punishment or a calamity, but as a *benefit*. But in p. 23. he supposes, those things would be a great calamity and misery, if it were not for the resurrection; which resurrection he there, and in the following pages, and in many other places, speaks of as being by Christ; and often speaks of it as being *by the grace* of God in Christ.

P. 63, 64. Speaking of our being subjected to sorrow, labour, and death, in consequence of *Adam's* sin, he represents these as evils that are reversed and turned into advantages, and from which we are delivered *through grace* in Christ. And p. 65, 66, 67. he speaks of God thus turning death into an advantage *through grace* in Christ, as what vindicates the justice of God in bringing death by Adam.

P. 152, 156. One thing he alleges against this proposition of the Assembly of Divines—That we are by nature bond-slaves to Satan—*That God hath been providing, from the beginning of the world to this day, various means and dispensations, to preserve and rescue mankind from the devil.*

P. 168, 169, 170 In answer to that objection against his doctrine That we are in worse circumstances than Adam, he alleges the happy circumstances we are under by the provision and means furnished through *free grace in Christ.*

P. 228. In answering that argument against his doctrine—That there is a law in our members, bringing us into captivity to the law of sin and death, *Rom.* vii.—He allows, that the case of those who are under a law threatening death for every sin (which law he elsewhere says, *shews us the natural and proper demerit of sin, and is perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness*) *must be quite deplorable if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver.*

P. 90—93. S. In opposition to what is supposed of the miserable state mankind are brought into by Adam's sin, he alleges, *The noble designs of love, manifested by advancing a new and happy dispensation, founded on the obedience and righteousness of the Son of God;* and that, although by Adam we are subjected to death.

this effect, in order to be made good, must depend on such a supposition as this:—that God's dispensations of grace are rectifications or amendments of his foregoing constitutions and proceedings, which were merely legal; as though the dispensations of grace, which succeed those of mere law, implied an acknowledgment that the preceding legal constitution would be unjust if left as it was, or at least very hard dealing with mankind; and that the other were of the nature of a satisfaction to his creatures for former injuries, or hard treatment. So that, put together the injury with the satisfaction, the legal and injurious dispensation taken with the following good dispensation, which our author calls grace, and the unfairness or improper severity of the former amended by the goodness of the latter, both together made up one righteous dispensation.

The reader is desired to bear in mind what I have said concerning the interposition of divine grace not altering the nature of things as they are in themselves. Accordingly, when I speak of such and such an evil *tendency* of things belonging to the present nature and state of mankind, understand me to mean their tendency *as they are in themselves*, abstracted from any consideration of that remedy the sovereign and infinite grace of God has provided.—Having premised these things, I now assert, that mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue; that THEY UNIVERSALLY RUN THEMSELVES INTO THAT WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, THEIR OWN UTTER ETERNAL PERDITION, as being finally accursed of God and the subject of his remediless wrath through sin.—From which I infer,

yet in this dispensation a resurrection is provided; and that Adam's posterity are under a mild dispensation of *Grace*, &c.

P. 112. *S.* He vindicates God's dealings with *Adam*, in placing him at first under the rigour of law, transgress and die, (which, as he expresses it, *was putting his happiness on a foot extremely dangerous*) by saying, *that as God had before determined in his own breast, so he immediately established his covenant upon a quite different bottom, namely, upon grace.*

P. 122, 123, *S.* Against what *R. R.* says, That God forsook man when he fell, and that mankind after Adam's sin were born without the divine favour, &c. he alleges, among other things, *Christ's coming to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world—And the riches of God's mercy in giving the promise of a Redeemer to destroy the works of the devil—That he caught his sinning falling creature in the arms of his grace.*

In his note on *Rom.* v. 20. p. 297, 298. he says as follows: "The law I conceive, is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in our present state; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God, to afford us no other way of salvation but by a law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined for ever. For who then from the beginning of the world could be saved? And therefore it seems to me, that the law was not absolutely intended to be a rule for obtaining life, even to Adam in paradise: *Grace* was the dispensation God intended mankind should be under; and therefore Christ was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world."—There are various other passages in this author's writings of the like kind.

that the natural state of the mind of man, is attended with a *propensity of nature*, which is prevalent and effectual, to such an issue; and that therefore their nature is corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity that amounts to and implies their utter undoing.

Here I would first consider the *truth* of the proposition; and then would shew the certainty of the *consequences* which I infer from it. If both can be clearly and certainly proved, then I trust none will deny but that the doctrine of original depravity is evident, and so the falseness of Dr. *T.'s* scheme demonstrated; the greatest part of whose book called *the Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin*, &c. is against the doctrine of *innate depravity*. In p. 107, S. he speaks of the conveyance of a corrupt and sinful nature to *Adam's* posterity as *the grand point* to be proved by the maintainers of the doctrine of original sin.

In order to demonstrate what is asserted in the proposition laid down, there is need only that these two things should be made manifest: *one* is this fact, that all mankind come into the world in such a state as without fail comes to this issue, namely, the universal commission of sin; or that every one who comes to act in the world as a moral agent, is, in a greater or less degree, guilty of sin. The *other* is, that all sin deserves and exposes to utter and eternal destruction under God's wrath and curse; and would end in it, were it not for the interposition of divine grace to prevent the effect. Both which can be abundantly demonstrated to be agreeable to the word of God, and to Dr. *T.'s* own doctrine.

That every one of mankind, at least such as are capable of acting as moral agents, are guilty of sin (not now taking it for granted that they come guilty into the world) is most clearly and abundantly evident from the holy scriptures: 1 Kings viii. 46. *If any man sin against thee; for there is no man that sinneth not.* Eccl. vii. 20. *There is not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not.* Job. ix. 2, 3. *I know it is so of a truth*, (i. e. as *Bildad* had just before said, that God would not cast away a perfect man, &c.) *but how should man be just with God? If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thousand.* To the like purpose, Psal. cxliii. 2. *Enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified.* So the words of the apostle (in which he has apparent reference to those of the Psalmist.) Rom. iii. 19, 20. "That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. So, Gal. ii. 16. 1 John i. 7—10. "If we walk in the light, the blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin. If we say that we have no sin, we deceive our-

selves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us." In this, and innumerable other places, confession and repentance of sin are spoken of as duties proper for ALL; as also prayer to God for pardon of sin: also forgiveness of those that injure us, from that motive, that we hope to be *forgiven* of God. Universal guilt of sin might also be demonstrated from the appointment, and the declared use and end of the ancient sacrifices; and also from the ransom which every one that was numbered in *Israel* was directed to pay, to make atonement for his soul. (*Exod.* xxx. 11—16.) All are represented, not only as being sinful, but as having great and manifold iniquity. (*Job.* ix. 2, 3, *Jam.* iii. 1, 2.)

There are many scriptures which both declare the *universal sinfulness* of mankind, and also that all sin *deserves* and justly exposes to *everlasting destruction*, under the wrath and curse of God; and so demonstrate both parts of the proposition I have laid down. To which purpose that passage in Gal. iii. 10. is exceeding full: *For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse; for it is written, cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them.* How manifestly is it implied in the apostle's meaning here, that there is no man but what fails in some instances of doing all things that are written in the book of the law, and therefore as many as have their dependence on their fulfilling the law, are under that curse which is pronounced on them that fail of it? And hence the apostle infers in the next verse, *that* NO MAN *is justified by the law in the sight of God:* as he had said before in the preceding chapter, ver. 16. *By the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.* The apostle shews us he understands, that by this place which he cites from Deuteronomy, *the scripture hath concluded, or shut up all under sin.* (Gal. iii. 22.) So that here we are plainly taught, both that every one of mankind is a *sinner*, and that every sinner is under the *curse* of God.

To the like purpose is *Rom.* iv. 14. also 2 *Cor.* iii. 6, 7, 9. where the law is called *the letter that kills, the ministration of death, and the ministration of condemnation.* The wrath, condemnation, and death, which is threatened in the law to all its transgressors, is final perdition, the second death, eternal ruin; as is very plain, and indeed is confessed. And this punishment which the law threatens for every sin is a *just* punishment; being what every sin truly *deserves;* God's law being a righteous law, and the sentence of it a righteous sentence.

All these things are what Dr. Taylor himself confesses

and asserts. He says that the law of God requires *perfect* obedience. (*Note* on *Rom.* vii. 6. p. 308.) "God can never require imperfect obedience, or by his holy law allow us to be guilty of any one sin how small soever. And if the law, as a rule of duty, were in any respect abolished, then we might in some respects transgress the law and yet not be guilty of sin. The moral law, or law of nature, is the truth, everlasting, unchangeable; and therefore, as such, can never be abrogated. On the contrary, our Lord Jesus Christ has promulgated it anew under the gospel, fuller and clearer than it was in the mosaical constitution, or any where else:—having added to its precepts the sanction of his own divine authority." And many things which he says imply that all mankind do in some degree transgress the law. In p. 228. speaking of what may be gathered from *Rom.* vii. and viii. he says, "We are very apt in a world full of temptation, to be deceived and drawn into sin by bodily appetites, &c. And the case of those who are under a law threatening death to every sin must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the law-giver."

But this is very fully declared in what he says in his note on *Rom.* v. 20. p. 297. His words are as follows: "Indeed as a rule of action prescribing our duty, it (the law) always was and always must be a rule ordained for obtaining life; but not as a rule of justification, not as it subjects to death for every transgression. For if it COULD in its utmost rigour have given us life, then as the apostle argues, it would have been against the promises of God. For if there had been a law in the strict and rigorous sense of law, WHICH COULD HAVE MADE US LIVE, verily justification should have been by the law. But he supposes no such law was ever given: and therefore there is need and room enough for the promises of grace: or as he argues, *Gal.* ii. 21. it would have frustrated or rendered useless the grace of God. For if justification came by the law, then truly Christ is dead in vain, then he died to accomplish what was, or MIGHT HAVE BEEN EFFECTED by law itself without his death. Certainly the law was not brought in among the *Jews* to be a rule of justification, or to recover them out of a state of death and to procure life by their sinless obedience to it: For in this, as well as in another respect, it was WEAK; not in itself, but through the WEAKNESS of our flesh, *Rom.* viii. 3. The law, I conceive, is not a dispensation *suitable to the infirmity of the human nature* in our present state, or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God to afford us no other way of salvation but by LAW; WHICH IF WE ONCE TRANSGRESS, WE ARE RUINED FOR EVER. FOR WHO THEN, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD, COULD BE SAVED?" How clear and express are these things,

that no one of mankind, from the beginning of the world, can ever be justified by law, because every one transgresses it?*

And here also we see, Dr. T. declares, that by the law men are sentenced to *everlasting ruin* for one transgression. To the like purpose he often expresses himself. So p. 207. "The law requireth the most extensive obedience, discovering sin in all its branches.—It gives sin a deadly force, subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death; and yet supplieth neither help nor hope to the sinner, but leaving him under the power of sin and sentence of death." In p 213, he speaks of the law as *extending to lust and irregular desires, and to every branch and principle of sin; and even to its latent principles and minutest branches;* again (*Note* on *Rom.* vii. 6. p. 308.) *to every sin how small soever.* And when he speaks of the law subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death, he means eternal death, as he from time to time explains the matter. In p. 212. he speaks of the law *in the condemning power of it, as binding us in everlasting chains.* In p. 120. S. he says, that death which is the wages of sin, is the *second death;* and this p. 78. he explains of *final perdition.* In his *Key*, p. 107, § 296, he says, "The curse of the law subjected men for every transgression to *eternal death.*" So in *Note* on *Rom.* v. 20. p. 291. "The law of *Moses* subjected those who were under it to death, meaning by death, eternal death." These are his words.

He also supposes that this sentence of the law, thus subjecting men for *every*, even the *least sin*, and *every minutest branch* and *latent principle of sin* to so dreadful a punishment, is *just and righteous, agreeable to truth* and the *nature of things*, or to the *natural* and *proper demerits of sin.* In this he is very full. Thus in p. 186. P. "It was sin (says he) which subjected us to death by the law, JUSTLY threatening sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might appear; might be set forth IN ITS PROPER COLOURS; when we saw it subjected us to death by a law PERFECTLY HOLY, JUST, and GOOD; that sin by the commandment, by the law, might be represented WHAT IT REALLY IS, an exceeding great and deadly evil. So in note on Rom. v. 20. p. 299. "The law or ministration of death, as it subjects to death for every transgression, is still of use to shew the NATURAL AND PROPER DEMERIT OF SIN." *Ibid.* p. 292. "The language of the law, dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the *demerit* of the transgression, that which it *deserves.*" *Ibid.* p. 298. "The

* I am sensible these things are quite inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, of *sufficient power in all mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God requires of them*, without a necessity of breaking God's law *in any degree*, (p. 63—68. S.) But I hope the reader will not think me accountable for his inconsistencies.

law was added, saith Mr. LOCKE, on the place because the *Israelites*, the posterity of *Abraham*, were transgressors as well as other men, to show them their sins, and the punishment and death which in STRICT JUSTICE they incurred by them. And this appears to be a true comment on *Rom.* vii. 13.—Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death for this end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is *holy, just, and good*, PERFECTLY CONSONANT TO EVERLASTING TRUTH AND RIGHTEOUSNESS.—Consequently every sin is in *strict justice deserving* of wrath and punishment; and the law in its rigour was given to the *Jews* to set home this awful truth upon their consciences, to show them the evil and pernicious NATURE of sin; and that being conscious they had broke the law of God, this might convince them of the great need they had of the FAVOUR of the lawgiver, and oblige them by faith in his GOODNESS, to fly to his MERCY for pardon and salvation."

If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution perfectly agreeable to God's holiness, justice, and goodness; then he might have put it exactly in execution, agreeably to all these his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133. S. "How that constitution, which establishes a law, the making of which is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the executing of it inconsistent with his holiness, can a be righteous constitution, I confess is quite beyond my comprehension.

Now the reader is left to judge whether it be not most plainly and fully agreeable to Dr. T.'s own doctrine, that there never was any one person from the beginning of the world who came to act in the world as a moral agent, and that it is not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what is a sinner or transgressor of the law of God; and that therefore this proves to be the issue and event of things, with respect to all mankind in all ages, that by the natural and proper demerit of their own sinfulness, and in the judgment of the law of God, which is perfectly consonant to truth and exhibits things in their true colours, they are the proper subjects of the curse of God, eternal death, and everlasting ruin; which must be the actual consequence, unless the grace or favour of the lawgiver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salvation. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the doctrine of the holy scripture. If so, and if the interposition of divine grace alters not the nature of things as they are *in themselves*, and that it does not in the least affect the state of the controversy we are upon—concerning the true nature and tendency of the state in which mankind come into the world—whether grace prevents the fatal effect or no; I trust none will deny that the proposition laid down is fully proved, as agree-

able to the word of God, and Dr. T.'s own words; viz. That mankind are all naturally in such a state as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue, that they *universally are the subjects of that guilt and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin*, being cast wholly out of the favour of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and curse.

SECT. II.

It follows from the proposition proved in the foregoing Section, that all Mankind are under the influence of a prevailing effectual Tendency in their Nature to that sin and Wickedness, which implies their utter and eternal Ruin.

The proposition laid down being proved, the *consequence* of it remains to be made out, viz. That the mind of man has a *natural tendency* or *propensity* to that event which has been shewn universally and infallibly to take place; and that this is a *corrupt* or *depraved* propensity.—I shall here consider the former part of this consequence, namely, Whether such an universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of *any tendency* or *propensity* to that event; leaving the *evil* and *corrupt nature* of such a propensity to be considered afterwards.

If any should say they do not think that its being a thing universal and infallible in *event* that mankind commit some sin, is a proof of a prevailing *tendency* to sin; because they do good, and perhaps more good than evil: let them remember that the question at present is not, *How much* sin there is a tendency to; but, whether there be a prevailing propensity to that issue which it is allowed all men do actually come to that all fail of keeping the law perfectly—whether there be not a tendency to such imperfection of obedience as always without fail comes to pass; to that degree of sinfulness, at least, which all fall into; and so to that utter ruin which that sinfulness implies and infers. Whether an effectual propensity to this be worth the name of depravity, because of the good that may be supposed to balance it, shall be considered by and by. If all mankind, in all nations and ages, were at least one day in their lives deprived of the use of their reason, and raving mad; or that all, even every individual person, once cut their own throats, or put out their own eyes; it might be an evidence of some tendency in the nature or natural state of mankind to such an event; though they might exercise reason many more days than they were distracted, and were kind to and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruelly wounded themselves.

To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the above-named event be an evidence of tendency, let it be considered, What can be meant by *tendency*, but a prevailing liableness or exposedness to such or such an event? Wherein consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated prevalence or preponderation in the nature or state of causes or occasions, that is followed *by*, and so proves to be effectual *to*, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular kind of effect? Or something in the permanent state of things, concerned in bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which is a foundation for the constancy or strongly prevailing probability of such an event? If we mean this by tendency, (and I know not what else can be meant by it, but this or something like,) then it is manifest, that where we see a stated prevalence of any effect there is a tendency to that effect in the nature and state of its causes. A common and steady effect shews that there is somewhere a preponderation, a prevailing exposedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shews, that where there is an effect there is a cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; because if it were not sufficient, it would not be effectual; and that therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause. A steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of tendency, no other way than by observation: And we can observe nothing but events: And it is the commonness or constancy of events that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus we judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals, vegetables, animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion of a stated tendency or fixed propensity, is not obtained by observing only a single event. A stated preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the effect. If a die be once thrown and it falls on a particular side, we do not argue from hence, that *that* side is the heaviest; but if it be thrown without skill or care many thousands or millions of times, and it constantly falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds but that there is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should earnestly dispute against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter or heat in the summer; or should stand to it, that although it often happened that water quenched fire, yet there was no tendency in it to such an effect?

In the case we are upon, human nature, as existing in such an immense diversity of persons and circumstances and never failing in any one instance, of coming to that issue—

that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and eternal ruin—is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the least as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, proceeding one from another from the beginning of the world, growing in all countries, soils, and climates, all bearing ill fruit; it as much proves the nature and tendency of the *kind*, as if it were only one individual tree that had remained from the beginning of the world, often transplanted into different soils, and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there were a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to innumerable different countries and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evidence of the *tendency* of something in the nature or constitution of that *race*, as it would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if some one person had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often appeared in him, which he had been the agent or subject of from year to year and from age to age, continually and without fail.*

Thus a propensity attending the present nature or natural state of mankind, eternally to ruin themselves by sin, may certainly be inferred from apparent and acknowledged fact.—And I would now observe further, that not only does this follow from facts acknowledged by Dr. T. but the things he *asserts* and the expressions which he *uses*, plainly imply that all mankind have such a propensity; yea, one of the highest kind, a propensity that is *invincible*, or a tendency which really amounts to a fixed, constant, unfailing *necessity*. There is a plain confession of a propensity or proneness to sin, p. 143.—"Man who drinketh in iniquity like water; who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so APT to indulge them.—" And again, p. 228. "WE ARE VERY APT, in a world full

* Here may be observed the weakness of that objection made against the validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin from the constancy and universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance without a fixed propensity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence that there was *some cause* or occasion of that event: But the thing we are speaking of, is a *fixed cause*: Propensity is a *stated* continued thing. We justly agree, that a *stated effect* must have a *stated cause*, and truly observe, that we obtain the notion of tendency or *stated preponderation* in causes, no other way than by observing a stated prevalence of a particular kind of effect. But who ever argues a fixed propensity from a single event? And it is not strange arguing, that because an event which once came to pass does not prove any stated tendency, therefore the unfailing constancy of an event is an evidence of no such thing? But because Dr. T. makes so much of this objection from Adam sinning without a propensity, I shall hereafter consider it more particularly, in the beginning of the 9th *section* of this chapter; where will also be considered what is objected from the fall of the angels.

of temptation, to be deceived and drawn into sin by bodily appetites."—If we are *very apt* or prone to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites and *sinfully to indulge them*, and very apt or prone *to yield to temptation to sin*, then we are *prone to sin;* for to yield to temptation to sin is *sinful.*—In the same page he shews, that on this account and its consequences, *the case of those who are under a law threatening death for every sin must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver.* Which implies that their case is hopeless as to any escape from death, the punishment of sin, by any other means than God's mercy. And that implies such an *aptness* to yield to temptation as renders hopeless that any of mankind should wholly avoid it. But he speaks of it elsewhere, over and over, as truly *impossible*, or what *cannot be;* as in the words before cited in the last *section* from his note on *Rom.* v. 20. where he repeatedly speaks of the law, which subjects us to death for every transgression, as what CANNOT GIVE LIFE; and states, that if God offered us no other way of salvation, *no man from the beginning of the world* COULD *be saved.* In the same place he cites with approbation Mr. LOCKE's words, in which, speaking of the *Israelites*, he says, "All endeavours after righteousness was LOST LABOUR, since any one slip forfeited life, and it was IMPOSSIBLE for them to expect ought but death." Our author speaks of it as impossible for the law requiring sinless obedience to give life, *not that the law was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh.* Therefore he says *he conceives the law not to be a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in its present state.* These things amount to a full confession, that the *proneness* in men to sin and to a *demerit* of and just exposedness to eternal ruin, is universally invincible; or which is the same thing, amounts to invincible necessity; which surely is the highest kind of tendency or propensity: And that not the less, for his laying this propensity to our *infirmity* or weakness, which may seem to intimate some defect, rather than any thing positive: And it is agreeable to the sentiments of the *best divines*, that *all sin originally comes from a* DEFECTIVE *or* PRIVATE *cause.* But sin does not cease to be sin justly exposing to eternal ruin (as implied in Dr. T.'s own words) for arising from infirmity or defect; nor does an invincible propensity to sin cease to be a propensity to such demerit of eternal ruin, because the proneness arises from such a cause.

It is manifest, that this tendency which has been proved, does not exist in any particular *external* circumstances that persons are in peculiarly influencing their minds; but is *inherent*, and is seated in that *nature* which is common to all mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go, and still

remains the same however circumstances may differ. For it is implied in what has been proved and shewn to be confessed, that the same event comes to pass in *all* circumstances. *In God's sight no man living can be justified;* but all are sinners, and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all constitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions and educations; in all countries, climates, nations and ages; and through all the mighty changes and revolutions which have come to pass in the habitable world.

We have the same evidence that the propensity in this case lies in the *nature* of the subject—and does not arise from any particular circumstances—as we have in any case whatsoever; which is only by the *effects* appearing to be the same in all changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circumstances. It is in this way only we judge that any propensities which we observe in mankind, are seated in their nature in all other cases. It is thus we judge of the mutual propensity betwixt the sexes, or of the dispositions which are exercised in any of the natural passions or appetites, that they truly belong to the nature of man; because they are observed in mankind in general through all countries, nations and ages, and in all conditions.

If any should say, Though it be evident that there is a tendency in the state of things to this general event—that all mankind should fail of perfect obedience, and should sin, and incur a demerit of eternal ruin; and also that this tendency does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any particular people, person or age—yet it may not lie in *man's nature*, but in the general constitution and frame of *this world*. Though the nature of man may be good, without any evil propensity inherent in it; yet the nature and universal state of this world may be full of so many and strong temptations and of such powerful influence on such a creature as man, dwelling in so infirm a body, &c. that the result of the whole may be a strong and infallible tendency *in such a state of things*, to the sin and eternal ruin of every one of mankind.

To this I would reply, that such an evasion will not at all avail to the purpose of those whom I oppose in this controversy. It alters not the case as to this question, Whether man, in his present state, is depraved and ruined by propensities to sin. If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not good in its place in the system; and those inherent qualities of that part of the system which are not good, but corrupt, in that place are justly looked upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to the *nature* of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the no-

cessary consequence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence; whether that propensity be good or bad. It is the nature of a stone to be heavy; but yet if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance from this world, it would have no such quality. But being a stone is of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tendency in its proper place in this world, where God has made it, it it is properly looked upon as a propensity belonging to its nature. And if it be a good propensity here in its proper place, then it is a good quality of its nature; but if it be contrariwise, it is an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature that they have an universal effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature. There is perhaps scarce any such thing, in beings not independent and self-existent, as any power or tendency but what has some dependence on other beings, with which they stand connected in the universal system of existence. Propensities are no propensities any otherwise than as taken with their objects. Thus it is with the tendencies observed in natural bodies, such as gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. And thus it is with the propensities observed in the various kinds of animals: and thus it is with most of the propensities in created spirits.

It may further be observed, that it is exactly the same thing as to the controversy concerning an agreeableness with God's moral perfections of such a disposal of things—that man should come into the world in a depraved and ruined state by a propensity to sin and ruin—whether God has ordered it, that this propensity should lie in his nature considered *alone*, or with relation to his situation in the universe, and its *connection* with other parts of the system to which the Creator has united it: which is as much of God's ordering as man's nature itself, most simply considered.

Dr. T. (p. 188, 189.) speaking of the attempt of some to solve the difficulty of God being the author of our nature and yet that our nature is polluted, by supposing that God makes the soul pure, but unites it to a polluted body, (or a body so made as tends to pollute the soul;) he cries out of it as weak and insufficient, and *too gross to be admitted:* For, says he, *Who infused the soul into the body? And if it is polluted by being infused into the body, Who is the author and cause of its pollution? And who created the body, &c.*—But is not the case just the same, as to those who suppose that God made the soul pure, and places it in a polluted world, or a world tending by its natural state in which it is made to pollute the soul, or to have such an influence upon it that it shall without fail be polluted with sin and eternally ruined? Here may not I also cry out, on as good grounds as Dr. T.—Who placed the soul

here in this world? And if the world be polluted, or so constituted as naturally and infallibly to pollute the soul with sin, Who is the cause of this pollution? And, who created the world?

Though in the place now cited, Dr. T. so insists upon it, that God must be answerable for the pollution of the soul, if he has infused or put the soul into a body that tends to pollute it: yet this is the very thing which he himself supposes to be fact, with respect to the soul being created by God, in such a body, and in such a world; where he says, "We are *apt*, in a world full of temptation, to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites." And if so, according to his way of reasoning, God must be the author and cause of this aptness to be drawn into sin. Again, p. 143. we have these words, "*Who drinketh in iniquity like water? Who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them?*" In these words our author in effect says the individual things that he exclaims against as so *gross, viz.*—The tendency of the body, as God has made it, to pollute the soul which he has infused into it. These sensual appetites which incline the soul or make it *apt* to a sinful *indulgence*, are either from the body which God hath made, or otherwise a proneness to sinful indulgence is immediately and originally seated in the soul itself, which will not mend the matter.

I would lastly observe, that our author insists upon it, p. 42, S. that this lower world, in its present state, "Is as it was, when, upon a review, God pronounced it and all its furniture, *very good*. And that the present form and furniture of the earth is full of God's riches, mercy, and goodness, and of the most evident tokens of his love and bounty to the inhabitants." If so, there can be no room for evading the evidences from facts of the universal infallible tendency of *man's nature* to sin and eternal perdition; since, on the supposition, the tendency to this issue does not lie in the general constitution and frame of this world, which God hath made to be the habitation of mankind.

SECT. III.

That propensity which has been proved to be in the Nature of all Mankind, must be a very evil, depraved, and pernicious Propensity; making it manifest, that the Soul of Man as it is by Nature, is in a corrupt, fallen, and ruined State; which is the other Part of the Consequence drawn from the Proposition laid down in the first Section.

The question to be considered in order to determine whether man's nature be *depraved and ruined*, is not, Whether he is inclined to perform as many *good deeds as bad ones?* But to which of these two he preponderates in the frame of his heart and the state of his nature, *a state of innocence and righteousness, and favour with God; or a state of sin, guiltiness, and abhorrence in the sight of God?*—Persevering sinless righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alternative on the decision of which depends—according to the nature and truth of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule of right and of perfect justice—man being approved and accepted of his Maker and eternally blessed as good; or his being rejected and cursed as bad. And therefore the determination of the tendency of man's heart and nature, with respect to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to determine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or corrupt, sound or ruined. If such be man's nature and the state of his heart, that he has an infallibly effectual propensity to the latter of those terms; then it is wholly impertinent to talk of *the innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves, surpassing their crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind.* Let never so many thousands or millions of acts of honesty, good nature, &c. be supposed; yet, by the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such moral evil as in its dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects or consequences of any supposed good. Surely that tendency which in effect is an infallible tendency to eternal destruction, is an infinitely dreadful and pernicious tendency: And that nature and frame of mind which implies such a tendency, must be an infinitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind. It would be much more absurd to suppose, that such a state of nature is not bad, under a notion of men doing more honest and kind things than evil ones; than to say the state of that ship is *good* for crossing the *Atlantic* Ocean, though such as cannot hold together through the voyage, but will infallibly founder

and sink, under a notion that it may probably go *great part* of the way before it sinks, or that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than it will be in sinking: Or, to pronounce that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part of which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are dangerous and certainly fatal to them that travel in it; or to call that a good propensity, which is an inflexible inclination to travel in such a way.

A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath and curse (which has been proved to belong to the nature of man) is evil, not only as it is *calamitous* and *sorrowful*, ending in great *natural evil;* but as it is *odious* and *detestable;* for by the supposition, it tends to that *moral evil* by which the subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable as such, to be condemned, and utterly rejected, and cursed by him. This also makes it evident, that the state which it has been proved mankind are in is a *corrupt* state in a *moral sense*, that it is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the law of God, which is the rule of moral rectitude and goodness. That tendency which is opposite to what the moral law requires, and prone to that which the moral law utterly forbids and eternally condemns, is doubtless a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense.

So that this depravity is both *odious*, and also *pernicious*, fatal and destructive, in the highest sense; as inevitably tending to that which implies man's eternal ruin. It shews that man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable state, in the highest sense. And this proves that men do not come into the world perfectly innocent in the sight of God, and without any just exposedness to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined state, in the highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature in a state of favour with God.

But if any should still insist on a notion of men's good deeds exceeding their bad ones, and that, seeing the good more than countervails the evil, they cannot be properly denominated evil; all persons and things being most properly denominated from that which prevails and has the ascendant in them; I would say further, That if there is in man's nature a tendency to guilt and ill desert in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit; or a propensity to sin, the demerit of which is so great, that the value and merit of all the virtuous acts that ever he performs are as nothing to it; then truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and evil.

That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what is evident of the infinite heinousness of sin against God, from the nature of things. The heinousness of this must rise in some proportion to the obligation we are under to regard the Divine Being; and that must be in some proportion to his worthiness of regard; which doubtless is infinitely beyond

the worthiness of any of our fellow-creatures. But the merit of our respect or obedience to God is not infinite. The merit of respect to any being does not increase, but is rather diminished, in proportion to the obligations we are under in strict justice to pay him that respect. There is no great merit in paying a debt we owe, and by the highest possible obligations in strict justice are obliged to pay; but there is great demerit in refusing to pay it. That on such accounts as these, there is an infinite demerit in all sin against God, which must therefore immensely outweigh all the merit which can be supposed to be in our virtue, I think is capable of full demonstration; and that the futility of the objections which some have made against the argument might most plainly be demonstrated. But I shall omit a particular consideration of the evidence of this matter from the nature of things, as I study brevity, and lest any should cry out, *metaphysics!* as the manner of some is, when any argument is handled against a tenet they are fond of with a close and exact consideration of the nature of things. And this is not so necessary in the present case, in as much as the point asserted—that he who commits any one sin has guilt and ill desert so great, that the value and merit of all the good which it is possible he should do in his own life is as nothing to it—is not only evident by *metaphysics*, but is plainly demonstrated by what has been shewn to be *fact*, with respect to God's own constitutions and dispensations towards mankind. Thus, whatever acts of virtue and obedience a man performs, yet if he trespasses in one point, is guilty of any, the least sin, he—according to the law of God, and so according to the exact truth of things and the proper demerit of sin—is exposed to be wholly cast out of favour with God and subjected to his curse, to be utterly and eternally destroyed. This has been proved; and shown to be the doctrine which Dr. T. abundantly teaches.

But how can it be agreeable to the nature of things and exactly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness, thus to deal with a creature for the least sinful act, though he should perform ever so many thousands of honest and virtuous acts, to countervail the evil of that sin? Or how can it be agreeable to the exact truth and real demerit of things, thus wholly to cast off the deficient creature without any regard to the merit of all his good deeds, unless that be in truth the case, that the value and merit of all those good actions bear no proportion to the heinousness of the least sin? If it were not so, one would think that however the offending person might have some proper punishment, yet seeing there is so much virtue to lay in the balance against the guilt, it would be agreeable to the nature of things that he should find some favour, and not be altogether rejected and made the subject

of perfect and eternal destruction; and thus no account at all be made of all his virtue, so much so as to procure him the least relief or hope. How can such a constitution *represent sin in its proper colours*, and *according to its true nature and desert*, (as Dr. T. says it does) unless this be its true nature, that it is so bad, that even in the least instance it perfectly swallows up all the value of the sinner's supposed good deeds, let them be ever so many. So that this matter is not left to our metaphysics or philosophy; the great lawgiver and infallible judge of the universe has clearly decided it in the revelation he has made of what is agreeable to exact truth, justice, and the nature of things, in his revealed law or rule of righteousness.

He that in any respect or degree is a transgressor of God's law, is a wicked man, yea, wholly wicked in the eye of the law; all his goodness being esteemed nothing, having no account made of it, when taken together with his wickedness. And therefore, without any regard to his righteousness, he is, by the sentence of the law, and so by the voice of truth and justice, to be treated as worthy to be rejected, abhorred, and cursed for ever; and must be so, *unless grace interpose* to cover his transgression. But men are really in themselves what they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity and justice; however they may be looked upon and treated by infinite and unmerited mercy.

So that on the whole it appears all mankind have an infallibly effectual propensity to that moral evil, which infinitely outweighs the value of all the good that can be in them; and have such a disposition of heart, that the certain consequence of it is their being, in the eye of perfect truth and righteousness, wicked men. And I leave all to judge, whether such a disposition be not in the eye of truth a *depraved* disposition?

Agreeable to these things, the scripture represents all mankind not only as having guilt, but immense guilt, which they can have no merit or worthiness to countervail. Such is the representation we have in *Matt.* xviii. 21. to the end.—There, on Peter's enquiring, *How often his brother should trespass against him and he forgive him, whether until seven times!* Christ replies, *I say not unto thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven;* apparently meaning, that he should esteem no number of offences too many, and no degree of injury it is possible our neighbour should be guilty of towards us, too great to be forgiven. For which this reason is given in the parable following, that if ever we obtain forgiveness and favour with God, he must pardon that guilt and injury towards his majesty which is immensely greater than the greatest injuries that ever men are guilty of one towards another; yea.

than the sum of all their injuries put together, let them be ever so many, and ever so great; so that the latter would be but as an hundred pence to ten thousand talents, which immense debt we owe to God and have nothing to pay; which implies, that we have no merit to countervail any part of our guilt.—And this must be, because if all that may be called virtue in us be compared with our ill desert, it is in the sight of God as nothing to it. The parable is not to represent Peter's case in particular, but that of all that who then were, or ever should be, Christ's disciples; as appears by the conclusion of the discourse, (ver. 35.) *So likewise shall my heavenly Father do, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.*

Therefore how absurd must it be for christians to object against the depravity of man's nature, a greater number of innocent and kind actions than of crimes; and to talk of a prevailing innocency, good nature, industry, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind? Infinitely more absurd than it would be to insist, that the domestic of a prince was not a bad servant, because though sometimes he contemned and affronted his master to a great degree, yet he did not spit in his master's face so often as he performed acts of service. More absurd than it would be to affirm, that his spouse was a good wife to him, because, although she committed adultery, and that with the slaves and scoundrels sometimes, yet she did not do this so often as she did the duties of a wife. These notions would be absurd, because the crimes are too heinous to be atoned for by many honest actions of the servant or spouse of the prince; there being a vast disproportion between the merit of the one and the ill desert of the other: But infinitely less than that between the demerit of our offences against God, and the value of our acts of obedience.

Thus I have gone through with my first argument; having shewn the evidence of the truth of the proposition laid down at first, and proved its consequence. But there are many other things that manifest a very corrupt tendency or disposition in man's nature in his present state, which I shall take notice of in the following *sections.*

SECT. IV.

e depravity of Nature appears by a Propensity in all to Sin immediately, as soon as they are capable of it, and to Sin continually and progressively; and also by the Remains of Sin in the best of Men.

The great depravity of man's nature appears, not only in that they universally commit sin who spend any long time in the world; but in that men are naturally so prone to sin, that none ever fail of *immediately* transgressing God's law, and so of bringing infinite guilt on themselves, and exposing themselves to eternal perdition, as soon as they are capable of it.

The scriptures are so very express upon it, that all mankind, *all flesh*, *all the world*, every man *living*, are guilty of sin; that it must at least be understood, every one capable of active duty to God or of sin against him. There are multitudes in the world who have but very lately begun to exert faculties as moral agents; and so have but just entered eir state of trial as acting for themselves: *many thousands constantly*, who have not lived one month, or week, or day, since they have arrived at any period that can be assigned (for the commencement of their agency) from their birth to twenty years of age. Now—if there be not a strong *propensity* in men's nature to sin, that should, as it were, hurry them on to speedy transgression, and if they have no guilt previous to their personal sinning—what should hinder, but that there might always be a *great numb r*, who have hitherto kept themselves free from sin, and have perfectly obeyed God's law, and so are righteous in his sight, with the righteousness of the law? And who, if they should be called out of the world without any longer trial, as great numbers die at all periods of life, would be justified by the deeds of the law? And how then can it be true, that *in God's sight no man living can be justified*, that *no man can be just with God*, and that *by the deeds of the law no flesh can be justified, because by the law is the knowledge of sin?* And what should hinder but that there may *always be many* in the world—who are capable subjects of instruction and counsel, and of prayer to God—for whom the calls of God's word to *repentance*, to seek *pardon* through the blood of Christ, and to forgive others their injuries *because* they need that God should forgive them, *would not be proper;* and for whom the Lord's prayer is not *suitable*, wherein Christ directs all his followers to pray that God would *forgive their sins*, as they forgive those that trespass against them?

If there are *any* in the world—though but lately become capable of acting for themselves as subjects of God's law—who are perfectly free from sin; such are most likely to be found among the children of christian parents, who give them the most pious education and set them the best examples. And therefore such would never be so likely to be found in any part or age of the world, as in the primitive christian church, in the first age of christianity, (the age of the Church's greatest purity) so long after christianity had been established that there had been time for great numbers of children to be born, and educated by those primitive christians. It was in that age, and in such a part of that age, that the apostle *John* wrote his first epistle to the christians. But if there was then a number of them come to understanding who were perfectly free from sin, why should he write as he does? 1 John i. 8, 9, 10, *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and the truth is not in us.**

Again, the reality and greatness of the depravity of man's nature appears in this, That he has a prevailing propensity to be *continually* sinning against God. What has been observed above will clearly prove this. That same disposition of nature which is an effectual propensity to *immediate* sin, amounts to a propensity to *continual* sin. For a being prone to *continual* sinning is nothing but a proneness to immediate sin *continued.* Such appears to be the tendency of nature to sin, that as soon as ever man is capable, it causes him immediately to sin, with-

* If any should object, that this is an overstraining of things; and that it supposes a greater niceness and exactness than is observed in scripture representations to infer from these expressions, that all men sin *immediately* as soon as ever they are capable of it. To this I would say, that I think the arguments used are truly solid, and do really and justly conclude, either that men are born guilty, and so are chargeable with sin before they come to act for themselves, or else commit sin immediately, without the least time intervening, after they are capable of understanding their obligations to God, and reflecting on themselves; and that the scripture clearly determines there is not one such person in the world, free from sin. But whether this be straining things to too great an exactness or not; yet I suppose none that do not entirely set aside the sense of such scriptures as have been mentioned, and deny those propositions which Dr. T. himself allows to be contained in some of them, will deny they prove, that no *considerable time* passes after men are capable of acting for themselves, as the subjects of God's law, before they are guilty of sin; because if the time were considerable, it would be great enough to deserve to be taken notice of, as an exception to such universal propositions as, *in thy sight shall no man living be justified,* &c. And if this be allowed, that men are so prone to sin that in fact all mankind do sin, *as it were,* immediately, after they come to be capable of it, or fail not to sin so soon that *no considerable time* passes before they run into transgression against God; it does not much alter the case as to the present argument. If the time of freedom from sin be so small as not to be worthy of notice in the forementioned universal propositions of scripture, it is also so small as not to be worthy of notice in the present argument.

out suffering any considerable time to pass without sin. And therefore, if the same propensity be continued undiminished, there will be an equal tendency to immediate sinning again, without any considerable time passing. And so the same will always be a disposition still immediately to sin, with as little time passing without sin afterwards as at first. The only reason that can be given why sinning must be immediate at first, is that the disposition is so great, that it will not suffer any considerable time to pass without sin: and therefore, the same disposition being continued in equal degree, without some new restraint or contrary tendency, it will still equally tend to the same effect. And though it is true, the propensity may be diminished or have restraints laid upon it, by the gracious disposals of providence or the merciful influences of God's spirit; yet this is not owing to nature. That strong propensity of nature by which men are so prone to immediate sinning at first, has no tendency in itself to a diminution; but rather to an *increase;* as the continued exercise of an evil disposition in repeated actual sins, tends to strengthen it more and more: agreeable to that observation of Dr. T.'s, p. 228. "We are apt to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and when once we are under the government of these appetites, it is at least exceeding difficult, if not impracticable, to recover ourselves by the mere force of reason." The increase of strength of disposition in such a case is as in a falling body, the strength of its tendency to descend is continually increased, so long as its motion is continued. Not only a constant commission of sin, but a constant increase in the habits and practice of wickedness, is the true tendency of man's depraved nature, if unrestrained by divine grace; as the true tendency of the nature of an heavy body, if obstacles are removed, is not only to fall with a continual motion, but with a constantly increasing motion. And we see that increasing iniquity is actually the consequence of natural depravity in most men, notwithstanding all the restraints they have. Dispositions to evil are commonly much stronger in adult persons, than in children when they first begin to act in the world as rational creatures.

If sin be such a thing as Dr. T. himself represents it, p. 69. "a thing of an odious and destructive nature, the corruption and ruin of our nature, and infinitely hateful to God; then such a propensity to continual and increasing sin must be a very evil disposition. And if we may judge of the perniciousness of an inclination of nature, by the evil of the effect it naturally tends to, the propensity of man's nature must be evil indeed: For the soul being immortal, as Dr. T. acknowledges, p. 94. *S.* it will follow from what has been observed above, that man has a natural disposition to one of these two things; either to an increase of wickedness without end, or till

wickedness comes to be so great, that the capacity of his nature will not allow it to be greater. This being what his wickedness will come to by its natural tendency, if divine grace does not prevent, it may as truly be said to be the effect which man's natural corruption tends to, as that an acorn in a proper soil truly tends by its nature to become a great tree.

Again, That sin which is remaining in the hearts of the *best* men on earth, makes it evident that man's nature is corrupt as he comes into the world. A remaining depravity of heart in the greatest saints may be argued from the sins of most of those who are set forth in scripture as the most eminent instances and examples of virtue and piety: and is also manifest from this, that the scripture represents all God's children as standing in need of chastisement. Heb. xii. 6, 7, 8. *For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth; and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth.—What son is he, whom the Father chasteneth not? If ye are without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not sons.* But this is directly and fully asserted in some places; as in Eccles. vii. 20. *There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not.* Which is as much as to say, there is no man upon earth that is so just, as to have attained to such a degree of righteousness as not to commit any sin. Yea, the apostle *James* speaks of all christians as often sinning, or committing many sins; even in that primitive age of the christian church, an age distinguished from all others by eminent attainments in holiness; Jam. iii. 2. *In many things we all offend.* And that there is pollution in the hearts of all antecedent to all means for purification, is very plainly declared in Prov. xx. 9. *Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?*

According to Dr. T. men come into the world wholly free from sinful propensities. And if so, it appears from what has been already said, there would be nothing to hinder—but that many, without being better than they are by nature, might perfectly avoid the commission of sin. But much more might this be the case with men after they had, by care, diligence, and good practice, attained those positive habits of virtue whereby they are at a much greater distance from sin than they were naturally—:which this writer supposes to be the case with many good men. But since the scripture teaches us that the best men in the world do often commit sin, and have remaining pollution of heart, this makes it abundantly evident that men, when they are no otherwise than they were by nature, without any of those virtuous attainments, have a sinful depravity; yea, must have great corruption of nature.

SECT. V.

depravity of Nature appears, in that the general consequence of the State and Tendency of Man's Nature is a much greater degree of Sin, than Righteousness; not only with respect to value and demerit, but matter and quantity.

I have before shewn that there is a propensity in man's nature to that sin, which in heinousness and ill desert immensely outweighs all the value and merit of any supposed good that be in him, or that he can do. I now proceed to say further that such is man's nature in present state, that it tends s lamentable effect, that th should at all times, through ourse of his life, be at least much more sin than righteous- not only as to *weight* and *value*, but as to *matter* and re; more disagreement of he t and practice from the law od and from the law of nature nd reason, than agreement and conformity. The law of God the rule of right, as Dr. T. often calls it. It is the measu f virtue and sin: so much agreement as there is with this so much is there of rectitude, righteousness, or true virtue, and no more; and so much disagreement as there is with this rule, so much sin is there. Having premised this, the following things may be here observed.

I. The degree of disagreement from this rule of right is to be determined, not only by the degree of distance from it in *excess* but also in *defect*; or in other words, not only in positive transgression, or doing what is *forbidden*, but also in withholding what is *required*. The divine Lawgiver does as much prohibit the one as the other, and does as much charge the latter as a sinful breach of his law, exposing to his eternal wrath and curse, as the former. Thus at the day of judgment, as described, *Matth.* xxv. The wicked are condemned as *cursed* to *everlasting fire*, for their sin in defect and omission; *I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat, &c.* And the case is thus, not only when the defect is in word or behaviour, but in the inward temper and exercise of the mind. 1 Cor. xvi. 22. *If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha.* Dr. *T.* speaking of the sentence and punishment of the wicked, (*Matth.* xxv. 41, 46.) says, p. 159. "It was manifestly for WANT of benevolence, love, and compassion to their fellow-creatures, that they were condemned." And elsewhere, as was observed before, he says, that the law of God extends to the *latent principles* of sin to *forbid* them, and to condemn to eternal destruction for them. And if so, it doubt so extends to the inward principles of holiness, to

require them, and in like manner to condemn them for the want of them.

II. The sum of our duty to God required in his law, is LOVE; taking love in a large sense, for the true regard of our hearts to GOD, implying esteem, honour, benevolence, gratitude, complacence, &c. This is not only very plain by the scripture, but it is evident in itself. The sum of what the law of God requires, is doubtless obedience to that law: No law can require more than that it be obeyed. But it is manifest, that obedience is nothing, any otherwise than as a testimony of the respect of our hearts to God: Without the heart, man's external acts are no more than the motions of the limbs of a wooden image: have no more of the nature of either sin or righteousness. It must therefore needs be, that *love to God*, the respect of the heart, must be the sum of the duty required in his law.

III. It therefore appears from the premises, that whosoever withholds more of that love or respect of heart from God which his law requires, than he affords, has more sin than righteousness. Not only he that has less divine love than passions and affections which are opposite; but also he that does not love God half so much as he ought or has reason to do, has justly more wrong than right imputed to him, according to the law of God and the law of reason; he has more irregularity than rectitude, with regard to the law of love. The sinful disrespect of his heart towards God is greater than his respect to him.

But what considerate person is there, even among the more virtuous part of mankind, but would be ashamed to say and profess before God or men, that he loves God half so much as he ought to do; or that he exercises one half of that esteem, honour and gratitude towards God, which would be altogether becoming him; considering what God is, and what great manifestations he has made of his transcendent excellency and goodness, and what benefits he receives from him? And if few or none of the best of men can with reason and truth make even such a profession, how far from it must the generality of mankind be?

The chief and most fundamental of all the commands of the moral law requires us *to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and with all our souls, with all our strength, and all our mind:* that is plainly, with all that is within us, or to the utmost capacity of our nature. God is in himself *worthy* of infinitely greater love than any creature can exercise towards him; love equal to his perfections, which are infinite. God loves himself with no greater love than he is worthy of, when he loves himself *infinitely;* but we can give to God no more than we *have*. Therefore if we give him *so much*, if we love him to

the *utmost extent* of the faculties of our nature, we are excused. But when what is proposed is only that we should love him *as much as our capacity will allow*, all excuse of *want of capacity* ceases, and obligation takes hold of us; and we are doubtless *obliged* to love God to the *utmost* of what is *possible* for us, with such faculties and such opportunities and advantages to know God, as we have. And it is evidently implied in this great commandment of the law, that our love to God should be so great, as to have the most absolute possession of all the soul, and the perfect government of all the principles and springs of action that are in our nature.

Though it is not easy precisely to fix the limits of man's capacity as to love to God; yet in general we may determine, that his capacity of love is co-extended with his capacity of knowledge: The exercise of the understanding opens the way for the exercise of the other faculty. Now, though we cannot have any proper positive understanding of God's infinite excellency; yet the capacity of the human understanding is very great, and may be extended far. It is needless to dispute how far man's knowledge may be said to be strictly comprehensive of things that are very great, as of the extent of the expanse of the heavens, &c. The word *comprehensive* seems to be ambiguous. But doubtless we are capable of some proper *positive* understanding of the greatness of these things, in comparison of other things that we know. We are capable of some clear understanding of the greatness or considerableness of a whole nation; or of the whole world of mankind, as vastly exceeding that of a particular person or family. We can positively understand, that the whole globe of the earth is vastly greater than a particular hill or mountain. And can have some good positive apprehension of the starry heavens, as so greatly exceeding the globe of the earth that the latter is as it were nothing to it. So the human faculties are capable of a real and clear understanding of the greatness, glory, and goodness of God, and of our dependence upon him, from the manifestations which God has made of himself to mankind, as being beyond all expression above that of the most excellent human friend or earthly object. And so we are capable of esteem and *love* to God, which shall be proportionable, much exceeding that which we have to any creature.

These things may help us to form some judgment, how vastly the generality of mankind fall below their duty, with respect to love to God; yea, how far they are from coming half-way to that height of love which is agreeable to the rule of right. Surely if our esteem of God, desires after him, and delight in him, were such as become us, considering the things forementioned, they would exceed our regard to other things

as the heavens are high above the earth, and would swallow up all other affections like a deluge. But how far, how exceeding far, are the generality of the world from any appearance of being influenced and governed by such a degree of divine love as this!

If we consider the love of God with respect to one exercise of it, *gratitude*, how far indeed do the generality of mankind come short of the rule of right and reason in this!—If we consider how various, innumerable, and vast the benefits we receive from God, how infinitely great and wonderful that grace which is revealed and offered to them who live under the gospel—in that eternal salvation which is procured by God giving his only begotten Son to die for sinners—and also how unworthy we are all, deserving (as Dr. T. confesses) eternal perdition under God's wrath and curse—how great is the *gratitude* that would become us, who are the subjects of so many and great benefits. What grace is this towards poor sinful lost mankind, set before us in so affecting a manner, as in the extreme sufferings of the Son of God; who was carried through those pains by a love stronger than death, a love that conquered those mighty agonies, a love whose length and breadth, and depth and height, passes knowledge? But oh! what poor returns! How little the gratitude! How low, how cold and inconstant the affection in the best, compared with the obligation! And what then shall be said of the gratitude of the generality? Or rather, who can express the ingratitude?

If the greater part of them who are called christians, were no enemies to Christ in heart and practice, were not governed by principles opposite to him and his gospel, but had some real love and gratitude; yet if their love falls vastly short of the obligation, or occasion given, they are guilty of shameful and odious ingratitude. As when a man has been the subject of some instance of transcendent generosity, whereby he has been relieved from the most extreme calamity, and brought into very opulent, honourable and happy circumstances by a benefactor of excellent character; and yet expresses no more gratitude on such an occasion than would be requisite for some kindness comparatively infinitely small, he may justly fall under the imputation of vile unthankfulness, and of much more ingratitude than gratitude; though he may have no ill will to his benefactor; or no positive affection of mind contrary to thankfulness and benevolence. What is odious in him is his *defect*, whereby he falls so vastly below his duty.

Dr. TURNBULL abundantly insists, that the forces of the affections naturally in man are well proportioned; and often puts a question to this purpose—How man's nature could have been better constituted in this respect? How the affec-

tions of art could have been better proportioned? I will now ....n one instance out of many that might be mention- e f his heart were not depraved, might have had a .. to *gratitude to God for his goodness*, in proportion s disposition to *anger towards men for their injuries*. When in proportion, I mean considering the greatness and ber of favours and injuries, and the degree in which the and the other are unmerited, and the benefit received by ormer, and the damage sustained by the latter. Is there an apparent and vast difference and inequality in the dis- sitions to these two kinds of affection, in the generality of h old and young, adult persons and little children? How y is resentment for injuries received from men? And how ily is it raised in most, at least to an equality with the deserv? And is it so with respect to gratitude for benefits received from God, in any degree of comparison? Dr. TURNBULL pleads for the natural disposition to anger for injuries, as being good and useful. But surely gratitude to God, if we were inclined to it, would be at least as good and useful as the other.

How far the generality of mankind are from their duty, with respect to love to God, will further appear, if we consider, that we are obliged not only to love him with a love of gratitude for benefits received; but true love to God primarily consists in a supreme regard to him for what he is in *himself*. The tendency of true virtue is to treat every thing as it is, and according to its nature. And if we regard the Most High according to the infinite dignity and glory of his nature, we shall esteem and love him with all our heart and soul, and to the utmost of the capacity of our nature, on this account; and not primarily because he has promoted our interest. If God be infinitely excellent in himself, then he is infinitely lovely on that account; or in other words, infinitely worthy to be loved, And doubtless, if he be *worthy* to be loved for this, then he *ought* to be loved for it. And it is manifest, there can be no *true* love to him, if he be not loved for what he is in *himself*. For if we love him not for his own sake but for something else, then our love is not terminated on *him*, but on something else, as its ultimate object. That is no true value for infinite worth, which implies no value for that worthiness in itself considered, but only on the account of something foreign. Our esteem of God is fundamentally defective, if it be not primarily for the excellency of his nature, which is the foundation of all that is valuable in him in any respect. If we love not God because he is what he is, but only because he is *profitable* to us, in truth we love him not at all: If we seem to love him, our love is not to him, but to something else.

And now I must leave it to every one to judge for himself, from his own opportunities of observation and information concerning mankind, how little there is of this disinterested love to God, this pure divine affection, in the world. How very little indeed in comparison of other affections altogether diverse, which perpetually urge, actuate and govern mankind, and keep the world, through all nations and ages, in a continual agitation and commotion! This is an evidence of an horrid contempt of God. It would justly be esteemed a great instance of disrespect and contempt of a prince, if one of his subjects when he came into his house, should set him below his meanest slave. But in setting the infinite JEHOVAH below earthly objects and enjoyments, men degrade him below those things, between which and him there is an infinitely greater distance, than between the highest earthly potentate and the most abject of mortals. Such a conduct as the generality of men are guilty of towards God, continually and through all ages, in innumerable respects, would be accounted the most vile contemptuous treatment of a fellow-creature of distinguished dignity. Particularly men's treatment of the offers God makes of himself to them as their friend, their father, their God, and everlasting portion; their treatment of the exhibitions he has made of his unmeasurable love and the boundless riches of his grace in Christ, attended with earnest repeated calls, counsels, expostulations, and intreaties: as also of the most dreadful threatenings of his eternal displeasure and vengeance.

Before I finish this *section*, it may be proper to say something in reply to an objection some may be *ready* to make against the force of this argument—that men do not come half-way to that degree of love to God, which becomes them and is their duty. The *objection* is this: That the argument seems to prove too much, in that it will prove, that even good men themselves have more sin than holiness; which also has been supposed. But if this were true it would follow, that sin is the prevalent principle even in good men, and that it is the principle which has the predominancy in the heart and practice of the truly pious; which is plainly contrary to the word of God.

I answer, If it be indeed so, that there is more sin, consisting in defect of required holiness, than there is of holiness in good men in this world; yet it will not follow that sin has the chief government of their heart and practice, for two reasons.

1. They may love God more than other things, and yet there may not be so much love, as there is want of due love; or in other words, they may love God more than the world, and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and yet may not love God near half so much as they ought to do.

This need not be esteemed a paradox: A person may love a father, or some great friend and benefactor, of a very excellent character, more than some other object, a thousand times less worthy of his esteem and affection, and yet love him ten times less than he ought; and so be chargeable, all things considered, with a deficiency in respect and gratitude that is very unbecoming and hateful. If love to God prevails above the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil affections, or positive principles of sin; by which principles it is, that sin has a positive power and influence. For evil affections radically consist in inordinate love to other things besides God: And therefore, virtue prevailing beyond these, will have the governing influence. The *predominance* of the love of God in the hearts of good men, is more from the *nature* of the object loved, and the nature of the principle of true love, than the *degree* of the principle. The object is one of supreme loveliness; immensely above all other objects in worthiness of regard; and it is by such a transcendent excellency, that he is God and *worthy* to be regarded and adored as God: And he that truly loves God, loves him *as* God. True love acknowledges him to be divinely and supremely excellent; and must arise from some knowledge, sense, and conviction of his worthiness of supreme respect: And though the sense and view of it may be very imperfect, and the *love that* arises from it in like manner imperfect; yet if there be any realising view of such divine excellency, it must cause the heart to respect God *above all*.

2. Another reason why a principle of holiness maintains the dominion in the hearts of good men, is the nature of the covenant of grace, and the promises of that covenant, on which true Christian virtue relies, and which engage God's strength and assistance to be on its side, and to help it against its enemy, that it may not be overcome. The just live by faith. Holiness in the Christian or his spiritual life, is maintained as it has respect by faith to its author and finisher, and derives strength and efficacy from the divine fountain, and by this means overcomes. For, as the apostle says, *This is the victory that overcomes the world, even our faith.* It is our faith in him who has promised never to leave nor forsake his people; not to forsake the work of his own hands, nor suffer his people to be tempted above their ability; that his grace shall be sufficient for them, his strength be made perfect in weakness; and that where he has begun a good work he will carry it on to the day of Christ.

SECT. VI.

The Corruption of Man's Nature appears by its Tendency, in its present State, to an extreme Degree of Folly and Stupidity in Matters of Religion.

It appears that man's nature is greatly depraved, by an apparent proneness to an exceeding *stupidity* and sottishness in those things wherein his duty and main interest are chiefly concerned. I shall instance in two things, *viz.* men's proneness to *idolatry;* and a general great *disregard of eternal things*, in them who live under the light of the gospel.

It is manifest, in the *first* instance, that man's nature in its present state is attended with a great propensity to forsake the acknowledgment and worship of the true God, and to fall into the most stupid *idolatry*. This has been sufficiently proved by known fact, on abundant trial: Insomuch as the world of mankind in general (excepting one small people, miraculously delivered and preserved) through all nations, in all parts of the world, ages after ages, continued without the knowledge and worship of the true God and overwhelmed in gross idolatry, without the least appearance or prospect of its recovering itself from so great blindness or returning from its brutish principles and customs, till delivered by divine grace.

In order to the most just arguing from fact, concerning the tendency of man's nature, as that is in itself, it should be enquired what the event has been, where nature has been left to itself, to operate according to its own tendency, with least opposition made to it by any thing supernatural; rather than in exempt places, where the infinite power and grace of God have interposed, and extraordinary means have been used to stem the current, and bring men to true religion and virtue. As to the means by which God's people of old, in the line of *Abraham*, were delivered and preserved from idolatry, they were miraculous and of mere grace. Notwithstanding which, they were often relapsing into the notions and ways of the heathen; and when they had backslidden, never were recovered but by divine gracious interposition. And as to the means by which many Gentile nations have been delivered since the days of the gospel, they are such as have been wholly owing to the most wonderful, miraculous, and infinite grace. God was under no obligation to bestow on the heathen world greater advantages than they had in the ages of their gross darkness; as appears by the fact, that God actually did not, for so long a time, bestow greater advantages.

Dr. T. himself observes, (*Key* p. 1.) *That in about four hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry.* And thus it was every where through the world, excepting among that people that was saved and preserved by a constant series of miracles, through a variety of countries, nations, and climates, *great enough*,—and through successive changes, revolutions, and ages, *numerous enough* to be a sufficient trial of what mankind are prone to, if there be any such thing as a sufficient trial.

That men should forsake the true God for idols is an evidence of the most astonishing folly and stupidity, by God's own testimony, Jer. ii. 12, 13. *Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and be ye horribly afraid, be ye very desolate, saith the Lord: For my people have committed two evils; they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water.* And that mankind in general did thus, so soon after the flood, was from the evil propensity of their hearts, and *because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge*: as is evident by *Rom.* i. 28. And the Universality of the effect shews that the cause was universal, and not any thing belonging to the particular circumstances of one, or only some nations or ages, but something belonging to that nature which is common to all nations and which remains the same through all ages. And what other cause could this great effect possibly arise from, but a depraved disposition, natural to all mankind? It could not arise from want of a sufficient capacity or means of knowledge. This is in effect confessed on all hands Dr. TURNBULL (*Chris. Phil.* p. 21.) says: "The existence of one infinitely powerful, wise, and good mind, the Author, Creator, Upholder, and Governor of all things, is a truth that lies plain and obvious to all that will but think." And (ibid. p. 245:) "Moral knowledge, which is the most important of all knowledge, may easily be acquired by all men." And again, (ibid. p. 292.) Every man by himself, if he would duly employ his mind in the contemplation of the works of God about him or in the examination of his own frame, might make very great progress in the knowledge of the wisdom and goodness of God. This all men, generally speaking, might do, with very little assistance; for they have all sufficient abilities for thus employing their minds, and have all sufficient time for it." Mr. LOCKE says, (*Hum. Und.* p. iv. chap. iv. p. 242. edit. 11.) "Our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe, offer the proofs of a Deity so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considerate man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can any where be delivered, that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by

the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." And Dr. T. himself, (in p. 78.) says, "The light given to all ages and nations of the world, is sufficient for the knowledge and practice of their duty." And (p. 111, 112,) citing those words of the apostle, *Rom.* ii. 14, 15, he says, "This clearly supposes that the Gentiles, who were then in the world, might have done the things contained in the law by nature, or their natural power." And in one of the next sentences he says, "The apostle, in *Rom.* i. 19, 20, 21, affirms that the Gentiles had light sufficient to have seen God's eternal power and godhead in the works of creation; and that the reason why they did not glorify him as God, was because they became vain in their imaginations, and had darkened their foolish heart; so that they were without excuse. And in his paraphrase on those verses in the 1st of *Rom.* he speaks of the very heathens that were without a written revelation, as having that clear and evident discovery of God's being and perfections that they are inexcusable in not glorifying him suitably to his excellent nature, and as the author of their being and enjoyments." And (p. 146. S.) he says, "God affords every man sufficient light to know his duty." If all ages and nations of the world have sufficient light for the knowledge of God and their duty to him, then even such nations and ages, in which the most brutish ignorance and barbarity prevailed, had sufficient light, if they had but a disposition to improve it; and then much more those of the heathen which were more knowing and polished, and in ages wherein arts and learning had made greatest advances. But even in such nations and ages there was no advance made towards true religion; as Dr. WINDER observes, (*Hist. of Knowl.* vol. ii. p. 336.) in the following words:—The pagan religion degenerated into greater absurdity the further it proceeded; and it prevailed in all its height of absurdity when the Pagan nations were polished to the height. Though they set out with the talents of reason, and had solid foundations of information to build upon, it in fact proved that with all their strengthened faculties and growing powers of reason, the edifice of religion rose in the most absurd deformities and disproportions, and gradually went on in the most irrational, disproportioned, incongruous systems, of which the most easy dictates of reason would have demonstrated the absurdity. They were contrary to all just calculations in moral mathematics. "He observes, "that their grossest abominations first began in *Egypt*, where was an ostentation of the greatest progress in learning and science: And they never renounced clearly any of their abominations, or openly returned to the worship of the one true God, the Creator of all things, and to the original, genuine sentiments of the highest and most venerable antiquity. The Pagan

religion continued in this deep state of corruption to the last. The Pagan philosophers, and inquisitive men, made great improvements in many sciences, and even in morality itself; yet the inveterate absurdities of Pagan idolatry remained without remedy. Every temple smoked with incense to the sun and moon, and other inanimate material luminaries, and earthly elements, to Jupiter, Juno, Mars, and Venus, &c. &c. the patrons and examples of almost every vice. Hecatombs bled on the altars of a thousand Gods, as mad superstition inspired. And this was not the disgrace of our ignorant untaught northern countries only; but even at *Athens* itself the infamy reigned, and circulated through all *Greece*, and finally prevailed, amidst all their learning and politeness, under the *Ptolemys* in *Egypt*, and the *Cæsars* at *Rome*. Now if the knowledge of the pagan world in religion proceeded no further than this; if they retained all their deities, even the most absurd of them all their deified beasts, and deified men, even to the last breath of pagan power: We may justly ascribe the great improvements in the world on the subject of religion to divine revelation, either vouchsafed in the beginning when this knowledge was competently clear and copious; or at the death of paganism, when this light shone forth in its consummate lustre at the coming of Christ."

Dr. T. often speaks of the idolatry of the heathen world as *great wickedness*, in which they were wholly inexcusable; and yet often speaks of their case as remediless, and of them as being dead in sin and unable to recover themselves. If so, and yet according to his own doctrine, every age, every nation, and every man, had sufficient light afforded to know God and their whole duty to him; then their inability to deliver themselves must be a moral inability, consisting in a desperate depravity and most evil disposition of heart.

And if there had not been sufficient trial of the propensity of the hearts of mankind, through all those ages that passed from *Abraham* to Christ, the trial has been continued down to this day in all those vast regions of the face of the earth that have remained without any effects of the light of the gospel; and the dismal effect continues every where unvaried. How was it with that multitude of nations inhabiting *South* and *North America?* What appearance was there when the *Europeans* first came hither, of their being recovered, or recovering, in any degree, from the grossest ignorance, delusion, and most stupid paganism? And how is it at this day in those parts of Africa and Asia into which the light of the gospel has not penetrated?

This strong and universally prevalent disposition of mankind to idolatry, of which there has been such great trial and

so notorious and vast proof, in fact, is a most glaring evidence of the exceeding depravity of the human nature; as it is a propensity in the utmost degree contrary to the highest end, the main business, and chief happiness of mankind—consisting in the knowledge, service, and enjoyment of the living God, the Creator and Governor of the world—in the highest degree contrary to that for which mainly God gave mankind more understanding than the beasts of the earth, and made them wiser than the fowls of heaven; which was, that they might be capable of the knowledge of God. It is also in the highest degree contrary to the first and greatest commandment of the moral law, That *we should have no other Gods before* JEHOVAH, and that we should love and adore him with all our heart, soul, mind, and strength. The scriptures are abundant in representing the idolatry of the heathen world as their exceeding wickedness and their most brutish stupidity. They who worship and trust in idols are said themselves to be like the lifeless statues they worship, like mere senseless stocks and stones.—(Psalm cxv. 4—8. and cxxxv. 15—18.)

A *second* instance of the natural *stupidity* of mankind is that great *disregard of their own eternal interest*, which appears so remarkably, so generally among them who live under the gospel.

Mr. LOCKE observes, (*Hum. Und.* vol. i. p. 207.) "Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation greater or less to the understanding, it could never get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed and considered as possible; the eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or honour, or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves; though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained." Again, (p. 228, 229.) "He that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of his laws, are of weight enough to determine the choice against whatsoever pleasure or pain this life can shew. When the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, which nobody can make any doubt of, he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a virtuous life with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery which it is very possible may overtake the guilty, or at least the terrible uncertain hope

of annihilation. This is evidently so; though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession: Nay, all things rightly considered, have I think even the worst part here. But when infinite happiness is put in one scale against infinite misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked man can attain to, if he be in the right; who can, without madness, run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery? which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard: Whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing, against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass."

That disposition of mind which is a propensity to act contrary to reason, is a depraved disposition. It is not because the faculty of reason which God has given to mankind is not sufficient fully to discover to them, that forty, sixty, or an hundred years, is as nothing in comparison of eternity—infinitely less than a second of time to an hundred years—that the greatest worldly prosperity is not treated with the most perfect disregard, in all cases where there is any degree of competition of earthly things, with salvation from exquisite, eternal misery, and the enjoyment of everlasting glory and felicity. But is it a matter of controversy, whether men in general shew a strong disposition to act far otherwise, from their infancy till death sensibly approaches? In things that concern their temporal interest, they easily discern the difference between things of a long and short continuance. It is no hard matter to convince men of the difference between being admitted to the accommodations and entertainments of a convenient, beautiful, well-furnished habitation, and to partake of the provisions and produce of a plentiful estate for a day, or a night; and having all given them and settled upon them as their own, to possess as long as they live, and to be theirs and their heirs for ever. There would be no need of preaching sermons, and spending strength and life to convince them of the difference. Men know how to adjust things in their dealings and contracts one with another, according to the length of time in which any thing agreed for is to be used or enjoyed. In temporal affairs, they are sensible that it concerns them to provide for *future* time as well as for the *present*. Thus common prudence teaches them to take care in summer to lay up for winter; yea, to provide a fund, or an estate, whence they may be supplied for a long time to come. And not only so, but they are forward to spend and be spent, in order to provide for their children after they are dead; though it be quite uncertain, who shall

enjoy what they lay up, after they have left the world. And if their *children* should have the comfort of it as they desire, they will not partake with them in that comfort, or have any portion in any thing under the sun. In things which relate to men's temporal interest, they seem very sensible of the uncertainty of life, especially of the lives of others; and to make answerable provision for the security of their worldly interest, that no considerable part of it may rest only on so uncertain a foundation, as the life of a neighbour or friend. Common discretion leads them to take good care that their outward possessions be well secured by a good and firm title. In worldly concerns, men discern their opportunities, and are careful to improve them before they are past. The husbandman is careful to plough his ground and sow his seed in the proper season; otherwise he knows he cannot expect a crop: And when the harvest is come, he will not sleep away the time; for he knows if he does so the crop will soon be lost. How careful and eagle-eyed is the merchant to improve opportunities to enrich himself? How apt are men to be alarmed at the appearance of danger to their worldly estate, or any thing that remarkably threatens great damage to their outward interest? And how will they bestir themselves in such a case, if possible to avoid the threatened calamity? In things purely secular, and not of a moral or spiritual nature, they easily receive conviction by past experience, when any thing, on repeated trial, proves unprofitable or prejudicial; and are ready to take warning by what they have found themselves, and also by the experience of their neighbours and forefathers.

But if we consider how men generally conduct themselves in things on which their well-being infinitely more depends, how vast is the diversity? In these things how cold, lifeless, and dilatory? With what difficulty are a few, out of multitudes, excited to any tolerable degree of care and diligence, by the innumerable means used in order to make them wise for themselves? And when some vigilance and activity is excited, how apt is it to die away, like a mere force against a natural tendency? What need of a constant repetition of admonitions and counsels to keep the heart from falling asleep? How many objections are made? How are difficulties magnified? And how soon is the mind discouraged? How many arguments, often renewed, variously and elaborately enforced, do men stand in need of, to convince them of things that are almost self-evident? As that things which are eternal are infinitely more important than things temporal, and the like. And after all, how very few are convinced effectually, or in such a manner as to induce them to a practical preference of eternal things? How senseless are men of the necessity of improving their time, as to their

spiritual interest, and their welfare in another world? Though it be an *endless* futurity, and though it be their own *personal*, infinitely important good, that is to be cared for. Though men are so sensible of the uncertainty of their neighbours' lives, when any considerable part of their own estates depends on the continuance of them; how stupidly senseless do they seem to be of the uncertainty of their own lives, when their preservation from immensely great, remediless, and endless misery, is risked by a present delay, through a dependence on future opportunity? What a dreadful venture will men carelessly and boldly run, repeat and multiply, with regard to their eternal salvation; who yet are very careful to have every thing in a deed or bond, firm and without a flaw? How negligent are they of their special advantages and opportunities for their soul's good? How hardly awakened by the most evident and imminent dangers, threatening eternal destruction, yea, though put in mind of them, and much pains taken to point them forth, shew them plainly, and fully to represent them, if possible to engage their attention? How are they like the horse that boldly rushes into the battle? How hardly are men convinced by their own frequent and abundant experience, of the unsatisfactory nature of earthly things, and the instability of their own hearts in their good frames and intentions? And how hardly convinced by their own observation, and the experience of all past generations, of the uncertainty of life and its enjoyments? Psal. xlix. 11, &c. *Their inward thought is, that their houses shall continue for ever.—Nevertheless, man being in honour, abideth not; he is like the beasts that perish. This their way is their folly; yet their posterity approve their sayings. Like sheep are they laid in the grave.*

In these things, men who are prudent for their temporal interest act as if they were bereft of reason: *They have eyes, and see not; ears, and hear not; neither do they understand: They are like the horse and mule, that have no understanding.* —Jer. viii. 7. *The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe the time of their coming: But my people know not the judgment of the Lord.*

These things are often mentioned in scripture as evidences of extreme folly and stupidity, wherein men act as great enemies to themselves, as though they loved their own ruin; *Prov.* viii. 37. Laying wait for their own blood, *Prov.* i. 18. And how can these things be accounted for but by supposing a most wretched depravity of nature? Why otherwise should not men be as wise for themselves in spiritual and eternal things as in temporal? All christians will confess, that man's faculty of reason was given him chiefly to enable him to understand the former, wherein his main interest and true happiness con-

sists. This faculty would therefore undoubtedly be every way as fit for understanding them as the latter, if not depraved. The reason why these are understood, and not the other, is not that such things as have been mentioned belonging to men's spiritual and eternal interest, are more obscure and abstruse in their own nature. For instance, the difference between long and short, the need of providing for futurity, the importance of improving proper opportunities, and of having good security and a sure foundation in affairs wherein our interest is greatly concerned, &c. these things are as plain in themselves in religious, as in other matters. And we have far greater means to assist us to be wise for ourselves in eternal, than in temporal things. We have the abundant instruction of perfect and infinite wisdom itself, to lead and conduct us in the paths of righteousness, so that we may not err. And the reasons of things are most clearly, variously and abundantly set before us in the word of God; which is adapted to the faculties of mankind, tending greatly to enlighten and convince the mind: Whereas, we have no such excellent and perfect rules to instruct and direct us in things pertaining to our temporal interest, nor any thing to be compared to it.

If any should say, It is true, if men gave full credit to what they are told concerning eternal things, and these appeared to them as real and certain things, it would be an evidence of a sort of madness in them, that they shew no greater regard to them in practice: But there is reason to think, this is not the case; the things of another world being unseen, appear to men as things of a very doubtful nature, and attended with great uncertainty.—In answer, I would observe, agreeable to what has been cited from Mr. LOCKE, though eternal things were considered in their bare *possibility*, if men acted rationally, they would infinitely outweigh all temporal things in their influence on their hearts. And I would also observe, that to suppose eternal things not to be fully believed, at least by them who enjoy the light of the gospel, does not weaken, but rather strengthen the argument for the depravity of nature. For the eternal world being what God had chiefly in view in the creation of men, this world was made wholly subordinate to the other, man's state here being only a state of probation, preparation, and progression, with respect to the future state. Eternal things are in effect their all, their whole concern; to understand and know which it chiefly was, that they had understanding given them; therefore we may undoubtedly conclude, that if men have not respect to them as real and certain things, it cannot be for want of sufficient evidence of their truth: But it must be from a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance, when manifested by the clearest evidence.

SECT. VII.

That Man's Nature is corrupt, appears, in that by far the greater Part of Mankind, in all Ages, have been wicked Men.

The depravity of man's nature appears, not only in its propensity to sin in *some degree*, which renders a man an evil or wicked man in the *eye of the law*, and strict justice, as was before shewn; but it is so corrupt, that its depravity either shews that men *are*, or tends to make them *to be*, of such an evil character as shall denominate them wicked men, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace.

This may be argued from several things which have been already observed: As from a tendency to continual sin; a tendency to much greater degrees of sin than righteousness, and from the general extreme stupidity of mankind. But yet the present state of man's nature, as implying or tending to a *wicked character*, may deserve to be more particularly considered and directly proved. And in general, this appears, in that there have been so very few in the world, from age to age, ever since the world has stood, that have been of any other character.

It is abundantly evident in scripture, and is what I suppose none that call themselves christians will deny, that the whole world is divided into good and bad, and that all mankind at the day of judgment will either be approved as righteous or condemned as wicked: either glorified as *children of the kingdom*, or cast into a furnace of fire as *children of the wicked one*.

I need not stand to shew what things belong to the character of such as shall hereafter be accepted as righteous, according to the word of God. It may be sufficient for my present purpose to observe what Dr. T. himself speaks of as belonging essentially to the character of such. In p. 203. he says, "This is infallibly the character of true christians, and what is essential to such, that they have really mortified the flesh with its lusts;—they are dead to sin, and live no longer therein; the old man is crucified, and the body of sin destroyed: They yield themselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead, and their members as instruments of righteousness to God and as servants of righteousness to holiness."—There is more to the like purpose in the two next pages. In p. 228. he says, "Whatsoever is evil and corrupt in us we ought to condemn; not so, as it shall still remain in us, that we may always be condemning it, but that we may speedily re-

form, and be effectually delivered from it; otherwise certainly we do not come up to the character of the true disciples of Christ."

In p. 248. he says, "Unless God's favour be preferred before all other enjoyments whatsoever, unless there be a delight in the worship of God, and in converse with him, unless every appetite be brought into subjection to reason and truth, and unless there be a kind and benevolent disposition towards our fellow-creatures, how can the mind be fit to dwell with God in his house and family, to do him service in his kingdom, and to promote the happiness of any part of his creation."—And in his Key, § 286. p. 101, 102, &c. shewing there *what it is to be a true christian*, he says among other things. "That he is one who has such a sense and persuasion of the love of God in Christ, that he devotes his life to the honour and service of God, in hope of eternal glory. And that to the character of a true christian it is absolutely necessary, that he diligently study the things that are freely given him of God, *viz.* his election, regeneration, &c. that he may gain a just knowledge of those inestimable privileges, may taste that the Lord is gracious, and rejoice in the gospel salvation as his greatest happiness and glory. It is necessary that he work these blessings on his heart, till they become a vital principle, producing in him the love of God, engaging him to all cheerful obedience to his will, giving him a proper dignity and elevation of soul, raising him above the best and worst of this world, carrying his heart into heaven, and fixing his affections and regards upon his everlasting inheritance, and the crown of glory laid up for him there.—Thus he is armed against all the temptations and trials resulting from any pleasure or pain, hopes or fears, gain or loss, in the present world. None of these things move him from a faithful discharge of any part of his duty, or from a firm attachment to truth and righteousness; neither counts he his very life dear to him, that he may do the will of God, and finish his course with joy. In a sense of the love of God in Christ, he maintains daily communion with God by reading and meditating on his word. In a sense of his own infirmity and the readiness of the divine favour to succour him, he daily addresses the throne of grace for the renewal of spiritual strength, in assurance of obtaining it through the one Mediator Christ Jesus. Inlightened and directed by the heavenly doctrine of the gospel, &c.*

Now I leave every one that has any degree of impartiality to judge, whether there be not sufficient grounds to think that it is but a very small part indeed of the many myri-

* What Dr. TURNBULL says of the character of a good man, is also worthy to be observed, *Chris. Phil.* p. 86, 258, 259, 288, 375, 376, 409. 410

ads and millions which overspread this globe, who are of a character that in any wise answers these descriptions. However Dr. T. insists, that all nations, and every man on the face of the earth, have light and means sufficient to do the whole will of God, even they that live in the grossest darkness of paganism.

Dr. T. in answer to arguments of this kind, very impertinently from time to time objects, that we are no judges of the viciousness of men's characters, nor are able to decide in what degree they are virtuous or vicious. As though we could have no good grounds to judge, that any thing appertaining to the qualities or properties of the mind, which is invisible, is general or prevailing among a multitude or collective body, unless we can determine how it is with each individual. I think I have sufficient reason from what I know and have heard of the *American Indians* to judge, that there are not many good philosophers among them; though the thoughts of their hearts, and the ideas and knowledge they have in their minds, are things invisible; and though I have never seen so much as a thousandth part of the *Indians;* and with respect to most of them, should not be able to pronounce preremptorily concerning any one, that he was not very knowing in the nature of things, if all should singly pass before me. And Dr. T. himself seems to be sensible of the falseness of his own conclusions that he so often urges against others; if we may judge by his practice, and the liberties he takes in judging of a multitude himself. He, it seems, is sensible that a man may have good grounds to judge that wickedness of character is general in a collective body; because he openly does it himself. (*Key*, p. 102.) After declaring the things which belong to the character of a true Christian, he judges of the generality of Christians, that they have cast off these things, that *they are a people that do err in their hearts, and have not known God's ways*, p. 259, he judges, that *the generality of Christians are the most wicked of all mankind*, when he thinks it will throw some disgrace on the opinion of such as he opposes. The like we have from time to time in other places, (as p. 168, p. 258, Key, p. 127, 128.)

But if men are not sufficient judges whether there are few of the world of mankind but what are wicked, yet doubtless God is sufficient, and his judgment, often declared in his word, determines the matter. Matt. vii. 13, 14. *Enter ye in at the strait gate: For wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be that go in thereat: Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way that leadeth to life, and few there be that find it.* It is manifest, that here Christ is not only describing the state of things as it was at that day, and does not mention the comparative smallness of the

number of them that are saved as a consequence of the peculiar perverseness of that people and of that generation; but as a consequence of the general circumstances of the way to life and the way to destruction, the broadness of the one and the narrowness of the other. In the straitness of the gate, &c. I suppose none will deny that Christ has respect to the strictness of those rules, which he had insisted on in the preceding sermon, and which render the way to life very difficult. But certainly these amiable rules would not be difficult, were they not contrary to the natural inclinations of men's hearts; and they would not be contrary to those inclinations, were these not depraved. Consequently the wideness of the gate, and broadness of the way, that leads to destruction, in consequence of which many go in thereat, must imply the agreeableness of this way to men's natural inclinations. The like reason is given by Christ, why few are saved. Luke xiii. 23, 24. *Then said one unto him, Lord, are there few saved? And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at the strait gate: For many I say unto you, shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able.* That there are generally but few good men in the world, even among them who have the most distinguishing and glorious advantages for it, is evident by that saying of our Lord, *Many are called, but few are chosen.* And if there are but few among these, how few, how very few indeed, must persons of this character be, compared with the whole world of mankind? The exceeding smallness of the number of the saints, compared with the whole world, appears by the representations often made of them as distinguished from the world; in which they are spoken of as called and chosen *out of the world*, redeemed *from the earth*, redeemed *from among men;* as being those that *are of God*, while the *whole world* lieth in wickedness, and the like.

And if we look into the Old Testament, we shall find the same testimony given. Prov. xx. 6. *Most men will proclaim every man his own goodness: But a faithful man who can find?* By the faithful man, as the phrase is used in scripture, is intended much the same as a sincere, upright, or truly good man; as in Psal. xii. 1, and xxxi. 23. and ci. 6. and other places. Again, Eccl. vii. 25—29. *I applied mine heart to know, and to search, and to find out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness: And I find more bitter than death, the woman whose heart is snares, &c. Behold, this have I found, saith the preacher, counting one by one, to find out the account, which yet my soul seeketh, but I find not: One man among a thousand have I found: but a woman among all these have I not found. Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.* Solomon here signifies, that when he set

himself diligently to find out the account or proportion of true wisdom, or thorough uprightness among men, the result was, that he found it to be but as one to a thousand, &c. Dr. T. on this place, p. 184. says, "The wise man in the context, is inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind, of the men and women THAT LIVED IN HIS TIME." As though what he said represented nothing of the state of things in the world in general, but only *in his time*. But does Dr. T. or any body else, suppose this only to be the design of that book, to represent the vanity and evil of the world in that time, and to shew that all was vanity and vexation of spirit in *Solomon's* day? That day truly, we have reason to think, was a day of the greatest smiles of heaven on that nation that ever had been on any nation from the foundation of the world. Not only does the subject and argument of the whole book shew it to be otherwise; but also the declared design of the book in the first chapter; where the world is represented as very much the same, as to its vanity and evil, from age to age. It makes little or no progress, after all its revolutions and restless motions, labours and pursuits; like the sea, that has all the rivers constantly emptying themselves into it, from age to age, and yet is never the fuller. As to that place, Prov. xx. 6. *A faithful man who can find?* there is no more reason to suppose that the wise man has respect only to *his* time in these words, than in those immediately preceding, *Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out.* Or in the words next following, *The just man walketh in his integrity: His children are blessed after him.* Or in any other proverb in the whole book. And if it were so that *Solomon* in these things meant only to describe his own times, it would not at all weaken the argument. For, if we observe the history of the Old Testament, there is reason to think there never was any time from *Joshua* to the captivity, wherein wickedness was more restrained, and virtue and religion more encouraged and promoted, than in *David's* and *Solomon's* times. And if there was so little true piety in that nation, the only people of God under heaven, even in their best times, what may we suppose concerning the world in general, take one time with another?

Notwithstanding what some authors advance concerning the prevalence of virtue, honesty, good neighbourhood, chearfulness, &c. in the world; *Solomon*, whom we may justly esteem as wise and just an observer of human nature and the state of the world of mankind as most in these days (besides, Christians ought to remember, that he wrote by divine inspiration)—judged the world to be so full of wickedness, that it was better never to be born, than to be born to live only in such a world. Eccl. iv. 1—3. *So I returned and considered all the oppressions that are under the sun; and behold, the tears of such as*

were oppressed, and they had no comforter: And on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter. Wherefore, I praised the dead, which were already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been; WHO HATH NOT SEEN THE EVIL WORK THAT IS DONE UNDER THE SUN. Surely it will not be said that Solomon has only respect to *his* time here too, when he speaks of the oppressions of them that were in power; since he himself, and others appointed by him, and wholly under his controul, were the men that were in power in that land, and in almost all the neighbouring countries.

The same inspired writer says, Eccles. ix. 3. *The heart of the sons of men is full of evil; and madness is in their heart while they live; and after that they go to the dead.* If these general expressions are to be understood only of some, and those the smaller part, when in general *truth, honesty, good-nature*, &c. govern the world, why are such general expressions from time to time used? Why does not this wise and noble prince express himself in a more generous and benevolent strain, and say, *wisdom is in the hearts of the sons of men while they live*, &c.—instead of leaving in his writings so many sly, ill-natured suggestions, which pour such contempt on human nature, and tend so much to excite mutual jealousy and malevolence to taint the minds of mankind through all generations after him?

If we consider the various successive parts and periods of the duration of the world, it will, if possible, be yet more evident, that by far the greater part of mankind have in all ages been of a wicked character. The short accounts we have of *Adam* and his family are such as lead us to suppose that the greater part of his posterity in his life-time, yea, in the former part of his life, were wicked. It appears, that his eldest son, *Cain* was a very wicked man who slew his righteous brother *Abel*. And *Adam* lived an hundred and thirty years before *Seth* was born: And by that time we may suppose, his posterity began to be considerably numerous: When he was born, his mother *called his name* Seth; *for God, said she, hath appointed me another seed instead of* Abel: which naturally suggests this to our thoughts; that of all her seed then existing, none were of any such note for religion or virtue, as that their parents could have any great comfort in them, or expectation from them on that account. And if by the brief history we have, it looks as if—however there might be some intervals of a revival of religion, yet—in the general, mankind grew more and more corrupt till the flood. It is signified, that *when men began to multiply on the face of the earth*, wickedness prevailed exceedingly, Gen. vi. 1, &c. And that before God appeared to *Noah*, to command him to build the ark, one hun-

dred and twenty years before the flood, the world had long continued obstinate in great and general wickedness, and the disease was become inveterate. The expressions (ver. 3, 5, 6.) suggest as much:—*And the Lord said, my spirit shall not* ALWAYS *strive with man.—And God saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every imagination of the thought of his heart was evil, only evil* CONTINUALLY; *and it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart.* And by that time, *all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth.* (v. 12.) And as Dr. T. himself observes, (p. 122.) "Mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice."

And with respect to the period *after* the flood, to the calling of *Abraham*; Dr. T. says, as already observed, that in about four hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry; which was before all they were dead who came out of the ark. And it cannot be thought the world went suddenly into that general and extreme degree of corruption, but that they had been gradually growing more and more corrupt; though it is true, it must be by very swift degrees—however soon we may suppose they began—to get to that pass in one age.

And as to the period from the calling of *Abraham* to the coming of Christ, Dr. T. justly observes as follows: (*Key*, p. 133.) "If we reckon from the call of *Abraham* to the coming of Christ, the *Jewish* dispensation continued one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one years; during which period, the other families and nations of the earth not only lay out of God's peculiar kingdom, but also lived in idolatry, great ignorance, and wickedness." And with regard to the *Israelites*, it is evident that wickedness was the generally prevailing character among them, from age to age. If we consider how it was with *Jacob's* family, the behaviour of *Reuben* with his father's concubine, the behaviour of *Judah* with *Tamar*, the conduct of *Jacob's* sons towards the *Shechemites*, and the behaviour of *Joseph's* ten brethren in their cruel treatment of him; we cannot think that the character of true piety belonged to many of them, according to Dr. T's. own notion of such a character; though it be true, they might afterwards repent. And with respect to the time the children of *Israel* were in *Egypt*; the scripture, speaking of them in general, or as a collective body, often represents them as complying with the abominable idolatries of the country.* And as to that generation which went out of *Egypt* and wandered in the wilderness, they are abundantly represented as extremely and almost universally wicked, perverse, and children of divine wrath. And after *Joshua's* death, the scrip-

* Levit. xvii. 7. Josh. v. 9. and xxiv. 14. Ezek. xx. 7. 8. and xxiii. 3.

ture is very express, that wickedness was the prevailing character in the nation, from age to age. So it was till *Samuel's* time. (1 Sam. viii. 7. 8.) *They have rejected me, that I should not reign over them; according to all their works which they have done, since the day that I brought them out of Egypt, unto this day.* Yea, so it was till *Jeremiah's* and *Ezekiel's* time. (Jer. xxxii. 30, 31.) *For the children of* Israel *and the children of* Judah, *have* only *done evil before me* from their youth; *for the children of* Israel have only *provoked me to anger with the work of their hands, saith the Lord: For this city hath been to me a provocation of mine anger, and of my fury*, from the day they built it even unto this day. (Compare chap. v. 21, 23. and chap. vii. 25, 26, 27.) So Ezek. ii. 3, 4. *I send thee to the children of* Israel, *to a rebellious nation that hath rebelled against me, they and their fathers have transgressed against me* even unto this very day: *For they are impudent children, and stiff-hearted.* And it appears by the discourse of *Stephen*, (Acts vii.) that this was generally the case with that nation, from their first rise, even to the days of the apostles. After this summary rehearsal of the instances of their perverseness from the very time of their selling *Joseph* into *Egypt*, he concludes, (ver. 51—53.) *Ye stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do* ALWAYS *resist the Holy Ghost. As your Fathers did, so do ye. Which of the Prophets have not your fathers persecuted! And they have slain them which shewed before of the coming of that just One, of whom ye have been now the betrayers and murderers: Who have received the law by the disposition of angels, and have not kept it.*

Thus it appears that wickedness was the generally prevailing character in all nations, till Christ came. And so also it appears to have been since his coming to this day. So in the age of apostles. There was a great number of persons of a truly pious character in the latter part of the apostolic age, when multitudes of converts had been made, and christianity was as yet in its primitive purity; but what says the apostle *John* of the church of God at that time, as compared with the rest of the world? (1 John v. 19.) *We know that we are of God, and the* WHOLE WORLD *lieth in wickedness.* And after that Christianity came to prevail to that degree, that christians had the upper hand in nations and civil communities, still the greater part of mankind remained in their old heathen state; which Dr. T. speaks of as a state of great ignorance and wickedness. And besides, this is noted in all ecclesiastical history, that as the christians gained in power and secular advantages, true piety declined, and corruption and wickedness prevailed among them. And as to the state of the christian world since christianity began to be established by human laws, wickedness for the most part has greatly prevailed; as is very notorious, and is implied in

what Dr. T. himself says: In giving an account how the doctrine of original sin came to prevail among christians, he observes, (p. 167. S.) "That the christian religion was very early and grievously corrupted, by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious monks." In p. 259. he says, "The generality of christians have embraced this persuasion concerning original sin; and the consequence has been, that the generality of christians have been the most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind."

Thus a view of the several successive periods of the past duration of the world, from the beginning to this day, shews that wickedness has ever been exceeding prevalent, and has had vastly the superiority in the world. And Dr. T. himself in effect owns, that it has been so ever since *Adam* first turned into the way of transgression. "It is certain (says he, p. 168.) the moral circumstances of mankind, since the time *Adam* first turned into the way of transgression, have been very different from a state of innocence. So far as we can judge from history, or what we know at present, the greatest part of mankind have been, and still are very corrupt; though not equally so in every age and place." And lower in the same page, he speaks of *Adam's posterity, as having sunk themselves into the most lamentable degrees of ignorance, superstition, idolatry, injustice, debauchery, &c.*

These things clearly determine the point concerning the tendency of man's nature to wickedness, if we may be allowed to proceed according to such rules and methods of reasoning as are never denied or doubted to be good and sure, in experimental philosophy:* or may reason from experience and facts, in that manner which common sense leads all mankind to in other cases. If experience and trial will evince any thing at all concerning the natural disposition of the human heart, one would think the experience of so many ages as have elapsed since the beginning of the world, and the trial made by hundreds of different nations together for so long a time, should be sufficient to convince all, that wickedness is agreeable to the nature of mankind in its present state.

Here, to strengthen the argument, if there were any need of it, I might observe not only the *extent* and *generality* of the prevalence of wickedness in the world, but the *height* to which it has risen and the *degree* in which it has reigned. Among innumerable things which confirm this, I shall now only observe. The *degree* in which mankind have from age to age been *hurtful* one to another. Many kinds of brute animals are esteemed very noxious and destructive, many of them very fierce, vora-

* Dr. TURNBULL, though so great an enemy to the doctrine of the depravity of nature, yet greatly insists upon it, that the experimental method of reasoning ought to be adopted in moral matters and things pertaining to the human nature and should chiefly be relied upon in moral as well as natural philosophy. See *Introduc. to Mor. Phil.*

cious, and many very poisonous, and the destroying of them has always been looked upon as a public benefit: But have not mankind been a thousand times as hurtful and destructive as any one of them, yea, as all the noxious beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles in the earth, air, and water, put together, at least of all kinds of animals that are visible? And no creature can be found any where so destructive of its own kind as man is. All others, for the most part, are harmless and peaceable with regard to their own species. Where one wolf is destroyed by another wolf, one viper by another, probably a thousand men are destroyed by those of their own species. Well therefore might our blessed Lord say, when sending forth his disciples into the world, (Matth. x. 16, 17.) *Behold I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves;* —BUT, BEWARE OF MEN. Why do I say wolves? I send you forth into the wide world of *men*, that are far more hurtful and pernicious, and of whom you had much more need to beware, than of wolves.

It would be strange indeed, that this should be the state of mankind, distinguished by reason for that very end that they might be capable of *religion*, which summarily consists in *love*, if men, as they come into the world, are in their nature innocent and harmless, undepraved, and perfectly free from all evil propensities.

SECT. VIII.

The native depravity of Mankind appears, in that there has been so little good effect of so manifold and great means, used to promote Virtue in the world.

The evidence of the native corruption of mankind appears much more glaring, when it is considered that the world has been so generally, so constantly, and so exceedingly corrupt, notwithstanding the *various*, *great*, and *continual means*, that have been used to restrain men from sin, and promote virtue and true religion among them.

Dr. T. supposes, that sorrow and death, which came on mankind in consequence of *Adam's* sin, was brought on them in *great favour;* as a *benevolent father* exercising *a wholesome discipline* towards his children; to restrain them from sin by *increasing the vanity of all earthly things to abate their force to tempt and delude;* to induce them to be *moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body;* to *mortify pride and ambition;* and that men might *always have before their eyes a striking demonstration that sin is infinitely hateful to God*, by a sight of that *than which nothing is more proper to give them the utmost abhorrence of iniquity, and to fix in their minds a sense of the*

dreadful consequences of sin, &c. &c. And in general, that they do not come as *punishments*, but purely as means to keep men from vice and to make them better.—If it be so, surely they are *great* means. Here is a mighty alteration: mankind, once so easy and happy, healthful, vigorous, and beautiful, rich in all the pleasant and abundant blessings of paradise, now turned out, destitute, weak, and decaying, into a wide barren world, yielding briars and thorns, instead of the delightful growth and sweet fruit of the garden of *Eden*, to wear out life in sorrow and toil, on the ground cursed for his sake; and at last, either through long and lingering decay, or severe pain and acute disease, to expire and turn to putrefaction and dust. If these are only used as *medicines*, to prevent and to cure the diseases of the mind, they are sharp medicines indeed; especially death; which, to use *Hezekiah's* representation, is as it were *breaking all his bones*. And one would think, should be very effectual, if the subject had no depravity—no evil and contrary bias to resist and hinder a proper effect—especially in the old world, when the first occasion of this terrible alteration, this severity of means, was fresh in memory. *Adam* continued alive near two thirds of the time before the flood; so that a very great part of those who were alive till the flood might have opportunity of seeing and conversing with him, and hearing from his mouth not only an account of *his fall*, and the introduction of the awful consequences of it, but also of his first finding himself in existence in the new-created world, of the creation of *Eve*, and what passed between him and his Creator in paradise.

But what was the success of these great means, to restrain men from sin and to induce them to virtue? Did they prove sufficient?—instead of this the world soon grew exceeding corrupt; till, to use our author's own words, *mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice.*

Then God used further means: He sent *Noah*, a preacher of righteousness to warn the world of the universal destruction which would come upon them by a flood of waters, if they went on in sin. This warning he delivered with circumstances tending to strike their minds and command their attention. He immediately went about building that vast structure, the ark, in which he must employ a great number of hands, and probably spent all he had in the world to save himself and his family. And under these uncommon means God waited upon them *one hundred and twenty years*.—But all to no effect. The whole world, for ought appears, continued obstinate, and absolutely incorrigible: So that nothing remained to be done with them, but utterly to destroy the inhabitants of the earth; and to begin a new world from that single family who had distinguished themselves by their virtue, that from them might be

propagated a new and purer race. Accordingly, this was done: And the inhabitants of this new world, *Noah's* posterity, had these new and extraordinary means to restrain sin and excite to virtue, in addition to the toil, sorrow, and common mortality, which the world had been subjected to before, in consequence of *Adam's* sin: *viz.* that God had newly testified his dreadful displeasure for sin, in destroying the many millions of mankind, all at one blow, old and young, men, women, and children, without pity on any for all the dismal shrieks and cries with which the world was filled. They themselves, the remaining family, were wonderfully distinguished by God's preserving goodness, that they might be a holy seed, being delivered from the corrupting examples of the old world; and being all the offspring of a living parent, whose pious instructions and counsels they had, to enforce these things upon them, to prevent sin, and engage them to their duty. These inhabitants of the new earth must, for a long time, have before their eyes many evident and striking effects of that universal destruction, to be a continual affecting admonition to them. And besides all this, God now shortened the life of man to about one half of what it used to be. The shortening man's life, Dr. T. says, (p. 68.) "Was that the wild range of ambition and lust might be brought into narrower bounds, and have less opportunity of doing mischief; and that death, being still nearer to our view, might be a more powerful motive to regard less the things of a transitory world, and to attend more to the rules of truth and wisdom."

And now let us observe the consequence.—These new and extraordinary means, in addition to the former, were so far from proving sufficient, that the new world degenerated and became corrupt by such swift degrees, that as Dr. T. observes, mankind in general were sunk into idolatry, in about four hundred years after the flood, and so in about fifty years after *Noah's* death they became so wicked and brutish, as to forsake the true God, and turn to the worship of inanimate creatures.

When things were come to this dreadful pass, God was pleased, for a remedy, to introduce a new and wonderful dispensation—separating a particular family and people from all the rest of the world by a series of the most astonishing miracles, done in the open view of the world; and fixing their dwelling as it were in the midst of the earth, between *Asia*, *Europe* and *Africa*, and in the midst of those nations which were most considerable for power, knowledge, and arts—that might, in an extraordinary manner, dwell among that people, in visible tokens of his presence. There he manifested himself, and thence to the world, by a course of miraculous operations and effects, for many ages: that the people might be holy to God

as a kingdom of priests, and might stand as a city on a hill, to be a light to the world. He also gradually shortened man's life, till it was brought to about one-twelfth part of what it used to be before the flood; and so, according to Dr. T. greatly diminishing his temptations to sin, and increasing his excitements to holiness.—And now let us consider what the success of these means was, both as to the *Gentile* world, and the nation of *Israel*.

Dr. T. justly observes, (*Key*, p. 24. § 75.) "The Jewish dispensation had respect to the nations of the world, to spread the knowledge and obedience of God in the earth; and was established for the benefit of all mankind."—But how unsuccessful were these means, and all other means used with the *Heathen* nations, so long as this dispensation lasted? *Abraham* was a person noted in all the principal nations then in the world; as in *Egypt*, and the eastern monarchies. God made his name famous by his wonderful, distinguishing dispensations towards him, particularly by so miraculously subduing, before him and his trained servants, those armies of the four eastern kings. This great work of the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth, was greatly noticed by *Melchizedeck*; and one would think should have been sufficient to awaken the attention of all the nations in that part of the world, and to lead them to the knowledge and worship of the only true God; especially if considered in conjunction with that miraculous and most terrible destruction of *Sodom* and all the cities of the plain for their wickedness, with *Lot's* miraculous deliverance: facts which doubtless in their day were much famed abroad in the world. But there is not the least appearance, in any accounts we have, of any considerable good effect. On the contrary, those nations which were most in the way of observing and being affected with these things, even the nations of *Canaan*, grew worse and worse, till their iniquity came to the full, in *Joshua's* time. And the posterity of *Lot*, that saint so wonderfully distinguished, soon became some of the most gross idolaters; as they appear to have been in *Moses's* time. (See Num. xxv.) Yea, and the far greater part even of *Abraham's* posterity, the children of *Ishmael*, *Ziman*, *Joksham*, *Medan*, *Midian*, *Ishbak* and *Shuah*, and *Esau*, soon forgot the true God, and fell off to heathenism.

Great things were done in the sight of the nations, tending to awaken them and lead them to the knowledge and obedience of the true God, in *Jacob's* and *Joseph's* time; in that God did miracuously, by the hand of *Joseph*, preserve from perishing by famine as it were the whole world; as appears by *Gen.* xli. 56, 57. Agreeably to which, the name that *Pharaoh* gave to *Joseph*, *Zaphnath-Paaneah*, as is said, in the *Egyptian* language signifies *saviour of the world*. But there does not

appear to have been any good abiding effect of this; no, not so much as among the *Egyptians*, the chief of all the heathen nations at that day, who had these great works of *Jehovah* in their most immediate view. On the contrary, they grew worse and worse, and seemed to be far more gross in their idolatries and ignorance of the true God, and every way more wicked and ripe for ruin, when *Moses* was sent to *Pharaoh*, than they were in *Joseph's* time.

After this, in *Moses* and *Joshua's* time, the great God was pleased to manifest himself in a series of the most astonishing miracles for about fifty years together, wrought in the most public manner in *Egypt*, in the wilderness, and in *Canaan*, in the view as it were of the whole world; miracles by which the world was shaken, the whole frame of the visible creation, earth, seas, and rivers, the atmosphere, the clouds, sun, moon, and stars were affected; miracles greatly tending to convince the nations of the world of the vanity of their false gods, shewing JEHOVAH to be infinitely above them in the thing wherein they dealt most proudly, and exhibiting God's awful displeasure at the wickedness of the heathen world. And these things are expressly spoken of as one end of these great miracles. (Exod. ix. 14. Numb. xiv. 21. Josh. iv. 23, 24.) However, no reformation followed, but by the scripture-account, the nations which had them most in view, were dreadfully hardened, stupidly refusing all conviction and reformation, and obstinately went on in opposition to the living God, to their own destruction.

After this, God from time to time very publicly manifested himself to the nations of the world, by wonderful works wrought in the time of the *Judges*, of a like tendency with those already mentioned. Particularly in so miraculously destroying, by the hand of *Gideon*, almost the whole of that vast army of the *Midianites*, *Amalekites*, and *all the children of the east*, consisting of about 135,000 men. (Judg. vii. 12. and viii. 10.) But no reformation followed this, or the other great works of God, wrought in the times of *Deborah* and *Barak*, *Jeptha* and *Sampson*.

After these things God used new, and in some respects much greater means with the heathen world, to bring them to the knowledge and service of the true God, in the days of *David* and *Solomon*. He raised up *David*, a man after his own heart, a most fervent worshipper of the true God and zealous hater of idols, and subdued before him almost all the nations between *Egypt* and *Euphrates*; often miraculously assisting him in his battles with his enemies. And he confirmed *Solomon* his son in the full and quiet possession of that great empire for about forty years: and made him the wisest, richest, most magnificent, and every way the greatest

monarch that ever had been in the world; and by far the most famous and of greatest name among the nations; especially for his wisdom, and things *concerning the name of his God*; particularly the temple he built, which was *exceeding magnificent, that it might be of fame and glory throughout all lands*; 1 Chron. xxii. 5. And we are told that there came of all people to hear the wisdom of *Solomon*, from all kings of the earth. (1 Kings iv. 34. and x. 24.) And the scripture informs us that these great things were done, that the *nations in far countries might hear of God's great name, and of his out-stretched arm; that all the people of the earth might fear him, as well as his people* Israel: *And that all the people of the earth might know that the Lord was God, and that there was none else.* (1 Kings viii. 41—43, 60.) But still there is no appearance of any considerable abiding effect, with regard to any one heathen nation.

After this, before the captivity in *Babylon*, many great things were done in the sight of the Gentile nations, very much tending to enlighten, affect and persuade them. As God destroying the army of the *Ethiopians* of a thousand thousand, before *Asa*; *Elijah's* and *Elisha's* miracles; especially *Elijah* miraculously confounding *Baal's* prophets and worshippers; *Elisha* healing *Naaman*, the king of *Syria's* prime minister and the miraculous victories obtained, through *Elisha's* prayers, over the *Syrians*, *Moabites*, and *Edomites*; the miraculous destruction of the vast united army of the children of *Moab*, *Ammon*, and *Edom*, at *Jehoshaphat's* prayer. (2 Chron. xx.) *Jonah's* preaching at *Nineveh*, together with the miracle of his deliverance from the whale's belly; which was published, and well attested, as a sign to confirm his preaching: But more especially that great work of God, in destroying *Sennacherib's* army by an angel, for his contempt of the God of *Israel*, as if he had been no more than the gods of the heathen.

When all these things proved ineffectual, God took a new method with the heathen world, and used, in some respects, much greater means to convince and reclaim them, than ever before. In the first place, his people, the *Jews*, were removed to *Babylon*, the head and heart of the heathen world (*Chaldea* having been very much the fountain of idolatry) to carry thither the revelations which God had made of himself, contained in the sacred writings; and there to bear their testimony against idolatry; as some of them, particularly *Daniel*, *Shadrach*, *Meshack*, and *Abed-nego*, did in a very open manner before the king and the greatest men of the empire, with such circumstances as made their testimony very famous in the world. And God confirmed it with great miracles; which were published through the empire by order of its monarch, as the mighty works of the God of *Israel*, shewing him to be above all gods: *Daniel*, that

great prophet, at the same time being exalted to be governor of all the wise men of *Babylon*, and one of the chief officers of *Nebuchadnezzar's* court.

After this, God raised up *Cyrus* to destroy *Babylon*, for its obstinate contempt of the true God and injuriousness towards his people; according to the prophecies of *Isaiah*, speaking of him by name, instructing him concerning the nature and dominion of the true God. (Isai. xlv.) Which prophecies were probably shewn to him, whereby he was induced to publish his testimony concerning the God of *Israel*, as THE GOD. (Ezra. i. 2, 3.) *Daniel*, about the same time, being advanced to be prime minister of state in the new empire erected under *Darius*, did in that place appear openly as a worshipper of the God of *Israel*, and him alone; God confirming his testimony for him, before the king and all the grandees of his kingdom, by preserving him in the den of lions; whereby *Darius* was induced to publish to all people, nations, and languages, that dwell in all the earth, his testimony that *that the God of* Israel *was the living God, and steadfast for ever*, &c.

When after the destruction of *Babylon*, some of the *Jews* returned to their own land, multitudes never returned, but were dispersed abroad through many parts of the vast *Persian* empire; as appears by the book of *Esther*. And many of them afterwards, as good histories inform us, were removed into the more western parts of the world; and so were dispersed as it were all over the heathen world; having the holy scriptures with them, and synagogues every where for the worship of the true God. And so it continued to be to the days of Christ and his apostles; as appears by the *Acts of the Apostles*. Thus that light, which God had given them, was carried abroad into all parts of the world: So that now they had far greater advantages to come to the knowledge of the truth in matters of religion, if they had been disposed to improve their advantages.

And besides all these things, from about *Cyrus's* time, learning and philosophy increased, and was carried to a great height. God raised up a number of men of prodigious genius, to instruct others, and improve their reason and understanding, in the nature of things: And philosophic knowledge having gone on to increase for several ages, seemed to be got to its height before Christ came, or about that time.

And now let it be considered what was the effect of all these things.—Instead of a reformation, or any appearance or prospect of it, the heathen world in general rather grew worse. As Dr. WINDAR observes, "The inveterate absurdities of pagan idolatry continued without remedy, and increased as arts and learning increased; and paganism prevailed in all its height of absurdity, when pagan nations were polished to the height,

and in the most polite cities and countries; and thus continued to the last breath of pagan power." And so it was with respect to wickedness in general, as well as idolatry; as appears by what the apostle *Paul* observes in Rom. i.—Dr. T. speaking of the time when the gospel-scheme was introduced, (*Key*, § 289.) says, "The moral and religious state of the heathen was very deplorable, being generally sunk into great ignorance, gross idolatry, and abominable vice." Abominable vices prevailed, not only among the common people, but even among their philosophers themselves, yea, some of the chief of them, and of greatest genius; so Dr. T. himself observes, as to that detestable vice of sodomy, which they commonly and openly allowed and practised without shame. (See Dr. T.'s note on Rom. 1. 27.)

Having thus considered the state of the heathen world, with regard to the effect of means used for its reformation during the *Jewish* dispensation, from the first foundation of it in *Abraham's* time; let us now consider how it was with that people themselves, who were distinguished with the peculiar privileges of that dispensation. The means used with the heathen nations were great; but they were small if compared with those used with the *Israelites*. The advantages by which that people were distinguished are represented in scripture as vastly above all parallel, in passages which Dr. T. takes notice of. (*Key*, § 54.) And he reckons these privileges among those which he calls *antecedent blessings*, consisting in motives to virtue and obedience; and says, (*Key*, § 66.) "That this was the very end and design of the dispensation of God's extraordinary favours to the *Jews*, *viz.* to engage them to duty and obedience, or that it was a scheme for promoting virtue, is clear beyond dispute, from every part of the old testament." Nevertheless, the generality of that people, through all the successive periods of that dispensation, were men of a wicked character. But it will be more abundantly manifest how strong the natural bias to iniquity appeared to be among that people, by considering more particularly their condition from time to time.

Notwithstanding the great things God had done in the times of *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, to separate them and their posterity from the idolatrous world, that they might be a holy people to himself; yet in about two hundred years after *Jacob's* death, and in less than one hundred and fifty years after the death of *Joseph*, and while some were alive who had seen *Joseph*, the people had in a great measure lost the true religion, and were apace conforming to the heathen world. For a remedy, and the more effectually to alienate them from idols and engage them to the God of their fathers, God appeared, in order to bring them out from among the *Egyptians* and sepa-

rate them from the heathen world, and to reveal himself in his glory and majesty, in so affecting and astonishing a manner as tended most deeply and durably to impress their minds; that they might never forsake him any more. But so perverse were they, that they murmured even in the midst of the miracles that God wrought for them in *Egypt*, and murmured at the *Red Sea*, in a few days after God had brought them out with such a mighty hand. When he had led them through the sea, *they sang his praise, but soon forgot his works.* Before they got to Mount *Sinai*, they openly manifested their perverseness from time to time; so that God says of them, Exod. xvi. 28. *How long refuse ye to keep my commandments and my laws?* Afterwards they murmured again at *Rephidim.*

In about two months after they came out of *Egypt*, they came to Mount *Sinai;* where God entered into a most solemn covenant with the people, that they should be an holy people unto him, with such astonishing manifestations of his power, majesty, and holiness, as were altogether unparalleled. God puts the people in mind, (Deut. iv. 32—34.) *For ask now of the days that are past, which were before thee, since the day that God created man upon the earth; and ask from one side of heaven unto the other, whether there has been any such thing as this great thing is, or hath been heard like it. Did ever people hear the voice of God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and live? Or hath God assayed to take him a nation from the midst of another nation, &c.?* And these great things were in order to impress their minds with such a conviction and sense of divine truth, and their obligations, that they might never forget them; as God says, (Exod. xix. 9.) *Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and believe thee for ever.* But what was the effect of all? It was not more than two or three months, before that people, under that very mountain, returned to their old *Egyptian* idolatry, and were singing and dancing before a golden calf, which they had set up to worship. And after awful manifestations of God's displeasure for that sin, and so much done to bring them to repentance and confirm them in obedience, it was but a few months before they came to that violence of spirit, in open rebellion against God, that with the utmost vehemence they declared their resolution to follow God no longer, but to make them a captain to return into *Egypt.* And thus they went on in perverse opposition to the Most High, from time to time, repeating their open acts of rebellion, in the midst of continued astonishing miracles till that generation was destroyed. And though the following generation seems to have been the best that ever was in *Israel*, yet notwithstanding their good example, and notwithstanding all the wonders of God's power and love to that people in *Joshua*'s time; how soon

did that people degenerate, and begin to forsake God, and join with the heathen in their idolatries, till God by severe means, and by sending prophets and judges, extraordinarily influenced from above, reclaimed them? But when they were brought to some reformation by such means, they soon fell away again into the practice of idolatry; and so from one age to another; and nothing proved effectual for any abiding reformation.

After things had gone on thus for several hundred years, God used new methods with his people, in two respects; *First*, he raised up a great prophet, under whom a number of young men were trained up in schools, that from among them there might be a constant succession of great prophets in *Israel*, of such as God should choose; which seems to have been continued for more than five hundred years. *Secondly*, God raised up a great king, *David*, one eminent for wisdom, piety, and fortitude, to subdue all their heathen neighbours, who used to be such a snare to them; and to confirm, adorn, and perfect the institutions of his public worship; and by him to reveal more fully the great salvation and future glorious kingdom of the Messiah. And after him was raised up his son, *Solomon*, the wisest and greatest prince that ever was on earth, more fully to settle and establish those things which his Father *David* had begun concerning the public worship of God in *Israel*, and to build a glorious temple for the honour of JEHOVAH and the institutions of his worship, and to instruct the neighbour nations in true wisdom and religion. But what was the success of these new and extraordinary means? If we take Dr. T. for our expositer of scripture, the nation must be extremely corrupt in *David's* time; for he supposes he has respect to his own times in those words, Psal. xiv. 2, 3. *The Lord looked down from heaven, to see if there were any that did understand, and seek God; they are all gone aside: they are together become filthy; there is none that doeth good; no, not one.* But, whether Dr. T. be in the right in this or not, yet if we consider what appeared in *Israel* in *Absalom's* and *Sheba's* rebellion, we shall not see cause to think, that the greater part of the nation at that day were men of true wisdom and piety. As to *Solomon's* time, Dr. T. supposes, as has been already observed, that *Solomon* speaks of his own times, when he says, he had found but one in a thousand that was a thoroughly upright man.

However, it appears, that all those great means used to promote and establish virtue and true religion, in *Samuel's*, *David's*, *and Solomon's* times, were so far from having any general abiding good effect in *Israel*, that *Solomon* himself, with all his wisdom, and notwithstanding the unparalleled favours of God to him, had his mind corrupted so as openly to tolerate idolatry in the land, and greatly to provoke God against him. And as soon as he was dead, ten tribes of the twelve forsook the

true worship of God, and instead of it, openly established the like idolatry that the people fell into at mount *Sinai*, when they made the golden calf; and continued finally obstinate in this apostacy, notwithstanding all means that could be used with them by the prophets whom God sent, one after another, to reprove, counsel, and warn them, for about two hundred and fifty years; especially those two great prophets, *Elijah* and *Elisha*. Of all the kings that reigned over them, there was not so much as one but what was of a wicked character. And at last their case seemed utterly desperate; so that nothing remained to be done with them, but to remove them out of God's sight. Thus the scripture represents the matter, 2 Kings xvii.

And as to the other two tribes; though their kings were always of the family of *David*, and they were favoured in many respects far beyond their brethren, yet they were generally exceeding corrupt. Their kings were, most of them, wicked men, and their other magistrates, and priests and people, were generally agreed in the corruption. Thus the matter is represented in the scripture history, and the books of the prophets. And when they had seen how God had cast off the ten tribes, instead of taking warning, they made themselves vastly more vile than ever the others had done. 2 Kings xvii. 18, 19. Ezek. xvi. 46, 47, 51. God indeed waited longer upon them, for his servant *David's* sake, and for *Jerusalem's* sake, that he had chosen; and used more extraordinary means with them; especially by those great prophets, *Isaiah* and *Jeremiah*, but to no effect: So that, at last, as the prophets represent the matter, they were like a body universally and desperately diseased and corrupted, that would admit of no cure, the whole head sick, and the whole heart faint, &c.

Things being come to that pass, God took this method with them; he utterly destroyed their city and land, and the temple which he had among them, made thorough work in purging the land of them; as when a man *empties a dish, wipes it, and turns it upside down: or when a vessel is cast into a fierce fire, till its filthiness is thoroughly burnt out.* (2 Kings xxi. 13. Ezek. chap. xxiv.) They were carried into captivity and there left, till that wicked generation was dead and those old rebels were purged out; that afterwards the land might be resettled with a more pure generation.

After the return from the captivity, and God had built the Jewish church again in their own land, by a series of wonderful providences; yet they corrupted themselves again to so great a degree, that the transgressors were come to the full again in the days of *Antiochus Epiphanes;* as the matter is represented in the prophecy of *Daniel*. (Dan. viii. 23.) And then God made them the subjects of a dispensation, little, if any thing, less terrible, than that which had been in *Nebuchad-*

uezzar's days. And after God had again delivered them, and restored the state of religion among them, by the instrumentality of the *Maccabees*, they degenerated again: So that when Christ came, they were arrived to that extreme degree of corruption which is represented in the accounts given by the Evangelists.

It may be observed here in general, that the *Jews*, though so vastly distinguished with advantages, means, and motives to holiness, yet are represented, from time to time, as more wicked in the sight of God, than the very worst of the heathen. As, of old, God sware by his life that the wickedness of *Sodom* was small compared with that of the *Jews;* (Ezek. xvi. 47, 48, &c. also chap. v. 5—10.) So Christ, speaking of the *Jews* in his time, represents them as having much greater guilt than the inhabitants of *Tyre* and *Sydon*, or even *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*.

But we are now come to the time when the grandest scene was displayed that ever was opened on earth. After all other schemes had been so long and so thoroughly tried, and had so greatly failed of success, both among *Jews* and *Gentiles;* that wonderful dispensation was at length introduced—the greatest scheme for suppressing and restraining iniquity among mankind, that ever infinite wisdom and mercy contrived—even the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ. "A new dispensation of grace was erected (to use Dr. T's. own words, p. 239, 240) for the more certain and effectual sanctification of mankind into the image of God; delivering them from the sin and wickedness into which they might fall, or were already fallen; to redeem them from all iniquity, and bring them to the knowledge and obedience of God." In whatever high and exalted terms the scripture speaks of the means and motives which the *Jews* enjoyed of old; yet their privileges are represented as having no glory, in comparison of the advantages of the gospel. Dr. T.'s words (p. 233.) are worthy to be here repeated. "Even the heathen (says he) knew God, and might have glorified him as God; but under the glorious light of the gospel, we have very clear ideas of the divine perfections, and particularly of the love of God as our Father, and as the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. We see our duty in the utmost extent, and the most cogent reasons to perform it: We have eternity opened to us, even an endless state of honour and felicity, the reward of virtuous actions; and the Spirit of God promised for our direction and assistance. And all this may and ought to be applied to the purifying of our minds and the perfecting of holiness. And to these happy advantages we are born; for which we are bound for ever to praise and magnify the rich grace of God in the Redeemer."

And he elsewhere says,* "The gospel constitution is a scheme the most perfect and effectual for restoring true religion, and promoting virtue and happiness, that ever the world has yet seen." And† *admirably adapted to enlighten our minds and sanctify our hearts.* And‡ *never were motives so divine and powerful proposed, to induce us to the practice of all virtue and goodness.*

And yet even these means have been ineffectual upon the far greater part of them with whom they have been used; of the *many that have been called few have been chosen.*

As to the *Jews*, God's ancient people, with whom they were used in the first place, and used long by Christ and his apostles, the generality of them rejected Christ and his gospel with extreme pertinacity of spirit. They not only went on still in that career of corruption which had been increasing from the time of the *Maccabees;* but Christ's coming, his doctrine and miracles, the preaching of his followers, and the glorious things that attended the same, were the occasion, through their perverse misimprovement, of an infinite increase of their wickedness. They crucified the Lord of Glory with the utmost malice and cruelty, and persecuted his followers; they pleased not God, and were contrary to all men; they went on to grow worse and worse, till they filled up the measure of their sin, and wrath came upon them to the uttermost; and they were destroyed and cast out of God's sight, with unspeakably greater tokens of the divine abhorrence and indignation, than in the days of *Nebuchadnezzar.* The greater part of the whole nation were slain, and the rest were scattered abroad through the earth in the most abject and forlorn circumstances. And in the same spirit of unbelief and malice against Christ and the Gospel, and in their miserable dispersed circumstances, do they remain to this day.

And as to the *gentile* nations, though there was a glorious success of the gospel amongst them in the apostles' days; yet probably not one in ten of those that had the gospel preached to them embraced it. The powers of the world were set against it, and persecuted it with insatiable malignity. And among the professors of christianity, there presently appeared in many a disposition to abuse the gospel to the service of pride and licentiousness. The apostles foretold a grand apostacy of the christian world which should continue many ages; and observed, that there appeared a disposition to such an apostacy among professing christians, even in that day. (2 Thess. ii. 7.) The greater part of the ages now elapsed, have been spent in that grand and general apostacy, under which the christian world, as it is called, has been transformed into what has been

* *Key*, § 167. † *Note on* Rom. i. 16. ‡ *Pref. to Par. on* Rom. p. 145, 47.

vastly more dishonourable and hateful to God, and repugnant to true virtue, than the state of the heathen world before: Which is agreeable to the prophetical descriptions given of it by the Holy Spirit.

In these latter ages of the christian church, God has raised up a number of great and good men to bear testimony against the corruptions of the Church of *Rome*, and by their means introduced that light into the world, by which, in a short time, at least one third part of *Europe* was delivered from the more gross enormities of *Antichrist*: Which was attended at first with a great reformation as to vital and practical religion. But how is the gold become dim! To what a pass are things come in protestant countries at this day, and in our nation in particular! To what a prodigious height has a deluge of infidelity, profaneness, luxury, debauchery, and wickedness of every kind, arisen! The poor savage *Americans* are mere babes, if I may so speak, as to proficiency in wickedness, in comparison of multitudes in the christian world. Dr. T. himself, as before observed, represents, that the *generality of christians have been the most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind;* and (*Key*, § 388.) that "The wickedness of the christian world renders it so much like the heathen, that the good effects of our change to christianity are but little seen."

With respect to the dreadful corruption of the present day, it is to be considered, besides the advantages already mentioned, that great advances in learning and philosophic knowledge have been made in the present and past century: affording great advantage for a proper and enlarged exercise of our rational powers, and for our seeing the bright manifestation of God's perfections in his works. And it is to be observed, that the means and inducements to virtue which this age enjoys, are in *addition* to most of those which were mentioned before, as given of old; and among other things, in addition to the shortening of man's life to 70 or 80 years, from near a thousand. And, with regard to this, I would observe, that as the case now stands in christendom, take one with another of those who ever come to years of discretion, their life is not more than forty or forty-five years; which is but about the twentieth part of what it once was: And not so much in great cities, places where profaneness, sensuality, and debauchery, commonly prevail to the greatest degree.

Dr. T. (Key, § 1.) truly observes, That God has from the beginning exercised wonderful and infinite wisdom in the methods he has, from age to age, made use of to oppose vice, cure corruption, and promote virtue in the world; and introduced several schemes to that end. It is indeed remarkable, how many schemes and methods were tried of old, both before and after the flood: how many were used in the times of the

old testament, both with jews and heathens, and how ineffectual all these ancient methods proved, for 4000 years together, till God introduced that grand dispensation, for redeeming men from all iniquity, and purifying them to himself, a people zealous of good works; which the scripture represents as the subject of the admiration of angels. But even this has now so long proved ineffectual, with respect to the generality, that Dr. T. thinks *there is need of a new dispensation; the present light of the gospel being insufficient for the full reformation of the Christian world, by reason of its corruptions:* (Note on Rom. i. 27.)—And yet all these things, according to him, without any natural bias to the contrary; no stream of natural inclination or propensity at all, to oppose inducements to goodness; no native opposition of heart, to withstand those gracious means which God has ever used with mankind, from the beginning of the world to this day; any more than there was in the heart of *Adam* the moment God created him in perfect innocence.

Surely Dr. T.'s scheme is attended with strange paradoxes. And that his mysterious tenets may appear in a true light, it must be observed that—at the same time he supposes these means, even the very greatest and best of them, to have proved so ineffectual, that help from them, as to any general reformation, is to be despaired of—that he maintains all mankind, even the heathen in all parts of the world, yea, every single person in it, (which must include every *Indian* in *America*, before the *Europeans* came hither; and every inhabitant of the unknown parts of *Africa* and *Terra Australis*) has ability, light, and means sufficient to do their whole duty; yea, many passages in his writings plainly suppose, to perform perfect obedience to God's law, without the least degree of vice or iniquity.*

But I must not omit to observe, that Dr. T. supposes, the reason why the gospel-dispensation has been so ineffectual, is, that it has been greatly misunderstood and perverted. In his Key, (§ 389,) he says, "Wrong representations of the scheme of the gospel have greatly obscured the glory of divine grace, and contributed much to the corruption of its professors.—Such doctrines have been almost universally taught and received, as quite subvert it. Mistaken notions about nature, grace, election and reprobation, justification, regeneration, redemption, calling, adoption, &c. have quite taken away the very ground of the Christian life."

But how came the gospel to be so universally and exceedingly misunderstood? Is it because it is in itself so very dark and unintelligible, and not adapted to the apprehension of the

* See p. 259, 63, 64, 72. S.

human faculties? If so, how is the possession of such an obscure and unintelligible thing, so glorious an advantage?—Or is it because of the native blindness, corruption, and superstition of mankind? But this is giving up the thing in question, and allowing a great depravity of nature. Dr. T. speaks of the gospel as far otherwise than dark and unintelligible; he represents it as exhibiting the clearest and most glorious light, calculated to deliver the world from darkness, and to bring them into marvellous light. He speaks of the light which the *Jews* had under the *Mosaic* dispensation, as vastly exceeding the light of nature which the heathen enjoyed; and yet he supposes, that even the latter was so clear, as to be sufficient to lead men to the knowledge of God and their whole duty to him. He speaks of the light of the gospel as vastly exceeding the light of the Old Testament; and says of the apostle *Paul* in particular, "That he wrote with great perspicuity; that he takes great care to explain every part of his subject; that he has left no part of it unexplained and unguarded; and that never was an author more exact and cautious in this."* Is it not strange, therefore, that the Christian world, without any native depravity, should be so blind in the midst of such glaring light, as to be all, or the generality, agreed, from age to age, so essentially to *misunderstand* that which is made so very plain?

Dr. T. says (p. 167. S.) "It is my persuasion, that the Christian religion was very early and grievously corrupted by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious *monks*, too conceited to be satisfied with the plain gospel; and has long remained in that deplorable state."—But how came the whole Christian world, without any blinding depravity, to hearken to these ignorant, foolish men, rather than unto wiser and better teachers? Especially, when the latter had *plain gospel* on their side, and the doctrines of the other were (as our author supposes) so very contrary not only to the plain gospel, but to men's reason and common sense? Or were all the teachers of the Christian church nothing but a parcel of *ignorant dreamers?* If so, this is very strange indeed, unless mankind naturally *love darkness*, rather than light; seeing in all parts of the Christian world there was a great multitude in the work of the ministry, who had the gospel in their hands, and whose whole business it was to study and teach it; and therefore had infinitely greater advantages to become truly wise, than the heathen philosophers. But if, by some strange and inconceivable means, notwithstanding all these glorious advantages, all the teachers of the christian church through the world, without any native evil propensity, very early became silly

* Pref. to Par. on Rom. p. 146, 48.

dreamers—and also in their *dreaming*, generally stumbled on the *same* individual monstrous opinions, and so the world might be blinded for a while—yet, why did they not hearken to that wise and great man, *Pelagius*, and others like him, when he plainly held forth the truth to the christian world? Especially seeing his instructions were so agreeable to the plain doctrines, and the bright and clear light of the gospel of Christ, and also so agreeable to the plainest dictates of the common sense and understanding of all mankind; but the other so repugnant to it, that (according to our author) if they were true, it would prove *understanding* to be *no understanding*, and *the word of God to be no rule of truth, nor at all to be relied upon, and God to be a Being worthy of no regard!*

Besides, if the inefficacy of the gospel to restrain sin and promote virtue be owing to the general prevalence of these doctrines, which are supposed to be so absurd and contrary to the gospel, here is this further to be accounted for; namely, Why, since there has been so great an increase of light in religious matters (as must be supposed on Dr. T.'s scheme) in this and the last age, and these monstrous doctrines of original sin, election, reprobation, justification, regeneration, &c. have been so much exploded, especially in our nation, there has been no reformation attending this great advancement of light and truth: But on the contrary, vice, and every thing opposite to practical christianity, has gone on to increase with such a prodigious celerity as to become like an overflowing deluge; threatening, unless God mercifully interposes, speedily to swallow up all that is virtuous and praiseworthy.

Many other things might have been mentioned under this head—the *means* which mankind have had to restrain vice and promote virtue—such as wickedness being many ways contrary to men's temporal interest and comfort, and their having continually before their eyes so many instances of persons made miserable by their vices; the restraints of human laws, without which men cannot live in society: the judgments of God brought on men for their wickedness with which history abounds, and the providential rewards of virtue; and innumerable particular means that God has used from age to age to curb the wickedness of mankind, which I have omitted. But there would be no end of a particular enumeration of such things. They that will not be convinced by the instances which have been mentioned, probably would not be convinced, if the world had stood a thousand times so long, and we had the most authentic and certain accounts of means having been used from the beginning, in a thousand times greater variety; and new dispensations had been introduced, after others had been tried in vain, ever so often, and still to little effect. He that will not be convinced by a thousand good witness

es, it is not likely that he would be convinced by a thousand thousand.

The proofs that have been extant in the world, from trial and fact, of the depravity of man's nature, are inexpressible, and as it were infinite, beyond the representation of all gratitude. If there were a piece of ground which abounded with briars and thorns, or some poisonous plant, and all mankind had used their endeavours, for a thousand years together, to suppress that evil growth—and to bring that ground by manure and cultivation, planting and sowing, to produce better fruit, all in vain; it would still be over-run with the same noxious growth—it would not be a proof that such a produce was agreeable to the nature of that soil, in any wise to be compared to that which is given in divine providence, that wickedness is a produce agreeable to the nature of the field of the world of mankind. For the means used with it have been various, great and wonderful, contrived by the unsearchable and boundless wisdom of God; medicines procured with infinite expense, exhibited with a vast apparatus; a marvellous succession of dispensations, introduced one after another, displaying an incomprehensible length and breadth, depth and height, of divine wisdom, love and power, and every perfection of the godhead, to the eternal admiration of principalities and powers in heavenly places.

SECT. IX.

Several Evasions of the arguments for the Depravity of Nature from Trial and Events considered.

Evasion I. Dr. T. says, (p. 231, 232.) "*Adam's* nature, it is allowed, was very far from being sinful; yet he sinned. And therefore, the common doctrine of Original Sin is no more necessary to account for the sin that has been or is in the world, than it is to account for *Adam's* sin."* Again, (p. 52—54. S. &c.) "If we allow mankind to be as wicked as R. R. has represented them to be; and suppose that there is not one upon earth that is truly righteous and without sin, and that some are very enormous sinners, yet it will not thence follow that they are naturally corrupt.—For, if sinful action infers a nature originally corrupt, then, whereas *Adam* (according to them that hold the doctrine of Original Sin) committed the most heinous and aggravated sin that ever was committed in the world; for, according to them, he had greater light than any other man in the world, to know his duty, and greater

* Belsham.

power than any other man to fulfil it, and was under greater obligations than any other man to obedience; he sinned when he knew he was the representative of millions, and that the happy or miserable state of all mankind depended on his conduct; which never was, nor can be, the case of any other man in the world:—Then, I say, it will follow, that *his* nature was originally *corrupt*, &c.—Thus their argument from the wickedness of mankind, to prove a sinful and corrupt nature, must inevitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground.—Which will appear more abundantly, if we take in the case of the angels, who in numbers sinned and kept not their first estate, though created with a nature superior to *Adam's*." Again, (p. 145 S.) "When it is inquired, how it comes to pass that our appetites and passions are now so irregular and strong, as that not one person has resisted them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent? If this be the case, if such as make the inquiry will tell the world how it came to pass that *Adam's* appetites and passions were so irregular and strong that he did not resist them so as to keep himself pure and innocent, when upon their principles he was far more able to have resisted them; I also will tell them how it comes to pass that his posterity does not resist them. Sin doth not alter its nature by its being general; and therefore how far soever it spreads, it must come upon all just as it came upon *Adam*."

These things are delivered with much assurance. But is there any reason in such a way of talking? One thing implied in it, and the main thing, if any at all to the purpose, is, that because an effect being general does not alter the *nature* of the effect, therefore nothing more can be argued concerning the cause from its happening constantly, and in the most steady manner, than from its happening but once. But how contrary is this to reason? Suppose a person, through the deceitful persuasions of a pretended friend, once takes a poisonous draught of liquor to which he had before no inclination; but after he has once taken of it, he is observed to act as one that has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same, in his constant practice, obstinately continued in as long as he lives, against all possible arguments and endeavours used to dissuade him from it. And suppose we should from hence argue a fixed inclination, and begin to suspect that this is the nature and operation of the poison, to produce such an inclination, or that this strong propensity is some way the consequence of the first draught. In such a case, could it be said with good reason, that a fixed propensity can no more be argued from his consequent *constant* practice than from his *first* draught? Or, suppose a young man, soberly inclined, enticed by wicked companions, should drink to excess, until he had got a habit of excessive drinking, and should come under the power of a

greedy appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should become a common and constant practice with him: And suppose an observer, arguing from this general practice, should say, "It must needs be that this young man has a fixed inclination to that sin; otherwise, how should it come to pass that he should make such a trade of it?" And another, ridiculing the weakness of his arguing, should reply, "Do you tell me how it came to pass, that he was guilty of that sin the first time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell you how he is guilty of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does not alter its nature by being general: And therefore, how common soever it becomes, it must come at all times by the same means that it came at first." I leave it to every one to judge, *who* would be chargeable with weak arguing in such a case.

It is true there is no effect without some cause, ground, or reason of that effect, and some cause answerable to the effect. But certainly it will not follow that a *transient* effect requires a *permanent* cause or a fixed propensity. An effect happening once, though great, yea, though it may come to pass on the same occasion in many subjects at the same time, will not prove any fixed propensity or permanent influence. It is true, it proves an influence great and extensive, answerable to the effect, *once* exerted, or once effectual; but it proves nothing in the cause *fixed* or constant. If a particular tree, or a great number of trees standing together, have blasted fruit on their branches at a particular season—or if the fruit be very much blasted, and entirely spoiled—it is evident that something was the occasion of such an effect at that time; but this alone does not prove the *nature* of the tree to be bad. But if it be observed, that those trees, and all other trees of the kind, wherever planted, and in all soils, countries, climates, and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill fruit, from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence of the evil nature of the tree. And if the fruit, at all these times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it proves the nature of the tree to be very bad. If we argue in like manner from what appears among men, it is easy to determine whether the universal sinfulness of mankind—all sinning immediately, as soon as capable of it, and continually, and generally being of a wicked character, at all times, in all ages, in all places, and under all possible circumstances, against means and motives inexpressibly manifold and great and in the utmost conceivable variety—be from a *permanent* internal great cause.

If the voice of common sense were heard, there would be no occasion for labour in multiplying arguments to shew that one act does not prove a fixed inclination; but that constant pursuit does. We see that, in fact, it is agreeable to the rea-

son of all mankind, to argue fixed principles, tempers, and prevailing inclinations, from repeated and continued actions—though the actions are voluntary, and performed of choice—and thus to judge of the tempers and inclinations of persons, ages, sexes, tribes, and nations. But is it the manner of men to conclude, that whatever they see others *once* do, they have a fixed abiding inclination to do? Yea, there may be *several* acts seen, and yet not be taken as good evidence of an established propensity, even though that one act, or those several acts, are followed by such constant practice as afterwards evidences fixed disposition. As for example; there may be several instances of a man drinking some spirituous liquor, and those instances be no sign of a fixed inclination to that liquor: But these acts may be introductory to a settled habit or propensity, which may be made very manifest afterwards by constant practice.

From these things it is plain, that what is alleged concerning the first sin of *Adam*, and of the angels, without a previous fixed disposition to sin, cannot in the least weaken the arguments brought to prove a fixed propensity to sin in mankind, in their present state. From the permanence of the cause has been argued the permanence of the effect. And that the permanent cause consists in an internal fixed propensity, and not in any particular external circumstances, has been argued from the effects being the same, through a vast variety and change of circumstances. But the first acts of sin in *Adam* or the angels, considered in themselves, were not permanent, continued effects. And though a great number of the angels sinned, and the effect on that account was the greater and more extensive; yet this *extent* of the effect is a very different thing from that *permanence*, or settled continuance of effect, which is supposed to shew a permanent cause or fixed propensity. Neither was there any trial of a vast variety of circumstances attending a permanent effect, to shew the fixed cause to be internal, consisting in a settled disposition of nature, in the instances objected. And however great the sin of *Adam*, or of the *angels* was, and however great the means, motives, and obligations were against which they sinned—and whatever may be thence argued concerning the transient cause, occasion, or temptation, as being very subtle, remarkably tending to deceive and seduce, &c.—yet it argues nothing of any *settled* disposition, or *fixed* cause, either great or small; the effect both in the angels and our first parents, being in itself *transient*, and, for ought appears, happening in each of them under one system or coincidence of influential circumstances.*

* See vol. I. p. 398. note.

The general continued wickedness of mankind, against such means and motives, proves each of these things, *viz.* that the cause is *fixed*, and that the fixed cause is *internal* in man's nature, and also that it is very *powerful*. It proves that the cause is *fixed*, because the effect is so abiding, through so many changes. It proves that the fixed cause is *internal*, because the circumstances are so various—including a variety of means and motives—and they are such circumstances as cannot possibly cause the effect, being most opposite to it in their tendency. And it proves the *greatness* of the internal cause; or that the propensity is powerful; because the means which have opposed its influence have been so great, and yet have been statedly overcome.

But here I may observe, by the way, that with regard to the motives and obligations against which our first father sinned, it is not reasonably alleged, that he sinned when he *knew* his sin would have destructive consequences to all his posterity, *and might in process of time pave the whole globe with skulls, &c.* It is evident, by the plain account the scripture gives us of the temptation which prevailed with our first parents to commit that sin, that it was so contrived by the subtlety of the tempter, as first to blind and deceive them as to that matter, and to make them believe that their disobedience should be followed with *no destruction or calamity at all* to themselves, (and therefore not to their posterity) but on the contrary, with a great increase and advancement of dignity and happiness.

Evasion II. Let the wickedness of the world be ever so general and great, there is no necessity of supposing any depravity of nature to be the cause: man's own *free-will* is cause sufficient. Let mankind be more or less corrupt, they make themselves corrupt by their own free choice. This Dr. T. abundantly insists upon, in many parts of his book.*

But I would ask, how it comes to pass that mankind so universally agree in this evil exercise of their free-will? If their wills are in the first place as free to good as to evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consultation, all agree to exercise their freedom in favour of evil? If there be no natural tendency or preponderation in the case, then there is as good a chance for the will being determined to good as to evil. If the *cause* be indifferent, why is not the effect in some measure indifferent? If the balance be no heavier at one end than the other, why does it perpetually preponderate one way? How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been determined to evil, in like manner before the flood, and after the flood; under the law and under the gospel:

* Page 257, 258, 52, 53, S. and many other places.

among both *Jews* and *Gentiles*, under the Old Testament; and since then, among *Christians*, *Jews*, *Mahometans*; among papists and protestants; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and learning most prevail, and among the *Negroes*, and *Hottentots* in *Africa*, the *Tartars* in *Asia*, and *Indians* in *America*, towards both the poles, and on every side of the globe; in greatest cities and obscurest villages; in palaces and in huts, wigwams and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, It happens so, that men every where, and at all times, choose thus to determine their own wills, and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half way to their duty?

A steady effect requires a steady cause; but free-will, without any previous propensity to influence its determinations, is no *permanent* cause; nothing can be conceived of farther from it: For the very notion of freedom of will, consisting in self-determining power, implies contingence; and if the will is perfectly free from any government of previous inclination, its freedom must imply the most *absolute* and *perfect* contingence: And surely nothing can be conceived of more unfixed than that. The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies perfect freedom from every thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it; that it may be left to be fixed and determined wholly by itself: Therefore its determinations must be previously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a cause sufficient to account for an effect in such a manner, and to such a degree, permanent, fixed, and constant?

When we see any person going on in a certain course with great constancy, against all manner of means to dissuade him, do we judge this to be no argument of a *fixed* disposition of mind, because, being free, he may determine to do so, if he will, without any such disposition? Or if we see a nation, or people, that differ greatly from other nations in such and such instances of their constant conduct—as though their tempers and inclinations were very diverse—and any should say, we cannot judge at all of the temper or disposition of people by any thing observable in their constant practice or behaviour, because they have all free-will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any thing in their temper or inclination to bias them. Would such an account of such effects be satisfying to the reason of mankind? But infinitely further would it be from satisfying a considerate mind, to account for the constant and universal sinfulness of mankind by saying that their will is free, and therefore all may, if they please, make themselves wicked: They are free when they first begin to act as moral agents and therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as soon as they begin to act: They are free as long as they continue to act in the

world, and therefore they may all commit sin continually, if they will: Men of all nations are free, and therefore all nations may act alike in these respects, if they please, though some do not know how other nations do act. Men of high and low condition, learned and ignorant, are free, and therefore they may agree in acting wickedly, if they please, though they do not consult together. Men in all ages are free, and therefore men in one age may all agree with men in every other age in wickedness, if they please, though they do not know how men in other ages have acted, &c. Let every one judge whether such an account of things can satisfy reason.

Evasion III. It is said by many opposers of the doctrine of original sin, that the corruption of mankind may be owing, not to a depraved nature, but to bad *example*. And I think we must understand Dr. *T.* as having respect to the powerful influence of bad instruction and example, when he says, (p. 118.) "The gentiles in their heathen state, when incorporated into the body of the gentile world, were without strength, unable to help or recover themselves." And in several other places to the like purpose. If there was no depravity of nature, what else could there be but bad instruction and example, to hinder the heathen world, as a collected body, (for as such Dr. *T.* speaks of them, as may be seen p. 117, 118.) from emerging out of their corruption on the rise of each new generation? As to their bad instruction, our author insists upon it, that the heathen, notwithstanding all their disadvantages, had sufficient light to know God, and do their whole duty. Therefore it must be chiefly bad example, according to him, that rendered their case helpless.

Now concerning this way of accounting for the corruption of the world by the influence of bad example, I would observe,

1. It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. It is accounting for the corruption of the world by the corruption of the world. For, that bad examples are general all over the world to be followed by others, and have been so from the beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description of that corruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If mankind are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, then how come there to be so many more bad examples than good ones, in all ages? And if there are not, how come the bad examples that are set to be so much more followed than the good? If the propensity of man's nature be not to evil, how comes the current of general example, every where, and at all times, to be so much to evil? And when opposition has been made by good examples, how comes it to pass that it has had so little effect to stem the stream of general wicked practice?

I think from the brief account the scripture gives us of the behaviour of our first parents, and of the expressions of their faith and hope in God's revealed mercy, we have reason to suppose, that before ever they had any children they repented, were pardoned, and became truly pious. So that God planted the world at first with a *noble vine;* and at the beginning of their generations he set the stream of example the right way. And we see that children are more apt to follow the example of their parents than of any others; especially in early youth, their forming time, when those habits are generally contracted which abide by them all their days. Besides, *Adam's* children had *no other* examples to follow but those of their parents. How therefore came the stream so soon to turn and to proceed the contrary way with so violent a current? When mankind became so universally and desperately corrupt as not to be fit to live on earth any longer, and the world was every where full of bad examples, God destroyed them all at once—except righteous *Noah* and his family—in order to remove those bad examples, and that the world might be planted again with good example, and the stream again turned the right way. How therefore came it to pass, that *Noah's* posterity did not follow his good example, especially when they had such extraordinary things to enforce it, but so generally, even in his life-time, became exceeding corrupt? One would think the first generation at least, while all lived together as one family, under *Noah*, their venerable father, might have followed his good example. And if they had done so, then, when the earth came to be divided in *Peleg's* time, the heads of the several families would have set out their particular colonies with good examples, and the stream would have been turned the right way in all the various divisions, colonies, and nations of the world. But we see in fact, that in about fifty years after *Noah's* death the world in general was overrun with dreadful corruption; so that all virtue and goodness was like soon to perish from among mankind, unless something extraordinary should be done to prevent it.

Then, for a remedy, God separated *Abraham* and his family from all the rest of the world, that they might be delivered from the influence of bad example, and that in his posterity he might have an holy seed. Thus God again planted a *noble vine; Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob* being eminently pious. But how soon did their posterity degenerate, till true religion was like to be swallowed up? We see how desperately, and almost universally corrupt they were, when God brought them out of Egypt, and led them in the wilderness.

Then God was pleased, before he planted his people in *Canaan*, to destroy that perverse generation in the wilder-

ness, that he might plant them there a *noble vine, wholly a right seed*, and set them out with good example, in the land where they were to have their settled abode. Jer. ii. 21. It is evident that the generation which came with *Joshua* into *Canaan* was an excellent generation, by innumerable things said of them.* But how soon did that people, nevertheless, become *the degenerate plant of a strange vine?*

And when the nation had a long time proved desperately and incurably corrupt, God destroyed them, and sent them into captivity—till the old rebels were dead and purged out, in order to deliver their children from their evil example. And when the following generation was purified as in a furnace, God planted them again, in the land of *Israel*, a *noble vine*, and set them out with good example; which yet was not followed by their posterity.

When again the corruption was become inveterate, the christian church was planted; and a glorious out-pouring of the Spirit of God caused true virtue and piety to be exemplified far beyond what ever had been on earth before; and thus the christian church was planted a *noble vine*. But that primitive good example has not prevailed to cause virtue to be generally and steadfastly maintained in the christian world. To how great a degree it has been *otherwise*, has already been observed.

After many ages of general and dreadful apostacy, God was pleased to erect the protestant church, as separated from the more corrupt part of Christendom; and true piety flourished in it very much at first; God planted it a *noble vine*: But notwithstanding the good examples of the first reformers, what a melancholy pass is the protestant world come to at this day?

When *England* grew very corrupt, God brought over a number of pious persons, and planted them in *New England*, and this land was planted with a *noble vine*. But how is the gold become dim! How greatly have we forsaken the pious examples of our fathers!

So prone have mankind always proved themselves to degeneracy and backsliding, that it shews plainly their natural propensity. And when good has revived and been promoted among men, it has been by some divine interposition opposing the natural current; the fruit of some extraordinary means. And the efficacy of such means has soon been overcome by constant natural bias, the effect of good example presently lost, and evil has regained the dominion. Like a heavy body, which may by some great power be caused to ascend, against its nature, a little while, but soon goes back again towards the center, to which it naturally and constantly tends.

* See Jer. ii. 2, 3. Psal. lxviii. 14. Josh. xxii. 2. and xxiii. 8. Deut. iv. 3. 4. Hos. xi. 1. and ix. 10. Judg. ii. 7, 17, 22. and many other places.

So that evil example will in no wise account for the corruption of mankind, without supposing a natural proneness to sin. The tendency of example alone will not account for general wicked practice, as consequent on good example. And if the influence of bad example is a reason of *some* of the wickedness, that alone will not account for men becoming worse than the example set, degenerating more and more, and growing worse and worse, which has been their manner.

2. There has been given to the world an example of virtue, which, were it not for a dreadful depravity of nature, would have influence on them who live under the gospel, far beyond all other examples; that is, the example of Jesus Christ.

God, who knew the human nature, and how apt men are to be influenced by example, has made answerable provision. His infinite wisdom has contrived that we should have set before us the most amiable and perfect example, in such circumstances as should have the greatest tendency to influence all the principles of man's nature but his corruption. Men are apt to be moved by the example of others *like themselves*, or in their own nature: therefore this example was given in our nature. Men are ready to follow the example of the *great* and honourable; and this—though that of one in our nature, yet—was the example of one infinitely higher and more honourable than kings or angels. A people are apt to follow the example of their *prince*. This is the example of that glorious person, who stands in a peculiar relation to Christians as their Lord and King, the supreme head of the church; and not only so, but the King of kings, supreme head of the universe, and head over all things to the church. Children are apt to follow the example of their *parents;* this is the example of the author of our being, and of our holy and happy being; the Creator of the world and everlasting Father of the universe. Men are very apt to follow the example of their *friends*: The example of Christ is that of one who is infinitely our greatest friend, standing in the most endearing relations of brother, Redeemer, spiritual head and husband; whose grace and love expressed to us, transcends all other love and friendship, as much as heaven is higher than the earth. The virtues and acts of his example were exhibited to us in the most endearing and engaging circumstances that can possibly be conceived of.—His obedience and submission to God, his humility, meekness, patience, charity, self-denial, &c. being exercised and expressed in a work of infinite grace, love, condescension, and beneficence to us—and had all their highest expressions in his laying down his life, and meekly, patiently, and cheerfully undergoing unutterable suffering for our eternal salvation. Men are peculiarly apt to follow the example of

those from whom they have great *benefits:* But it is utterly impossible to conceive of greater benefits, that we could have by the virtues of any person, than we have by the virtuous acts of Christ; we, who depend upon being thereby saved from eternal destruction, and brought to inconceivable, immortal glory at God's right hand. Surely if it were not for an extreme corruption of the human heart, such an example would have that strong influence on it, which would as it were swallow up the power of all the evil and hateful examples of a generation of vipers.

3. The influence of bad example, without corruption of nature, will not account for children universally committing sin as soon as capable of it; which I think, is a fact that has been made evident by the scripture. It will not account for it in the children of eminently pious parents; the first example set in their view being very good; which was especially the case of many children in Christian families in the apostolic days, when the apostle *John* supposes that every individual person had sin to repent of, and confess to God.

4. What Dr. T. supposes to have been fact, with respect to a great part of mankind—the state of the heathen world, which he supposes, considered as a collective body, was helpless, dead in sin, and unable to recover itself—cannot consistently be accounted for from the influence of bad example. Not evil example alone, no, nor as united with evil instruction, can be supposed a sufficient reason why every new generation that arose among them, should not be able to emerge from the idolatry and wickedness of their ancestors, in any consistence with his scheme. The ill example of ancestors could have no power to oblige them to sin, any other way than as a strong temptation. But Dr. T. himself says, (p. 72. S.) "To suppose men's temptations to be superior to their powers, will impeach the goodness and justice of God, who appoints every man's trial." And as to bad instructions, as he supposes that they all, yea every individual person, had light sufficient to know God, and do their whole duty. And if each one could do this for himself, then surely they might all be agreed in it through the power of free-will, as well as the whole world be agreed in corruption by the same power.

Evasion IV. Some modern opposers of the doctrine of original sin, thus account for the general prevalence of wickedness, viz. that in the course of nature our senses grow up first, and the animal passions get the start of reason. So Dr. TURNBULL,* "Sensitive objects first affect us, and inasmuch as reason is a principle which, in the nature of things, must

* See *Mor. Phil.* p. 279, and *Chris. Phil.* p. 274.

be advanced to strength and vigour by gradual cultivation, and these objects are continually assailing and soliciting us; so unless a very happy education prevents, our sensitive appetites must have become very strong, before reason can have force enough to call them to an account, and assume authority over them." From hence Dr. TURNBULL supposes it comes to pass,* "That though some few may, through the influence of virtuous example, be said to be sanctified from the womb, so liberal, so generous, so virtuous, so truly noble is their cast of mind; yet generally speaking, the whole world lieth in such wickedness, that, with respect to the far greater part of mankind, the *study of virtue is beginning to reform*, and is a severe struggle against bad habits early contracted, and deeply rooted; it is therefore putting off an old inveterate corrupt nature, and putting on a new form and temper; it is moulding ourselves anew; it is being born again, and becoming as children.—And how few are there in the world who escape its pollutions, so as not to be early in that class, or to be among the righteous that need no repentance?"

Dr. TAYLOR, though not so explicit, seems to hint at the same thing, (p. 192.) "It is by slow degrees that children come to the use of understanding; the animal passions being for some years the governing part of their constitution. And therefore, though they may be froward and apt to displease us, yet how far this is sin in them, we are not capable of judging. But it may suffice to say, that it is the will of God that children should have appetites and passions to regulate and restrain, that he hath given parents instructions and commands to discipline and inform their minds, that if parents first learned true wisdom for themselves, and then endeavoured to bring up their children in the way of virtue, there would be less wickedness in the world."

Concerning these things I would observe, that such a scheme is attended with the very same difficulties which they who advance it would avoid by it; liable to the same objections which they make against God's ordering it so, that men should be brought into being with a prevailing propensity to sin. For this scheme supposes, the Author of Nature has so ordered things, that men should come into being as moral agents, that is, should first have existence in a state and capacity of moral agency, under a prevailing propensity to sin. For that strength which sensitive appetites and animal passions come to by their habitual exercise, before persons come to the exercise of their rational powers, amounts to a strong propensity to sin, when they first come to the exercise of those rational powers, by the supposition: Because this is given as a

* *Chris. Phil. p.* 282, 283.

reason why the scale is turned for sin, and why, *generally speaking, the whole world lies in wickedness, and the study of virtue is a severe struggle against bad habits early contracted, and deeply rooted.* These deeply rooted habits must imply a tendency to sin; otherwise they could not account for that which they are brought to account for, namely, prevailing wickedness in the world: For that cause cannot account for an effect, which is supposed to have no *tendency* to that effect. And this *tendency* which is supposed, is altogether equivalent to a *natural tendency*, being as necessary to the subject. For it is supposed to be brought on the person who is the subject of it, when he has no power to oppose it; the habit, as Dr. TURNBULL says, becoming very strong, before reason can have force enough to call the passions to account, or assume authority over them. And it is supposed, that this necessity, by which men become subject to this propensity to sin, is from the ordering and disposal of the Author of Nature; and therefore must be as much from his hand, and as much without the hand of the person himself, as if he were first brought into being with such a propensity. Moreover, it is supposed that the effect is truly *wickedness.* For it is alledged as a cause why the whole world lies in *wickedness*, and why all but a very few are first in the class of the *wicked*, and not among the righteous *that need* no repentance. If they need *repentance*, what they are guilty of is truly and properly wickedness, or moral evil; for certainly men need no repentance for that which is no sin, or blameable evil. If, as a consequence of this propensity, the world lies in wickedness and the far greater part are of a wicked character, without doubt the far greater part go to eternal perdition; For death does not pick and choose, only for men of a righteous character. And certainly that is an evil, corrupt state of things, which naturally tends to, and issues in this consequence, that as it were the whole world lies and lives in wickedness, dies in wickedness, and perishes eternally. And this, by the supposition, is a state of things wholly ordered by the Author of Nature, before mankind are capable of having any hand in the affair. And is this any relief to the difficulties which these writers object against the doctrine of natural depravity?

And I might here also observe, that this way of accounting for the wickedness of the world amounts to just the same thing with that solution of man's depravity, mentioned before, against which Dr. T. cries out, as too gross to be admitted, (p. 188, 189.) *viz.* God creating the soul pure, and putting it into such a body as naturally tends to pollute it. For this scheme supposes, that God creates the soul pure, and puts it into a body, and into such a state in that body, that the natural

consequence is a strong propensity to sin, as soon as the soul is capable of sinning.

Dr. TURNBULL seems to suppose, that the matter could not have been ordered otherwise, consistent with the nature of things, than that animal passions should be so aforehand with reason, as that the consequence should be that which has been mentioned; because reason is a faculty of such a nature, that it can have strength and vigour no otherwise than by exercise and culture.* But can there be any force in this? Is there any thing in nature to make it impossible, but that the superior principles of man's nature should be so proportioned to the inferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence as the moral and natural ruin, and eternal perdition of the far greater part of mankind? Could not those superior principles be in much greater strength at first, and yet be capable of endless improvement? And what should hinder its being so ordered by the Creator, that they should improve by vastly swifter degrees than they do? If we are christians, we must be forced to allow it to be *possible* in the nature of things, that the principles of human nature should be so balanced, that the consequence should be no propensity to sin, in the very beginning of a capacity for moral agency; because we must own, that it was so in fact in *Adam*, when first created, and also in the man Christ Jesus; though the faculties of the latter were such as grew by culture and improvement, so that he increased in wisdom as he grew in stature.

Evasion V. Seeing men in this world are in a state of trial, it is fit that their virtue should meet with trials, and consequently that it should have opposition and temptation to overcome; not only from without, but from within, in the animal passions and appetites; that by the conflict and victory our virtue may be refined and established.† Agreeably to this Dr. T. (p. 253.) says, "Without a right use and application of our powers, were they naturally ever so perfect, we could not be judged fit to enter into the kingdom of God.—This gives a good reason why we are now in a state of trial and temptation, *viz.* to prove and discipline our minds, to season our virtue, and to fit us for the kingdom of God; for which, in the judgment of infinite wisdom, we cannot be qualified but by overcoming our present temptations." And, (p. 78. S.) "We are upon trial, and it is the will of our Father that our constitution should be attended with various passions and appetites, as well as our outward condition with various temptations." He says the like in several other places. To the same purpose very often Dr. TURNBULL, particularly *Chris. Phil.* p. 310. "What merit (says he) except from combat?

* *Mor. Phil.* p. 311. † Belsham.

What virtue without the encounter of such enemies, such temptations as arise both from within and from abroad? To be virtuous, is to prefer the pleasures of virtue to those which come into competition with it, and vice holds forth to tempt us; and to dare to adhere to truth and goodness, whatever pains and hardships it may cost. There must therefore, in order to the formation and trial, in order to the very being of virtue, be pleasures of a certain kind to make temptations to vice."

In reply to these things I would say, either the state of temptation, which is supposed to be ordered for men's trial, amounts on the whole to a prevailing tendency to that state of general wickedness and ruin which has been proved to take place, or it does not. If it does not amount to a tendency to such an effect, then how does it account for it? When it is inquired by what cause such an effect should come to pass, is it not absurd to allege a cause which is owned at the same time to have no tendency to such an effect? Which is as much as to confess, that it will not account for it. I think it has been demonstrated, that this effect must be owing to some prevailing tendency.—But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be said, that this state of things does imply a prevailing tendency to that effect which has been proved, *viz.* that all mankind, without one exception, sin against God, to their own deserved eternal ruin—and not only so, but sin thus immediately, as soon as capable of it, and continually, have more sin than virtue, and have guilt that infinitely outweighs the value of all the goodness any ever have, and that the generality of the world in all ages are extremely stupid and foolish, of a wicked character, and actually perish for ever—then I say, if the state of temptation implies a natural tendency to such an effect as this, it is a very evil, corrupt, and dreadful state of things, as has been already largely shewn.

Besides, such a state has a tendency to defeat its own supposed end, which is to refine, ripen, and perfect virtue, and so to fit men for the greater eternal happiness and glory: Whereas, the effect it tends to is the reverse of this, *viz.* general, eternal infamy and ruin, in all generations. It is supposed, that men's virtue must have passions and appetites to struggle with, in order to have the glory and reward of victory: but the consequence is, a prevailing, continual, and generally effectual tendency—not to men's victory *over evil appetites and passions*, and the glorious reward of that victory, but—to the victory of evil appetites and lusts *over men*, utterly and eternally destroying them. If a trial of virtue be requisite, yet the question is, Whence comes so general a failing in the trial, if there be no depravity of nature? If conflict and war be necessary, whence the necessity that there should be more

cowards than good soldiers? and whence is it necessary that the whole world as it were should lie in wickedness, and die in cowardice?

I might also here observe, that Dr. TURNBULL is not very consistent in supposing that combat with temptation is requisite to the *very being* of virtue. For I think it clearly follows from his own notion of virtue, that it must have a being prior to any virtuous or praiseworthy combat with temptation. For by his principles, all virtue lies in good affection, and no actions can be virtuous but what proceed from good affection.* Therefore, surely the combat itself can have no virtue in it, unless it proceeds from virtuous affection: And therefore virtue must have an existence before the combat, and be the cause of it.

CHAP. II.

Universal Mortality proves Original Sin; particularly the Death of Infants, with its various Circumstances.

THE universal reign of *death* over persons of all ages indiscriminately, with the awful circumstances and attendants of death, prove that men come sinful into the world.—It is needless here particularly to inquire, Whether God has not a sovereign right to set bounds to the lives of his own creatures, be they sinful or not; and as he gives life, so to take it away when he pleases? Or how far God has a right to bring extreme suffering and calamity on any innocent moral agent? For death, with the pains and agonies with which it is usually brought on, is not merely a limiting of existence, but is a most terrible calamity: and to such a creature as man—capable of conceiving of immortality, made with an earnest desire after it, capable of foresight and reflection on approaching death, and having an extreme dread of it—is a calamity above all others terrible. I say, it is needless elaborately to consider, whether God may not, consistent with his perfections by absolute sovereignty, bring so great a calamity on mankind when perfectly innocent. It is sufficient, if we have good evidence from scripture, that it is not agreeable to God's manner of dealing with mankind so to do.

It is manifest, that mankind were not originally subjected to this calamity: God brought it on them afterwards, on occasion of man's sin, when manifesting his great displeasure, and by a sentence pronounced by him as a judge; which Dr. T. often confesses. Sin entered into the world, as the apostle

* *Chris. Phil.* p. 113, 114, 115.

says, and death by sin. Which certainly leads us to suppose, that this affair was ordered, not merely by the sovereignty of a creator, but by the righteousness of a judge. And the scripture every where speaks of all great afflictions and calamities which God in his providence brings on mankind, as testimonies of his displeasure for sin, in the subjects of those calamities; excepting those sufferings which are to atone for the sins of others. He ever taught his people to look on such calamities as his *rod*, *the rod of* his *anger*, his *frowns*, the *hidings of his face* in displeasure. Hence such calamities are in scripture so often called by the name of *judgments*, being what God brings on men as a *judge*, executing a righteous sentence for transgression. Yea, they are often called by the name of *wrath*, especially calamities consisting or issuing in death.* And hence also is that which Dr. T. would have us take so much notice of, that sometimes, in the scripture, calamity and suffering is called by such names as *sin*, *iniquity*, *being guilty*, &c. which is evidently by a metonymy of the cause for the effect. It is not likely that, in the language used of old among God's people, calamity or suffering would have been called by the names of sin and guilt, if it had been so far from having any connection with sin, that even death itself, which is always spoken of as the most terrible of calamities, is not so much as any sign of the sinfulness of the subject, or any testimony of God's displeasure for his guilt, as Dr. T. supposes.

Death is spoken of in scripture as the *chief* of calamities, the most extreme and terrible of all natural evils in this world. *Deadly destruction* is spoken of as the most terrible destruction. (1 Sam. v. 11.) *Deadly sorrow*, as the most extreme sorrow. (Isai. xvii. 11. Matt. xxvi. 38.) And *deadly enemies*, as the most bitter and terrible enemies. (Psal. xvii. 9.) The extremity of Christ's sufferings is represented by his suffering *unto death*. (Phil. ii. 8. and other places.) Hence the greatest testimonies of God's anger for the sins of men in this world, have been by inflicting *death*; as on the sinners of the old world; on the inhabitants of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*; on *Onan*, *Pharaoh*, and the *Egyptians*; on *Nadab* and *Abihu*, *Corah* and his company, and the rest of the rebels in the wilderness; on the wicked inhabitants of *Canaan*; on *Hophni* and *Phinehas*, *Ananias* and *Sapphira*, and the unbelieving *Jews*, upon whom wrath came to the uttermost, in the time of the last destruction of *Jerusalem*. This calamity is often spoken of as in a peculiar manner the fruit of guilt. Exod. xxviii. 43. *That they bear not iniquity and* die. Levit. xxii. 9. *Lest they bear*

* See Levit. x. 6. Numb. i. 53. and xviii. 5. Josh. ix. 20. 2 Chron. xxiv. 18. and xix. 2, 10. and xxviii. 13. and xxxii. 25. Ezra vii. 23. Neh. xiii. 18. Zech. vii. 12. and many other places.

sin for it and die. (So Num. xviii. 22. compared with Levit. x. 1, 2.) The very light of nature, or tradition from ancient revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine vengeance. Thus we have an account, (Acts xxviii. 4.) That *when the barbarians saw the venemous beast hang on* Paul's *hand, they said among themselves, no doubt this man is a murderer, whom though he hath escaped the seas, yet* VENGEANCE SUFFERETH NOT TO LIVE.

Calamities very small in comparison of the universal temporal destruction of mankind by death, are spoken of as manifest indications of God's great displeasure for the sinfulness of the subject; such as the destruction of particular cities, countries, or numbers of men, by war or pestilence. Deut. xxix. 24. *All nations shall say, Wherefore hath the Lord done thus unto this land? what meaneth the heat of this great anger?* (Compare Deut. xxxii. 30. 1 Kings ix. 8. and Jer. xxii. 8, 9.) These calamities, thus spoken of as plain testimonies of God's great anger, consisted only in *hastening* on that death, which otherwise, by God's disposal, would most certainly have come in a short time. Now to take off thirty or forty years from seventy or eighty, (supposing it to be so much, one with another, in the time of these extraordinary judgments) is but a small matter, in comparison of God first making man mortal, cutting off his hope of immortality, subjecting him to inevitable death, which his nature so exceedingly dreads; and afterwards shortening his life further, by cutting off more than eight hundred years of it: so bringing it to be less than a twelfth part of what it was in the first ages of the world. Besides that innumerable multitudes in the common course of things, without any extraordinary judgment, die in youth, in childhood, and infancy. Therefore how inconsiderable a thing is the additional or hastened destruction, that is sometimes brought on a particular city or country by war, compared with that universal havock which death makes of the whole human race, from generation to generation, without distinction of sex, age, quality, or condition; with all the infinitely various dismal circumstances, torments, and agonies, which attend the death of old and young, adult persons and little infants? If those particular and comparatively trivial calamities, extending perhaps not to more than the thousandth part of one generation, are clear evidences of God's great anger; certainly this universal destruction—by which the whole world, in all generations, is swallowed up as by a flood that nothing can resist—must be a most glaring manifestation of God's anger for the sinfulness of mankind. Yea, the scripture is express, that it is so: (Psal. xc. 3, &c.) "Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, return, ye

children of men.—Thou carriest them away as with a flood: They are as a sleep: In the morning they are like grass, which groweth up: in the morning it flourisheth and groweth up; in the evening it is cut down and withereth. For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled. Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the light of thy countenance. For all our days are passed away in thy wrath: We spend our years as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten: And if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow, for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine anger? According to thy fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our days that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom." How plain and full is this testimony, that the general mortality of mankind is an evidence of God's anger for the sin of those who are the subjects of such a dispensation?

Abimelech speaks of it as what he had reason to conclude from God's nature and perfection, *that he would not slay a righteous nation.* Gen. xx. 4. By *righteous* evidently meaning *innocent.* And if so, much less *will God slay a righteous world* —consisting of so many nations, repeating the great slaughter in every generation—or subject the whole world of mankind to death, when they are considered as innocent, as *Dr. T.* supposes. We have from time to time in scripture such phrases as—*worthy of death*, and *guilty of death:* But certainly the righteous Judge of all the earth will not bring death on thousands of millions, not only that are not worthy of death, but are worthy of no punishment at all.

Dr. T. from time to time speaks of affliction and death as a great *benefit*, as they increase the vanity of all earthly things, and tend to excite sober reflections, and to induce us to be moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body, and to mortify pride and ambition, &c.* To this I would say,

I. It is not denied but God may see it needful for mankind in their present state, that they should be mortal, and subject to outward afflictions, to restrain their lusts, mortify their pride, &c. But then is it not an evidence of man's *depravity*, that it is so? Is it not an evidence of distemper of mind, yea, strong disease, when man stands in need of such sharp medicines, such severe and terrible means to restrain his lusts, keep down his pride, and to make him willing and obedient to God? It must be owing to a corrupt and ungrateful heart, if the riches of divine bounty in bestowing life and prosperity, things comfortable and pleasant, will not engage the heart to God and virtue, love and obedience. Whereas

* P. 21, 67, and other places.

he must always have the *rod* held over him, be often *chastised*, and held under the apprehensions of death, to keep him from running wild in pride, contempt and rebellion; ungratefully using the blessings dealt forth from God's hand, in sinning against him, and serving his enemies. If man has no natural disingenuity of heart, it must be a mysterious thing indeed, that the sweet blessings of God's bounty have not as powerful an influence to restrain him from sinning against God, as terrible afflictions If any thing can be a proof of a perverse and vile disposition, this must be a proof of it, that men should be most apt to forget and despise God, when his providence is most kind; and that they should need to have God chastising them with great severity, and even killing them, to keep them in order. If we were as much disposed to gratitude to God for his benefits, as we are to anger at our fellow-creatures for injuries, as we must be (so far as I can see) if we are not of a depraved heart; then the sweetness of divine bounty, and the height of every enjoyment pleasing to innocent human nature, would be as powerful incentives to a proper regard for God—tending as much to promote religion and virtue—as to have the world filled with calamities, and to have God (to use the language of *Hezekiah*, Isaiah xxxviii. 13. describing death and its agonies) *as a lion, breaking all our bones, and from day even to night, making an end of us.*

Dr. T. himself, (p. 252.) says, "That our first parents before the fall were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love, and obedience." Which is as much as to say, a condition proper to engage them to the exercise and practice of all religion. And if the paradisaical state was proper to engage to all religion and duty, and men still come into the world with hearts as good as the two first of the species, why is it not proper to engage them to it still? What need of so vastly changing man's state, depriving him of all those blessings, and instead of them allotting to him a world full of briers and thorns, affliction, calamity, and death, to engage him to it? The taking away of life, and all those pleasant enjoyments man had at first, by a permanent constitution, would be no stated benefit to mankind, unless there was in them a stated disposition to abuse such blessings. The taking of them away is supposed to be a benefit, under the notion of their tending to lead men to sin: But they would have no such tendency, at least in a *stated* manner, unless there was in men a *fixed* tendency to make that unreasonable misimprovement of them. Such a temper of mind as amounts to a disposition to make such a misimprovement of blessings, is often spoken of in scripture, as most astonishingly vile and perverse. So concerning *Israel* abusing the blessings of *Canaan*, that land flowing with milk and honey; their ingratitude in it is spoken of

by the as enough to astonish all heaven and earth, an han brutish stupidity and vileness. Jer. ii. 7. *I m into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit thereof, rooaness thereof. But when ye entered, ye defiled my c.* See the following verses, especially verse 12. *Be nished, O ye heavens, at this.* So Isai. i. 2—4. *Hear, O ens, and give ear, O earth; I have nourished and brought up ren, and they have rebelled against me. The ox knoweth owner, and the ass his master's crib; but my people doth not , Israel doth not consider. Ah, sinful nation! a people with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that are corrup-* (Compare Deut. xxxii. 6—19.) If to be disposed thus buse the blessings of so fruitful and pleasant a land as *aan*, showed so great depravity, surely it would be an evi-ice of a corruption no less astonishing, to be inclined to abuse ure blessings of *Eden*, and the garden of God.

2. If death be brought on mankind only as a benefit, and manner which Dr. T. mentions,—to mortify or mode-carnal appetites and affections, wean them from the cite them to sober reflections, and lead them to the obedience of God, &c.—is it not strange that it should eavily on infants, who are not capable of making any rovement of it; so that many more of mankind suffer infancy, than in any other equal part of the age of Our author sometimes hints, that the death of infants may be for the correction and punishment of parents. But hath God any need of such methods to add to parents' afflictions? Are there not other ways for increasing their trouble, without destroying the lives of such multitudes of those who are perfectly innocent, and who, on the supposition, have in no respect any sin belonging to them? On whom death comes at an age, when not only the subjects are not capable of reflection, or making any improvement of it, either in suffering, or the expectation of it: but also at an age, when parents and friends—who alone can improve, and whom Dr. T. supposes alone to be punished by it—suffer least by being bereaved of them; though the infants themselves sometimes suffer to great extremity?

3. To suppose, as Dr. T. does, that death is brought on mankind in consequence of *Adam's* sin, not at all as a calamity, but only as a *favour* and benefit, is contrary to the gospel; which teaches, that when Christ, as the second *Adam*, comes to remove and destroy that death which came by the first *Adam*, he finds it not as a friend, but an enemy, 1 Cor. xv. 22. *For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;* (with ver. 25. and 26.) *For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last ENEMY that shall be destroyed, is DEATH.*

Dr. T. urges, that the afflictions to which mankind are subjected, and particularly their common mortality, are represented in scripture as the chastisements of our heavenly Father; and therefore are designed for our spiritual good, and consequently are not of the nature of punishments. (So in p. 68, 69, 38, 39. S.)

Though I think the thing asserted far from being true, *viz.* that the scripture represents the afflictions of mankind in general, and particularly their common mortality, as the chastisement of an heavenly Father; yet it is needless to stand to dispute that matter. For if it be so, it will be no argument that the afflictions and death of mankind are not evidences of their sinfulness. Those would be strange chastisements from the hand of a wise and good Father, which are wholly for nothing; especially such severe chastisements, as to break the child's bones, when at the same time the father does not suppose any guilt, fault, or offence, in any respect, belonging to the child; but it is chastised in this terrible manner only for fear that it will be faulty hereafter. I say, these would be a strange sort of chastisements; yea, though he should be able to make it up to the child afterwards. Dr. T. speaks of representations made by the whole current of scripture; I am certain it is not agreeable to the current of scripture to represent divine fatherly chastisements after this manner. It is true, the scripture supposes such chastenings to be the fruit of God's goodness; yet at the same time it evermore represents them as being for the *sin* of the subject, and as evidences of the divine displeasure for its *sinfulness*. Thus the apostle (1 *Cor.* xi. 30—32.) speaks of God's chastening his people by mortal sickness, for their good, *that they might not be condemned with the world*, and yet signifies that it was *for their sin;* FOR THIS CAUSE *many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep:* that is, for the profaneness and sinful disorder before mentioned. So *Elihu*, (Job xxxiii. 16, &c.) speaks of the same *chastening* by sickness, as for men's good; *to withdraw man from his* sinful *purpose, and to hide pride from man, and keep back his soul from the pit; that therefore God chastens man with pain on his bed, and the multitude of his bones with strong pain.* But these chastenings are for his SINS, as appears by what follows; (ver. 28.) Where it is observed, that when God by this means has ought men to *repent*, and humbly *confess their sins*, he delivers them. Again, the same *Elihu*, speaking of the unfailing love of God to the righteous, even when he *chastens them*, and *they are bound in fetters and holden in cords of affliction*, (Chap. xxxvi. 7, &c.) yet speaks of these chastenings as being for their SINS, (ver. 9.) *Then he sheweth them their work, and their transgressions that they have exceeded.* So *David*, (Psal. xxx.—) speaks of God's *chastening* by some afflictions, as being for his

good, and issuing joyfully; and yet being the fruit of God's anger for his sin, (ver. 5.) *God's ANGER endureth but for a moment*, &c. (compare Psal. cxix. 67, 71, 75.) God's fatherly chastisements are spoken of as being for sin. (2 Sam. vii. 14, 15.) *I will be his father, and he shall be my son. If he commit* iniquity, *I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men; but my mercy shall not depart away from him.* So the prophet *Jeremiah* speaks of the great affliction that God's people suffered in the time of the captivity, as being for their *good*. (Lam. iii. 25, &c.) But yet these chastisements are spoken of as being for their SIN, (see especially ver. 39, 40.) So Christ says, Rev. iii. 19. *As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten.* But the words following shew, that these chastenings from love are for sin that should be repented of: *Be zealous therefore, and repent.* And though Christ tells us they are blessed that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, and have reason to rejoice and be exceeding glad; yet even the persecutions of God's people, as ordered in divine Providence, are spoken of as divine chastenings for sin, like the just corrections of a father when the children deserve them, Heb. xii. The apostle there speaking to the Christians concerning the persecutions which they suffered, calls their sufferings by the name of divine *rebukes*; which implies testifying *against a fault:* And that they may not be discouraged, puts them in mind, that *whom the Lord loves he chastens, and scourgeth every son that he receiveth.* It is also very plain, that the persecutions of God's people, as they are from the disposing hand of God, are chastisements for SIN.*

If divine chastisements in general are certain evidences that the subjects are not wholly without sin some way belonging to them, then in a peculiar manner is death so; for these reasons:

(I.) Because slaying, or delivering to death, is often spoken of as, in general, a more awful thing than the chastisements which are endured in this life. Thus, Psal. cxviii. 17, 18. *I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord. The Lord hath chastened me sore; but he hath not given me over unto death.* So the Psalmist, (Psal. lxxxviii. 15.) setting forth the extremity of his affliction, represents it as what was next to death. *I am afflicted, and ready to die—while I suffer thy terrors, I am distracted.* (See 1 Sam. xx. 3.) And so God's *tenderness* towards persons under chastisement, is, from time to time, set forth, that he did not proceed so far as to make

* See 1 Pet. iv. 17, 18, compared with Prov. ix. 31. See also Psal. lxix. 4—9.

an end of them by death.* God's people often pray, when under great affliction, that God would not proceed to this as the greatest extremity. Psal. xiii. 3. *Consider, and hear me, O Lord, my God; lighten mine eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death.*†

Especially may death be looked upon as the most extreme of all temporal sufferings, when attended with such dreadful circumstances and extreme pains, as those with which providence sometimes brings it on *infants;* as on the children that were offered up to *Moloch* and some other idols, who were tormented to death in burning brass. Dr. T. says, (p. 83. 128. S.) "The Lord of all Being can never want time, and place, and power, to compensate abundantly any sufferings infants now undergo in subserviency to his good providence." But there are no bounds to such a licence, in evading evidences from fact. It might as well be said, that there is not and cannot be any such thing as evidence, from events of God's displeasure; which is most contrary to the whole current of scripture. as may appear in part from what has been observed. This gentleman might as well go further still, and say, that God may cast guiltless persons into hell-fire, to remain there in the most unutterable torments for ages of ages, (which bear no greater proportion to eternity than a quarter of an hour) and if he does so, it is no evidence of God's displeasure; because he can never want time, place, and power, abundantly to compensate their sufferings afterwards. If it be so, it is not to the purpose, as long as the scripture so abundantly teaches us to look on great calamities and sufferings which God brings on men, especially death, as marks of his displeasure for sin, and for sin belonging to them who suffer.

(2.) Another thing—which may well lead us to suppose death, in a peculiar manner, above other temporal sufferings, to be intended as a testimony of God's displeasure for sin—is that death is attended with that awful appearance, that gloomy and terrible aspect, which naturally suggests to our minds God's awful displeasure. Of this Dr. T. himself takes particular notice, when (p. 69.) speaking of death; "Herein (says he) have we before our eyes a striking demonstration, that sin is infinitely hateful to God, and the corruption and ruin of our nature. Nothing is more proper than such a sight to give us the utmost abhorrence of all iniquity, &c." Now, if death be no testimony of God's displeasure for sin—no evidence that the subject is looked upon by him who inflicts it, as any other than perfectly innocent, free from all imputation of guilt, and

* As in Psal. lxxviii. 38, 39, Psal. ciii. 9, with ver. 14, 15, Psal. xxx. 2, 3, 9 and Job xxxiii. 22—24.

† So Job x. 9. Psal. vi 1—5. lxxxviii. 9, 10, 11. and cxliii. 7.

treated only as an object of favour—is it not strange, that God should annex to it such affecting appearances of his hatred and anger for sin, more than to other chastisements? Which yet the scripture teaches us are always for sin. These gloomy and striking manifestations of God's hatred of sin attending death, are equivalent to the awful frowns of God attending the stroke of his hand. If we should see a wise and just father chastising his child, mixing terrible frowns with severe strokes, we should justly argue, that the father considered his child as having in him something displeasing, and that he did not thus treat his child *only* under a notion of *mortifying* him, and preventing his being faulty *hereafter*, and making it up to him afterwards, when he had been perfectly innocent, and without fault, either of action or disposition.

We may well argue from these things, that infants are not sinless, but are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes so heavily on mankind at this early period. But, besides the mortality of infants in general, there are some *particular cases* of their death attended with circumstances, which, in a peculiar manner, give evidence of their sinfulness, and of their just exposedness to divine wrath. Particularly,

The destroying of the infants in *Sodom* and the neighbouring cities, may be pleaded in evidence; for these cities, destroyed in so miraculous and awful a manner, are set forth as a signal example of God's dreadful vengeance for sin. (*Jude*, ver. 7.) God did not reprove, but manifestly countenanced *Abraham*, when he said with respect to the destruction of *Sodom*, (Gen. xviii. 23, 25.) *Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked?—That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* *Abraham's* words imply that God would not destroy the *innocent* with the *guilty*. We may well understand *innocent* as included in the word *righteous*, according to the language usual in scripture, in speaking of such cases of judgment and punishment.* Eliphaz says, Job iv. 7. *Who ever perished, being* INNOCENT? *or where were the* RIGHTEOUS *cut off?* We see what great care God took that *Lot* should not be involved in that destruction. He was miraculously rescued by angels, sent on purpose; who laid hold on him, brought him, set him without the gates of the city, and told him that they could do nothing till he was out of the way. (*Gen.* xix. 22.) And not only was he thus miraculously delivered, but his two wicked daughters for his sake. The

* Gen. xx. 4. Exod. xxiii. 7. Deut. xxv. 1. 2 Sam. iv. 11. 2 Chron. vi. 23. and Prov. xviii. 5.

whole affair, both the destruction and the rescue, was miraculous; and God could as easily have delivered the infants which were in those cities. And if they had been without sin, their perfect innocency, one should think, would have pleaded much more strongly for them, than those lewd women's relation to *Lot* pleaded for them. When in such a case, we must suppose these infants much further from deserving to be involved in that destruction, than even *Lot* himself. To say, that God could make it up to those infants in another world, must be an insufficient reply. For so he could as easily have made it up to *Lot*, or to *ten* or *fifty righteous*, if they had been destroyed in the same fire. Nevertheless, it is plainly signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise and holy proceedings of *the Judge of all the earth.*

Since God declared, that if there had been found but ten righteous in *Sodom*, he would have spared the whole city for their sakes, may we not well suppose, if infants are perfectly innocent, that he would have spared the *old world*, in which there were, without doubt, many hundred thousand infants, and in general, one in every family, whose perfect innocence pleaded for its preservation? Especially when such vast care was taken to save *Noah* and his family, (some of whom, one at least, seem to have been none of the best) that they might not be involved in that destruction. If the perfect sinlessness of infants had been a notion entertained among the people of God in the ages next following the flood—handed down from *Noah* and his children, who well knew that vast multitudes of infants perished in the flood—is it likely that *Eliphaz*, who lived within a few generations of *Shem* and *Noah*, would have said to *Job*, (Job iv. 7.) *Who ever perished, being innocent? and when were the righteous cut off?* Especially, since in the same discourse (chap. v. 1.) he appeals to the tradition of the ancients for a confirmation of this very point. (also in chap. xv. 7—10 and xxii. 15, 16.) and he mentions the destruction of the wicked by the flood, as an instance of that perishing of the wicked which he supposes to be peculiar to them, for *Job's* conviction; in which *the wicked were cut down out of time, their foundation being overflown with a flood.* Where it is also observable, that he speaks of such an *untimeliness* of death as they suffered by the flood, as one evidence of guilt; as he also does, chap. xv. 32, 33. *It shall be accomplished before his time; and his branch shall not be green.* But those who were destroyed by the flood in infancy, above all the rest, were *cut down out of time;* when instead of living above nine hundred years, according to the common period of man's life at that time, many were cut down before they were one year old.

When God executed vengeance on the an[illegible] inhabitants

of *Canaan*, he not only did not spare their cities and families for the sake of their infants, nor took care that they should not be involved in the destruction; but he often repeated his express commands, that their infants should not be spared, should be utterly destroyed, without any pity; while *hab* the *harlot* (who had been far from innocence, though she ressed her faith in entertaining, and safely dismissing the es) was preserved, and all her friends for her sake. And n God executed his wrath on the *Egyptians* by slaying first born—though the children of *Israel*, who were most them wicked men, as was before shewn, were wonderfully red by the destroying angel, yet—the *Egyptian* infants e not spared. They not only were not rescued by the angel, and no miracle wrought to save them (as was observed in the case of the infants of *Sodom*) but the angel destroyed them by his own immediate hand, and a miracle was wrought to kill them.

Not to be particular concerning the command by *Moses*, respecting the destruction of the infants of the *Midianites*; (Numb. xxxi. 17.) And that given to *Saul* to destroy all the infants of the *Amalekites*; (1 Sam. xv. 3.) and what is said concerning *Edom*, (Psal. cxxxvii. 9.) *Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones*; I proceed to take notice of something remarkable concerning the destruction of *Jerusalem*, represented in Ezek. ix. when command was given to destroy the inhabitants, ver. 1—8. And this reason is given for it, that their iniquity required it, and it was a just recompence of their sin, (ver. 9, 10.) God, at the same time was most particular and exact in his care, that such as had proved by their behaviour, that they were not partakers in the abominations of the city, should by no means be involved in the slaughter. Command was given to the angel to go through the city, and set a mark upon their foreheads, and the destroying angel had a strict charge not to come near any man on whom was the mark; yet the infants were not marked, nor a word said of sparing them: On the contrary, infants were expressly mentioned as those that should be utterly destroyed, without pity, (ver. 5, 6.) *Go through the city and smite: Let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and* YOUNG, *both maids and* LITTLE CHILDREN: *But come not near any man upon whom is the mark.*

And if any should suspect that such instances as these were peculiar to a more severe dispensation, under the Old Testament, let us consider a remarkable instance in the days of the glorious gospel of the grace of God; even the last destruction of *Jerusalem*. This was far more terrible, and with greater testimonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction of *Sodom*, or of *Jerusalem* in *Nebuchadnezzar's* time, or any

thing that ever had happened to any city or people from the beginning of the world to that time. (Agreeable to Matt. xxiv. 21, and Luke xxi. 22, 23.) At that time particular care was taken to distinguish and to deliver God's people; as foretold DAN. xii. 1. And we have in the New Testament a particular account of the care Christ took for the preservation of his followers: He gave them a sign by which they might know when the desolation of the city was nigh, that they who were in *Jerusalem* might flee to the mountains and escape. And, as history relates, the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a place in the mountains called *Pella*, and were preserved. Yet no care was taken to preserve the infants of the city, in general; but according to the predictions of that event, they were involved with others in that great destruction. So heavily did the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified, Luke xxiii. 29. *Behold the days are coming in which they shall say, Blessed are the barren, and the womb that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck:* And that prophecy in Deut. xxxii. 21—25. which has undoubtedly a special respect to this very time, and is so applied by the best commentators;—*I will provoke them to jealousy, with those that are not a people: For a fire is kindled in mine anger,—and it shall burn to the lowest hell. I will heap mischiefs upon them: I will spend mine arrows upon them. They shall be burnt with hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and bitter destruction. The sword without, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man, and the virgin, the* SUCKLING *also, with the man of grey hairs.* And by the history of that destruction it appears, that then was a remarkable fulfilment of Deut. xxviii. 53—57. concerning *parents eating their children in the siege,—and the tender and delicate woman eating her new-born child.* And here it must be remembered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations who shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath towards *infants;* who, equally with the rest, were the subject of the destruction. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made a very considerable part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any distinction made in divine Providence, and yet this was no evidence at all of God's displeasure with any of them; then being the subjects of such a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against *any* of the inhabitants, to the reason of *all nations*, or any nation, or so much as one person.

PART II.

CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE, WHICH PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

CHAPTER I.

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness, or moral Rectitude of heart?

THE doctrine of *Original Righteousness*, or the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connection, in several respects, with the doctrine of original sin. Dr. T. was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place, remove this author's main objection against this doctrine, and then shew how it may be inferred from the account which *Moses* gives us in the *three first chapters of Genesis.*

Dr. T.'s grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: That it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holi-

ness: That a *necessary* holiness is *no* holiness. So p. 180, where he observes, "That *Adam* must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." (See also p. 250, 251.) In p. 161, S. he says, "To say that God not only endowed *Adam* with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. TURNBULL in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing to our own choice and diligent culture.

With respect to this I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. T.'s own notions of virtue. Therefore, if to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection, and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall shew plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself.

In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds, is so; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that *good* choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion—not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but—that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good is no further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the character of that choice? There can according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetites; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.

The following things, in Mr. HUTCHESON's inquiry concerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason. (Sec II. p. 132, 133.) "Every action which we apprehend

as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to FLOW FROM some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action CONSEQUENT UPON IT.—All the actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to FLOW FROM some affections towards the Deity: And whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose to FLOW FROM affections towards our fellow creatures.—Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue." In these things Dr. TURNBULL expressly agrees with Mr. HUTCHESON, his admired author.*

If a virtuous disposition or affection is before its acts, then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. Therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice: And so, no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeably to this Mr. HUTCHESON says, (*Ibid.* sect. III. p. 196, 197.) "I know not for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct towards private happiness? If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love."

And if we consider what Dr. T. declares, as his own notion of the essence of virtue, and which he so confidently and often affirms, that it should follow choice, and proceed from it, we shall find it is no less repugnant to that sentiment, than it is to the nature of things and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. HUTCHESON's, that the essence of virtue lies in *good affection*, and particularly in benevolence or *love:* As he very fully declares in these words in his Key,† "That the word that signifies goodness and mercy should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that *love* is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of scripture, and the nature of things, includes all *moral rectitude*; which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into

* *Mor. Phil.* p. 112—115. p. 142. *et alibi passim.* † Marginal Note annexed to § 358.

this *single principle.*" If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have *moral rectitude*, but what proceeds from *t. is principle.* And consequently no act of volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection, and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a principle of benevolence or *love;* for he insists that all genuine moral rectitude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle. And yet the principle of benevolence itself, cannot be virtuous unless it proceeds from choice; for he affirms, that nothing can have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that virtuous love, as the principle of all virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and be the principle or spring of it; and yet virtuous choice must go before virtuous benevolence, and be the spring of that. If a virtuous act of choice goes before a principle of benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous act is something distinct from that principle which follows it and is its effect. So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea the spring and source of all virtue, *viz.* a virtuous choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle of *love.*

Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. T. (p. 128.) says, *the cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth or which proceedeth from it:* And so he argues, that if the effect be *bad*, the cause *alone* is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the effect *is good*, the cause *alone* is righteous or virtuous. To the cause is to be ascribed all the praise of the good effect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr. Taylor says, Adam must *choose* to be righteous before he was righteous, and if it be essential to the nature of righteousness or moral rectitude that it be the effect of choice, and hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral rectitude, unless it proceeds from choice; then not to the principle of benevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of all moral rectitude in every part of it, being resolved into that single principle of benevolence, no moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle: But all is to be resolved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause.

But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that there is no moral rectitude or virtue in that first act of choice, that is the cause of all consequent virtue. This follows two ways; 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent principle, which is the effect; and therefore no part of it can lie

in the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least, can have no virtue or righteousness at all; because it does not proceed from any foregoing choice. For Dr. *T.* insists, that a man must first have reflection and choice, before he can have righteousness; and that it is essential to holiness that it proceed from choice. So that the first choice from which holiness proceeds can have no virtue at all, because, by the supposition, it does not proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence, if it be essential to holiness that it proceeds from choice, it must oceed from an unholy choice; unless the first holy choice can *before itself.*

And with respect to Adam, let us consider how, upon Dr. .'s principles, it was possible he ever should have any such ..ing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state wherein God created him, he could have no such thing as love to God, or any benevolence in his heart. For if so, there would have been original righteousness; there would have been *genuine moral rectitude;* nothing would have been wanting: For our author says, *True genuine moral rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this single principle.* But if he were wholly without any such thing as love to God or any virtuous love, how should he come by virtue? The answer doubtless will be, by act of choice: He must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose to be virtuous? It could not be from love to God, or any virtuous principle, that he chose it; for, by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart. And if he chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this author, there is no virtue in his choice; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single principle of love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice that are not virtuous? But this does not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is no way that can possibly be devised, in consistence with Dr. *T.'s* scheme, in which Adam ever could have any righteousness, or could either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform any one virtuous act.

These confused inconsistent assertions concerning virtue and moral rectitude, arise from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning *freedom of will*, as if it consisted in the will's *self-determining power*, supposed to be necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of these errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters, with its evidences, I have, according to my ability, fully and largely considered in my "*Inquiry*" on that subject; to which I must refer the reader who desires further satisfaction, and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.*

* See the first part of this volume.

Having considered this great argument and pretended demonstration of Dr. *T.* against original righteousness; I proceed to the *proofs* of the doctrine. And, in the first place, I would consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the *three first* chapters of *Genesis*: Or whether the history there delivered does not lead us to suppose that our *first parents* were created in a state of moral rectitude and holiness.

I. This history leads us to suppose that Adam's sin with relation to the forbidden fruit was the *first* sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his existence; and consequently, created or brought into existence righteous. In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly *innocent*, as to be perfectly *righteous*. It must be the same, because there can no more be any *medium* between sin and righteousness, or between being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight and crooked, in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately as a moral agent; and therefore he was immediately under a rule of *right* action. He was obliged as soon as he existed to *act aright*. And if he was obliged to act aright as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be *inclined* to act right. Dr. *T.* says, (p. 166. S.) "Adam could not *sin* without a sinful *inclination*:*" and just for the same reason, he could not do *aright* without an *inclination* to right action. And as he was obliged to act rightly from the first moment of his existence, and did so, till he sinned in reference to the forbidden fruit, he must have had a disposition of heart to do rightly the first moment of his existence; and that is the same as to be created or brought into existence with an inclination to right action, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.

Here it will be in vain to say, "It is true, that it was *Adam's* duty to have a good disposition or inclination, as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the nature of things; but as it could not be without *time* to establish such a habit, which requires antecedent thought, reflection, and repeated right action; therefore all that *Adam* could be obliged to, in the first place, was to reflect, and consider things in a right manner, and apply himself to right action, in order to obtain a right disposition:" for this supposes, that even the reflection and consideration to which he was obliged, was *right action*. Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was *right*: And therefore he must have an *inclination* to this right action imme-

* This is doubtless true: For although there was no natural *sinful* inclination in *Adam*, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was begotten in him by the delusion and error he was led into; and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual eating.

diately, before he could perform those first right actions. And as the inclination to them should be right, the principle or disposition from which he performed even those actions, must be good: Otherwise the actions would not be right in the sight of him who looks at the heart; nor would they answer his obligations, if he had done them for some sinister end, and not from a regard to God and his duty. Therefore there must have been a regard to God and his duty implanted in him at his first existence: Otherwise it is certain, he would have done nothing from a regard to God and his duty; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The very supposition of a *disposition* to right action being first obtained by repeated right *action*, is grossly inconsistent with itself: For it supposes a course of right action *before* there is a disposition to perform any right action.

These are no invented quibbles or sophisms. If God expected from *Adam* any obedience or duty to him at all, when he first made him—whether it was in reflecting, considering, or any way exerting his faculties—then he was expected immediately to exercise love to God. For how could it be expected that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God's commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard to him in his heart, nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to have; then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love to God: And if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no avoiding the consequence. Not only external duties, but internal ones, such as summarily consist in love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any duty at all was required. For it is most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties of understanding and will, being required to perform external duties, without internal. Dr. T. himself observes, that love is the fulfilling of the law, and that *all moral rectitude, even every part of it, must be resolved into that single principle.* Therefore, if any morally right act at all, reflection, consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately on his first existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of divine *love* which implies the whole of moral rectitude in every part of it, according to our author's own doctrine; and so the whole of moral rectitude or righteousness must begin with his existence: Which is the thing taught in the doctrine of original righteousness.

Let us consider how it could be otherwise than that Adam was always, in every moment of his existence, obliged to ex-

ercise such respect of heart towards every object, as was agreeable to the apparent merit of that object. For instance, would it not at any time have become Adam, on the exhibition of God's infinite goodness to him, to have exercised answerable gratitude; and would not the contrary have been unbecoming and odious? And if something had been presented to Adam's view transcendently amiable in itself, for instance, the glorious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish, and delight in it? Would not such an object have merited this? And if the view of an object so amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to the plain dictates of our understanding, have shewn an unbecoming temper of mind? Time, by culture, to form and establish a good disposition, would not have taken off the odiousness of the temper. And if there had been never so much time, I do not see how it could be expected he should improve it aright in order to obtain a good disposition, if he had not already some good disposition to engage him to it.

That belonging to the will, and disposition of the heart, which is in *itself* either odious or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam's virtue or sin, in any moment of his existence; if there be any such thing as virtue or vice; by which terms nothing can be meant, but something in our moral disposition and behaviour which is becoming or unbecoming, amiable or odious.

Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable: Otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or will; perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice, or aversion, towards any thing as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of things excellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things which were most worthy of it, then his dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium between these.

II. This notion of Adam being created without a principle of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. T.'s scheme, is inconsistent with what the history in the beginning of *Genesis* leads us to suppose of the great favours and smiles of heaven, which Adam enjoyed while he remained in innocency. The *Mosaic* account suggests to us that till Adam

only without toil or sorrow, pain or disease, to humble and mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them from the world, but—in the midst of the most exquisite and alluring sensitive delights; the reverse in every respect, and the highest degree, of that most gracious state of requisite means and great advantages, which mankind now enjoy! If mankind now under these vast restraints and great advantages, are not restrained from general, and as it were universal wickedness, how could it be expected that Adam and Eve, created with no better hearts than men bring into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disadvantages should escape it?

These things are not agreeable to *Moses's* account. That represents a happy state of peculiar favours and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming afterwards; but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favours and testimonies of love followed the apostacy. And the curse before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so high a degree the reverse of such means, means so necessary for such a creature as innocent man, and in all their multitude and fulness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere delusion! There was indeed a great shew of favour in placing man in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden, it seems, with all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of *Sodom*. It was but a mere bait, (God forbid the blasphemy) the more effectually enticing by its beauty and deliciousness to Adam's eternal ruin. Which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing he was the first man, having no capacity superior to his posterity, and wholly without the advantage of their observations, experiences, and improvements.

I proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the doctrine we are upon, from another part of the holy scripture. A very clear text for *original righteousness*, we have in Eccles. vii. 29. *Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.*

It is an observation of no weight which Dr. T. makes on this text, that the word *man* is commonly used to signify mankind in general, or mankind collectively taken. It is true it often signifies the species of mankind; but then it is used to signify the species with regard to its duration and *succession* from its beginning, as well as with regard to its *extent*. The English word *mankind* is used to signify the species: But what then? Would it be an improper way of speaking to say, that when God first made *mankind* he placed them in a pleasant paradise, (meaning in their first parents) but now they live in the midst of briars and thorns? And it is certain that to speak thus of God making mankind—his giving the species an existence in their

first parents, at the creation—is agreeable to the scripture use of such an expression. As in Deut. iv. 32. *Since the day that God* CREATED MAN *upon the earth.* Job xx. 4. *Knowest thou not this of old, since* MAN *was placed upon the earth.* Isai. xlv. 12. *I have made the earth and* CREATED MAN *upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens.* Jer. xxvii. 5. *I* HAVE MADE *the earth, the* MAN *and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power.* All these texts speak of God *making* man, signifying the *species* of mankind; and yet they all plainly have respect to God making man *at first*, when he *made the earth* and *stretched out the heavens.* In all these places the same word, Adam, is used as in Ecclesiastes; and in the last of them, used with (HE *emphaticum*) *the emphatic sign*, as here; though Dr. T. omits it, when he tells us he gives us a catalogue of *all* the places in scripture where the word is used. And it argues nothing to the doctor's purpose that the pronoun they is used;—THEY *have sought out many inventions.* This is properly applied to the species, which God made at first upright; the species begun with more than one, and continued in a multitude. As Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the relation of man and wife, continued in successive generations; Mat. xix. 4. *He that* MADE THEM *in the beginning, made them male and female;* having reference to Adam and Eve.

No less impertinent, and also very unfair, is *his criticism* on the word (ישר) translated *upright.* Because the word sometimes signifies *right*, he would from thence infer, that it does not properly signify moral rectitude, even when used to express the character of moral agents. He might as well insist that the English word *upright*, sometimes, and in its most original meaning, signifies *right up*, or in an erect posture, therefore it does not properly signify any moral character, when applied to moral agents. And indeed less unreasonably; for it is known that in the *Hebrew* language, in a peculiar manner, most words used to signify moral and spiritual things, are taken from external and natural objects. The word (ישר *Jashar*) is used, as applied to moral agents, or to the words and actions of such, (if I have not mis-reckoned*) about an hundred and ten times in scripture; and about an hundred of them, without all dispute, to signify virtue, or moral rectitude, (though Dr. *T.* is pleased to say, the word does not generally signify a moral character and for the most part it signifies *true virtue*, or virtue in such a sense, as distinguishes it from all false appearances of virtue, or what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so in the sight of God. It is used at least eighty times in this sense. And scarce any word can be found in the *Hebrew* language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in *Solomon*

* Making use of *Buxtorf's* Concordance, which, according to the author's professed design, directs to all the places where the word is used.

writings, (where it is often found) when used to express a character or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all controversy, that he uses it in this place, (the viith of *Eccles.*) to signify moral rectitude, or a character of real virtue and integrity. For the wise man is speaking of persons with respect to their *moral* character, inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind, (as is confessed p. 184.) and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a thousand of the right stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright: Which appeared a strange thing! But in this text he clears God, and lays the blame on man: Man was not made thus at first. He was made of the right stamp, altogether good in his kind, (as all other things were) truly and thoroughly virtuous as he ought to be; *but they have sought out many inventions.* Which last expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil; (as is confessed, p. 185.) And this expression, used to signify those moral evils he found in man, which he sets in opposition to the uprightness man was made in, shews, that by uprightness he means the most true and sincere goodness. The word rendered *inventions*, most naturally and aptly signifies the subtile devices and crooked deceitful ways of hypocrites, wherein they are of a character contrary to men of simplicity and godly sincerity; who, though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning evil. Thus the same wise man, in Prov. xii. 2. sets a truly good man in opposition to a man of *wicked devices*, whom God will condemn. *Solomon* had occasion to observe many who put on an artful disguise and fair shew of goodness; but on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says, Prov. xx. 6. *Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness: But a faithful man who can find?* So that it is exceeding plain that by uprightness, in this place, (*Eccles.* vii.) *Solomon* means true moral goodness.

What our author urges concerning *many inventions*, whereas Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit was but *one invention*, is of as little weight as the rest of what he says on this text. For the many lusts and corruptions of mankind, appearing in innumerable ways of sinning, are all the consequence of that sin. The great corruption men are fallen into by the original apostacy, appears in the multitude of the wicked ways to which they are inclined. And therefore these are properly mentioned as the fruits and evidences of the greatness of that apostacy and corruption.

SECT. II.

rning the Kind of Death threatened to our first Parents, if they should eat of the forbidden Fruit.

Dr. T. in his observations on the three first chapters of nesis, says, (p. 7.) "The threatening to man in case of transgression was, that he should surely die.—Death is the ng of life. Death is opposed to life, and must be under-d according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. Now the death here threatened can, with any certainty, be opposed only to the life God gave Adam, when he created him, (ver. 7.) Any thing besides this must be pure conjecture, without solid foundation."

To this I would say: it is true, *Death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed.* But does it therefore follow that nothing can be meant by it but the *loss* of life? Misery is opposed to happiness, and sorrow is in scripture often opposed to joy; but can we conclude from thence, that nothing is meant in scripture by sorrow, but the *loss of joy?* Or that there is no more in misery than the *loss* or absence of happiness? And if the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, be opposed only to the life *given to Adam, when God created him;* I think a state of perfect, perpetual, and hopeless misery is properly opposed to that state *Adam was in when God created him.* For I suppose it will not be denied, that the life Adam had was truly a *happy* life; happy in perfect innocency, in the favour of his Maker, surrounded with the happy fruits and testimonies of his love. And I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a state of perfect righteousness. Nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a very common acceptation of the word *life*, in scripture, that it be understood as signifying a state of excellent and happy existence. Now that which is most opposite to *that life* and state *in which Adam was created*, is a state of total, confirmed wickedness, and perfect hopeless misery, under the divine displeasure and curse; not excluding temporal death, or the destruction of the body, as an introduction to it.

Besides, that which is much more evident than any thing Dr. T. says on this head, is, that the *death* which was to come on Adam as the *punishment of his disobedience*, was opposed to that *life* which he would have had as the *reward* of his *obedience* in case he had not sinned. *Obedience* and *disobedience* are con-

traries; the *threatenings* and *promises* which are sanctions of a law are set in direct opposition; and the *promises*, *rewards* and *threatened punishments*, are most properly taken as each other's opposites. But none will deny that the life which would have been *Adam's reward*, if he had persisted in obedience, was *eternal life*. And therefore we argue justly that the death which *stands opposed to that life*, (Dr. T. himself being judge, p. 120. S.) *is manifestly eternal death, a death widely different from the death we now die*—to use his own words. If Adam, for his persevering *obedience* was to have had *everlasting life and happiness, in perfect holiness, union* with his Maker, and *enjoyment of his favour;* and this was the life which was to be confirmed by the tree of life; then, doubtless, the death threatened in case of disobedience, which stands in direct opposition to this, was an exposure to *everlasting wickedness and misery, in separation* from God, and in *enduring his wrath.*

When God first made mankind, and made known to them the methods of his moral government towards them, in the revelation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole species—and letting him know that obedience to him was expected, and in enforcing his duty with the sanction of a threatened punishment, called by the name of *death*—we may with the greatest reason suppose, in such a case, that by *death* was meant the most proper punishment of the sin of mankind, and which he speaks of under that name throughout the scripture, as the proper wages of sin; and this was always, from the beginning, understood to be so in the church of God. It would be strange indeed if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if, when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the threatening of a punishment, nothing at all had been mentioned of that *great punishment* ever spoken of under the name of *death*—in the revelations which he has given to mankind from age to age—as the proper punishment of the sin of mankind.—And it would be no less strange, if when the punishment which was mentioned and threatened on that occasion was called by the same name, even death, yet we must not understand it to mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderable.

But now let us consider what that death is, which the scripture ever speaks of as the proper wages of sin, and is spoken of as such by God's saints in all ages of the church. I will begin with the New Testament. When the apostle *Paul* says, (Rom. vi. 23.) *The wages of sin is* DEATH, Dr. T. tells us, (p. 120, S.) that *this means eternal death, the second death, a death widely different from the death we now die.* The same apostle speaks of death as the proper punishment due for sin, Rom. vii. 5. and chap. viii. 13. 2 Cor. iii. 7. 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all which places. Dr. T. himself supposes the apostle to intend *eternal*

death.* And when the apostle James speaks of death, as the proper reward, fruit, and end of sin, (Jam. i. 15.) *Sin, when it finished, bringeth forth death;* it is manifest, that our author uses eternal destruction to be meant.† And the apostle agreeably to Dr. T.'s sense, speaks of the second death as which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at last. Rev. xx. 6, 14. and xxi. 8. In the same sense the apostle John the word in his 1st epistle chap. iii. 14. *We know that we passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. He hateth his brother abideth in death.* In the same manner st used the word from time to time, when he was on earth, and spake concerning the punishment of sin. John v. 24. *He that heareth my word and believeth, &c. hath everlasting life; l shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from* DEATH *life.* Where according to Dr. T.'s own way of arguing, it cannot be the death we now die that Christ speaks of, but *eternal* death, because it is set in opposition to everlasting life. John vi. 50. *This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof and not* DIE. chap. viii. 51. *Verily, verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying he shall never see* DEATH. Chap. xi. 26. *And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never* DIE. In which places it is plain Christ does not mean that believers shall never see *temporal* death. (See also Matt. x. 28. and Luke x. 28.) In like manner the word was commonly used by the prophets of old, when they spake of death as the proper end and recompence of sin. So abundantly by the prophet Ezekiel. Ezek. iii. 18. *When I say unto the wicked man thou shalt surely* DIE. In the original it is, *Dying thou shalt die:* The same form of expression which God used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words again, chap. xxxiii. 18.—In chap. xviii. 4, it is said, *The soul that sinneth, it shall* DIE.‡ And that temporal death is not meant in these places is plain, because it is promised most absolutely, that the righteous shall not die the death spoken of. Chap. xviii. 21. *He shall surely live, he shall not* DIE. (So verse 9, 17, 19, and 22. and chap. iii. 21.) And it is evident the prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense. Jer. xxxi. 30. *Every one shall* DIE *for his own iniquity.* And the same death is spoken of by the prophet Isaiah. Isai. xi. 4. *With the breath of his lips shall he* SLAY *the wicked.* (See also chap. lxvi. 16. with ver. 24.) Solomon, who we must suppose

* See p. 78. note on Rom. vii. 5, and note on ver. 6. Note on Rom. v. 20. Note on Rom. vii. 8.

† By comparing what he says, p. 126, with what he often says of that death and destruction which is the demerit and end of personal sin, which he says is the *second death or eternal destruction.*

* To the like purpose are chap. iii. 19, 20, and xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17—21, 24, 26, 28, chap. xxxiii. 8, 9. 12—14. 19.

was thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word was used by the wise, and by the ancients, continually speaks of *death* as the proper fruit, issue, and recompense of sin, using the word only in this sense. Prov. xi. 19. *As righteouness tendeth to* LIFE, *so he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own* DEATH.* He cannot mean *temporal* death, for he often speaks of it as a punishment of the wicked, wherein the righteous shall certainly be distinguished from them: As in Prov. xii. 28. *In the way of righteousness is life, and in the path-way thereof is no* DEATH. (So in chap. x. 2, xi. 4. xiii. 14. xiv. 27, and many other places.) But we find this same wise man observes, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in general, there is no distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad. (Eccl. ii. 1—16. viii. 14. and ix. 2, 3.) His words are remarkable in Eccl. vii. 15. *There is a just man that* PERISHETH *in his righteousness; and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life, in his wickedness.* So we find, David in the book of Psalms uses the word *death* in the same sense, when he speaks of it as the proper wages and issue of sin, Psalm xxxiv. 21. *Evil shall* SLAY *the wicked.* He speaks of it as a certain thing, Psal. cxxxix. 19. *Surely thou wilt* SLAY *the wicked, O God.* And he speaks of it as a thing wherein the wicked are distinguished from the righteous. Psal. lxix. 28. *Let them be blotted out of the book of the* LIVING, *and not be written with the righteous.*—And thus we find the word *death* used in the *Pentateuch*, where we have the account of the threatening of death to Adam. When, in these books, it is spoken of as the proper fruit and appointed reward of sin, it is to be understood of *eternal* death. Thus, Deut. xxx. 15. *See, I have set before thee this day* LIFE *and good, and* DEATH *and evil.* Ver. 19. *I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you* LIFE *and* DEATH, *blessing and cursing.* The life that is spoken of here is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Levit. xviii. 5. *Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall* LIVE *in them.* This the apostle understands of ETERNAL *life;* as is plain by Rom. x. 5, and Gal. iii. 12. But that the death threatened for sin in the law of *Moses* meant *eternal* death, is what Dr. T. abundantly declares So in his note on Rom. v. 20. (Par. p. 291.) "*Such a constitution the law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to death for every transgression: Meaning by death* ETERNAL DEATH." These are his words. The like he asserts in many other places. When it is said, in the place now mentioned, *I have set before thee* LIFE *and* DEATH, *blessing and cursing*, without doubt, the same *blessing and cursing*

* See chap. v. 5, 6, 23, vii. 27, viii. 36. ix. 18. x. 21, xi. 19. xiv. 12. xv. 10. xviii. 21, xix. 16. 21. and xxiii. 13. 14.

is meant which God had already set before them with such solemnity, in the 27th and 28th chapters; where we have the sum of the curses in those last words of the 27th chapter, *Cursed is every one which confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them.* Which the apostle speaks of as a threatening of *eternal* death; and with him Dr. T. himself.* In this sense also *Job* and his friends spake of *death*, as the wages and end of sin, who lived before any written revelation, and had their religion and their phraseology about religion, from the ancients.

If any should insist upon it as an objection—against supposing that death was intended to signify *eternal* death in the threatening to Adam—that this use of the word is figurative: I reply, that though this should be allowed, yet it is by no means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history contained in these three chapters: As when it is said, *God said, Let there be light; God said, Let there be a firmament*, &c. as though God spake such words with a voice. So when it is said, *God* called *the light day; God* called *the firmament heaven*, &c. *God* rested *on the seventh day;* as though he had been weary, and then rested. *And when it is said, They heard the* voice of God walking; as though the deity had feet, and took steps on the ground. Dr. T. supposes, that when it is said of *Adam* and *Eve, Their eyes were opened and they saw that they were naked*; by the word *naked* is meant a *state of guilt.* (P. 12.) Which sense of the word, *naked*, is much further from the *common* use of the word, than the supposed sense of the word *death.* So this author supposes the promise concerning the seed of the woman *bruising the serpent's head*, while the serpent should *bruise his heel*, is to be understood of the *Messiah destroying the power and sovereignty of the devil, and receiving some slight hurt from him.* (P. 15, 16.) Which makes the sentence full of figures. And why might not God deliver *threatenings* to our first parents in figurative expressions as well as *promises?*

But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the word *death*, or the *Hebrew* word so translated, if used in the manner that has been supposed, to have been figurative at all. It does not appear but that this word, in its true and proper meaning, might signify perfect misery, and sensible destruction; though the word was also applied to signify something more external and visible. There are many words in our language, such as *heart, sense, view, discovery, conception, light*, and many others, which are applied to signify *external* things as that muscular part of the body called *heart;* external feeling called *sense;* the sight of the bodily eye called *view*

* Note on Rom. v. 20. Par. p. 291—299.

the finding of a thing by its being uncovered, called *discovery;* the first beginning of the fœtus in the womb, called *conception:* and the rays of the sun, called *light.* Yet these words do as truly and properly signify other things of a more spiritual *internal* nature; such as the disposition, affection, perception, and thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the soul. Common use, which governs the propriety of language, makes the latter things to be as much signified by those words, in their proper meaning, as the former. It is especially common in the *Hebrew*, and I suppose other oriental languages, that the same word that signifies something external, does no less properly and usually signify something more spiritual. So the *Hebrew* words used for breath, have such a double signification; (נשמה) *Neshama* signifies both *breath* and the *soul;* and the latter as commonly as the former: (רוח) *Ruach* is used for *breath* or *wind*, but yet more commonly signifies *spirit.* (נפש) *Nephesh* is used for *breath*, but yet more commonly signifies *soul.* So the word (לבב or לב) *Lébh*, *heart*, no less properly signifies the *soul*, especially with regard to the will and affections, than that part of the body so called. The word (שלום) *Shalom*, which we render *peace*, no less properly signifies prosperity and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word translated *life*, signifies the natural life of the body, and also the perfect and happy state of sensible active being; and the latter as properly as the former. So the word *death*, signifies destruction, as to outward *sensibility*, activity, and enjoyment: But it has most evidently another signification, which in the *Hebrew* tongue, is no less proper, viz. *perfect*, *sensible*, *hopeless ruin and misery.*

It is therefore wholly without reason urged, that death properly signifies only the *loss* of this *present* life; and that therefore nothing else was meant by that death which was threatened for eating the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at all appear but that Adam—who, from what God said concerning the seed of the woman, could understand that *relief* was promised as to the death which was threatened, as Dr. T. himself supposes—understood the death which was threatened, in the *more important* sense. Especially seeing temporal death, considered originally and in itself, is evermore, excepting as changed by divine grace, an entrance into that dismal state of misery which is shadowed forth by the awful circumstances of this death; circumstances naturally suggesting to the mind the most dreadful state of hopeless, sensible ruin.

As to the objection, that the phrase, *Dying thou shalt die*, is several times used in the books of *Moses* to signify *temporal* death, it can be of no force. For it has been shewn already, that the same phrase is sometimes used in scripture to signify *eternal* death, in instances much more parallel with

this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning nature of the thing intended, from its being expressed in a manner. For it is evident, that such repetitions of a in the *Hebrew* language, are no more than an emphasis a word in the more modern languages, to signify the degree of a thing, the importance or certainty of it, &c. we would signify and impress these, we commonly n *emphasis* on our words. Instead of this, the *Hebrews*, they would express a thing strongly, *repeated* or doubled ord, the more to impress the mind of the hearer; as be plain to every one in the least conversant with the *ew* bible. The repetition in the threatening to *Adam*, refore, only implies the solemnity and importance of the threatening. But God may denounce either eternal or temporal death with peremptoriness and solemnity, and nothing certainly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing atened because it is threatened with *emphasis*, more than , that the threatening is *much to be regarded*. Though it true, that it might in an especial manner be expected that a threatening of eternal death would be denounced with great emphasis, such a threatening being infinitely important, and to be regarded above all others.

SECT. III.

Wherein it is inquired, whether there be any thing in the History of the three first Chapters of Genesis which should lead us to suppose that God, in his Constitution with Adam dealt with mankind in general, as included in their first Father, and that the Threatening of Death, in Case he should eat the forbidden Fruit, had respect not only to him, but his Posterity?

Dr. T. rehearsing that threatening to *Adam*, *Thou shalt surely die*, and giving us his paraphrase of it, (p. 7, 8.) concludes thus: "Observe, here is not *one word* relating to *Adam's* posterity." But it may be observed, in opposition to this, that there is scarcely *one word* that we have an account of, which God ever said to Adam or Eve, but what *does* manifestly include their posterity in the meaning and design of it. There is as much of *a word* said about *Adam's* posterity in that threatening, as there is in those words of God to Adam and Eve, Gen. i. 28. *Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it*; and as much in events, to lead us to suppose Adam's posterity to be included. There is as much of *a word* of his posterity in that threatening, as in those words, (ver. 29.) *Behold, I have given you every herb bearing*

seed,—and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed, &c. Even when God was about to create Adam, what he said on that occasion had not respect only to Adam, but to his posterity. Gen. i. 26. *Let us make man in our image, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea*, &c. And, what is more remarkable, there is as much of *a word* said about Adam's posterity in the threatening of death, as there is in that sentence, (Gen. iii. 19,) *Unto dust shalt thou return.* Which Dr. T. himself supposes to be a sentence pronounced for the execution of that very threatening, *Thou shalt surely die.* This sentence he himself also often speaks of as including Adam's posterity: And, what is much more remarkable still, is a sentence which Dr. T. himself often speaks of, as *including his posterity, as a* SENTENCE OF CONDEMNATION, as a JUDICIAL sentence, and a sentence which God pronounced with regard to Adam's POSTERITY, ACTING THE PART OF A JUDGE, and as such condemning them to temporal death.—Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inasmuch as he at the same time abundantly insists, that death is not brought on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin, at all as a punishment; but merely by the gracious disposal of a father, bestowing a *benefit of the highest nature* upon him.*

But I shall shew that I do not in any of these things falsely charge or misrepresent Dr. T.—He speaks of the sentence in chap. iii. 19. as pronounced in pursuance of the threatening in the former chapter, in these words, (p. 17, 18.) "The sentence upon the man, ver. 17, 18, 19. first affects the earth upon which he was to subsist: The ground should be incumbered with many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome: Which would oblige the man to procure a sustenance by hard labour, till he should die, and drop into the ground from whence he was taken. Thus death entered by sin into the world, and man became mortal,† ACCORDING TO THE THREATENING IN THE FORMER CHAPTER." Now, if mankind became mortal, and must die, according to the threatening in the former chapter, then doubtless the threatening in the former chapter, *Thou shalt die*, had respect not only to Adam but to mankind, and included Adam's posterity. Yea, and Dr. T. is express in it, and very often so, that the sentence concerning dropping into the ground, or returning to the dust, did include Adam's posterity. So, p. 20. speaking there of that sentence, "Observe (says he) that we their posterity are in fact subjected to the same affliction and mortality, here by sentence inflicted upon our first parents.—P. 42. Note. "But yet men through

* Page 27. S.

† The subsequent part of the quotation the reader will not meet with in the third edition of Dr. T. but in the second of 1741.

that long tract were all subject to death, therefore they must be included in the sentence." The same he affirms in innumerable other places, some of which I shall have occasion to mention presently.

The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and (as Dr. T. says) *according to the threatening*, extends to as many as were included in the threatening, and to no more. If the sentence be upon a collective subject, indefinitely, the greatest part of which were not included in the threatening nor were ever threatened at all, then certainly this sentence is not *according to the threatening*, nor built upon it. If the sentence be according to the threatening, then we may justly explain the threatening by the sentence. And if we find the *sentence* spoken to the *same* person to whom the *threatening* was spoken, and spoken in the second person singular in like manner with the threatening, *founded on* the threatening, and *according to* it; and if we find the *sentence* includes Adam's posterity, then we may certainly infer, that so did the *threatening*. And hence, that both the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam as the *public head* and representative of his posterity.

And we may also further infer from it, in another respect, directly contrary to Dr. T.'s doctrine, that the sentence which included *Adam's* posterity was to death, *as a punishment* to that posterity, as well as to Adam himself. For a sentence pronounced in execution of a threatening, is for a punishment. *Threatenings* are of *punishments*. Neither God nor man are wont to *threaten* others with *favours* and benefits.

But lest any of this author's admirers should stand to it that it may very properly be said, God *threatened* mankind with bestowing great kindness upon them, I would observe, that Dr. T. himself often speaks of this sentence as pronounced by God on *all mankind*, as *condemning them*; as *a sentence of condemnation judicially pronounced*, or a sentence which God pronounced on all mankind *acting as their judge*, and *in a judicial proceeding*. This he affirms in multitudes of places. In p. 20. speaking of this sentence, which he there says subjects us, *Adam's* and *Eve's* posterity, to affliction and mortality, he calls it a *judicial* act of condemnation. "The *judicial act of condemnation* (says he) clearly implies, a taking him to pieces, and returning him to the ground from whence he was taken." And p. 28, 29. (Note.) "In all the scripture from one end to the other, there is recorded but one *judgment to condemnation*, which came upon *all men*, and that is, Gen. iii. 17—19. "*Dust thou art*," &c. P. 40. speaking of the same, he says, "*All men* are brought under *condemnation*." In p. 27, 28. "By judgment, *judgment to condemnation*, it appeareth evidently to me, he (*Paul*) means the being *adjudged* to the forementioned death; he means the *sentence of death*, of a general mortality

pronounced upon mankind in consequence of *Adam's* first transgression. And the *condemnation* inflicted by the *judgment of God*, answereth to, and is in effect the same thing with, being dead." P. 30. "The many, that is mankind, were subject to death by the *judicial act* of God." P. 31. "Being made sinners, may very well signify, being *adjudged*, or *condemned* to death.—For the *Hebrew* word, *&c.* signifies to make one a sinner by a *judicial sentence*, or to *condemn*."—P. 178. Par. on Rom. v. 19. Upon the account of one man's disobedience, *mankind* were *judicially constituted sinners;* that is, subjected to death by the *sentence* of God the *Judge*." And there are many other places where he repeats the same thing. And it is pretty remarkable, that (page 48, 49.) immediately after citing Prov. xvii. 15. *He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are both an abomination to the Lord*—and when he is careful in citing these words to put us in mind, that it is meant of a *judicial act*—yet, in the very next words, he supposes that God himself does so, since he constantly supposes that *Adam's* posterity, whom God condemns, are innocent. His words are these, "From all this it followeth, that as the judgment that passed upon all men to *condemnation*, is death's coming upon *all men*, by the *judicial act of God*, upon occasion of Adam's transgression: So," &c.—And it is very remarkable, that (p. 3, 4, 7, 8.) he insists, "That in scripture no action is said to be imputed, reckoned, or accounted to any person for righteousness or CONDEMNATION, but the proper act and deed of that person."—And yet he thus continually affirms, that all mankind are made sinners by a *judicial act of God the Judge*, even to *condemnation*, and *judicially constituted sinners*, and so subjected to a *judicial sentence of condemnation*, on occasion of *Adam's* sin; and all *according to the threatening* denounced to *Adam*, *Thou shalt surely die:* Though he supposes Adam's posterity were not included in the threatening, and are looked upon as perfectly innocent, and treated wholly as such.

I am sensible Dr. T. does not run into all this inconsistence only through oversight and blundering; but that he is driven to it, to make out his matters in his evasion of that noted paragraph in the fifth chapter of Romans: especially those three sentences; (ver. 16.) *The judgment was by one to condemnation.* (ver. 18.) *By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation:* and (ver. 19.) *By one man's disobedience many were made sinners.* And I am also sensible of what he offers to salve the inconvenience, *viz.* "That if the threatening had immediately been executed on Adam, he would have had no posterity; and that so far the possible existence of Adam's posterity fell under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, to be disposed of as he should

think fit: And that this is the ground of the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men.*" But this is trifling to a great degree: For,

1. Suffering *death*, and failing of possible *existence*, are entirely different things. If there had never been any such thing as sin committed, there would have been infinite numbers of possible beings, which would have failed of existence by God's appointment. God has appointed (if the phrase be allowable) not to bring into existence numberless possible worlds, each replenished with innumerable possible inhabitants. But is this equivalent to God's appointing them all to suffer death?

2. Our author represents, that *by Adam's sin, the possible existence of his posterity fell into the hands of the Judge, to be disposed of as he should think fit.* But there was no need of any sin of Adam, or of any body else, in order to their being brought into God's hands, in this respect. The future possible existence of all created beings is in God's hands, antecedently to the existence of any sin. And therefore infinite numbers of possible beings, without any relation to Adam, or any other sinning being, fail of their possible existence. And if Adam had never sinned, yet it would be unreasonable to suppose, but that innumerable multitudes of his possible posterity would have failed of existence by God's disposal. For will any be so unreasonable as to imagine, that God would and must have brought into existence as many of his posterity as it was possible should be, if he had not sinned? Or, that then it would not have been possible, that any other persons of his posterity should ever have existed, than those individual persons who now actually suffer death, and return to the dust?

3. We have many accounts in scripture, which imply the actual failing of the possible existence of innumerable multitudes of Adam's posterity, yea, of many more than ever come into existence. As, of the possible posterity of *Abel*, the possible posterity of all them that were destroyed by the flood, and the possible posterity of the innumerable multitudes which we read of in scripture destroyed by sword, pestilence, &c. And if the threatening to *Adam* reached his posterity in no other respect than this, that they were liable to be deprived by it of their possible existence, then *these* instances are much more properly a fulfilment of that threatening, than the suffering of death by such as *actually* come into existence; and so is that which is most properly the judgment to condemnation executed by the sentence of the Judge, proceeding on the ground of that threatening. But where do we ever find this so represented in scripture? We read of multitudes cut off for their personal sins, who

* Page 95, 90, 91. S.

thereby failed of their possible posterity. And these are mentioned as God's judgments on them, and effects of God's condemnation of them: But when are they ever spoken of as God judicially proceeding against, and condemning their possible posterity?

4. Dr. T. in what he says concerning this matter, speaks of the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, which the possible existence of his posterity fell under, *as the ground of the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men.* But herein he is exceeding inconsistent with himself: For he affirms in a place forecited, that the scripture never speaks of any sentence of condemnation coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third of *Genesis*, concerning man turning to dust. But according to him, the threatening of the law delivered to Adam could not be the ground of that sentence; for he greatly insists upon it, that that law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was pronounced, *had no existence* to have any such influence as might procure a sentence of death; and therefore this sentence was introduced entirely on another footing, a new dispensation of grace. The reader may see this matter strenuously urged, and particularly argued by him, p. 113—120. S. So that this sentence could not, according to him, have the threatening of that law for its ground, as he supposes; for it never stood upon that ground. It could not be called a judgment of condemnation *under any such view;* for it could not be viewed in circumstances where it never existed.

5. If, as our author supposes, the sentence of death on all men comes under the notion of a judgment to condemnation by this means, *viz.* that the threatening to *Adam* was in some respect the ground of it; then it also comes under the notion of a punishment: For threatenings annexed to breaches of laws, are to punishments; and a judgment of condemnation to the thing threatened, must be to punishment; and the thing condemned to must have as much the notion of a punishment, as the sentence has the notion of a judgment to condemnation. But this Dr. T. wholly denies: He denies that death comes as any punishment at all; but insists that it comes only as a favour and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly love to Adam's posterity, respected not as guilty, but wholly innocent. So that his scheme will not admit of its coming under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect whatsoever. Our author's supposition, that the possible existence of Adam's posterity comes under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, and is the ground of the condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death by this sentence is appointed to mankind as an evil, at least negatively so; as it is a privation of good: For he manifestly speaks of a non-existence as a negative evil. But herein he is

inconsistent with himself: For he continually insists that mankind are subjected to death *only as a benefit*, as has been before shewn. According to him, death is not appointed to mankind, as a negative evil, as any cessation of existence, or even diminution of good; but on the contrary, as a means of *a more happy existence*, and a great *increase of good*.

So that this evasion of Dr. T. is so far from helping the matter, that it increases and multiplies the inconsistence. And that the law, with the threatening of death annexed, was given to Adam as the head of mankind, and to his posterity as included in him, not only follows from some of our author's own assertions—and the plain full declarations of the apostle in the fifth of *Romans*, which drove Dr. T. into such gross inconsistencies—but the account given in the three first chapters of *Genesis* directly and inevitably leads us to such a conclusion.

Though the sentence, *Gen.* iii. 19. *Unto dust thou shalt return*, be not of equal extent with the threatening in the foregoing chapter, or an execution of the main curse of the law therein denounced—for that it should have been so would have been inconsistent with the intimations of mercy just before given—yet it is plain, this sentence is in pursuance of that threatening, being to something that was included in it. The words of the *sentence* were delivered to the same *person* with the words of the *threatening*, and in the same manner, in like singular terms, and as much without any express mention of his posterity. Yet it manifestly appears by the consequence, as well as all circumstances, that his posterity were included in the words of the sentence; as is confessed on all hands. And as the words were apparently delivered in the form of the sentence of a judge, condemning for something that he was displeased with, and ought to be condemned, *viz.* sin; and as the sentence to him and his posterity was but one, dooming to the same suffering, under the same circumstances, both the one and the other sentenced in the same words, spoken but once and immediately to but one person, we hence justly infer, that it was the same thing to both; and not as Dr. T. suggests, (p. 67.) a sentence to a proper punishment to Adam, but a mere promise of favour to his posterity.

Indeed, sometimes our author seems to suppose, that God meant the thing denounced in this sentence, as a favour both to Adam and his posterity.* But to his posterity, or mankind in general, who are the main subject, he over insists that it was purely intended as a favour. And therefore, one would have thought, the sentence should have been delivered with manifestations and appearances of favour, and not of anger. How could Adam understand it as a promise of grea

* Page 25. 45. 46. 8.

favour, considering the manner and circumstances of the denunciation? How could he think, that God would go about to delude him, by clothing himself with garments of vengeance, using words of displeasure and rebuke, setting forth the heinousness of his crime, attended with cherubims and a flaming sword; when all that he meant was only higher testimonies of favour than he had before in a state of innocence, and to manifest fatherly love and kindness, in promises of great blessings! If this was the case, God's words to Adam must be understood thus: "Because thou hast done so wickedly, hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it; therefore I will be more kind to thee than I was in thy state of innocence, and do now appoint for thee the following great favours: *Cursed be the ground for thy sake*," &c. And thus *Adam* must understand what was said, unless any will say (and God forbid that any should be so blasphemous) that God clothed himself with appearances of displeasure, to deceive Adam, and make him believe the contrary of what he intended, and lead him to expect a dismal train of evils on his posterity, contrary to all reason and justice, implying the most horribly unrighteous treatment of millions of perfectly innocent creatures. It is certain, there is not the least appearance in what God said, or the manner of it, as *Moses* gives us the account, of any other, than that God was now testifying displeasure, condemning the subject of the sentence he was pronouncing, as justly exposed to punishment for sin, and for that sin which he mentions.

When God was pronouncing this sentence, *Adam* doubtless understood that God had respect to his posterity, as well as himself; though God spake wholly in the second person singular, *Because thou hast eaten,—In sorrow thou shalt eat,—Unto the dust shalt thou return.* But he had as much reason to understand God as having respect to his posterity, when he directed his speech to him in like manner in the threatening, *thou shalt surely die.* The sentence plainly refers to the threatening and results from it. The threatening says, *If thou eat, thou shalt die:* The sentence says, *Because thou hast eaten, thou shalt die.* And Moses, who wrote the account, had no reason to doubt but that the affair would be thus understood by his readers; for such a way of speaking was well understood in those days: The history he gives us of the origin of things abounds with it. Such a manner of speaking to the heads of the race, having respect to the progeny, is not only used in almost every thing that God said to Adam and Eve, but even in what he said to the very *birds* and *fishes*, Gen. i. 22. And also in what he said afterwards to Noah, Gen. ix. to Shem, Ham and Japheth. and Canaan, Gen. ix. 25—27.

So in promises made to Abraham, God directed his speech to him, and spake in the second person singular, from time to time, but meant chiefly his posterity: *To thee will I give this land. In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed*, &c. &c. And in what is said of Ishmael, as of his person, but meant chiefly of his posterity, Gen. xvi. 12. and xvii. 20. Thus in what Isaac said to Esau and Jacob in his blessing he spake to them in the second person singular; but meant chiefly their posterity. And so for the most part in the promises made to Isaac and Jacob; and in Jacob blessing Ephraim and Manasseh, and his twelve sons.

But I shall take notice of one or two things further, shewing that Adam's posterity were included in God's establishment with him, and the threatening denounced for his sin; and that the calamities which come upon them in consequence of his sin, are brought on them as punishments.

This is evident from the *curse on the ground*; which if it be any curse at all, comes equally on Adam's posterity with himself. And if it be a curse, then against whomsoever it is designed, and on whomsoever it terminates, it comes as a punishment, and not as a blessing, so far as it comes in consequence of that sentence.

Dr. T. (p. 19.) says, "A curse is pronounced upon the ground, but no curse upon the woman and the man." *And* (p. 45, 46. S.) he insists, that the *ground* only was cursed, and not the man: as though a curse could terminate on lifeless senseless earth! To understand this curse otherwise than as terminating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless as to suppose the meaning to be, *The ground shall be punished and shall be miserable for thy sake.* Our author interprets the curse on the ground, of its being incumbered with noxious weeds: But would these weeds have been any curse on the ground if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants had been of such a nature, that these weeds should not have been noxious, but useful to them? It is said, Deut. xxviii. 17. *Cursed shall be thy basket and thy store;* And would he not be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, 'Here is a curse upon the basket; but not a word of any curse upon the owner: And therefore we have no reason at all to look upon it as any punishment upon him, or any testimony of God's displeasure towards him.' How plain is it, that when *lifeless* things not capable either of benefit or suffering, are said to be cursed or blessed with regard to *sensible* beings—who use or possess these things, or have connection with them—the meaning must be, that these *sensible* beings are cursed or blessed in *the other*, or with respect to them! In Exod. xxiii. 25. it is said, *He shall bless thy bread and thy water.* And I suppose never any body yet proceeded to such a degree of subtility in distin-

guishing, as to say, 'Here is a blessing on the *bread* and the *water*, which went into the possessor's mouth, but no blessing on him.' To make such a distinction with regard to the curse God pronounced on the ground, would in some respects be more unreasonable; because God is express in *explaining* the matter, declaring that it was *for man's sake*, expressly referring this curse to *him*, as being for the sake of his guilt; and as consisting in the sorrow and suffering he should have from it. *In sorrow shalt thou eat of it.—Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth* TO THEE. So that God's own words tell us where the curse terminates. The words are parallel with those in Deut. xxviii. 16. but only more plain and explicit, *Cursed shalt* THOU *be in the field*, or in the ground.

If this part of the sentence was pronounced under no notion of any curse or punishment at all upon mankind, but, on the contrary, as making an alteration for the *better*, as to *them*—that instead of the sweet, but tempting, pernicious fruit of paradise, it might produce wholesome fruits, more for the health of the soul; that it might bring forth thorns and thistles, as excellent medicines, to prevent or cure moral distempers, diseases which would issue in eternal death—then it was a *blessing* on the ground, and not a curse; and it might more properly have been said, 'BLESSED *shall the ground be for thy sake*—I will make a happy change in it, that it may be a habitation more fit for a creature so infirm, and so apt to be overcome with temptation, as thou art.'

The *event* makes it evident, that in pronouncing this curse, God had as much respect to Adam's *posterity*, as to himself. And so it was understood by his pious posterity before the flood; as appears by what Lamech, the father of Noah, says, Gen. v. 29. *And he called his name Noah; saying, this same shall comfort us concerning our work, and the toil of our hands.* BECAUSE OF THE GROUND WHICH THE LORD HATH CURSED.

Another thing which argues that Adam's posterity were included in the threatening of death—and that our first parents understood, when fallen, that the tempter, in persuading them to eat the forbidden fruit, had aimed at the punishment and ruin of both them and their posterity, and had procured it—is Adam immediately giving his wife that new name, *Eve* or *Life*, on the promise or intimation of the disappointment and overthrow of the tempter in that matter, by her seed. This Adam understood to be by his procuring LIFE; not only for themselves, but for many of their posterity, and thereby delivering them from that death and ruin which the serpent had brought upon them. Those that should be thus delivered, and obtain life, Adam calls *the living*. And because he observed by what God had said, that deliverance, or life, was to be by the seed of the woman, he therefore remarks

that *she is the mother of all living*, and thereupon gives her a new name, חוה LIFE, Gen iii. 20.

There is a great deal of evidence that this is the occasion Adam giving his wife her new name. This was her new honour, and the greatest honour, at least in her present state, that the Redeemer was to be of her seed. New names were wont to be given for something that was the person's peculiar ur. So it was with regard to the new names of *Abraham*, and *Israel*. Dr. T. himself observes,* that they who ed by Christ, are called, (οἱ ζωντες 2 Cor. iv. 11.) *the living that live*. Thus we find in the Old Testament, the ous are called by the name of *the living*, Psal. lxix. 28. *em be blotted out of the book of the* LIVING, *and not be writ- with the righteous*. If what Adam meant by her being the *mother of all living*, was only her being the mother of mankind; and gave her the name *life* upon that account; it were much the most likely that he would have given her this name at first; when God first united them, under that blessing, *be fruitful and multiply*, and when he had a prospect of her being the mother of mankind *in a state of immortality*, *living indeed*, *living* and never *dying*. But that Adam should at that time give her only the name of (אשה) *Isha*, and then immediately on that melancholy change, by their coming under the *sentence of death*, with all their posterity—having now a new awful prospect of her being the mother of nothing but a *dying race*, all from generation to generation turning to dust, through her folly—he should change her name into *life*, calling her now the mother of *all living*, is (on that supposition) perfectly unaccountable. Besides it is manifest, that it was not her being the mother of all *mankind*—or *her relation* as a mother to her posterity—but the *quality of those* of whom she was to be the mother, Adam had in view, in giving his wife this new name; as appears by the name itself, which signifies *life*. And if it had been only a *natural* and mortal life he had in view, this was nothing to distinguish her posterity from the brutes; for the very same name of *living* ones, or *living* things, is given from time to time to *them*.† Besides, if by *life* the *quality* of her posterity was not meant, there was nothing in it to distinguish her from Adam; for thus she was no more the mother of all living, than he was the father of all living; and she could no more properly be called by the name of *life* on any such account, than he: But names are given for distinction. Doubtless Adam took notice of something distinguishing concerning her, that occasioned his giving her this new name. And I

* Note annexed to § 287.

† As in Gen. i. 21, 24, 28. Chap. ii. 19. Chap. vi. 19. vii. 23. and viii. 1. and many other places in the bible.

think it is exceeding natural to suppose, that as Adam had given her the *first name* from the manner of her *creation*, so he gave her the *new name* from *redemption*, and as it were *new creation*, through a Redeemer of her seed. And it is equally probable that he should give her this name from that which comforted him, with respect to the curse that God had pronounced on him and the earth, as *Lamech* named *Noah*, Gen. v. 29. *Saying, this same shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed.* Accordingly he gave her this new name, not at her first creation, but immediately after the promise of a Redeemer. (See *Gen.* iii. 15—20.)

Now as to the consequence which I infer from *Adam* giving his wife this name, on the intimation which God had given—that *Satan* should by her seed be overthrown and disappointed, as to his malicious design in tempting the woman—it is, that great numbers of mankind should be saved, whom he calls *the living*; they should be saved from the effects of this malicious design of the old serpent, and from that ruin which he had brought upon them by tempting their first parents to sin; and so the serpent would be, with respect to them, disappointed and overthrown in his design. But how is any death, or indeed any calamity at all, brought upon their posterity by *Satan's* malice in that temptation, if instead of that, all the consequent death and sorrow was the fruit of God's fatherly love? an instance of his free and sovereign favour? And if multitudes of *Eve's* posterity are saved from either spiritual or temporal death by a Redeemer, one of her seed, how is that any disappointment of *Satan's* design in tempting our first parents? How came he to have any such thing in view as the death of *Adam's* and *Eve's* posterity, by tempting them to sin, or any expectation that their death would be the consequence, *unless he knew that they were included in the* THREATENING.

Some have objected against his *posterity* being included in the threatening delivered to Adam, that the threatening itself was inconsistent with his *having any posterity*: It being that he should die *on the day that he sinned.* To this I answer, that the threatening was not inconsistent with his having posterity, on two accounts:

I. Those words, *In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die*, according to the use of such like expressions among the *Hebrews*, do not signify *immediate* death, or that the execution shall be within twenty-four hours from the commission of the fact; nor did God by those words limit himself as to the *time* of executing the threatened punishment; but that was still left to God's pleasure. Such a phrase, accord-

death in scripture Exod. x. 17.—*Intreat the Lord that he may take away this* DEATH. Not only was Adam's soul ruined that day, but his BODY was ruined; it lost its beauty and vigour, and became a poor, dull, decaying, dying thing.

And besides all this, Adam was that day undone in a more dreadful sense; he immediately fell under the curse of the law, and condemnation to eternal perdition. In the language of scripture, he is *dead*, that is, in a state of condemnation to death; even as our author often explains this language in his exposition upon *Romans*. In scripture-language, he that believes in Christ immediately receives *life*. He passes at that time from death to life, and thenceforward (to use the apostle *John's* phrase) "has eternal life abiding in him." But yet, he does not then receive eternal life in its highest completion; he has but the *beginning* of it; and receives it in a vastly greater degree at death. The proper time for the complete fulness, is not till the day of judgment. When the angels sinned, their punishment was *immediately* executed in a degree; but their full punishment is not till the end of the world. And there is nothing in God's threatening to Adam that bound him to execute his full punishment at once; nor any thing which determines that he should have no posterity. The constitution which God established and declared, determined, that IF he sinned, and had posterity, he and they should die. But there was no constitution determining the actual being of his posterity in this case; what posterity he should have, how many, or whether any at all. All these things God had reserved in his own power: The law and its sanction intermeddled not with the matter.

It may be proper in this place also to take some notice of that objection of Dr. T. against Adam being supposed to be a federal head for his posterity, that it gives him greater honour than Christ, as it supposes that all his posterity would have had eternal life by his obedience, if he had stood; and so a greater number would have had the benefit of his obedience, than are saved by Christ.*—I think, a very little consideration is sufficient to shew that there is no weight in this objection. For the benefit of Christ's merit may nevertheless be vastly beyond that which would have been by the obedience of Adam. For those that are saved by Christ, are not merely advanced to happiness by his merits, but saved from the infinitely dreadful effects of Adam's sin, and many from immense guilt, pollution, and misery, by personal sins. They are also brought to a holy and a happy state through infinite obstacles; and exalted to a far greater degree of dignity, felicity, and glory, than would have been due for *Adam's* obedience; for aught I know, many thousand times so great. And there is enough in the gospel-dis-

* Page 120, &c. S.

pensation, clearly to manifest the sufficiency of Christ's merits for such effects in all *mankind*. And how great the number will be, that shall *actually* be the subjects of them, or how great a proportion of the whole race, considering the vast success of the gospel that shall be in that future, extraordinary, and glorious season, often spoken of, none can tell. And the honour of these two federal heads arises not so much from what was proposed to each for his trial, as from their success, and the good actually obtained; and also the manner of obtaining. Christ obtains the benefits men have through him by proper merit of condignity, and a true purchase by an equivalent; which would not have been the case with Adam if he had obeyed.

I have now particularly considered the account which Moses gives us, in the beginning of the bible, of our first parents, and God's dealings with them; the constitution he established with them, their transgression, and what followed. And on the whole, if we consider the *manner* in which God apparently speaks to Adam from time to time; and particularly if we consider how plainly and undeniably his *posterity* are included in the sentence of death pronounced on him after his fall, founded on the foregoing threatening; and consider the *curse* denounc- on the ground for his sake, for his sorrow, and that of his posterity; and also consider, what is evidently the *occasion* of his giving his *wife* the new name of *Eve*, and his meaning in it—and withal consider apparent fact in constant and universal events, with relation to the state of our first parents, and their posterity from that time forward, through all ages of the world —I cannot but think it must appear to every impartial person, that Moses's account does, with sufficient evidence, lead all mankind, to whom his account is communicated, to understand, that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a *public* person—as the head of the human species—and had respect to his posterity, as included in him. And it must appear that this history is given by divine direction, in the beginning of the first written revelation, in order to exhibit to our view the origin of the present sinful, miserable state of mankind, that we might see what that was which first gave occasion for all those consequent wonderful dispensations of divine mercy and grace towards mankind, which are the great subject of the scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament; and that these things are not obscurely and doubtfully pointed forth, but delivered in a plain account of things, which easily and naturally exhibits them to our understandings.

CHAP. II.

Observations on other Parts of the holy Scriptures, chiefly in the Old Testament, that prove the doctrine of Original Sin.

ORIGINAL depravity may well be argued, from wickedness being often spoken of in scripture as a thing *belonging to the race of mankind, and as if it were a property of the species.* So in Psal xiv. 2, 3. *The Lord looked down from heaven upon the* CHILDREN OF MEN, *to see if there were any that did understand and seek God. They are all gone aside; they are altogether become filthy: There is none that doeth good; no, not one.* The like we have again, Psal. liii. 2, 3.—Dr. T. says, (p. 104, 105.) "The holy Spirit does not mean this of every individual; because in the very same psalm, he speaks of some that were righteous, ver. 5. *God is in the generation of the righteous.*" But how little is this observation to the purpose? For who ever supposed, that no unrighteous men were ever changed by divine grace, and afterwards made righteous? The psalmist is speaking of what men are as they are the *children of men*, born of the corrupt human race; and not as born of God, whereby they come to be the children of God, and of the *generation of the righteous.* The apostle *Paul* cites this place in Rom. iii. 10—12. to prove the universal corruption of mankind; but yet in the same chapter he supposes the same persons spoken of as wicked may become righteous, through the righteousness and grace of God.

Wickedness is spoken of in other places in the book of psalms, as a thing that *belongs to men, as of the human race, as sons of men.* Thus, in Psal. iv. 2. *O ye* sons of men, *how long will ye turn my glory into shame? How long will ye love vanity?* &c. Psal. lvii. 4. *I lie among them that are set on fire*, even the sons of men, *whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongue a sharp sword.* Psal. lviii. 1, 2. *Do ye indeed speak righteousness, O congregation? Do ye judge uprightly,* O ye sons of men? *Yea, in heart ye work wickedness; ye weigh out the violence of your hands in the earth.* Our author mentioning these places, says, (p. 105, note,) "There was a strong party in Israel disaffected to David's person and government, and sometimes he chooseth to denote them by the sons or children of men." But it would have been worth his while to have inquired, *Why* the psalmist *should choose to denote* the worst men in Israel by this name? Why he should choose thus to disgrace mankind, as if the compellation of sons of men most properly belonged to such as were of the vilest character, and as if all the sons of men, even every one of them, were of

such a character, and none of them did good; no, not one? Is it not strange that the righteous should not be thought worthy to be called *sons of men*, and ranked with that noble race of beings, who are born into the world wholly right and innocent! It is a good, easy, and natural reason, why he chooseth to call the wicked *sons of men*, as a proper name for them, That by being of the sons of men, or of the corrupt, ruined race of mankind, they come by their depravity. And the psalmist himself leads us to this very reason, Psal. lviii. *Do ye judge uprightly,* O YE SONS OF MEN? *yea, in heart ye work wickedness, ye weigh out the violence of your hands. The wicked are* ESTRANGED FROM THE WOMB, &c. Of which I shall speak more by and by.

Agreeable to these places is Prov. xxi. 8. *The way of* MAN *is froward and strange; but as for the* PURE, *his work is right.* He that is perverse in his walk is here called by the name of *man*, as distinguished from the pure: which I think is absolutely unaccountable, if all mankind by nature are *pure* and perfectly innocent, and all such as are froward and strange in their ways, therein depart from the native purity of all mankind. The words naturally lead us to suppose the contrary; that depravity and perverseness properly belong to mankind as they are naturally, and that a being made pure, is by an after-work, by which some are delivered from native pollution, and distinguished from mankind in general: Which is perfectly agreeable to the representation in Rev. xiv. 4. where we have an account of a number that *were not defiled*, but were pure, and *followed the Lamb;* of whom it is said, *These were* REDEEMED FROM AMONG MEN.

To these things agree Jer. xvii. 5, 9. In ver. 5, it is said, *Cursed is he that trusteth in* MAN. And in ver. 9. this reason is given, *The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it?* What heart is this so wicked and deceitful? Why, *evidently the heart of him, who, it was said before, we must not trust;* and that is MAN. It alters not the case as to the present argument, whether the deceitfulness of the heart here spoken of be its deceitfulness to the man himself, or to others. So Eccl. ix. 3. *Madness is in the heart of the* SONS OF MEN, *while they live.* And those words of Christ to *Peter*, Matth. xvi. 23. *Get thee behind me, Satan—For thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of* MEN. Signifying plainly, that to be carnal and vain, and opposite to what is spiritual and divine, is what properly belongs to *men* in their present state. The same thing is supposed in that of the apostle, 1 *Cor.* iii. 3. *For ye are yet carnal. For whereas there is among you envying and strife, are ye not carnal, and walk as* MEN? And that in Hos. vi. 7. *But they like* MEN *have transgressed the covenant.* To these places may be added

Matth. vii. 11. *If* YE BEING EVIL, *know how to give good gifts.* Jam. iv. 5. *Do ye think that the scripture saith in vain, the spirit that* DWELLETH IN US, LUSTETH TO ENVY?—1 Pet. iv. 2. *That he no longer should live the rest of his time in the lusts of* MEN, *but to the will of God*—Yet above all, that in Job xv. 16. *How much more abominable and filthy is* MAN WHO DRINKETH INIQUITY LIKE WATER? Of which more presently.

Now what account can be given of these things on Dr. T.'s scheme? How strange is it, that we should have such descriptions, all over the bible, of MAN, and the SONS OF MEN! Why should man be so continually spoken of as evil, carnal, perverse, deceitful, and desperately wicked, if all men are by nature as perfectly innocent, and free from any propensity to evil, as Adam was the first moment of his creation, all *made right*, as our author would have us understand, Eccl. vii. 29? Why on the contrary, is it not said, at least as often, and with equal reason, that *the heart of man is right and pure;* that *the way of man is innocent and holy;* and that *he who savours true virtue and wisdom, savours the things that be of men?* Yea, and why might it not as well have been said, *the Lord looked down from heaven on the sons of men, to see if there were any that did understand, and did seek after God; and they were all right, altogether pure, there was none inclined to do wickedness, no, not one?*

Of the like import with the texts mentioned are those which represent wickedness as what properly belongs to the WORLD; and that they who are otherwise are *saved from the world*, and *called out of it.* As John vii. 7. *The* WORLD *cannot hate you; but me it hateth; because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil.* Chap. viii. 23. *Ye are of this* WORLD: *I am not of this* WORLD. Chap. xiv. 17. *The spirit of truth, whom the* WORLD *cannot receive: because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: But ye know him.* Chap. xv. 18, 19. *If the* WORLD *hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you. If ye were of the* WORLD, *the* WORLD *would love its own: But because ye are not of the* WORLD, *but I have chosen you out of the* WORLD, *therefore the* WORLD *hateth you.* Rev. xiv. 3, 4. *These are they which were redeemed from the* EARTH,—*redeemed from among men.* John xvii. 9. *I pray not for the* WORLD, *but for them which thou hast given me.* ver. 14. *I have given them thy word; and the* WORLD *hath hated them, because they are not of the* WORLD, *even as I am not of the* WORLD. 1 John iii. 13. *Marvel not, my brethren, if the* WORLD *hate you.* Chap. iv. 5. *They are of the* WORLD, *therefore speak they of the* WORLD, *and the* WORLD *heareth them.* Chap. v. 19. *We are of God, and the whole* WORLD *lieth in wickedness.* It is evident that in these places by the world is meant the world of mankind; not the

itu , but the inhabitants: For it is the world spoken of as ...ing, *doing evil works, speaking, hearing*, &c.

...e same thing is shewn, when wickedness is often ...oken of as being man's OWN, in contradistinction from virtue ...d holiness. So men's lusts are often called their OWN heart's lusts, and their practising wickedness is called walking in their OWN ways, walking in their OWN counsels, in the imagination of their OWN heart, and in the sight of their own eyes, according to their OWN devices, &c. These things denote wickedness to be a quality belonging properly to the character and nature of mankind in their present state: As, when Christ would represent that lying is remarkably the character and the very nature of the devil in his present state, he expresses it thus, John viii. 44. *When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his* OWN: *For he is a liar, and the father of it.*

And that wickedness belongs to the very *nature* of men in their present state, may be argued from those places which speak of mankind as being wicked *in their childhood*, or *from their childhood*. So Prov. xxii. 15. *Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child; but the rod of correction shall drive it far from him.* Nothing is more manifest, than that the wise man in this book continually uses the word folly, or foolishness, for wickedness; and that this is what he means in this place, the words themselves explain. For the rod of correction is proper to drive away no other foolishness, but that which is of a moral nature. The word rendered *bound*, signifies (as observed in *Pool's Synopsis*,) a close and firm union. The same word is used in Chap. vi. 21. BIND *them continually upon thine heart.* And Chap. vii. 3. BIND *them upon thy fingers, write them upon the table of thine heart.** The same verb is used, 1 Sam. xviii. 1. *The soul of Jonathan was knit, or* BOUND *to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul.*—But how comes wickedness to be so firmly bound, and strongly fixed, in the hearts of children, if it be not there naturally? They have had no time firmly to fix habits of sin, by long custom in actual wickedness, as those who have lived many years in the world.

The same thing is signified in that noted place, Gen. viii. 21. *For the imagination of man's heart is evil*, FROM HIS YOUTH. It alters not the case, whether it be translated *for* or *though* the imagination of man's heart is evil from his yout , as Dr. T. would have it. The word translated *youth*, signifi s the whole of the former part of the age of man, which commences from the beginning of life. The word in its derivation has reference to the birth or beginning of existence. It comes from (נער) a word *to shake off*, as a tree shakes off its ripe fruit, or a plant its

* To the like purpose is Chap. iii. 3. and Deut. xi. 18. where this word is used

seed; the birth of children being commonly represented by a tree yielding fruit, or a plant yielding seed. So that the word here translated *youth*, comprehends not only what we in *English* most commonly call the time of youth, but also childhood and infancy, and is very often used to signify these latter.*

Dr. T. says, (p. 124. note,) that he "conceives, *from the youth*, is a phrase signifying the greatness or long duration of a thing." But if by long duration he means any thing else than what is literally expressed, *viz.* from the beginning of life, he has no reason to conceive so; neither has what he offers so much as the shadow of a reason for his conception. There is no appearance in the words of the two or three texts he mentions, of their meaning any thing else than what is most literally signified. And it is certain, that what he suggests is not the *ordinary* import of such a phrase among the *Hebrews*; but that thereby is meant *from the beginning*, or *the early time of life*, or existence; as may be seen in the places following, where the same word in the *Hebrew* is used as in the eighth of *Genesis*. 1 Sam. xii. 2. *I am old and grey-headed—and I have walked before you from my* CHILDHOOD *until this day.* Psal. lxxi. 5, 6, *Thou art my trust* FROM MY YOUTH: *By thee have I been holden up from the womb. Thou art he that took me of my mother's bowels.* (ver. 17, 18.) *O God, thou hast taught me* FROM MY YOUTH; *and hitherto have I declared thy wondrous works: Now also, when I am old and grey-headed, forsake me not.* Psal. cxxix. 1, 2. *Many a time have they afflicted me* FROM MY YOUTH, *may Israel now say: Many a time have they afflicted me* FROM MY YOUTH; *yet have they not prevailed against me.* Isa. xlvii. 12. *Stand now with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast laboured* FROM THY YOUTH. (So also ver. 15.) 2 Sam. xix. 7. *That will be worse unto thee, than all the evil that befell thee* FROM THY YOUTH *until now.* Jer. iii. 24, 25. *Shame hath devoured the labour of our fathers,* FROM OUR YOUTH.—*We have sinned against the Lord our God* FROM OUR YOUTH, *even to this day.*†

And it is observed, that according to the manner of the *Hebrew* language, when it is said, such a thing has been *from youth*, or the first part of existence, the phrase is to be understood as *including* that first time of existence. So, Josh. vi. 21. *They utterly destroyed all from the young to the old*, (so in the

* A word of the same root is used to signify a *young child*, or a *little child*, in the following places: 1 Sam. i. 24, 25, 27. 1 Kings iii. 7. and xi. 17. 2 Kings ii. 23. Job xxxiii. 25. Prov. xxii. 6. xxiii. 13. and xxix. 21 Isai. x. 19. xi. 6. and lxv. 20. Hos. xi. 1. The same word is used to signify an *infant*, in Exod. ii. 6. and x. 9. Jud. xiii. 5, 7, 8, 24, 1 Sam. i. 22. and iv. 21. 2 Kings v. 14. Isai. vii. 16. and viii. 4.

† So Gen. xlvi. 34. Job xxxi. 18. Jer. xxxii. 30. and xlviii. 11. Ezek. iv. 14. Zech. xiii. 5.

Hebrew) i. e. including both. (So Gen. xix. 4. and Esther iii. 13.)

And as mankind are represented in scripture as being of a wicked heart *from their youth*, so in other places they are spoken of as being thus *from the womb*. Psal. lviii. 3. *The wicked are estranged* FROM THE WOMB: *They go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies.* It is observable that the psalmist mentions this as what belongs to the wicked, as the SONS OF MEN: For, these are the preceding words; "*Do ye judge uprightly, O ye sons of men?—Yea, in heart ye work wickedness.*"* Then it follows, *the wicked are estranged* FROM THE WOMB, &c. The next verse is, *their poison is like the poison of a serpent.* Serpents are poisonous as soon as they come into the world; they derive a poisonous nature by their generation. Dr. T. (p. 134, 135.) says, "It is evident that this is a scriptural figurative way of aggravating wickedness on the one hand, and of signifying early and settled habits of virtue on the other, to speak of it as being *from the womb*." And as a probable instance of the latter, he cites that in Isai. xlix. 1. *The Lord hath called me from the womb; from the bowels of my mother hath he made mention of my name.* But I apprehend, that in order to seeing this to be either *evident* or *probable*, a man must have eyes peculiarly affected, I humbly conceive that such phrases as that in the 49th of *Isaiah*, of God's calling the prophet *from the womb*, are *evidently* not of the import which he supposes: but mean truly from the beginning of existence, and are manifestly of like signification with that which is said of the prophet *Jeremiah*, Jer. i. 5. *Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee: Before thou camest out of the womb, I sanctified thee, and ordained thee a prophet unto the nations.* Which surely means something else besides a high degree of virtue: It plainly signifies that he was, from his first existence, set apart by God for a prophet. And it would be as unreasonable to understand it otherwise, as to suppose the angel meant any other than that *Samson* was set apart to be a Nazarite from the beginning of his life, when he says to his mother, *Behold, thou shalt conceive and bear a son: And now drink no wine nor strong drink, &c. For the child shall be a Nazarite to God,* FROM THE WOMB, *to the day of his death.* By these instances it is plain, that the phrase, *from the womb*, as the other, *from the youth*, as used in scripture, properly signifies from the beginning of life.

Very remarkable is that place, Job xv. 14—16. *What is man, that he should be clean? And he that is* BORN OF A WOMAN, *that he should be righteous? Behold, he putteth no trust in*

* A phrase of the like import with that in Gen. viii. 21. The *imagination*, or as it might have been rendered, the *operation* of his heart is evil.

his saints; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight: How much more abominable and filthy is man, which drinketh iniquity like water? And no less remarkable is our author's method of managing it. The 16th verse expresses an exceeding degree of wickedness, in as plain and emphatical terms, almost, as can be invented; every word representing this in the strongest manner: *How much more abominable and filthy is man, that drinketh iniquity like water?* I cannot now recollect where we have a sentence equal to it in the whole bible, for an emphatical, lively, and strong representation of great wickedness of heart. Any one of the words, as such words are used in scripture, would represent great wickedness: If it had been only said, *How much more abominable is man?* Or, *How much more filthy is man?* Or, *Man that drinketh iniquity.* But all these are accumulated with the addition of—*like water*,—the further to represent the boldness or greediness of men in wickedness. Though iniquity be the most deadly poison, yet men drink it as boldly as they drink water, are as familiar with it as with their common drink, and drink it with like greediness as he that is thirsty drinks water. That boldness and eagerness in persecuting the saints, by which the great degree of the depravity of man's heart often appears, is thus represented, Psal. xiv. 4. *Have the workers of iniquity no knowledge who eat up my people* as they eat bread? And the greatest eagerness of thirst is represented by thirsting as an animal thirsts after water, Psal. xlii. 1.

Now let us see the soft, easy, light manner, in which Dr. T. treats this place, (p. 143.) "*How much more abominable and filthy is man*, IN COMPARISON OF THE DIVINE PURITY, who drinketh iniquity like water? who is attended with so many sensual appetites and so apt to indulge them. You see the argument, man in his present weak and fleshly state cannot be clean before God, Why so? Because he is conceived and born in sin, by reason of *Adam's* sin? No such thing. But because, if the purest creatures are not pure *in comparison of God*, much less a being subject to so many INFIRMITIES as a MORTAL man. Which is a demonstration to me, not only that *Job* and his friends did not intend to establish the doctrine we are now examining, but that they were wholly strangers to it." Thus he endeavours to reconcile this text with his doctrine of the perfect native innocence of mankind; in which we have a notable specimen of his *demonstrations*, as well as of that great *impartiality* and fairness in examining and expounding the scripture, of which he so often makes a profession!

In this place we are not only told how wicked man's heart is, but also how men come by such wickedness; even by being of the race of mankind, by ordinary generation: *What is*

n that he should be clean? and he that is born of a woman, t he should be righteous? Our author (p. 141, 142.) represents man being born of a woman, as a *periphrasis* to signify man; and that there is no design in the words to give a reason why man is not clean and righteous. But the case is most evidently otherwise, if we may interpret the book of *Job* by itself. It is most plain that man's being *born of a woman* is given as a reason of his not being clean; chapter xiv. 4. *Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Job* is speaking there expressly of man's being born of a woman, as appears in ver. 1. And here how plain is it, that this is given as a reason of man's not being clean? Concerning this Dr. T. says, *That this has no respect to any moral uncleanness, but only common frailty, &c.* But how evidently is this also otherwise? when that uncleanness which a man has by being born of a woman, is expressly explained of *unrighteousness*, in the next chapter at the 14th verse. *What is man that he should be clean? and he that is born of a woman that he should be righteous?* Also in chap. xxv. 4. *How then can man be justified with God? And how can he be clean that is born of a woman?* It is a moral cleanness *Bildad* is speaking of, which a man needs in order to his being *justified*—His design is to convince *Job* of his *moral impurity*, and from thence of God's righteousness in his severe judgments upon him; and not of his *natural frailty*.

And without doubt, David has respect to this way of derived wickedness of heart, when he says, Psal. li. 5. *Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.* It alters not the case as to the argument we are upon, whether the word (יחמתני) *conceive me* signifies to *conceive*, or to *nurse*; which latter our author takes so much pains to prove: For when he has done all, he speaks of it as a just translation of the words to render them thus, *I was* BORN *in iniquity, and in sin did my mother nurse me.* (p. 135.) If it is owned that man is *born in sin*, it is not worth the while to dispute, whether it is expressly asserted that he is *conceived in sin.* But Dr. T. after his manner, insists, that such expressions as being *born in sin*, being *transgressors from the womb*, and the like, are only phrases *figuratively* to denote aggravation, and a high degree of wickedness. But the contrary has been already demonstrated, from many plain scripture instances. Nor is one instance produced, in which there is any evidence that such a phrase is used in such a manner. A poetical sentence out of VIRGIL's *Æneid* has here been produced, and made much of by some, as parallel with this, in what *Dido* says to *Æneas*, in these lines:

> Nec tibi diva parens, generis nec Dardanus auctor,
> Perfide: Sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens
> Caucasus, hyrcanæque admôrunt ubera tygres.

In which she tells *Æneas*, that not a goddess was his mother, nor *Anchises* his father; but that he had been brought forth by a horrid rocky mountain, and nursed at the dugs of tigers, to represent the greatness of his cruelty to her. But how unlike and unparallel is this? Nothing could be more natural, than for a woman overpowered with the passion of love, and distracted with raging jealousy and disappointment, thinking herself treated with brutish perfidy and cruelty, by a lover whose highest fame had been his being the son of a goddess, to aggravate his inhumanity and hard-heartedness with this, that his behaviour was not worthy the son of a goddess, nor becoming one whose father was an illustrious prince: And that he acted more as if he had been brought forth by hard unrelenting rocks, and had sucked the dugs of tigers. But what is there in the case of David parallel, or at all in like manner leading him to speak of himself as born in sin, in any such figurative sense! He is not speaking himself, nor any one speaking to him, of any excellent and divine father and mother, of whom he was born: Nor is there any appearance of his aggravating his sin, by its being unworthy of his high birth. There is nothing else visible in David's case, to lead him to take notice of his being *born in sin*, but only his having such experience of the continuance and power of indwelling sin, after so long a time, and so many and great means to engage him to holiness: which shewed that sin was inbred, and in his very nature.

Dr. T. often objects to these and other texts, brought by divines to prove original sin, that there is no mention made in them of *Adam*, nor of his sin. He cries out, *Here is not the least mention or intimation of* Adam, *or any ill effects of his sin upon us.—Here is not one word, nor the least hint of* Adam, *or any consequences of his sin*, &c. &c.* He says,† "If *Job* and his friends had known and believed the doctrine of a corrupt nature, derived from Adam's sin only, they ought in reason and truth to have given this as the true and only reason of the human imperfection and uncleanness they mention." But these objections and exclamations are made no less impertinently than frequently. It is no more a proof that *corruption of nature* did not come by Adam's sin, because many times when it is mentioned, his sin is not expressly mentioned as the cause of it; than that *death* did not come by Adam's sin, as Dr. T. says it did. For though death, as incident to mankind, is mentioned so often in the Old Testament, and by our Saviour in his discourses, yet Adam's sin is not once expressly mentioned, after the three first chapters of *Genesis*, any

* Page 5, 64, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 112, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 136, 142, 143, 149, 152, 155, 229. † 142.

re in all the Old Testament or the four Evangelists, as the asion of it.

What christian has there ever been, that believed the oral corruption of human nature, who ever doubted that it me in the way of which the apostle speaks, when he says, "*By one man* sin entered into the world, and death by sin?" Nor indeed have they any more reason to doubt of it, than to doubt of the whole history of our first parents, because Adam's name is so rarely mentioned on any occasion in scripture, after that first account of him, and Eve's never at all; and because we have no more any express mention of the particular manner in which mankind were first brought into being, either with respect to the creation of Adam or Eve. It is sufficient, that the abiding, most visible effects of these things remain in the view of mankind in all ages, and are often spoken of in scripture; aud that the particular manner of their being introduced is once plainly set forth in the beginning of the Bible, in that history which gives us an account of the origin of all things. And doubtless it was expected by the great author of the bible, that the account in the three first chapters of Genesis should be taken as a plain account of the introduction of both natural and moral evil into the world. The history of Adam's sin, with its circumstances, God's threatening, the sentence pronounced upon him after his transgression and the immediate consequences, consisting in so vast an alteration in his state—and the state of the world, with respect to all his posterity—most directly and sufficiently lead us to understand the rise of calamity, sin and death, in this sinful, miserable world.

It is fit we all should know, that it does not become us to tell the Most High, how often he shall particularly explain and give the reason of any doctrine which he teaches, in order to our believing what he says. If he has at all given us evidence that it is a doctrine agreeable to his mind, it becomes us to receive it with full credit and submission; and not sullenly to reject it, because our notions and humours are not suited in the manner, and number of times, of his particularly explaining it. How often is pardon of sins promised in the Old Testament to repenting and returning sinners? How many hundred times is God's special favour there promised to the sincerely righteous, without any express mention of these benefits being through Christ? Would it therefore become us to say, that inasmuch as our dependence on Christ for these benefits is a doctrine, which, if true, is of such importance, God ought expressly to have mentioned Christ's merits as the reason and ground of the benefits, if he knew they were the ground of them; and should have plainly declared it sooner, and more frequently, if ever he expected we should believe him when he did tell us of

it?—How oft is vengeance and misery threatened in the Old Testament to the wicked, without any clear and express signification of any such thing intended, as that everlasting fire, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, in another world, which Christ so often speaks of as the punishment appointed for all the wicked? Would it now become a christian to object and say, that if God really meant any such thing, he ought in *reason and truth* to have declared it plainly and fully; and not to have been so silent about a matter of such vast importance to all mankind, for four thousand years together?

CHAP. III.

Observations on various other Places of Scripture, principally of the New Testament, proving the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Observations on John iii. 6. *in Connection with some other Passages in the New Testament.*

Those words of Christ, giving a reason to Nicodemus, why we must be born again, John iii. 6. *That which is born of the flesh, is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit*, have not without good reason been produced by divines, as a proof of the doctrine of original sin: supposing that by *flesh* here is meant *the human nature in a debased and corrupt state.* Yet Dr. T. (p. 144.) thus explains these words, "*that which is born of the flesh is flesh;* that which is born by natural descent and propagation, is a man consisting of body and soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man in their natural state." But the constant use of these terms, *flesh* and *spirit*, in other parts of the New Testament, when thus set in opposition, and the latter said to be produced by the spirit of God, as here—and when expressive of the same thing which Christ is here speaking of to Nicodemus, *viz.* the requisite qualifications to salvation—will fully vindicate the sense of our divines. Thus in the 7th and 8th chapters of *Romans*, where these terms *flesh* and *spirit*, (σαρξ and πνευμα are abundantly repeated, and set in opposition, as here. So chap. vii. 14. *The law is* (πνευματικος) *spiritual*, but I am (σαρκικος) *carnal*, sold under sin. He cannot only mean, 'I am *a man consisting body and soul, and having the powers of a man.*' Ver. 18 *know that in me, that is, in my* FLESH, *dwelleth no good* He does not mean to condemn his frame, *as consisting*

and soul; and to assert, that in his *human constitution, with the powers of a man*, dwells no good thing. And when he says in the last verse of the chapter, *with the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the* FLESH, *the law of sin;* he cannot mean, '*I myself serve the law of God;* but with my innocent *human constitution, as having the powers of a man*, I serve the law of sin.' And when he says in the next words, the beginning of the 8th chapter, *there is no condemnation to them,—that walk not after the* FLESH, *but after the spirit;* and ver. 4. *The righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us, who walk not after the* FLESH; he cannot mean, 'there is no condemnation to them that walk not according to *the powers of a man*,' &c. And when he says, (ver. 5. and 6.) *They that are after the* FLESH, *do mind the things of the* FLESH: and *to be* carnally *minded is death;* he does not intend, 'they that are according to *the human constitution, and the powers of a man*, do mind the things of the *human constitution and powers;* and to mind these is death.' And when he says, (ver. 7. and 8.) *The carnal* (or fleshly) *mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be: so that they that are in the* FLESH, *cannot please God;* he cannot mean, that to mind the things which are agreeable to 'the *powers and constitution of a man*,' who as our author says, is constituted or made right, is enmity against God; and that a mind which is agreeable to this right human constitution, as God hath made it, is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be; and that they who are according to such a constitution cannot please God.' And when it it is said, (ver. 9.) *Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit*, the apostle cannot mean, 'ye are not in the *human nature, as constituted of body and soul, and with the powers of a man.*' It is most manifest, that by the *flesh* here the apostle means a nature that is *corrupt*, of an evil tendency, and directly opposite to the law and holy nature of God; so that to walk according to it, and to have a mind so conformed, is to be an utter enemy to God and his law; in a state of perfect inconsistence with subjection to God, and of being pleasing to him; and in a sure and infallible tendency to death and utter destruction. And it is plain, that here by *walking after*, or according to *the flesh*, is meant the same thing as walking according to a corrupt and sinful nature; and to walk according to the *spirit*, is to walk according to a holy and divine nature or principle; And to be *carnally* minded, is the same as being viciously and corruptly minded; and to be *spiritually* minded, is to be of a virtuous and holy disposition.

When Christ says, John iii. 6. *That which is born of the* FLESH *is* FLESH, he represents the *flesh* not merely as a quality: for it would be incongruous to speak of a quality as a thing born. Therefore man, as in his whole nature corrupt, is called *flesh;* which is agreeable to other scripture representations, where he corrupt nature is called the *old man*, the *body of sin*, and

the *body of death.* Agreeable to this are those representations in the 7th and 8th chapters of *Romans.* There, *flesh* is figuratively represented as a person, according to the apostle's manner. This is observed by Mr. LOCKE, and after him by Dr. T. who takes notice that the apostle, in the 6th and 7th of *Romans*, represents sin as a person; and that he figuratively distinguishes in himself two persons, speaking of flesh as his person. *For I know that in* ME, *that is in my* FLESH, *dwelleth no good thing.* And it may be observed, that in the 8th chapter he still continues this representation, speaking of the *flesh* as a person. Accordingly, in the 6th and 7th verses, he speaks of *the mind of the flesh*, (φρονημα σαρκος,) and of the *mind of the spirit*, (φρονημα πνευματος,) as if the *flesh* and *spirit* were two opposite persons, each having a mind contrary to that of the other. Dr. T. interprets this *mind of the flesh, and mind of the spirit*, as though the *flesh and the spirit* were the different *objects*, about which the mind is conversant. But this is plainly beside the apostle's meaning; who speaks of the flesh and spirit as the *subjects* in which the mind is; and in a sense the agents, but not the *objects* about which it acts. We have the same phrase again, ver. 27. *He that searcheth the hearts*, knoweth what is the MIND OF THE SPIRIT, (φρονημα πνευματος.) The mind of the spiritual nature in the saints is the same with the mind of the spirit of God himself, who imparts and actuates that spiritual nature; and here the spirit is the subject and agent, but not the object. The same apostle, in a similar manner, uses the word, (νους,) *mind.* Col. ii. 18. *Vainly puffed up by his* FLESHY MIND, (απο τε νος της σαρκος αυτε,) *by the mind of his flesh.* And this agent so often called *flesh*, represented by the apostle as altogether evil, without any good thing dwelling in it, or belonging to it—yea perfectly contrary to God and his law, and tending only to death and ruin, and directly opposite to the spirit—is what Christ speaks of to Nicodemus as born in the first birth, and furnishing a reason why there is a necessity of a new birth, in order to a better production.

One thing is particularly observable in that discourse of the apostle—in which he so often uses the term *flesh*, as opposite to *spirit*—that he expressly calls it *sinful flesh*, Rom. viii. 3. It is manifest, that by *sinful flesh* he means the same thing with that *flesh* spoken of in all the context: And that when it is said, Christ was made in the likeness of *sinful flesh*, the expression is equipollent with those that speak of Christ as *made sin*, and *made a curse for us.*

Flesh and *spirit* are opposed to one another in *Gal.* v. in the same manner as in the 8th of Romans. And there assuredly, by *flesh* cannot be meant only the *human nature of body and soul* or *the mere constitution and powers of a man*, as in its

natural state, innocent and right. In the 16th ver. the Apostle says, *Walk in the* SPIRIT, *and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the* FLESH: the *flesh* is something of an evil inclination, desire, or lust. But this is more strongly signified in the next words; *For the* FLESH *lusteth against the* SPIRIT *and the* SPIRIT *against the* FLESH; *and these are contrary the one to the other.* What could have been said more plainly, to shew that what the apostle means by *flesh*, is something very evil in its nature, and an irreconcilable enemy to all goodness? And it may be observed that in these words and those that follow, the apostle still figuratively represents the *flesh* as a person or agent, desiring, acting, having lusts, and performing works. And by works of the *flesh*, and fruits of the *spirit*, which are opposed to each other, (from ver. 19, to the end) are plainly meant the same as works of a sinful nature, and fruits of a holy renewed nature. "Now the works of the *flesh* are manifest, which are these: Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, &c.—But the fruit of the *spirit* is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness," &c. The apostle by *flesh* does not mean any thing that is innocent and good in itself, which only needs to be restrained and kept in proper bounds; but something altogether evil, which is to be destroyed. 1 Cor. v. 5. *To deliver such an one to satan, for the* DESTRUCTION OF THE FLESH. We must have *no mercy on it;* we cannot be *too cruel to it;* it must even *be crucified.* Gal v. 24. *They that are Christ's have* CRUCIFIED *the* FLESH *with the affections and lusts.*

The apostle John—the same apostle that writes the account of what Christ said to Nicodemus—by the *spirit* means the same thing as a new, divine, and holy nature, exerting itself in a principle of divine love, which is the sum of all christian holiness. 1 John iii. 23, 24. "And that we should love one another, as he gave us commandment; and he that keepeth his commandments dwelleth in him, and he in him: And hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the *spirit* that he hath given us. Chap. iv. 12, 13. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us: Hereby know we that we dwell in him, because he hath given us of his *spirit.*" The spiritual principle in us being as it were a communication of the Spirit of God to us.

And as by (πνευμα) spirit, is meant a holy nature, so by the epithet (πνευματικος) *spiritual*, is meant the same as truly virtuous and holy, Gal. vi. 1. "Ye that are *spiritual*, restore such an one in the spirit of meekness." The apostle refers to what he had just said at the end of the foregoing chapter, where he had mentioned *meekness* as a fruit of the *spirit.* And so by *carnal* or *fleshly*, (σαρκικος) is meant the same as sinful. Rom. vii. 14.

"The law is *spiritual*, (i. e. holy) but I am *carnal*, sold under sin."

And it is evident that by *flesh*, as the word is used in the New Testament, and opposed to *spirit*, when speaking of the qualifications for eternal salvation, is meant—not only what is now vulgarly called *the sins of the flesh*, consisting in inordinate appetites of the body, and their indulgence; but—the whole body of sin, implying those lusts that are most subtle, and farthest from any relation to the body; such as pride, malice, envy, &c. When the *works of the flesh* are enumerated, Gal. v. 19—21. they are vices of the latter kind chiefly that are mentioned; *idolatry*, *witchcraft*, *hatred*, *variance*, *emulations*, *wrath*, *strife*, *seditions*, *heresies*, *envyings*. So, pride of heart is the effect or operation of the *flesh*. Col. ii. 18. *Vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind:* In the Greek, (as before observed) *by the mind of the flesh*. So, *pride*, *envying*, *strife*, and *division*, are spoken of as works of the flesh, 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4. "For ye are yet carnal (σαρκικοι, fleshly.) For whereas there is envying, and strife, and division, are ye not carnal, and walk as men? For while one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?" Such kind of lusts do not depend on the body, or external senses; for the devil himself has them in the highest degree, who has not, nor ever had, any body or external senses to gratify.

Here, if it should be inquired, how corruption or depravity in general, or the nature of man as corrupt and sinful, came to be called *flesh;* and not only that corruption which consists in inordinate bodily appetites? I think what the apostle says in the last cited place, *Are ye not carnal, and walk* AS MEN? leads us to the true reason. It is because a corrupt and sinful nature is what properly belongs to *mankind*, or the race of Adam, as they are in themselves, and as they are *by nature*. The word *flesh* is often used in both the Old and the New Testament to signify *mankind* in their present state. To enumerate all the places would be very tedious: I shall therefore only mention a few in the New Testament. Matt. xxiv. 22. "Except those days should be shortened, no *flesh* should be saved." Luke iii. 6. "All *flesh* shall see the salvation of God." John xvii. 2. "Thou hast given him power over all *flesh*.* Man's nature, being left *to itself*, forsaken of the Spirit of God, as it was when man fell, and consequently forsaken of divine and holy principles, *of itself* became exceeding corrupt, utterly depraved and ruined: And so the word *flesh*, which signifies *man*, came to be used to signify man as he is in himself, in his natural state, debased, corrupt, and ruined. On the other hand, the word *spirit* came to be used to signify a divine and holy prin-

* See also Acts ii. 17. Rom. iii. 20. 1 Cor. i. 29. Gal ii. 16.

ciple, or new nature; because that is not *of man*, but *of God*, by the indwelling and vital influence of his *spirit*. And thus to be *corrupt*, and to be *carnal*, or *fleshly*, and to *walk as men*, are the same thing. And so in other parts of scripture, to *savour the things that be of man*, and to *savour things which are corrupt*, are the same; and *sons of men*, and *wicked men*, also are the same, as observed before. And on the other hand, to *savour the things that be of God*, and to *receive the things of the Spirit of God*, are phrases that signify as much as relishing and embracing true holiness or divine virtue.

All these things confirm what we have supposed to be Christ's meaning in saying, "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the spirit, is spirit." His speech implies, that what is born in the first birth of man, is nothing but man as he is *of himself*, without any thing divine in him; depraved, debased, sinful, ruined man, utterly unfit to enter into the kingdom of God, and incapable of the spiritual divine happiness of that kingdom. But that which is born in the new birth, of the Spirit of God, is a spiritual principle, a holy and divine nature, meet for the heavenly kingdom. It is no small confirmation of this being the true meaning, that the words understood in this sense contain the proper and true reason, why a man must be born again, in order to enter into the kingdom of God; the reason given every where in other parts of scripture for the necessity of a renovation, a change of mind, a new heart, &c. in order to salvation: To give a reason of which to *Nicodemus*, is plainly Christ's design in the words which have been insisted on.——Before I proceed, I would observe one thing as a corollary from what has been said.

Corol. If by flesh and spirit, when spoken of in the New Testament, and opposed to each other in discourses on the necessary qualification for salvation, we are to understand what has been now supposed, it will not only follow, that men by nature are corrupt, but *wholly corrupt*, without any good thing. If by flesh is meant man's nature, as he receives it in his first birth, then *therein dwelleth no good thing*; as appears by Rom. vii. 18. It is wholly opposite to God, and to subjection to his law, as appears by Rom. viii. 7, 8. It is directly contrary to true holiness, and wholly opposes it, as appears by Gal. v. 17. So long as men are in their natural state, they not only have no good thing, but it is impossible they should have or do any good thing; as appears by Rom. viii. 8. There is nothing in their nature, as they have it by the first birth, whence should arise any true subjection to God; as appears by Rom. viii. 7. If there were any thing truly good in the *flesh*, or in *man's nature*, or natural disposition, under a moral view, then it should only be amended; but the scripture represents as though we were to be enemies to it, and were to seek no-

thing short of its entire destruction, as before observed. And elsewhere the apostle directs not to the amending of the *old man*, but *putting it off*, and putting on the *new man:* and seeks not to have the *body of death* made better, but to be *delivered* from it; and says, *that if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature* (which doubtless means the same as a man *new born*,) *old things are* (not amended but) *passed away, and* ALL *things are become new.*

But this will be further evident, if we particularly consider the apostle's discourse in 1 *Cor.* the latter part of the second chapter and the beginning of the third. There the apostle speaks of the *natural man* and the *spiritual man:* where *natural* and *spiritual* are opposed just in the same manner, as *carnal* and *spiritual* often are. In chap. ii. 14, 15. he says, "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God: For they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things." And not only does the apostle here oppose *natrual* and *spiritual*, just as he elsewhere does *carnal* and *spiritual*, but his following discourse evidently shews that he means the very same distinction, the same two distinct and opposite things. For immediately on his thus speaking of the difference betwen the *natnral* and the *spiritual* man he says, "And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto *spiritual*, but as unto *carnal*." Referring manifestly to what he had been saying in the immediately preceding discourse, about *spiritual* and *natural men*, and evidently using the word *carnal* as synonymous with *natural*. By which it is put out of all reasonable dispute, that the apostle by *natural men* means the same as men in that *carnal*, sinful state, that they are in by their first birth;—notwithstanding all the glosses and criticisms, by which modern writers have endeavoured to palm upon us another sense of this phrase; and so to deprive us of the clear instruction the apostle gives in that 14th verse, concerning the sinful miserable state of man by nature. Dr. T. says, by ψυχικος, is meant the *animal man*, the man who maketh sense and appetite the law of his action. If he aims to limit the meaning of the word to external sense and bodily appetite, his meaning is certainly not the apostle's. For the apostle in his sense includes the more spiritual vices of envy, strife, &c. as appears by the four first verses of the next chapter; where, as I have observed, he substitutes the word *carnal* in the place of ψυχικος. So the apostle *Jude* uses the word in like manner, opposing it to *spiritual*, or *having the spirit*, ver. 19. "These are they that separate themselves, sensual, (ψυχικοι) *not having the spirit*." The vices he had been just speaking of, were chiefly of the more spiritual kind. ver. 16. "These are murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts; and their

mouth speaking great swelling words, having men's persons in admiration, because of advantage." The vices mentioned are much of the same kind with those of the *Corinthians*, for which he calls them *carnal; envy, strife, divisions*, saying, *I am of Paul*, and *I of Apollos;* and being *puffed up for one against another*. We have the same word again, Jam. iii. 14, 15. "If ye have bitter envying and strife, glory not, and lie not against the truth: This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, *sensual*, (ψυχικη) and devilish;" where also the vices the apostle speaks of are of the more spiritual kind.

So that on the whole, there is sufficient reason to understand the apostle, when he speaks of the *natural man*, in 1 Cor. ii. 14. as meaning man in his native corrupt state. And his words represent him as totally corrupt, wholly a stranger and enemy to true virtue or holiness, and things appertaining to it, which it appears are commonly intended in the New Testament by things *spiritual*, and are doubtless here meant by *things of the spirit of God*. These words also represent, that it is impossible man should be otherwise, while in his natural state. The expressions are very strong: *The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God*, is not susceptible of things of that kind, *neither can he know them*, can have no true sense or relish of them, or notion of their real nature and true excellency; *because they are spiritually discerned;* they are not discerned by means of any principle in nature, but altogether by a principle that is divine, something introduced by the grace of God's holy spirit, which is above all that is natural. The words are in a considerable degree parallel with those of our Saviour, John xiv. 16, 17. "He shall give you the spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: But ye know him; for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you."

SECT. II.

Observations on Rom. iii. 9—24.

If the scriptures represent all mankind as wicked in their first state, before they are made partakers of the benefits of Christ's redemption, then they are wicked by nature: For doubtless men's *first* state is their *native* state, or that in which they come into the world. But the scriptures do thus represent all mankind.

Before I mention particular texts to this purpose, I would observe that it alters not the case as to the argument in hand, whether we suppose these texts speak directly of infants, or only of such as understand something of their duty and state

For if all mankind, as soon as ever they are capable of reflecting, and knowing their own moral state, find themselves wicked, this proves that they are wicked by *nature;* either born so, or born with an infallible disposition to be wicked as soon as possible, if there be any difference between these; and either of them will prove men to be born exceedingly *depraved.* I have before proved, that a native propensity to sin certainly follows from many things said of mankind in the scripture; but what I intend now, is to prove by direct scripture-testimony, that all mankind, in their first state, are really of a wicked character.

To this purpose, exceeding full, express, and abundant is that passage of the apostle, in *Rom.* iii. 9—24. which I shall set down at large, distinguishing the universal terms which are here so often repeated, by a distinct character. The apostle having in the first chapter (ver. 16, 17.) laid down his proposition, that none can be saved in any other way than through the righteousness of God, by faith in Jesus Christ, he proceeds to prove this point, by shewing particularly that all are in themselves wicked, and without any righteousness of their own. First, he insists on the wickedness of the *Gentiles*, in the first chapter; next, on the wickedness of the *Jews*, in the second chapter. And then, in this place, he comes to sum up the matter, and draw the conclusion in the words following: "What then, are we better than they? No, in no wise; for we have before proved both *Jews* and *Gentiles*, that they are ALL under sin: As it is written, there is NONE righteous, NO, NOT ONE; there is NONE that understandeth; there is NONE that seeketh after God; they are ALL gone out of the way; they are TOGETHER become unprofitable; there is NONE that doeth good, NO, NOT ONE. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips; whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness; their feet are swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace they have not known; there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know, that whatsoever things the law saith, it sayeth to them that are under the law, that EVERY mouth may be stopped, and ALL THE WORLD may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law, there shall NO FLESH be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the law, is manifest, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto ALL, and upon ALL them that believe; for there is NO DIFFERENCE. For ALL have sinned, and come short of the glory of God. Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption which is in Jesus Christ."

Here the thing which I would prove, *viz.* that mankind in their first state, before they are interested in the benefits of Christ's redemption, are universally wicked, is declared with the utmost possible fulness and precision. So that if here this matter be not set forth plainly, expressly, and fully, it must be because no words can do it, and it is not in the power of language, or any manner of terms and phrases, however contrived and heaped up one upon another, determinately to signify any such thing.

Dr. T. to take off the force of the whole, would have us to understand, (p. 104—107.) that these passages quoted from the Psalms, and other parts of the Old Testament, do not speak of *all mankind, nor of all the Jews; but only of them of whom they were true.* He observes, there were many that were innocent and righteous; though there were also many, a strong party, that were wicked, corrupt, &c. of whom these texts were to be understood. Concerning which I would observe the following things:

I. According to this, the *universality* of the terms in these places which the apostle cites from the Old Testament, to prove that *all the world, both Jews and Gentiles, are under sin,* is nothing to his purpose. The apostle uses universal terms in his proposition and in his conclusion, that ALL are under sin, that EVERY MOUTH is stopped, ALL THE WORLD guilty,—that by the deeds of the law NO FLESH can be justified. And he chooses out a number of universal sayings or clauses out of the Old Testament, to confirm this universality; as, *There is none righteous; no, not one: They are all gone out of the way; there is none that understandeth, &c.* But yet the universal terms found in them have no reference to any such universality, either in the collective or personal sense; no universality of the nations of the world, or of particular persons in those nations, or in any one nation in the world: "*But only of those of whom they are true!*" That is, *there is none of them righteous,* of whom it is *true,* that they are not *righteous; no, not one; there is none that understandeth,* of whom it is *true,* that *they* understand not: *they are all gone out of the way,* of whom it is *true,* that they are gone out of the way, &c. Or these expressions are to be understood concerning that strong party in Israel, in David's and Solomon's days, and in the prophets' days; they are to be understood of *them* universally. And what is that to the apostle's purpose? How does *such* an universality of wickedness—that all were wicked in Israel, who were wicked; or, that there was a particular evil party, all of which were wicked—confirm that universality which the apostle would prove, *viz.* That *all Jews and Gentiles, and the whole world,* were wicked, and *every mouth stopped,* and that *no flesh* could be justified by their own righteousness.

Here nothing can be said to abate the nonsense, but this, that the apostle would convince the Jews that they were capable of being wicked, as well as other nations; and to prove it, he mentions some texts which shew that there was a wicked party in Israel a thousand years ago. And as to the universal terms which happened to be in these texts, the apostle had no respect to them; but his reciting them is as it were accidental, they *happened* to be in some texts which speak of an evil party in Israel, and the apostle cites them as they are, not because they are any more to his purpose for the universal terms which happen to be in them. But let the reader look on the words of the apostle, and observe the violence of such a supposition. Particularly let the words of the 9th and 10th verses, and their connection, be observed.—*All are under sin: As it is written, there is none righteous: no, not one.* How plain is it, that the apostle cites that latter universal clause out of the 14th Psalm, to confirm the preceding universal words of his own proposition? And yet it will follow from what Dr. T. supposes, that the universality of the terms in the last words, *there is none righteous; no, not one*, hath no relation at all to that universality he speaks of in the preceding clause, to which they are joined, *all are under sin:* and is no more a confirmation of it, than if the words were thus, 'There are *some* or there are *many* in Israel, that are not righteous.'

2. To suppose the apostle's design in citing these passages was only to prove to the Jews, that of old there was a considerable number of their nation that were wicked men, is to suppose him to have gone about to prove what none of the Jews denied, or made the least doubt of; even the Pharisees, the most self-righteous sect of them, who went furthest in glorying in the distinction of their nation from other nations as a holy people, knew it, and owned it; they openly confessed that their *forefathers killed the prophets*, Mat. xxiii. 29—31. And if the apostle's design had been only to refresh their memories, to put them in mind of the ancient wickedness of their nation, to lead to reflection on themselves as guilty of the like wickedness, (as Stephen does, Acts vii.) what need had he to go so far about to prove this—gathering up many sentences here and there which prove, that their scriptures speak of some as wicked men—and then to prove that the wicked men spoken of must be Jews, by this argument, that *what things soever the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law*, or that whatsoever the books of the Old Testament said, it must be understood of that people who had the Old Testament? What need had the apostle of such an ambages as this, to prove to the Jews that there had been many of their nation in past ages, which were wicked men; when the Old Testament was full of passages that asserted this *expressly*, not

only of a strong party, but of the nation in general? How much more would it have been to such a purpose, to have put them in mind of the wickedness of the people in general in worshipping the golden calf: of the unbelief, murmuring, and perverseness of the whole congregation in the wilderness, for forty years, as *Stephen* does? Which things he had no need to prove to be spoken of their nation, by any such indirect argument as this, "Whatsoever things the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law."

3. It would have been impertinent to the apostle's purpose, even as our author understands his purpose, for him to have gone about to convince the *Jews*, that there had been a strong *party* of bad men in the time of *David* and *Solomon*, and the prophets. For Dr. T. supposes, the apostle's aim is to prove the great corruption of both *Jews* and *Gentiles* when *Christ* came into the world.*

In order the more fully to evade the clear and abundant testimonies to the doctrine of Original Sin, contained in this part of the holy scripture, our author says, the apostle is here speaking of *bodies* of people, of *Jews* and *Gentiles* in a *collective* sense, as two great bodies into which mankind are divided; speaking of them in their collective capacity, and not with respect to particular persons; that the apostle's design is to prove, that neither of these two great bodies, in their collective sense, can be justified by law, because both were corrupt; and so that no more is implied, than that the *generality* of both were wicked.† On this I observe,

(1.) That this supposed sense disagrees extremely with the *terms* and language which the apostle here makes use of. For according to this, we must understand either.

First, That the apostle means no *universality* at all, but only the far greater part. But if the words which the apostle uses do not most fully and determinately signify an universality, no words ever used in the bible are sufficient to do it. I might challenge any man to produce any one paragraph in the scripture, from the beginning to the end, where there is such a repetition and accumulation of terms, so strongly and emphatically and carefully, to express the most perfect and absolute universality; or any place to be compared to it. What instance is there in the scripture, or indeed in any other writing, when the meaning is only the *much greater part*, where this meaning is signified in such a manner, *They are all,—They are all,—They are all,—together,—every one,—all the world;* joined to multiplied negative terms, to shew the universality to be without exception; saying, *There is no*

* See Key, § 307, 310. † Page 102, 104, 117, 119, 120. and note on Rom. iii. 10—19.

flesh,—there is none,—there is none,—there is none,—there is none, four times *over;* besides the addition of *No, not one,—no, not one,*—once and again!—Or,

Secondly. If any universality at all be allowed, it is only of the *collective bodies* spoken of; and these collective bodies but two, as Dr. T. reckons them, viz. the *Jewish* nation, and the *Gentile* world; supposing the apostle is here representing each of these parts of mankind as being wicked. But is this the way of men using language, when speaking of but *two* things, to express themselves in such *universal* terms, when they mean no more than that the thing affirmed is predicated of *both* of them? If a man speaking of his two *feet* as both lame, should say, *All my feet are lame—They are all lame—All together are become weak—None of my feet are strong—None of them are sound—No, not one;* would not he be thought to be lame in his understanding, as well as his feet? When the apostle says, *That every mouth may be stopped*, must we suppose, that he speaks only of these two great collective bodies, figuratively ascribing to each of them a mouth, and means that these two mouths are stopped! Besides, according to our author's own interpretation, the universal terms used in these texts, cited from the Old Testament, have no respect to those two great collective bodies, nor indeed to either of them; but to *some* in *Israel*, a particular disaffected party in that one nation, which was made up of wicked men. So that his interpretation is every way absurd and inconsistent.

(2.) If the apostle is speaking only of the wickedness or guilt of great collective bodies, then it will follow, that also the *justification* he here treats of, is no other than the justification of such collective bodies. For they are the *same* of whom he speaks as guilty and wicked, and who cannot be *justified* by the works of the law, by reason of their being *wicked.* Otherwise his argument is wholly disannulled. If the guilt he speaks of be only of collective bodies, then what he argues from that guilt must be only, that collective bodies cannot be justified by the works of the law, having no respect to the justification of particular persons. And indeed this is Dr. T.'s declared opinion. He supposes the apostle here, and in other parts of this epistle, is speaking of men's justification *considered only as in their collective capacity.** But the contrary is most manifest. The 26th and 28th verses of this third chapter, cannot, without the utmost violence, be understood otherwise than of the justification of particular persons. "That he might be just, and the justifier of *him* that believeth in Jesus.—Therefore we conclude that *a man* is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law." So chap. iv. 5. "But to *him*

*ote on Rom. iii. 10—19. Chap. v. 11. and Chap. ix. 30, 31.

that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, *his* faith is counted for righteousness." And what the apostle cites in the 6th, 7th and 8th verses from the book of Psalms evidently shews, that he is speaking of the justification of particular persons. "Even as David also describeth the blessedness of *the man* unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." *David* says these things in the 32d Psalm, with a special respect to his own particular case; there expressing the great distress he was in while under a sense of personal sin and guilt, and the great joy he had when God forgave him.

And what can be plainer, than in the paragraph we have been upon, (Rom. iii. 20.) it is the justification of *particular persons* of which the apostle speaks. "Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight." He refers to Psal. cxliii. 2. "Enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall *no man living* be justified." Here the Psalmist is not speaking of the justification of a nation, as a collective body, or of one of the two parts of the world, but of a particular man. And it is further manifest, that the apostle is here speaking of personal justification, inasmuch as this place is evidently parallel with Gal. iii. 10, 11. "For as many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse: For it is written, Cursed is *every one* that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them. But that *no man* is justified by the works of the law, is evident; for the just shall live by faith." It is plain, that this place is parallel with that in the 3d of *Romans*, not only as the thing asserted is the same, and the argument by which it is proved—that all are guilty, and exposed to condemnation by the law.—But the same saying of the Old Testament is cited. (Gal. ii. 16.) Many other things demonstrate, that the apostle is speaking of the same justification in both places, which I omit for brevity's sake.

And besides all these things, our author's interpretation makes the apostle's argument wholly void another way. The apostle is speaking of a certain subject which cannot be justified by the works of the law; and his argument is, that the same subject is guilty, and is condemned by the law. If he means that one subject, suppose a collective body or bodies, cannot be justified by the law, because another subject, another collective body, is condemned by the law, it is plain, the argument would be quite vain and impertinent. Yet thus the argument must stand according to Dr. T.'s interpretation. The collective bodies which he supposes are spoken of as wicked, and condemned by the law, considered as in their collective capacity, are those two, the *Jewish* nation, and the

heathen world. But the collective body which he supposes the apostle speaks of as justified without the deeds of the law, is neither of these, but the christian church, or body of believers; which is a new collective body, a new creature, and a new man, (according to our author's understanding of such phrases) which never had any existence before it was justified, and therefore never was wicked or condemned, unless it was with regard to the *individuals* of which it was constituted; and it does not appear, according to our author's scheme, that these individuals had before been generally wicked For according to him, there was a number both among the *Jews* and *Gentiles*, that were righteous before. And how does it appear, but that the comparatively few *Jews* and *Gentiles*, of which this new-created collective body was constituted, were chiefly of the best of each?

So that in every view, this author's way of explaining the passage appears vain and absurd. And so clearly and fully has the apostle expressed himself, that it is doubtless impossible to invent any other sense to put upon his words, than that which will imply that all mankind, even every individual of the whole race, but their Redeemer himself, are in their first original state corrupt and wicked.

Before I leave this passage, (Rom. iii. 9—24.) it may be proper to observe, that it not only is a most clear and full testimony to the native depravity of mankind, but also plainly declares that natural depravity to be total and exceeding great. It is the apostle's manifest design in these citations from the Old Testament, to shew these three things. 1. That *all mankind* are by nature *corrupt*. 2. That every one is *altogether corrupt*, and as it were depraved in every part. 3. That they are in every part *corrupt in an exceeding degree*. With respect to the second of these, it is plain the apostle puts together those particular passages of the Old Testament, wherein most of those members of the body are mentioned, that are the soul's chief instruments or organs of external action. The hands (implicitly) in those expressions, *They are together become unprofitable. There is none that doeth good.* The throat, tongue, lips, and mouth, the organs of speech, in those words; "Their *throat* is an open sepulchre: With their *tongues* they have used deceit: The poison of asps is under their *lips;* whose *mouth* is full of cursing and bitterness." The feet in those words, ver. 15. "Their *feet* are swift to shed blood." These things together signify, that man is as it were *all over corrupt* in every part. And not only is the total corruption thus intimated by enumerating the several parts, but also by denying all good; any true understanding or spiritual knowledge, any virtuous action, or so much as a truly virtuous desire, or seeking after God. "There is none that *understand-*

eth; There is none that *seeketh* after God: There is none that *doeth good:* The way of peace have they *not known.*" And in general by denying all true piety or religion in men in their first state, ver. 18. "There is no *fear* of God before their eyes."—The expressions also are evidently chosen to denote a most extreme and desperate wickedness of heart. An exceeding depravity is ascribed to every part: To the throat, the scent of an *open sepulchre;* to the tongue and lips, *deceit,* and *the poison of asps;* to the mouth, *cursing* and *bitterness;* of their feet it is said, *they are swift to shed blood:* And with regard to the whole man it is said, *destruction* and *misery* are in their ways. The representation is very strong of each of these things, *viz.* That *all* mankind are corrupt; that every one is *wholly* and altogether corrupt; and also *extremely* and desperately corrupt. And it is plain, it is not accidental that we have here such a collection of such strong expressions, so emphatically signifying these things; but that they are chosen of the apostle on design, as being directly and fully to his purpose; which purpose appears in all his discourse in the whole of this chapter, and indeed from the beginning of the epistle.

SECT. III.

Observations on Rom. v. 6—10. *and Eph.* ii. 3. *with the Context, and Rom.* vii.

Another passage of this apostle, which shews that all who are made partakers of the benefits of Christ's redemption are in their first state wicked, desperately wicked, is Rom. v. 6—10. "For when we were yet *without strength,* in due time Christ died for the *ungodly.* For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man, some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet *sinners,* Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from *wrath* through him. For if while we were *enemies,* we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life."—Here all for whom Christ died, and who are saved by him, are spoken of as being in their first state *sinners, ungodly, enemies* to God, exposed to divine *wrath,* and *without strength,* without ability to help themselves, or deliver their souls from this miserable state.

Dr. T. says, the apostle here speaks of the Gentiles *only in their heathen state,* in contradistinction to the Jews; and that not of particular persons among the heathen Gentiles, or

as to the state they were in personally; but only of the Gentiles *collectively taken*, or of the miserable state of that great collective body, the heathen world: And that these appellations, *sinners*, *ungodly*, *enemies*, &c. were names by which the apostles in their writings were wont to signify and distinguish the heathen world in opposition to the Jews; and that in this sense these appellations are to be taken in their epistles, and in this place in particular.* And it is observable, that this way of interpreting these phrases in the apostolic writings is become fashionable with many late writers; whereby they not only evade several clear testimonies of the doctrine of original sin, but make void great part of the New Testament; on which account it deserves the more particular consideration.

It is allowed to have been long common and customary among the Jews, especially the sect of the Pharisees, in their pride and confidence in their privileges as the peculiar people of God, to exalt themselves exceedingly above other nations, and greatly to despise the Gentiles, calling them by such names as *sinners*, *enemies*, *dogs*, &c. Themselves they accounted, in general (excepting the *publicans*, and the notoriously profligate) as the *friends*, the special *favourites* and *children* of God; because they were the children of Abraham, were circumcised, and had the law of Moses as their peculiar privilege, and as a wall of partition between them and the Gentiles.

But it is very remarkable, that a christian divine, who has studied the New Testament, and the epistle to the Romans in particular, so diligently as Dr. T. has done, should so strongly imagine that the apostles of Jesus Christ countenance and cherish these self-exalting, uncharitable dispositions and notions of the Jews which gave rise to such a custom, so far as to fall in with that custom, and adopt that language of their pride and contempt; and especially that the apostle Paul should do it. It is a most unreasonable imagination on many accounts.

1. The whole gospel dispensation is calculated entirely to overthrow and abolish every thing to which this self-distinguishing, self-exalting language of the Jews was owing.—It was calculated wholly to exclude such boasting, and to destroy the pride and self-righteousness which were the causes of it. It was calculated to abolish the enmity, and break down the partition wall between Jews and Gentiles, and *of twain* to *make one new man*, *so making peace*: to destroy all dispositions in nations and particular persons to despise one another, or to say one to another, "stand by thyself, come not near to me; for I am holier than thou;" and to establish the

* Page 114—120. See also Dr. T.'s Paraph. and notes on the place.

contrary principles of humility, mutual esteem, honour and love, and universal union, in the most firm and perfect manner.

2. Christ, when on earth, set himself, through the whole course of his ministry, to militate against this pharasaical spirit, practice, and language of the Jews, by which they showed so much contempt of the Gentiles, Publicans, and such as were openly lewd and vicious, and thus exalted themselves above them; calling them *sinners* and *enemies*, and themselves *holy*, and *God's children*: not allowing the Gentile to be their neighbour, &c. He condemned the Pharisees for not esteeming themselves *sinners* as well as the Publicans; trusting in themselves that they were righteous, and despising others. He militated against these things in his own treatment of some Gentiles, Publicans, and others, whom they called *sinners*, and in what he said on those occasions.*

He opposed these notions and manners of the Jews in his parables,† and in his instructions to his disciples how to treat the unbelieving Jews‡; and in what he says to Nicodemus about the necessity of a new birth, even for the Jews, as well as the unclean Gentiles with regard to their proselyteism, which some of the Jews looked upon as a *new birth*. And in opposition to their notions of their being the children of God, because the children of Abraham, but the Gentiles by nature sinners and children of wrath, he tells them that even they were *children of the devil* §.

3. Though we should suppose the apostles not to have been thoroughly brought off from such notions, manners, and language of the Jews, till after Christ's ascension; yet after the pouring out of the spirit on the day of Pentecost, or at least after the calling of the Gentiles, begun in the conversion of Cornelius, they were fully instructed in this matter, and effectually taught no longer to call the Gentiles *unclean*, as a note of distinction from the Jews, Acts x. 28. which was before any of the apostolic epistles were written.

* Matth. viii. 5—13 Chap. ix. 9—13. Chap xi. 19—24. Chap. xv. 21—28. Luke vii. 37. to the end. Chap. xvii. 12—19. Chap. xix. 1—10. John iv. 9. &c. ver. 39, &c. Compare Luke x. 29, &c.

† Matth. xxi. 28—32. Chap. xxii. 1—10. Luke xiv. 16—24. Compare Luke xiii. 28, 29, 30.

‡ Matt. x 14, 15. § John viii. 33,——44.

It may also be observed, that John the Baptist greatly contradicted the Jews' opinion of themselves, as being a holy people and accepted of God, because they were the children of Abraham—and on that account better than the Heathen whom they called sinners, enemies, unclean, &c.—in baptizing the Jews as a *polluted* people, and *sinners*, as the Jews used to baptize proselytes from among the Heathen; calling them to repentance as *sinners*, saying, "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father; for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham;" and teaching the Pharisees, that instead of their being a holy generation, and children of God, as they called themselves, they were a *generation of vipers*.

4. Of all the apostles, none were more perfectly instructed in this matter than Paul, and none so abundant in instructing others in it, as this great apostle of the Gentiles. None of the apostles had so much occasion to exert themselves against the forementioned notions and language of the Jews, in opposition to Jewish teachers and judaizing Christians who strove to keep up the separation wall between Jews and Gentiles, and to exalt the former and set at nought the latter.

5. This apostle, in his epistle to the Romans, above all his other writings, exerts himself in a most elaborate manner, and with his utmost skill and power, to bring the Jewish Christians off from every thing of this kind. He endeavours by all means that there might no longer be in them any remains of these old notions in which they had been educated, of such a great distinction between Jews and Gentiles as were expressed in the names they used to distinguish them by; the Jews, *holy children of* Abraham, *friends and children of God;* but the Gentiles, *sinners*, *unclean*, *enemies*, and the like. He makes it almost his whole business, from the beginning of the epistle, Rom. v. 6, *&c.* to convince them that there was no ground for any such distinction, and to prove that in common, both Jews and Gentiles, all were desperately wicked, and none righteous, no not one. He tells them, chap. iii. 9. that the Jews were by no means better than the Gentiles; and (in what follows in that chapter) that there was no difference between Jews and Gentiles; and represents all as without strength, or any sufficiency of their own in the affair of justification and redemption. And in the continuation of the same discourse, in the 4th chapter, he teaches that all who were justified by Christ were in themselves *ungodly;* and that being the children of Abraham was not peculiar to the Jews. In this 5th chap. still in continuation of the same discourse—on the same subject and argument of justification through Christ, and by faith in him—he speaks of Christ dying for the *ungodly* and *sinners;* and those who were without *strength* or sufficiency for their own salvation, as he had done all along before. But now, it seems, the apostle by *sinners and ungodly*, must not be understood according as he used these words before; but must be supposed to mean only the Gentiles as distinguished from the Jews; adopting the language of those self-righteous, self-exalting, disdainful Judaizing teachers, whom he was with all his might opposing: countenancing the very same thing in them, which he had been from the beginning of the epistle discountenancing, and endeavouring to discourage, and utterly to abolish, with all his art and strength.

One reason why the Jews looked on themselves better than the Gentiles, and called themselves *holy*, and the Gentiles *sinners*, was, that they had the *law of Moses*. They *made*

their boast of the law. But the apostle shews them, that this was so far from making them better, that it condemned them, and was an occasion of their being *sinners* in a higher degree, and more aggravated manner, and more effectually and dreadfully *dead* in sin*.

It cannot be justly objected here, that this apostle did in fact use this language, and call the Gentiles sinners in contradistinction to the Jews, in what he said to Peter, Gal. ii. 15, 16. "We who are *Jews* by nature, and not *sinners* of the Gentiles, knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ." It is true that the apostle here refers to this distinction, as what was usually made by the self-righteous Jews, between themselves and the Gentiles; but not in such a manner as to adopt or favour it; but on the contrary, so as plainly to shew his disapprobation of it; *q. d.* 'Though we were born *Jews*, and by nature are of that people which are wont to make their boast of the law, expecting to be justified by it, and trust in themselves that they are righteous, despising others, calling the Gentiles *sinners*, in distinction from themselves; yet we being now instructed in the gospel of Christ, know better; we now know that a man is not justified by the works of the law; that we are all justified only by faith in Christ, in whom there is no difference, no distinction of *Greek* or *Gentile*, and *Jew*, but all are one in Christ Jesus.' And this is the very thing he there speaks of, which he blamed Peter for; that by his withdrawing and separating himself from the Gentiles, refusing to eat with them; &c. he had countenanced this self-exalting, self-distinguishing, separating spirit and custom of the Jews, whereby they treated the Gentiles as in a distinguishing manner *sinners* and *unclean*, and not fit to come near them who were a holy people.

6. The very words of the apostle in this place shew plainly, that he uses the term *sinners*, not as signifying *Gentiles*, in opposition to *Jews*, but as denoting the *morally evil*, in opposition to such as are *righteous* or *good*. This latter distinction between *sinners* and *righteous* is here expressed in plain terms. "Scarcely for a *righteous man* will one die; yet peradventure for a *good man* some would even dare to die; but God commended his love towards us, in that while we were yet *sinners*, Christ died for us." By *righteous men* are doubtless meant the same that are meant by such a phrase throughout this apostle's writings, throughout the New Testament, and throughout the Bible. Will any one pretend, that by the righteous man, for whom men would scarcely die, and by the good man, for whom perhaps some might even dare to die, is

* vii. 4—13. agreeably to those words of Christ, John v. 45.

meant a *Jew?* Dr. T. himself does not explain it so, in his exposition of this epistle; and therefore is not very consistent with himself, in supposing that in the other part of the distinction the apostle means Gentiles, as distinguished from the Jews. The apostle himself had been labouring abundantly in the preceding part of the epistle, to prove that the Jews were *sinners* in opposition to *righteous;* that all *had sinned*, that all were *under sin*, and therefore could not be justified, could not be accepted as *righteous*, by their own righteousness.

7. Another thing which makes it evident that the apostle, when he speaks in this place of the *sinners* and *enemies* for whom Christ died, does not mean only the Gentiles, is, that he includes *himself* among them, saying, *while we were sinners*, and *when we were enemies.*

Our author from time to time says, the apostle, though he speaks only of the Gentiles in their heathen state, yet *puts himself with them, because he was the apostle of the Gentiles.* But this is very unreasonable. There is no more sense in it, than there would be in a father ranking himself among his children, when speaking to his children of the benefits they have by being begotten by himself; and saying, *We children.* Or in a physician ranking himself with his patients, when talking to them of their diseases and cure; saying, *We sick folks.* Paul being the apostle of the Gentiles to save them from their heathenism, is so far from being a reason for him to reckon himself among the heathen, that on the contrary, it is the very thing that would render it in a peculiar manner unnatural and absurd for him so to do. Because, as the apostle of the Gentiles, he appears as their healer and deliverer from heathenism; and therefore in that capacity, in a peculiar manner, appears in his distinction from the heathen, and in opposition to the state of heathenism. For it is by the most opposite qualities only, that he is fitted to be an apostle of the heathen, and recoverer from heathenism. As the clear light of the sun is what makes it a proper restorative from darkness; and therefore, the sun being spoken of as such a remedy, none would suppose to be a good reason why it should be ranked among dark things. Besides, the apostle, in this epistle, expressly ranks himself with the Jews, when he speaks of them as distinguished from the Gentiles; as in Chap. iii. 9. *What then? are we better than they?* That is, are we *Jews* better than the *Gentiles?*

It cannot justly be alleged in opposition to this, that the apostle Peter puts himself with the heathen, 1 *Pet.* iv. 3. "For the time past of *our* life may suffice *us* to have wrought the will of the Gentiles; when *we* walked in lasciviousness, lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries."

For the apostle Peter (who by the way was not an apostle of the Gentiles) here does not speak of himself as one of the heathen, but as one of the church of Christ in general, made up of those who had been Jews, proselytes, and heathens, who were now all one body, of which body he was a member. It is *this* society therefore, and not the Gentiles, that he refers to in the pronoun us. He is speaking of the wickedness that the members of this *body* or *society* had lived in before their conversion; not that every member had lived in all those vices here mentioned, but some in one, others in another. Very parallel is the passage with that of the apostle *Paul* to *Titus*, Chap. iii. 3. "For *we* ourselves also (i. e. we of the christian church) were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, (some, one lust and pleasure, others another) living in malice, envy, hateful and hating one another," &c. There is nothing in this but what is very natural. That the apostle speaking *to* the christian church, and *of* that church, confessing its former sins, should speak of *himself* as one of that society, and yet mention some sins that he personally had not been guilty of, and among others, heathenish idolatry, is quite a different thing from what it would have been for the apostle, expressly distinguishing those of the christians which had been heathen, from those which had been Jews, to have ranked himself with the former, though he was truly of the latter.

If a minister in some congregation in England, speaking in a sermon of the sins of the nation, being himself of the nation, should say, 'We have greatly corrupted ourselves, and provoked God by our deism, blasphemy, profane swearing, lasciviousness, venality,' &c. speaking in the first person plural, though he himself never had been a deist, and perhaps none of his hearers, and they might also have been generally free from other sins he mentioned; yet there would be nothing unnatural in his thus expressing himself. But it would be quite a different thing, if one part of the British dominions, suppose our king's American dominions, had universally apostatized from christianity to deism, and had long been in such a state, and if one who had been born and brought up in England among christians, the country being universally christian, should be sent among them to shew them the folly and great evil of deism, and convert them to christianity; and this missionary, when making a distinction between English christians, and these deists, should rank himself the latter, and say, WE American *deists*, WE *foolish blind infidels*, &c. This indeed would be very unnatural and absurd.

Another passage of the apostle, to the like purpose with that which we have been considering in the 5th of Romans, is that in Eph. ii. 3.—"And were by nature children of wrath,

even as others." This remains a plain testimony to the doctrine of original sin, as held by those who used to be called orthodox christians, after all the pains and art used to torture and pervert it. This doctrine is here not only plainly and fully taught, but abundantly so, if we take the words with the context; where christians are once and again represented as being, in their first state, *dead in sin*, and as *quickened* and *raised up*, from such a state of death, in a most marvellous display of free *rich grace and love*, and *exceeding greatness of God's power*, &c.

With respect to those words (ημεν τεκνα φυσει οργης.) *We were by nature children of wrath*, Dr. T. says, (p. 112—114.) "The apostle means no more by this, than *truly* or *really children of wrath;* using a metaphorical expression, borrowed from the word that is used to signify a true and genuine child of a family, in distinction from one that is a child only by adoption." In which it is owned, that the proper sense of the phrase is, being a child by *nature*, in the same sense as a child by birth or natural generation: but only he supposes that here the word is used *metaphorically*. The instance he produces as parallel, to confirm his supposed metaphorical sense of the phrase as meaning only *truly*, *really*, or *properly* children of wrath, *viz.* the apostle Paul's calling Timothy his *own son in the faith*, (γνησιον τεκνον) is so far from confirming his sense, that it is rather directly against it. For doubtless the apostle uses the word here (γνησιον) in its original signification, meaning his *begotten son;* γνησιος being the adjective from γονη, offspring, or the verb, γενναω, to beget; as much as to say, *Timothy my begotten son in the faith.* For as there are two ways of being begotten, one natural, and the other spiritual; the first generation, and regeneration; so the apostle expressly signifies which of these he means in this place, *Timothy my begotten son* IN THE FAITH, in the same manner as he says to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. iv. 15. "In Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel." To say, the apostle uses the word, φυσει, in Eph. ii. 3. only as signifying *real*, true, and proper, is a most arbitrary interpretation, having nothing to warrant it in the whole bible. The word φυσις is no where used in this sense in the New Testament.*

Another thing which our author alleges to evade the force of this, is, that the word rendered *nature* sometimes signifies habit contracted by *custom*, or an acquired nature. But this is not its proper meaning. And it is plain, the word in its common use, in the New Testament, signifies what we properly

* The following are all the other places, where the word is used, Rom. i. 26. and ii. 14. and ver. 27. and xi. 21. and ver. 24. thrice in that verse, 1 Cor. xi. 14 Gal. ii. 15. and iv. 8. Jam. iii. 7. twice in that verse, and 2 Pet. i. 4.

express in English by the word *nature*. There is but one where there can be the least pretext for supposing it to sed otherwise; and that is 1 Cor. xi. 14. *Doth not even re itself teach you, that if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him?* And even here there is, I think, no manner of reason for understanding *nature* otherwise than in the proper sense. The emphasis used (αυτη η φυσις.) *nature* ITSELF, shews that the apostle does not mean *custom*, but nature in the proper sense. It is true, it was long custom which made having the head covered a token of subjection, and a feminine appearance; as it is custom that makes any outward action or word a sign or signification of any thing. But nature *itself*, nature in its proper sense, teaches, that it is a shame for a man to appear with the established sign of the female sex, and with significations of inferiority, &c. As nature itself shews it to be a shame for a father to bow down or kneel to his own child or servant, or for men to bow to an idol, because bowing down is by custom an established token or sign of subjection and submission. Such a sight therefore would be *unnatural*, shocking to a man's *very nature*. So nature would teach, that it is a shame for a woman to use such and such lascivious words or gestures, though it be a custom that establishes the unclean signification of those gestures and sounds.

It is particularly unnatural and unreasonable to understand the phrase, (τεκνα φυσει.) in this place, any otherwise than in the proper sense, on the following accounts. 1. It may be observed, that both the words τεκνα and φυσις, in their original signification, have reference to birth or generation. So the word φυσις, from φυω, which signifies to beget or bring forth young, or to bud forth, as a plant that brings forth young buds and branches. And so the word τεκνον comes from τικτω, which signifies to bring forth children.—2. As though the apostle took care by the word used here to signify what we are by birth, he changes the word he used before for children. In the preceding verse he used υιοι, speaking of the *children* of disobedience; but here τεκνα, which is a word derived, as observed, from τικτω to bring forth a child, and more properly signifies a *begotten* or *born child*.—3. It is natural to suppose that the apostle here speaks in opposition to the pride of some, especially the Jews, (for the church in Ephesus was mady up partly of Jews, as well as the church in Rome) who exalted themselves in the privileges they had by *birth*, because they were *born* the children of Abraham, and were *Jews by nature*, φυσει Ιουδαιοι, as the phrase is, Gal. ii. 15. In opposition to this proud conceit, he teaches the Jews, that notwithstanding this they were *by nature* children of wrath, *even as others*, i. e. as well as the Gentiles, which the Jews had been taught to look upon as *sinners*, and out of favour with God by *nature*, and *born chil-*

dren of wrath.—4. It is more plain that the apostle uses the word *nature* in its proper sense here, because he sets what they were *by nature*, in opposition to what they are *by grace.* In this verse the apostle shews what they are *by nature, viz.* children of wrath; and in the following verses he shews how very different their state is *by grace;* saying, ver. 5. *By grace ye are saved;* repeating it again ver. 8. *By grace ye are saved.* But if by being children of wrath by nature, were meant no more than only their being *really* and *truly* children of wrath, as Dr. T. supposes, there would be no opposition in the signification of these phrases; for in this sense they were *by nature* in a state *of salvation*, as much as *by nature children of wrath*; for they were *truly*, *really*, and *properly* in a state of salvation.

If we take these words with the context, the whole abundantly proves that by nature we are *totally corrupt*, without any good thing in us. For if we allow the plain scope of the place, without attempting to hide it by doing extreme violence to the apostle's words, the design here is strongly to establish this point; That what christians have that is good in them, or in their state, is *in no part* of it naturally in themselves or from themselves, but is *wholly from divine grace*, all *the gift of God* and *his workmanship*, the effect of his power, his free and wonderful love. None of our *good works* are primarily from ourselves, but with respect to them all, *we are God's workmanship, created unto good works*, as it were out of nothing. Not so much as *faith itself*, the first principle of good works in christians, is of themselves, but that *is the gift of God.* Therefore the apostle compares the work of God in forming christians to true virtue and holiness, not only to a *new creation*, but a *resurrection*, or raising from the dead. ver. 1. "You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins." And again, ver. 5. "Even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ." In speaking of Christians being quickened with Christ, the apostle has reference to what he had said before, in the latter part of the foregoing chap. of God manifesting *the exceeding greatness of his power* towards Christian converts in their conversion, *agreeable to the operation of his mighty power when he raised Christ from the dead.* So that it is plain by every thing in this discourse, the apostle would signify, that *by nature* we have *no goodness;* but are as destitute of it as a dead corpse is of life. And that all goodness, all good works, and faith the principle of all, are perfectly the gift of God's grace, and the work of his great, almighty, and exceeding excellent power. I think, there can be need of nothing but reading the chapter and minding what is read, to convince all who have common understanding of this; whatever any of the most subtle critics have done, or ever can do,

to twist, rack, perplex, and pervert the words and phrases here used.

Dr. T. here again insists, that the apostle speaks only of the gentiles in their heathen state, when he speaks of those that were *dead in sin*, and *by nature children of wrath;* and that though he seems to include himself among those, saying, WE *were by nature children of wrath*, WE *were dead in sins;* yet he only puts himself among them because he was the apostle of the *Gentiles*. The gross absurdity of this may appear from what was said before. But besides the things which have been already observed, there are some things which make it peculiarly unreasonable to understand it so here. It is true, the greater part of the church of *Ephesus* had been heathens, and therefore the apostle often has reference to their heathen state, in this epistle. But the words in this chap. ii. 3. plainly shew, that he means himself and other *Jews* in distinction from the *Gentiles;* for the distinction is fully expressed. After he had told the *Ephesians*, who had been generally heathen, that they had been dead in sin, and had walked according to the course of this world, &c. (ver. 1 and 2,) he makes a *distinction*, and says, "among whom *we also* had our conversation," &c. "and were by nature children of wrath, *even as others*." Here first he changes the person; whereas before he had spoken in the second person, "*ye* were dead—*ye* in time past walked," &c. now he changes style, and uses the first person in a most manifest distinction, *among whom* WE ALSO, that is, *we Jews*, as well as *ye Gentiles:* not only changing the person, but adding a particle of distinction *also;* which would be nonsense, if he meant the same without distinction. And besides all this, more fully to express the distinction the apostle further adds a pronoun of distinction; "*we* also, even as *others*," or we as well as others: Most evidently having respect to the notion so generally entertained by the Jews, of their being much better than the Gentiles, in being *Jews by nature*, children of Abraham, and children of God; when they supposed the Gentiles to be utterly cast off, as *born aliens*, and *by nature children of wrath:* In opposition to this, the apostle says, 'We Jews, after all our glorying in our distinction, *were by nature children of wrath, as well as the rest of the world.*' And a yet further evidence that the apostle here means to include the Jews, and even himself, is the universal term he uses, *Among whom also we* ALL *had our conversation*, &c. Though wickedness was supposed by the Jews to be the *course of this world*, as to the generality of mankind, yet they supposed themselves an exempt people, at least the Pharisees, and the devout observers of the law of Moses and traditions of the elders; whatever might be thought of *publicans* and *harlots*. But in opposition to this, the apostle asserts that *they all* were

no better by nature than others, but were to be reckoned among the *children of disobedience, and children of wrath.*

Besides, if the apostle chooses to put himself among the Gentiles, because he was the apostle of the Gentiles, I would ask, why does he not do so in the 11th verse of the same chapter, where he speaks of the gentile state expressly? *Remember that* YE *being in time past Gentiles in the flesh.* Why does he here make a distinction between the Gentiles and himself? Why did he not say, Let *us* remember, that *we* being in time past Gentiles? And why does the same apostle, even universally, make the same distinction, speaking either in the second or third person, and never in the first, where he expressly speaks of the gentilism of those to whom he wrote, or of whom he speaks, with reference to their distinction from the Jews? So every where in this same epistle; as in chap. i. 12, 13. where the distinction is made just in the same manner as here, by the change of the person, and by the distinguishing particle also: *That* WE *should be to the praise of his glory who first trusted in Christ*, (the first believers in Christ being of the Jews, before the Gentiles were called) *in whom* YE ALSO *trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation.* And in all the following part of this second chapter, as ver. 11, 17, 19, and 22. in which last verse the same distinguishing particle again is used; *In whom* YE ALSO *are builded together for an habitation of God through the spirit.**

Though I am far from thinking our author's exposition of the viith chap. of Romans to be in any wise agreeable to the true sense of the apostle, yet it is needless here to stand particularly to examine it; because the doctrine of original sin may be argued not the less strongly, though we should allow the thing wherein he mainly differs from such as he opposes in his interpretation, *viz.* That the apostle does not speak in his own name, or to represent the state of a true Christian, but as representing the state of the Jews under the law. For even on this supposition, the drift of the place will prove, that every one who is under the law, and with equal reason every one of mankind, *is carnal, sold under sin*, in his first state, and till delivered by Christ. For it is plain, that the apostle's design is to shew the insufficiency of the law to give life to any one whatsoever. This appears by what he says when he comes to draw his conclusion, in the continuation of this discourse; chap. viii. 3. † *For what the law could not do in that it was weak through*

* See also the following chapters, chap. iii. 6. and iv. 17. And not only in this epistle, but constantly in other epistles; as Rom. i. 12, 13, chap. xi. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31. chap. xv. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii. 2 Gal. iv. 8. Col. i. 27. chap. ii. 13. 1 Thess. i. 5, 6, 9. chap. ii. 13, 14, 15, 16.

† Dr. T. himself reckons this a part of the same discourse or paragraph, in the division he makes of the epistle, in his *paraphrase*, and *notes* upon it.

the flesh : God sending his own son, &c. Our author supposes what is here spoken of, viz. "that the law cannot give life because it is weak through the flesh," is true with respect to *every one of mankind**. And when the apostle gives this reason, *in that it is weak through the flesh*, it is plain that by the *flesh*, which here he opposes to the *spirit*, he means the same thing which in the preceding part of the same discourse, in the foregoing chapter, he had called by the name *flesh*, ver. 5, 14, 18. and *the law of the members*, ver. 23. and *the body of death*, ver. 24. This is what, through this chapter, he insists on as the grand hindrance why the law could not give life; just as he does in his conclusion, chap. viii. 3. Which, in his last place is given as a reason why the law cannot give life *to any of mankind*. And it being the *same reason* of the *same thing*, spoken of in the *same discourse*, in the former part of it—this last place being the conclusion, of which that former part is the premises—and inasmuch as the reason there given is *being in the flesh, and being carnal, sold under sin:* Therefore, taking the whole of the apostle's discourse, this is justly understood to be a *reason* why the law cannot give life to *any* of mankind; and consequently, that *all* mankind are *in the flesh* and are *carnal, sold under sin*, and so remain till delivered by Christ: And consequently, all mankind in their first original state are very sinful; which was the thing to be proved.

CHAP. IV.

Containing Observations on Rom. v. 12. to the End.

SECT. I.

Remarks on Dr. T.'s way of explaining this Text.

The following things are worthy of notice, concerning our author's exposition of this remarkable passage.

I. He greatly insists, that by *death* in this place no more is meant, than that death which we all die, when this present life is extinguished and the body returns to the dust. That no more is meant in the 12, 14, 15, and 17th verses (P. 27.) he declares as *evidently, clearly, and infallibly so*, because the apostle is still discoursing on the same subject; plainly implying, that *infallibly* the apostle means no more by death, throughout this paragraph on the subject. But as infallible as this is, if we

* See note on Rom. v. 20.

believe what Dr. T. says elsewhere, it must needs be otherwise: for, (p. 120. S.) speaking of those words in Rom. vi. 23. *The wages of sin is* DEATH, *but the gift of God is* ETERNAL LIFE *through Jesus Christ our Lord*, he says, "Death in this place is widely different from the death we *now die;* as it stands there *opposed to eternal life*, which is the gift of God through Jesus Christ, it manifestly signifies *eternal death*, the *second death*, or that death which they shall *hereafter die*, who live after the flesh." But the death, (in the conclusion of the paragraph we are upon) that comes by Adam and the life that comes by Christ, (in the last verse of the chapter,) is *opposed to eternal life* just in the same manner as in the last verse of the next chapter: "That as sin has reigned unto *death*, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto *eternal life*, by Jesus Christ our Lord." So that by our author's own argument, death in *this* place also, is *manifestly widely different from the death we now die, as it stands here opposed to eternal life through Jesus Christ; and signifies eternal death, the second death.* And yet this is a part of the *same discourse*, begun in the 12th verse; as reckoned by Dr. T. himself in his division of paragraphs, in his paraphrase and notes on the epistle. So that if we follow him, and admit his reasonings in the various parts of his book, here is *manifest* proof against *infallible* evidence! So that it is true, the apostle throughout this whole passage on the same subject, by death, *evidently*, *clearly*, and *infallibly means no more than that death we now die, when this life is extinguished;* and yet by death, in some part of this passage, is meant something *widely different from the death we now die*—MANIFESTLY *eternal death, the second death.*

But had our author been more consistent with *himself*, in laying it down as certain and *infallible*, that because the apostle has a special respect to temporal death in the 14th verse "*Death reigned from* Adam *to* Moses," therefore he means no more in the several consequent parts of this passage, yet he is doubtless too confident and positive in this matter. This is no more *evident*, *clear*, and *infallible*, than that Christ meant by *perishing*—in Luke xiii. 5. when he says, "I tell you, Nay, but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish"—no more than such a temporal death as came on those who died by the fall of the tower of *Siloam*, spoken of in the preceding words of the same speech; and no more infallible, than that by *life*, Christ means no more than this temporal life, in each part of that one sentence—Matth. x. 39. "He that findeth his *life* shall lose *it;* and he that loseth his *life* for my sake shall find *it*"—because in the first part of each clause he has respect especially to temporal life:*

* There are many places parallel with these, as John xi. 25, 26. "I am the resurrection, and the life: He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall

The truth of the case, with respect to what the apostle here intends by the word *death*, is this, *viz.* The whole of that death which he, and the scripture every where, speaks of as the proper wages and punishment of sin, including death *temporal*, *spiritual*, and *eternal;* though in some parts of this discourse he has a more special respect to one part of this whole, in others to another, as his argument leads him; without any more variation than is quite common in the same discourse. That life which the scripture speaks of as the reward of righteousness, is a whole containing several parts, *viz.* The life of the body, union of soul and body, and the most perfect sensibility, activity, and felicity of both, which is the chief thing. In like manner the death which the scripture speaks of as the punishment of sin, is a whole including the death of the body and the death of the soul, and the eternal, sensible, perfect destruction and misery of both. It is this latter whole that the apostle speaks of by the name of death in this discourse, in Rom. v. though in some sentences he has a more special respect to one part, in others to another: And this, without changing the signification of the word. For having respect to several things included in the extensive signification of the word, is not the same thing as using the word in several distinct significations. As for instance, the appellative, *man*, or the proper name of any particular man is the name of a whole, including the different parts of soul and body. And if any one in speaking of *James* or *John*, should say, he was a wise *man*, and a beautiful *man;* in the former part of the sentence, respect would be had more especially to his soul, in the latter to his body, in the word *man:* But yet without any proper change of the signification of the name to distinct senses. In John xxi. 7. it is said, *Peter was naked*, and in the following part of the same story it is said, *Peter was grieved.* In the former proposition, respect is had especially to his body, in the latter to his soul: But yet here is no proper change of the meaning of the name, *Peter*. And as to the apostle's use of the word *death* in the passage now under consideration, on the supposition that he in general means the whole of that death which is the wages of sin, there is nothing but what is perfectly natural in sup-

he live: And whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die." Here both the words, *life* and *death*, are used with this variation; *I am the resurrection and the life*, meaning spiritual and eternal life: *He that believeth in me, though he were dead*, having respect to temporal death, *yet shall he live*, with respect to spiritual life, and the restoration of the life of the body. *And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die*, meaning a spiritual and eternal death. So in John vi. 49, 50. *Your fathers did eat manna in the Wilderness, and are dead*, having respect chiefly to temporal death. *This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die*, i. e. by the loss of spiritual life, and by eternal death. (See also ver. 58.) And in the next verse, *If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever*, have eternal life. So ver. 54. See another like instance, John v. 24—29.

posing that—in order to evince that death, the proper punishment of sin, comes on all mankind in consequence of *Adam's* sin—he should take notice of that part of this punishment which is visible in this world, and which every body therefore sees does in fact come on all mankind. (as in ver. 14.) And is it not equally natural from thence to infer, that all mankind are exposed to the whole of that death which is the proper punishment of sin, whereof temporal death is a part, and a visible image of the whole, and (unless changed by divine grace) an introduction to the principal, and infinitely the most dreadful part?

II. Dr. T.'s explanation of this passage makes wholly insignificant those first words, *By one man sin entered into the world*, and leaves this proposition without any sense at all. The apostle had been largely and elaborately representing how the whole world was full of sin, both among *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and all exposed to death and condemnation. It is plain that in these words he would tell us how this came to pass, namely, that the sorrowful event came *by one man*, even the first man. That the world was full of sin, and full of death, were two great and notorious facts, deeply affecting the interests of mankind; and they seemed very wonderful facts, drawing the attention of the more thinking part of mankind every where, who often asked this question, *Whence comes evil*, moral and natural evil? It is manifest the apostle here means to tell us, how these came into the world, and came to prevail in it as they do. But all that is meant, according to Dr. T.'s interpretation, is "*He begun transgression.*"* As if all that the apostle meant was to tell us who happened to sin first; not how such a malady came upon the world, or how any one in the world, besides Adam himself, came by such a distemper. The words of the apostle, *By one man sin entered* INTO THE WORLD, *and death by sin*, shew the design to be, to tell us how these evils came, as affecting the state of *the world;* and not only as reaching one man in the world. If this were not plain enough in itself, the words immediately following demonstrate it; "And so death passed upon *all men*, for that all have sinned." By *sin being in the world*, the apostle does not mean being in the world only in that *one instance* of Adam's first transgression, but being *abroad in the world*, among the inhabitants of the earth, in a wide extent, and continued series of wickedness; as is plain in the first words of the next verse. *For until the law, sin was* IN THE WORLD. And therefore when he gives us an account how it came to be *in the world*, or, which is the same thing, how it *entered into the world*, he does not mean only coming in one instance.

* Page 56.

If the case were as Dr. T. represents, that the sin of Adam, either in its pollution or punishment, reached none but himself, any more than the sin of any other man, it would be no more proper to say that *by one man sin entered into the world*, than if—were it inquired how mankind came into America, and there had anciently been a ship of the *Phenicians* wrecked at sea, and a single man of the crew was driven on this continent, and here died as soon as he reached the shore—it should be said, *By that one man mankind came into America.*

Besides, it is not true that by *one man*, or by Adam, sin entered into the world, in Dr. T.'s sense: For it was not he but Eve, that *began transgression.* By one man Dr. T. understands Adam as the figure of Christ. And it is plain that it was for *his* transgression, and not Eve's, that the sentence of death was pronounced on mankind after the fall, Gen. iii. 19. It appears unreasonable to suppose the apostle means to include Eve when he speaks of Adam; for he lays great stress on it, that it was BY ONE, repeating it several times.

III. In like manner this author brings to nothing the sense of the causal particles, in such phrases as these, so often repeated, "Death *by sin*, ver. 12. If *through* the offence of one many be dead, ver. 15. *By* one that sinned—judgment was *by* one to condemnation, ver. 16. *By* one man's offence, death reigned *By* one, ver. 17. *By* the offence of one, judgment came upon all, &c. ver. 18. *By* one man's disobedience," ver. 19. These *causal* particles, so variously repeated, unless we make mere nonsense of the discourse, signify some connection and dependence, by some sort of influence of that sin of one man, or some tendency to that effect which is so often said to come BY it. But according to Dr. T. there can be no *real* dependence or influence in the case, of any sort whatsoever. There is no connection by any *natural* influence of that one act to make all mankind mortal. Our author does not pretend to account for this effect in any such manner, but in another most diverse, *viz.* A gracious act of God, laying mankind under affliction, toil, and death, from special favour and kindness. Nor can there be any dependence of this effect on that transgression of Adam, by any *moral* influence, as deserving such a consequence, or exposing to it on any *moral account:* For he supposes that mankind are not in this way exposed to the least degree of evil. Nor has this effect any *legal* dependence on that sin, or any connection by virtue of any antecedent constitution which God had established with Adam: For he insists, that in that threatening, *In the day thou eatest thou shalt die*, there is not a word said of his posterity; (p. 8.) And death on mankind according to him, cannot come by virtue of that legal constitution with Adam; because the sentence

by which it came was after the annulling and abolishing that constitution; (p. 113. S.) And it is manifest that this consequence cannot be through any kind of *tendency* of that sin to such an effect; because the effect comes only as a benefit, and is the fruit of mere favour: But sin has no tendency, either *natural or moral*, to *benefits*, and divine favours. And thus that sin of Adam could neither be *the efficient* cause, nor the *procuring* cause; neither the *natural*, *moral*, *nor legal* cause; nor an *exciting and moving* cause, any more than Adam's eating of any other tree of the garden. And the only real relation that the effect can have to that Sin, is a relation as to time, *viz.* that it is *after* it. And when the matter is closely examined, the whole amounts to no more than this, that God is pleased, of his mere good will and pleasure, to bestow a greater favour upon us than he did upon Adam in innocency, *after that sin* of his eating the forbidden fruit; which sin we are no more concerned in, than in the sin of the king of Pegu, or the emperor of China.

IV. It is altogether inconsistent with the apostle's scope, and the import of what he says, to suppose that the death of which he here speaks as coming on mankind by Adam's sin, comes not as a *punishment*, but only as a *favour*. It quite makes void the *opposition* in which the apostle sets the consequences of *Adam's sin*, and the consequences of the *grace and righteousness of Christ*. They are set in opposition to each other, as opposite effects, arising from opposite causes, throughout the paragraph: One, *as the just consequence of an offence;* the other, *a free gift*, ver. 15—18. Whereas, according to this scheme, there is no such opposition in the case; both are benefits, and both are free gifts. A very wholesome medicine to save from perishing, ordered by a kind father, or a shield to preserve from an enemy, bestowed by a friend, is as much a free gift as pleasant food. The death that comes by Adam, is set in opposition to the life and happiness that comes by Christ, as being the fruit of *sin, and judgment for sin:* when the latter is the fruit of *divine grace*, ver. 15, 17, 20, 21. Whereas, according to our author, both came by grace. Death comes on mankind by the free kindness and love of God, much more truly and properly than by *Adam's sin*. Dr. T. speaks of it as coming by OCCASION *of Adam's sin:* But, as I have observed, it is an occasion without any influence. Yet the proper CAUSE *is God's grace*. So that the true cause is wholly good. Which, by the way, is directly repugnant to the apostle's doctrine in Rom. vii. 13. "Was then that which is good, made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good." Where the apostle utterly rejects any such suggestion, as though that which is good were *the proper cause of death;* and signifies that *sin* is the

proper *cause*, and that which is *good*, only the occasion. But according to this author, the reverse is true: That which is good in the highest sense, even the love of God, and a divine gracious constitution, is the proper *cause* of death, and sin only the *occasion*.

But to return, it is plain that death by Adam, and life and happiness *by Christ*, are here set in opposition; the latter being spoken of as *good*, the other as *evil;* one as the effect *of righteousness*, the other of an *offence;* one of the fruit *of obedience*, the other *of disobedience;* one as the fruit of *God's favour*, in consequence of what *was pleasing and acceptable to him*, but the other the fruit of *his displeasure*, in consequence of what was *displeasing and hateful* to him; the latter coming by *justification*, the former by the *condemnation* of the subject. But according to the scheme of our author, there can be no opposition in any of these respects: The death here spoken of neither comes as an *evil*, nor from an *evil cause*, neither an evil *efficient* cause, *or procuring* cause, nor at all as any testimony of God's *displeasure* to the subject, but as properly the effect of *his favour*, no less than that which is spoken of as coming by Christ; yea, as much as an act of JUSTIFICATION of the subject; as he understands and explains the word *justification;* for both are *by a grant of favour*, and are instances of mercy and goodness. And he abundantly insists upon it, that "ANY grant of favour, ANY instance of mercy and goodness, whereby God delivers and exempts from any kind of danger, suffering, or calamity, or confers ANY favour, blessing, or privilege, is called *justification* in the scripture-sense and use of the word."*

Moreover our author makes void the grand and fundamental opposition—to illustrate which is the chief scope of this whole passage—between *the first and second Adam;* in the *death* that comes by *one*, and the *life* and happiness by the *other*. For, according to his doctrine, *both come by Christ the second Adam;* both by his grace, righteousness, and obedience: The death to which God sentenced mankind (Gen. iii. 19.) being a great deal more properly and truly by Christ, than by Adam. For, according to him, that sentence was not pronounced on the basis of the covenant with Adam; because that was abrogated, and entirely set aside, as he largely insists for many pages together, (p. 113—120. S.) "This covenant with Adam was disannulled immediately after Adam sinned. Even before God passed sentence upon Adam, grace was introduced." "The death that mankind are the subjects of now, stands under the covenant of grace."—In the counsel

* *Key.* § 374, where it is to be observed, that he himself puts the word ANY in capital letters. The same thing in substance is often asserted elsewhere. And this indeed is his main point in what he calls *the true gospel-scheme.*

and appointment of God, it stood in this very light, even before the sentence of death was pronounced upon Adam: and consequently, death is no proper and legal punishment of sin." And he often insists, that it comes only as a favour and benefit; and standing, as he says, under the covenant of grace, which is by Christ, therefore is truly one of the benefits of the new covenant, which comes by Christ, the second Adam. For he himself is decided, to use his own words.* "That all the grace of the gospel is dispensed to us, IN, BY, or THROUGH the son of God." "Nothing is clearer (says he †) from the whole current of scripture, than that all the mercy and love of God, and all the blessings of the gospel, from first to last, are IN, BY, and THROUGH Christ, and particularly by his blood, by the redemption that is in him. This can bear no dispute among Christians." What then becomes of all this discourse of the apostle's, about the great difference and opposition between Adam and Christ; as death is by one, and eternal life and happiness by the other? This grand distinction between the two Adams, it seems, and the other instances of opposition and difference here insisted on—as between the effects of *sin and righteousness*, the consequences of *obedience* and *disobedience*, of the *offence* and the *free gift*, *judgment and grace*, *condemnation and justification*—all come to nothing. And this whole discourse of the apostle, wherein he seems to labour much, as if it were to set forth some very grand and most important *distinction and opposition* in the state of things, as derived from the two great *heads* of mankind, proves nothing but a multitude of words without meaning, or rather a heap of inconsistencies.

V. Our author's own doctrine entirely *makes void* what he supposes to be the apostle's *argument* in the 13th and 14th verses, in these words; "For until the law, sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed where there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression."

What he supposes the apostle would prove here, is, that the mortality of mankind comes only by Adam's sin, and not by men's *personal* sins, because there was *no law* threatening death to Adam's posterity for *personal sins*, before the law of *Moses;* but death, or the mortality of Adam's posterity, took place many ages before the law was given; therefore death could not be by any law threatening death for *personal* sins, and consequently could be by nothing but Adam's sin‡. On this I would observe,

1. That which he supposes the apostle to take for a truth

* *Key*, chap. viii. title, p. 44. † *Key*, § 145.
‡ Page 40, 41, 42, 57. and often elsewhere.

in this argument, *viz.* That there was *no law of God* in being, by which men were exposed to death for *personal sin*, during the time from Adam to Moses, is neither true, nor agreeable to this apostle's own doctrine.

First, The assertion is *not true*. For the law of *nature*, ritten in men's hearts, was then in being, and was a law by hich men were exposed to death for *personal sin*. That there as a divine establishment, fixing the death and destruction of ne sinner as the consequence of personal sin, which was well known before the giving of the law by Moses, is plain by many passages in the book of Job, as fully and clearly implying a connection between such sin and such a punishment, as any passage in the law of Moses: Such as that in Job xxiv. 19. "Drought and heat consume the snow-waters; so doth the grave them that have sinned." (Compare ver. 20 and 24.) Also chap. xxxvi. 6. "He preserveth not the life of the wicked. Chap. xxi. 29—32. Have ye not asked them that go by the way? and do ye not know their tokens? That the wicked is reserved to the day of destruction; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath. Ver. 32. He shall be brought to the grave.*"

Secondly, To suppose that there is no law in being by which men are exposed to death for *personal sins*, when a revealed law of God is not in being, *is contrary to our apostle's own doctrine* in this epistle. Rom. ii. 12, 14, 15. *For as many as have sinned without law*, (i. e. the revealed law) *shall perish without law.* But how they can be exposed to die and perish, who have not the law of Moses, nor any revealed *law*, the apostle shews us in the 14th and 15th verses; *viz.* In that they have the law of nature, by which they fall under sentence to this punishment. "*For when the* Gentiles, *which have not the* law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law to themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness." Their conscience not only bore witness to the duty prescribed by this law, but also to the *punishment* before spoken of, as that which they who sinned without law were liable to suffer, *viz.* that they should *perish.* In which the apostle is yet more express, chap. i. 32. speaking more especially of the heathen, "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death." Dr. T. often calls the law the *rule of right;* and this rule of right sentenced those sinners to death who who were not under the law of Moses, according to this author's own paraphrase of this verse,

* See also Job iv. 7, 8, 9. Chap. xv. 17—35. Chap. xviii. 5—21. xix. 29. and xx. 4—8. and ver. 23—29. Chap. xxi. 16.—18. 20—26. xxii. 13—20. and xxvii. 11. to the end. Chap. xxxi. 3, 23. xxxiii. 18, 22, 23, 24, 28, 30. xxxiv. 11. 21—26. xxxvii. 12, 18, 19, 20. and xxxviii. 13.

in these words, "The heathen were not ignorant of the *rule of right*, which God has implanted in the human nature; and which shews that they which commit such crimes are deserving of death." And he himself supposes Abraham, who lived between Adam and Moses, to be *under law*, by which he would have been *exposed to punishment without hope*, were it not for the promise of grace.—(Paraph. on Rom. iv. 15.)

So that in our author's way of explaining the passage before us, the grand argument which the apostle insists upon here to prove his main point, *viz.* that death does not come by men's *personal sins*, but by *Adam's* sin, because it came *before* the law was given that threatened death for personal sin; I say, this argument which Dr. T. supposes so clear and strong,* is brought to nothing more than a mere shadow without substance; the very foundation of the argument having no truth. To say there was no such law actually expressed in any standing revelation, would be mere trifling. For it no more appears, that God would not bring *temporal* death for personal sins without a standing revealed law threatening it, than that he would not bring *eternal* death before there was a revealed law threatening that: Which yet wicked men that lived in Noah's time were exposed to, as appears by 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20. and which Dr T. supposes all mankind are exposed to by their personal sins; and he himself says,† "Sin in its own unalterable nature leads to death." Yea, it might be argued with as much strength of reason, that God could bring on men *no punishment at all* for any sin that was committed from Adam to Moses, because there was no standing revealed law then extant threatening any punishment. It may here be properly observed, that our author supposes the shortening of man's days, and hastening of death, *entered into the world by the sin of the Antediluvians*, in the same sense as death and mortality entered into the world by Adam's sin.‡ But where was there any standing revealed law for that, though the event was so universal? If God might bring this on all mankind, on occasion of *other* men's sins, for which they deserved nothing, without a revealed law, what could there be to hinder God bringing death on men for their *personal* sins, for which their own consciences tell them they deserve death without a revealed law?

2. If from Adam to Moses there had been no law in being of any kind, revealed or natural, by which men could be properly exposed to temporal death for personal sin, yet the mention of Moses's law would have been wholly impertinent, and of no signification in the argument, according to our author. He supposes that what the apostle would prove is,

* Page 117, 8. † Page 77, 78. ‡ Page 68.

that *temporal* death comes by Adam; and not by *any law* threatening such a punishment for personal sin; because this death prevailed before the law of Moses was in being, which is the only law threatening death for personal sin. And yet he himself supposes, that the law of Moses, *when it was in ng*, threatened *no such death* for personal sin. For he abun- ntly asserts, that the death which the law of Moses threaten- for personal sin, was *eternal death*, as has been already noted: And he says in express terms, that eternal death is of a nature *widely different from the death we now die*;* as was also observed before.

How impertinently therefore does Dr. T. make an inspired writer argue, when, according to him, the apostle would prove, that *this kind of death* did not come by any law threatening *this kind of death*, because it came before the existence of a law threatening *another kind of death*, of a nature *widely different?* How is it to the apostle's purpose, to fix on that period, the time of giving Moses's law, as if that had been the period wherein men began to be threatened with *this punishment* for their personal sins, when in truth it was no such thing? And therefore it was no more to his purpose to fix on that period, from Adam to Moses, than from Adam to David, or any other period whatsoever. Dr. T. holds, that even now, since the law of Moses has been given, the mortality of mankind, or the death we now die, does not come by that law; but that it always comes only by *Adam*.† And if it *never comes* by that law, we may be sure it *never was threatened* in that law.

3. If we should allow the argument in Dr. T.'s sense of it, to prove that death does not come by *personal sin*, yet it will be wholly without force to prove the main point, even that it must come by *Adam's sin:* For it might come by God's sovereign and gracious pleasure; as innumerable other divine benefits do. If it be ordered, agreeable to our author's supposition, not as a punishment, nor as a calamity, but only as a *favour*, what necessity of any settled constitution, or revealed sentence, in order to bestow *such* a favour, more than *other* favours; and particularly more than that *great benefit*, which he said entered into the world by the sin of the *Antediluvians*, the shortening men's lives so much after the flood? Thus the apostle's arguing, by Dr. T.'s explanation of it, is turned into mere trifling, a vain and impertinent use of words, without any real force or significance.

VI. The apostle here speaks of that great benefit which we have by Christ, as the antitype of *Adam*, under the notion

* Page 120 S. He says to the like purpose in his note on Rom. v. 17.
† This is plain by what he says. p. 38, 40, 53, 117. S.

of a fruit of GRACE. I do not mean only that *super-abounding* of grace, wherein the benefit we have by Christ goes beyond the damage sustained by Adam; but that benefit, with regard to which *Adam was the figure of him that was to come*, and which is as it were the counterpart of the suffering by Adam and which repairs the loss we have by him. This is here spoken of as the fruit of the *free grace of God;* (as appears by ver. 15—18, 20, 21.) which according to our author, is the restoring of mankind to that life which they lost in Adam: And he himself supposes this restoration of life by Christ to be what *grace* does for us, and calls it the *free gift of God*, and *the grace and favour of the lawgiver.** And speaking of this restoration, be breaks out in admiration of the *unspeakable riches of this grace.*†

But it follows from his doctrine, that there is NO *grace at all* in this benefit, and it is no more than a mere act of *justice*, being only a removing of what mankind suffer, being *innocent.* Death, as it commonly comes on mankind, and even on infants, (as has been observed) is an extreme positive calamity; to bring which on the perfectly *innocent*, unremedied, and without any thing to countervail it, we are sufficiently taught, is not consistent with the *Righteousness of the Judge of all the earth.* What *grace* therefore, worthy of being so celebrated, would there be in affording remedy and relief, after there had been brought on innocent mankind that which is (as Dr. T. himself represents)‡ the dreadful and universal destruction of their nature; being a striking demonstration how infinitely hateful sin is to God! What *grace* in delivering from such shocking ruin, them who did not deserve the least calamity! Our author says, "We could not *justly* lose communion with God by *Adam's* sin."§ If so, then we could not justly lose our lives, and be annihilated, after a course of extreme pains and agonies of body and mind, without any restoration; which would be an eternal loss of communion with God, and all other good, besides the positive suffering. The apostle, throughout this passage, represents the *death* which is the consequence of Adam's transgression, as coming in a way of *judgment* and *condemnation* for sin; but deliverence and life through Christ, as by *grace*, and the *free gift* of God. Whereas, on the contrary, by Dr. T.'s scheme, the death that comes by Adam, comes by *grace*, *great grace;* it being a great benefit, ordered in fatherly love and kindness, and on the basis of a covenant of grace: But in the deliverence and restoration by Christ there is *no grace at all.* So things are turned *topsy-turvy*, the apostle's scope and scheme entirely inverted and confounded.

* Page 39, 70, 148. 27. S. See also contents of this paragraph in Rom. v. in his notes on the epistle, and his note on ver. 15, 16, 17.
† Page 119. S. ‡ Page 69. § Page 148.

VII. Dr. T. explains the words, *judgment*, *condemnation*, *justification* and *righteousness*, as used in this place, in a very unreasonable manner.

I will first consider the sense he puts upon the two former, *judgment* and *condemnation*. He often calls this condemnation a *judicial act*, and a *sentence of condemnation*. But, according to his scheme, it is a judicial sentence of condemnation passed upon them who are perfectly *innocent*—and viewed by the judge, even in passing the condemnatory sentence, as having no guilt of sin, or any fault at all chargeable upon them—and a *judicial proceeding*, *passing sentence* arbitrarily, without any law or rule of right before established. For there was no preceding law threatening death, that he or any one else ever pretended to have been established, but only this, *In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.* And concerning this he insists, that there is not a word said in it of Adam's posterity. So that the condemnation spoken of, is a sentence of condemnation to death, for, or in consequence of the sin of Adam, without any law by which that sin could be imputed to bring any such consequence; contrary to the apostle's plain scope. And not only so, but, over and above all this, it is a *judicial sentence* of *condemnation* to that which is no calamity, nor is considered as such in the sentence; but a condemnation to a great favour!

The apostle uses the words *judgment* and *condemnation* in other places; they are no strange and unusual terms with him: But never are they used by him in this sense, or any like it; nor are they ever used thus any where else in the New Testament. This apostle, in this epistle to the *Romans* often speaks of *condemnation*, using the same or similar terms and phrases as here, but never in the abovesaid sense.* This will be plain to every one who casts his eye on those places. And if we look into the former part of this chapter, the apostle's discourse makes it evident, that he is speaking of a condemnation, which is no testimony of *favour* to the innocent; but of God's *displeasure* towards those to whom he is not reconciled, but looks on as offenders and enemies, and holds as the objects of his *wrath*, from which we are delivered by Christ. (See ver. 6—11.)

And even viewing this discourse itself, in the very paragraph we are upon, if we may judge any thing by language, there is every thing to lead us to suppose, that the apostle uses words here, as he does elsewhere, *properly*, and as implying a supposition of sin, chargeable on the subject, and

* See Chap. ii. 1, 2, 3. six times in these verses; also ver. 12 and 27. and chap. iii. 7. chap. viii. 1 and 3. chap. xiv. 3, 4. and ver. 10, 13, 22, and 23.

exposing to punishment. He speaks of *condemnation* as what *comes by sin*, a condemnation to *death*, which seems to be a most terrible evil, and capital punishment, even in what is temporal and visible; and this in the way of *judgment* and execution of justice, in opposition to *grace* or *favour*, and *gift* or a benefit coming by favour. And sin, offence, transgression and disobedience are, over and over again, spoken of as the *ground* of the condemnation, and of the capital suffering, for ten verses successively; that is, in every verse in the whole paragraph.

The words, *justification* and *righteousness*, are explained by Dr. T. in a manner no less unreasonable. He understands *justification*, in ver. 18. and *righteousness*, in ver. 19. in such a sense, as to suppose they belong to all, and are actually to be applied to all mankind, good and bad, believers and unbelievers; to the worst enemies of God, remaining such, as well as his peculiar favorites, and many that never had any sin imputed to them; meaning thereby no more than what is fulfilled in an universal resurrection from the dead, at the last day.* Now this is a most arbitrary, forced sense. Though these terms are used all over the New Testament, yet nothing like such an use of them is to be found in any one instance. The words *justify*, *justification*, and *righteousness*, as from God to men, are never used but to signify a *privilege* belonging only to *some*, and that which is peculiar to *distinguished favourites*. This apostle in particular, above all the other writers of the New Testament, abounds in the use of these terms; so that we have all imaginable opportunity to understand his language, and know the sense in which he uses these words: But he never elsewhere uses them in the sense supposed here, nor is there any *pretence* that he does. Above all, this apostle abounds in the use of these terms in this epistle. JUSTIFICATION is the subject he had been upon through all the preceding part of the epistle. It was the grand subject of all the foregoing chapters, and the preceding part of this chapter, where these terms are continually repeated. And the word *justification* is constantly used to signify something peculiar to believers who had been sinners; implying some reconciliation and forgiveness of sin, and special privilege in nearness to God, above the rest of the world. Yea, the word is constantly used thus, according to Dr. T.'s own explanations in his paraphrase and notes on this epistle. And there is not the least reason to suppose but that he is *still* speaking of the *same justification*, which he had dwelt upon from the beginning to this place. He speaks of *justification* and *righteousness* here, just in the same manner as he had done in the preceding part of the epistle. He had all along

* So pages 47. 49, 60, 61, 62, and other places.

spoken of justification as standing in relation to *sin*, disobedience to God, and offence against him, and so he does here. He had before been speaking of justification through free *grace*, and so he does here. He before had been speaking of justification through *righteousness, as in Christ Jesus*, and so he does here.

And if we look into the former part of this very chapter, we shall find *justification* spoken of just in the same sense as in the rest of the epistle; which is also supposed by our author in his exposition. It is still *justification by faith, justification* of them who had been *sinners, justification* attended with *reconciliation, justification* peculiar to them who had *the love of God shed abroad in their hearts.* The apostle's foregoing discourse on justification by grace through faith—and what he had so greatly insisted on as the evidence of the truth of this doctrine, even the universal sinfulness of mankind in their original state—is plainly what introduces this discourse in the latter part of this 5th chapter; where he shews how all mankind came to be sinful and miserable, and so to need this grace of God, and righteousness of Christ. And therefore we cannot, without the most absurd violence, suppose any other than that he is still speaking of the same *justification.*

And as to the universal expression used in the 18th verse, *by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon* ALL MEN *to justification of life;* it is needless here to go into the controversy between *the remonstrants and anti-remonstrants*, concerning universal redemption, and their different interpretations of this place. If we take the words even as the *Arminians* do; yet, in their sense of them, the free gift comes on all men to justification only *conditionally*, i. e. *provided* we believe, repent, &c. But in our author's sense, it *actually* comes on all, whether they believe and repent, or not: which certainly cannot be inferred from the universal expression, as here used. Dr. T. himself supposes the main design of the apostle in this universal phrase, *all men*, is to signify that the benefits of Christ shall come on Gentiles as well as Jews*. And he supposes *that the Many and the All*, here signify the same; but it is quite certain, that all the benefits here spoken of, which the apostle says are to *the many*, does not *actually* come upon all mankind; as particularly *the abounding of grace*, ver. 15. "The grace of God, and the gift by grace, hath abounded unto the many," (εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς.)

This abounding of grace our author explains thus; "a rich overplus of grace, in erecting a new dispensation, furnished with a glorious fund of light, means, and motives." (p. 44.)

* Page 60, 61. See also contents of this paragraph, in his notes on the epistle.

But will any pretend, that all mankind have actually been partakers of this new fund of light, &c.? How were the many millions of Indians, on the American side of the globe, partakers of it, before the Europeans came hither? Yea, Dr. T. himself supposes, *than it is only free for all that are willing to accept of it.* * The agreement between Adam as the type or figure of him that was to come, and Christ as the anti-type, appears full and clear, if we suppose that ALL who are IN CHRIST (to use the common scripture phrase) have the benefit of his obedience even as ALL who are IN ADAM have the sorrowful fruit of his disobedience. The scripture speaks of believers as the seed or posterity of Christ. (Gal. iii. 29.) They are *in Christ by grace*, as Adam's posterity *are in him by nature.* See also 1 Cor. xv. 45—49. The spiritual seed are those which this apostle often represents as *Christ's body:* And the οἱ πολλοὶ here spoken of as made righteous by Christ's obedience, are doubtless the same with the οἱ πολλοὶ which he speaks of in chap. xii. 5. *We, being many, are one body;* or, *we*, the many, οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμα ἐσμεν. And again, 1 Cor. x. 17. ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοὶ ἐσμεν. And the same which the apostle had spoken of in the preceding chapter. (Rom. iv. 18. compared with Gen. xv. 5.)

Dr. T. insists much on 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead: for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" to confirm his suppositions, that the apostle in the 5th of Romans, speaking of the death and condemnation which come by Adam, has respect only to the death *we all die* when this life ends: And that by the justification and life which come by Christ, he has respect only to the general *resurrection* at the last day. But it is observable that his argument is wholly built on these two suppositions, *viz. First*, that the resurrection meant by the apostle, 1 Cor. xv. is the resurrection of *all* mankind, both just and unjust. *Secondly*, That the opposite consequences of *Adam's sin* and Christ's obedience, in *Rom.* v. are the very same, neither more nor less, than are spoken of there. But there are no grounds for supposing either of these things to be true.

1. There is no evidence that the *resurrection* there spoken of relates both to the *just and unjust;* but abundant evidence of the contrary. The resurrection of the wicked is seldom mentioned in the New Testament, and rarely included in the meaning of the word; it being esteemed not worthy to be called a rising to life, being only for a great increase of the misery and darkness of eternal death: And therefore by the *resurrection* is most commonly meant a rising to life and

* Notes on the epistle, page 284.

happiness*. The saints are called *the children of the resurrection*, as Dr. T. observes in his note on Rom. viii. 11. And it is exceeding evident, that it is the resurrection to life and happiness which the apostle is speaking of in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. As appears by each of the three foregoing verses. Ver. 18. *Then they which are fallen asleep* IN CHRIST (i. e. the saints) *are* perished. Ver. 19. *If in this life only* WE (christians or apostles) *have hope in Christ*, (and have no resurrection and eternal life to hope for) *we are of all men most miserable*. Ver. 20. *But now is Christ risen from the dead, and is become the* FIRST FRUITS *of them that slept*. He is the forerunner and first fruits only with respect to them that are his; who are to follow him, and partake with him in the glory and happiness of his resurrection: But he is not the first fruits of them that shall come forth to the resurrection of *damnation*. It also appears by the verse immediately following, ver. 23. "But every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, and afterward they that are Christ's at his coming." The same is plain by what is said in verse 29—32. and by all that is said from the 35th verse to the end of the chapter, for twenty-three verses together: It there expressly appears, that the apostle is speaking only of arising *to glory, with a glorious body*, as the little grain that is sown, being quickened, rises a beautiful flourishing plant. He there speaks of the different degrees of glory among them that shall rise, and compares it to the different degres of glory among the celestial luminaries. The resurrection he treats of is expressly, *being raised in incorruption, in glory, in power, with a spiritual body, having the image of the second man*, the spiritual and heavenly Adam: a resurrection wherein this *corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal put on immortality, and death be swallowed up in victory*, and the saints gloriously triumph over that last enemy. Dr. T. himself says what is in effect owning that the resurrection here spoken of is only of the righteous; for it is expressly a resurrection εν αθανασια, and αφθαρσια, (ver. 53, and 42.) But Dr. T. says, "These are never attributed to the wicked in scripture."† So that when the apostle says here, *As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive*; it is as much as if he had said, *As in Adam we all die*, and our bodies *are sown in corruption, in dishonour, and in weakness; so in Christ we all* (we christians, whom I have been all along speaking of) *shall be raised in power, glory, and incorruption, spiritual and heavenly*, conformed to the second Adam. "For as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear

* As may be observed in Matt. xxii. 30. Luke xx. 35, 36. John vi. 39, 40, 54. Philip. iii. 11. and other places.

† Note on Rom. viii. 27.

the image of the heavenly," ver. 49. Which clearly explains and determines his meaning in ver. 21, 22.

2. There is no evidence that the benefit by the second Adam, spoken of in Rom. v. is the very same (containing neither more nor less) as the resurrection spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. It is no evidence of it, that the benefit is opposed to the death that comes by the first Adam, in like manner in both places. The resurrection to eternal life, though it be not the whole of that salvation and happiness which comes by the second Adam, yet is it that wherein this salvation is principally obtained. The time of the saints' glorious resurrection is often spoken of as the proper time of their salvation, *The day of their redemption*, the time of their adoption, glory, and recompense.* All that happiness which is given before, is only a prelibation and earnest of their great reward. Well therefore may that consummate salvation bestowed on them, be set in opposition to the death and ruin which comes by the first Adam, in like manner as the whole of their salvation is opposed to the same in Rom. v. Dr. T. himself observes,† "That the revival and resurrection of the body, is frequently put for our advancement to eternal life." It being the highest part, it is often put for the whole.

This notion, as if the justification, righteousness, and life, spoken of in Rom. v. implied the resurrection to damnation, is not only without ground from scripture, but contrary to *reason*. For those things are there spoken of as great benefits, by the gift and free grace of God: But this is the contrary, in the highest degree possible; the most consummate calamity. To obviate this, our author supposes the resurrection of all to be a great benefit *in itself*, though turned into a calamity by the sin and folly of obstinate sinners, who abuse God's goodness. But the far greater part of mankind, since Adam, have never had opportunity to abuse this goodness, it having never been made known to them. Men cannot abuse a kindness which they never had either in possession, promise, offer, or some intimation: But a resurrection is made known only by divine revelation; which few comparatively have enjoyed. So that as to such wicked men as die in lands of darkness, if their resurrection comes at all by Christ, it comes *from* him, and *to* them, only as a curse, and not a blessing; for it never comes to them at all by any *conveyance*, *grant*, *promise*, or *offer*, or any thing by which they can claim it, or know any thing of it, till it comes as an infinite calamity, past all remedy.

* As in Luke xiv. 14. and xxi. 28. Rom. viii. 23. Eph. iv. 30. Colos. iii. 4. 2 Thes. i. 7. 2 Tim. iv. 8. 1 Pet. i. 13. and v. 4. 1 John iii. 2. and other places.
† Nr Rom. viii. 11.

VIII. In a peculiar manner is there an unreasonable violence used in our author's explanation of the words *sinners* and *sinned*, in the paragraph before us. He says, "These words, *By one man's disobedience many were made sinners*, mean neither more nor less, than that by one man's disobedience, the many were made subject to death, by the judicial act of God."* And he says in the same place, "By death, most certainly is meant no other than the death and mortality common to all mankind." And these words, ver. 12, *For that all have sinned*, he thus explains, "All men became *sinners*, as all "mankind are brought into a state of suffering."† Here I observe,

1. The main thing by which he justifies such interpretations is, that *sin*, in various instances, is used for *suffering*, in the Old Testament.‡ To which I reply; though it be true that the original word (חטא) signifies both *sin*, and a *sin-offering* —and though this, and some other Hebrew words which signify sin, iniquity, and wickedness, are sometimes put for the effect or punishment of iniquity, by a metonymy of the cause for the effect—yet it does not appear, that these words are ever used for suffering, where that suffering is not a *punishment*, or a fruit of God's anger for sin. And therefore none of the instances he mentions come up to his purpose. When Lot is commanded to leave Sodom, that he might not be consumed *in the iniquity* of the city, meaning in that fire which was the *effect* and *punishment* of the iniquity of the city; this is quite *another* thing, than if that fire came on the city in general, as no punishment at all, nor as any fruit of a charge of iniquity, but as a token of God's *favour* to the inhabitants. For according to Dr. T. the death of mankind is introduced only as a *benefit*, from a covenant of grace. And especially is this quite another thing than if, in the expression used, the iniquity had been ascribed to Lot; and God, instead of saying, Lest thou be consumed in *the iniquity of the city*, had said, Lest thou be consumed *in thine iniquity*, or, Lest *thou sin*, or *be made a sinner*. Whereas the expression is such, as expressly removes the iniquity spoken of from Lot, and fixes it on the city. The place cited by our author in Jer. li. is exactly parallel. And as to what Abimelech says to Abraham, "What have I offended thee, that thou hast brought on me, and on my kingdom, a great *sin*?" It is manifest, Abimelech was afraid that God was angry, for what he had done to Sarah; or, would have been angry with him, if he had done what he was about to do, as imputing *sin* to him for it. Which is a quite different thing from calling some calamity, *sin*, under no notion of its being any punishment of sin, nor in the least degree from God's displeasure.

* Page 30. † Page 54, and elsewhere. ‡ Page 34.

And so with regard to every place our author cites in the margin, it is plain that what is meant in each of them is *the punishment of sin*, and not some suffering which is no punishment at all. And as to the instances he mentions in his *Supplement*, (p. 8.) the two that look most favourable to his design are those in *Gen.* xxxi. 39. and 2 *Kings* vii. 9. With respect to the former, where Jacob says, *that which was born of beasts*, (אנכי אחטאנו, *I bear the loss of it.*) Dr. T. is pleased to translate it, *I was the sinner;* but properly rendered, it is, *I expiated it;* the verb in *Pihel*, proper signifying to *expiate;* and the plain meaning is, *I bore the blame of it, and was obliged to pay for it*, as being supposed to be lost through my *fault* or neglect: Which is a quite different thing from suffering without any supposition of fault. And as to the latter place, where the lepers say, *this day is a day of good tidings, and we hold our peace: If we tarry till morning some mischief will befall us:* In the Hebrew it is (יסתאנו עון) *iniquity will find us*, that is, some punishment of our fault will come upon us. Elsewhere such phrases are used, as *your iniquity will find you out*, and the like. But certainly this is a different thing from suffering without fault, or supposition of fault. And it does not appear, that the verb in *Hiphil*, (הרשיע) rendered *to condemn*, is ever put for *condemn*, in any other sense than for sin, or guilt, or supposed guilt belonging to the subject condemned. This word is used in the participle of Hiphil, to signify CONDEMNING, in *Prov.* xvii. 15. "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that CONDEMNETH the just, even both are an abomination to the Lord." This Dr. T. observes, as if it were to his purpose, when he is endeavouring to shew, that in this place (Rom. v.) the apostle speaks of God himself as *condemning the just*, or perfectly innocent, in a parallel signification of terms. Nor is any instance produced, wherein the verb *sin*, which is used by the apostle when he says *all have sinned*, is any where used in our author's sense, for being brought into a state of suffering, and that not as a punishment for sin, or as any thing arising from God's displeasure; much less for being the subject of what comes only as the fruit of divine love, and as a benefit of the HIGHEST NATURE.* Not can any thing like this sense of the verb be found in the whole bible.

2. If there had been any thing like such an use of the words *sin* and *sinner*, as our author supposes, in the Old Testament, it is evident that such an use of them is quite alien from the language of the New Testament. Where can an instance be produced of any thing like it, in any one place, besides what is pretended in this? and particularly in any of this apostle's writings? We have enough of his writings by which

* Page 27. *S.*

to learn his way of speaking about *sin*, *condemnation*, *punishmeet*, *death*, and *suffering*. He wrote much more of the New-Testament than any other person. He very often has occasion to speak of *condemnation*: but where does he express it by such a phrase as *being made sinners?* Especially how far is he elsewhere from using such a phrase, to signify being condemned without guilt, or any imputation or supposition of guilt? Vastly more still is it remote from his language, so to use the verb *sin*, and to say, man *sinneth*, or *has sinned*, though hereby meaning nothing more or less than that he, by a *judicial act*, is *condemned*, according to a dispensation of *grace*, to receive a *great favour!* He abundantly uses the words *sin* and *sinner;* his writings are full of such terms; but where else does he use them in such a sense? He has much occasion in his epistles to speak of *death*, temporal and eternal; to speak of *suffering* of all kinds, in this world, and the world to come: But where does he call these things *sin?* or denominate innocent men *sinners*, meaning, that they are brought into a state of *suffering?* If the apostle, because he was a Jew, was so addicted to the Hebrew idiom as thus in *one* paragraph to repeat this particular Hebraism, which, at most is comparatively rare even in the Old Testament; is it not strange, that never any thing like it should appear any where else in his writings? and especially, that he should never fall into such a way of speaking in his epistle to the Hebrews, written to Jews only, who were most used to the Hebrew idiom? And why does Christ never use such language in any of his speeches, though he was born and brought up among Jews, and delivered almost all his speeches to Jews only? And why do none of the other New Testament writers ever use it, who were all born and educated Jews, (excepting perhaps Luke) and some of them wrote especially for the benefit of the Jews?

It is worthy to be observed what liberty is taken and boldness is used with this apostle. Such words as αμαρτολος, αμαρτανω, κριμα, κατακριμα, δικαιοω, δικαιωσις. are abundantly used by him elsewhere in this and other epistles, when speaking, as here, of Christ's redemption and atonement, the general sinfulness of mankind, the condemnation of sinners, the justification by Christ, death as the consequence of sin, and restoration to life by Christ; yet no where are any of these words used, but in a sense very remote from what is supposed by Dr. T. however, in this place, it seems, these terms must have a *distinguished singular* sense annexed to them! A *new* language must be coined for the apostle, to which he is evidently quite unused, for the sake of evading this clear, precise, and abundant testimony of his, to the doctrine of original sin.

3. To put such a sense on the word *sin*, in this place, is not only to make the apostle greatly disagree with himself in

the language he uses *every where else*, but also *in this very passage*. He often here uses the word *sin*, and other words plainly of the same import, such as *transgression*, *disobedience*, *offence*. Nothing can be more evident, than that these are used as several names of the same thing; for they are used interchangeably, and put one for another. And these words are used no less than *seventeen* times in this one paragraph. Perhaps we shall find no place in the whole bible, in which the word, *sin*, and other words plainly synonomous, are used so often in so little compass. And in all these instances, in the *proper* sense, as signifying *moral evil*, and even so understood by Dr. T. himself (as appears by his own exposition) but only in these two places (ver. 12, 19.) where, in the midst of all, to evade a clear evidence of the doctrine of original sin, another meaning must be found out, and it must be supposed that the apostle uses the word in a sense entirely different, signifying something that neither *implies* nor *supposes* any moral evil at all in the subject.

Here it is very remarkable, how the gentleman who so greatly insisted upon it, that the word, *death*, must needs be understood in the *same* sense throughout this paragraph; yea, that it is *evidently*, *clearly*, and *infallibly*, so, inasmuch as the apostle is still discoursing on the same subject; yet can, without the least difficulty, suppose the word *sin*, to be used so differently in the very same passage, wherein the apostle is discoursing on the same thing. Let us take that one instance in ver. 12. "Wherefore as by one man *sin* entered into the world, and death by *sin*, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have *sinned*." Here, by *sin*, implied in the word *sinned*, in the end of the sentence, our author understands something perfectly and altogether *diverse* from what is meant by the word *sin*, twice in the former part of the same sentence, of which this latter part is the explication. And a sense entirely *different* from the use of the word twice in the *next* sentence, wherein the apostle is still most plainly discoursing on the same subject, as is not denied. And so our author himself understands ver. 14. Afterwards (ver. 19.) the apostle uses the word, *sinners*, which our author supposes to be in a somewhat different sense still. So that here is the utmost violence of the kind that can be conceived of, to make out a scheme against the plainest evidence, in changing the meaning of a word backward and forward, in one paragraph, all about one thing, and in different parts of the same sentence, occurring in quick repetitions, with a variety of other synonymous words to fix its signification. To which we may add, the continued use of the word in all the preceding and subsequent parts of this epistle; in none of which places is it pretended, but that the word is used in the

proper sense, by our author in his paraphrase and notes on the whole epistle*.

But indeed we need go no further than ver. 12. What the apostle means by *sin*, in the latter part of the verse, is evident, by comparing it with the former part; the last clause being exegetical of the first. "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that (or, unto which) all have sinned." Here *sin* and *death* are so spoken of in the former and in the latter part that the same things are clearly meant by the terms in both parts. Besides, to interpret *sinning*, here, by falling under the suffering of *death*, is yet the more violent and unreasonable, because the apostle in this very place once and again *distinguishes* between *sin* and *death*; plainly speaking of one as the effect, and the other the cause. So in the 21st verse, *that as* SIN *hath reigned unto* DEATH; and in the 12th verse, SIN *entered into the world, and* DEATH *by sin*. And this plain distinction holds through all the discourse, as between *death* and the *offence*, ver. 15 and ver. 17, and between the *offence* and *condemnation*, ver. 18.

4. Though we should omit the consideration of the manner in which the apostle uses the words, *sin*, *sinned*, *&c.* in other places, and in other parts of this discourse, yet Dr. T.'s interpretation of them would be very absurd.

The case stands thus: According to *his* exposition, we are said to have *sinned* by an *active* verb, as though we had actively sinned; yet this is not spoken truly and properly, but it is put figuratively for our becoming sinners *passively*, our being *made* or *constituted* sinners. Yet again, not that we do truly become sinners *passively*, or are really *made sinners*, by any thing that God does; this also is only a figurative or tropical representation; and the meaning is only, we are *condemned*, and treated AS IF we were *sinners*. Not indeed that we are properly *condemned*, for God never truly condemns the innocent: But this is only a figurative representation of the thing. It is but *as it were* condemning; because it is appointing to *death*, a terrible evil, *as if it were* a punishment. But then, in reality, here is no appointment to a terrible *evil*, or any evil at all; but

* Agreeably to his manner, our author, in explaining the 7th chap. of Romans, understands the pronoun *I* or *me*, used by the apostle in that one continued discourse, in no less than *six* different senses. He takes it in the 1st ver. to signify the apostle Paul himself. In the 8, 9, 10, and 11th verses, for the people of the Jews, through all ages, both before and after Moses, especially the carnal ungodly part of them. In the 13th ver. for an objecting Jew, entering into a dialogue with the apostle. In the 15, 16, 17th, 20th, and latter part of the 25th ver. it is understood in two different senses, for two I's in the same person; one a man's reason; and the other, his passions and carnal appetites. And the 7th and former part of the [illegible] ver. for us Christians in general; or, for all that enjoy the word of God [illegible] and the [illegible] in two different senses [illegible] [illegible] and forwards.

truly to a *benefit*, a *great* benefit: And so in representing death as a punishment, another figure is used, and an exceeding bold one; for, as we are appointed to it, it is so far from being an evil or punishment, that it is really a *favour*, and that of the highest nature, appointed by mere grace and love, though it *seems* to be a calamity.

Thus we have tropes and figures multiplied, one upon another; and all in that one word, *sinned;* according to the manner, as it is supposed, in which the apostle uses it. We have a *figurative representation*, not of a reality, but a *figurative representation.* Neither is this a representation of a reality, but of another thing that still is but a *figurative representation* of something else: Yea, even this *something else* is still but a *figure*, and one that is very harsh and far-fetched. So that here we have a *figure*, to represent a *figure*, even a *figure*, of a *figure*, representing some very remote *figure*, which most obscurely represents the thing intended; if the most *terrible evil* can indeed be said of all to *represent* the contrary *good* of the highest kind. And now, what cannot be made of *any* place of scripture, in such a way as this? And is there any hope of ever deciding any controversy by the scripture, in the way of using such a licence in order to force it to a compliance with our own schemes? If the apostle indeed uses language after so strange a manner in this place, it is perhaps such an instance, as not only there is not the like in all the bible besides, but perhaps in no writing whatsoever. And this, not in any parabolical, visionary, or prophetic description, in which difficult and obscure representations are wont to be made; nor in a dramatic or poetical representation, in which a great license is often taken, and bold figures are commonly to be expected. But it is in a familiar letter, wherein the apostle is delivering gospel-instruction, as a minister of the New Testament; and wherein, as he professes, he delivers divine truth without the vail of ancient figures and similitudes, and uses great plainness of speech. And in a discourse that is wholly didactic, narrative, and argumentative; evidently setting himself to explain the doctrine he is upon, in the reason and nature of it, with a great variety of expressions, turning it as it were on every side, to make his meaning plain, and to fix in his readers the exact notion of what he intends. Dr. T. himself observes,* "This apostle takes great care to guard and explain every part of his subject: And I may venture to say, he has left no part of it unexplained or unguarded. Never was an author more exact and cautious in this than he. Sometimes he writes notes on a sentence liable to exception, and wanting explanation." Now I think, this care and ex-

* Pref. to paraph. on Rom. p. 146, 48.

actness of the apostle no where appears more than in the place we are upon. Nay, I scarcely know another instance equal to this, of the apostle's care to be well understood, by being very particular, explicit, and precise, setting the matter forth in every light, going over and over again with his doctrine, clearly to exhibit, and fully to settle and determine the thing at which he aims.

SECT. II.

Some Observations on the Connections, Scope, and Sense of this remarkable Paragraph, Rom. v. 12, &c. With some Reflections on the Evidence which we here have of the Doctrine of Original Sin.

The connection of this remarkable paragraph with the foregoing discourse in this epistle, is not obscure and difficult, nor to be sought for at a distance. It may be plainly seen, only by a general glance on what goes before, from the beginning of the epistle: And indeed what is said immediately before in the same chapter, leads directly to it. The apostle in the preceding part of this epistle had largely treated of the *sinfulness* and *misery* of all mankind, Jews as well as Gentiles. He had particularly spoken of the depravity and ruin of mankind in their natural state, in the foregoing part of this chapter; representing them as being *sinners*, *ungodly enemies*, exposed to divine *wrath*, and *without strength*. This naturally leads him to observe, *how* this so great and deplorable an event came to pass; *how* this universal sin and ruin came into the world. And with regard to the Jews in particular, though they might allow the doctrine of original sin in profession, they were strongly prejudiced against what was implied in it, or evidently followed from it, with regard to themselves. In this respect they were prejudiced against the doctrine of universal sinfulness, and exposedness to wrath by nature, looking on themselves as by nature holy, and favourites of God, because they were the children of Abraham; and with them the apostle had laboured most in the foregoing part of the epistle, to convince them of their being by nature as sinful, and as much the children of wrath, as the Gentiles: It was therefore exceeding proper, and what the apostle's design most naturally led him to, that they should take off their eyes from their father Abraham, their father in distinction from other nations, and direct them to their father Adam, who was the common father of mankind, equally of Jews and Gentiles. And when he had entered on this doctrine of the derivation of sin and death to all mankind from Adam, no wonder if he thought it needful to be somewhat

particular in it, seeing he wrote to Jews and Gentiles; the former which had been brought up under the prejudices of a proud opinion of themselves, as a holy people by nature, and the latter had been educated in total ignorance.

Again, the apostle had, from the beginning of the epistle, been endeavouring to evince the absolute dependence of all mankind on the free *grace* of God for salvation, and the greatness of this grace; and particularly in the former part of this chapter. The greatness of this grace he shews especially by two things. (1.) The universal corruption and misery of mankind; as in all the foregoing chapters, and in several preceding verses of this chapter, (ver. 6—10.) (2.) The greatness of the benefits which believers receive, and the greatness of the glory for which they hope. So especially in ver. 1—5, and 11th of this chapter. And here, ver. 12. to the end, he still pursues the same design of magnifying the grace of God, in the favour, life, and happiness which believers in Christ receive; speaking here of *the grace of God, the gift by grace, the abounding of grace, and the reign of grace.* And he still sets forth the freedom and riches of grace by the same two arguments, *viz.* The universal *sinfulness* and *ruin* of mankind, all having sinned, all being naturally exposed to death, judgment and condemnation; and the exceeding greatness of the benefit received being far greater than the misery which comes by the first Adam, and abounding beyond it. And it is by no means consistent with the apostle's scope, to suppose, that the benefit which we have by Christ, as the antitype of Adam, here mainly insisted on, is without any grace at all, being only a restoration to life of such as never deserved death.

Another thing observable in the apostle's grand scope from the beginning of the epistle, is, that he endeavours to shew the greatness and absoluteness of dependence on the *redemption* and *righteousness* of CHRIST, for justification and life, that he might *magnify* and *exalt* the *Redeemer;* in which design his whole heart was swallowed up, and may be looked upon as the main design of the whole epistle. And this is what he had been upon in the preceding part of this chapter, inferring it from the same argument, even the utter sinfulness and ruin of all men. And he is evidently still on the same thing from the 12th verse to the end; speaking of the *same* justification and righteousness which he had dwelt on before, and not another totally diverse. No wonder, when the apostle is treating so fully and largely of our restoration, righteousness, and life by Christ, that he is led by it to consider our fall, sin, death, and ruin by Adam; and to observe wherein these two opposite heads of mankind agree, and wherein they differ, in the manner of conveyance of opposite influences and communications from each.

Thus, if the place be understood, as it is used to be understood by orthodox divines, the whole stands in a natural, easy, and clear connection with the preceding part of the chapter, and all the former part of the epistle; and in a plain agreement with the express design of all that the apostle had been saying; and also in connection with the words last before spoken, as introduced by the two immediately preceding verses, where he is speaking of our justification, reconciliation, and salvation by Christ; which leads the apostle directly to observe, how, on the contrary, we have sin and death by Adam. Taking this discourse of the apostle in its true and plain sense, there is no need of great extent of learning, or depth of criticism, to find out the connection. But if it be understood in Dr. T.'s sense, the plain scope and connection are wholly lost, and there was truly need of skill in criticism, and the art of discerning, beyond or at least different from that of former divines, and a faculty of seeing what other men's sight could not reach, in order to find out the connection.

What has been already observed, may suffice to shew the apostle's general scope in this place. But yet there seems to be some *other* things to which he alludes in several expressions. As particularly, the Jews had a very superstitious and extravagant notion of their law, delivered by Moses; as if it were the prime, grand, and indeed only rule of God's proceeding with mankind as their judge; both in their justification and condemnation, or from whence all, both sin and righteousness, was imputed; and had no consideration of the law of nature, written in the hearts of the Gentiles, and of all mankind. Herein they ascribed infinitely too much to their particular law, beyond the true design of it. They *made their boast of the law;* as if their being distinguished from all other nations by that great privilege, *the giving of the law*, sufficiently made them a holy people, and God's children. This notion of theirs the apostle evidently refers to, chap. ii. 13, 17—19. and indeed through that whole chapter. They looked on the law of Moses as intended to be the only rule and means of justification; and as such, trusted in the works of the law, especially circumcision; which appears by the third chapter. But as for the Gentiles, they looked on them as by nature sinners, and children of wrath; because born of uncircumcised parents, and aliens from their law, and who themselves did not know, profess and submit to the law of Moses, become proselytes, and receive circumcision W at t ey esteemed the sum of *their* wickedness and condemnation, was, that they did not turn Jews, and act as Jews*. To this notion the apostle has a

* Here are worthy to be observed the things which Dr. T. himself says to the same purpose, *Key*, § 302, 303. and *Preface to Par. on Epist. to* Rom. p. 144, 43.

plain respect, and endeavours to convince them of its falseness, in chap. ii. 12—16. And he has a manifest regard again to the same thing here. (Chap. v. 12—14.) Which may lead us the more clearly to see the true sense of these verses; about the sense of which is the main controversy, and the meaning of which being determined, it will settle the meaning of every other controverted expression through the whole discourse.

Dr. T. misrepresents the apostle's argument in these verses; which, as has been demonstrated, is in his sense altogether vain and impertinent. He supposes, the thing which the apostle mainly intends to prove, is, that *death* or mortality does not come on mankind by *personal* sin; and that he would prove it by this medium, that *death reigned* when there was *no law* in being which threatened personal sin with death. It is acknowledged that this is implied, even that death came into the world by Adam's sin: Yet this is not the *main* thing the apostle designs to prove. But his main point evidently is, that *sin and guilt*, and *just exposedness to death and ruin*, came into the world by Adam's sin; as *righteousness*, *justification*, and a *title to eternal life* come by Christ. Which point he confirms by this consideration, that from the very time when Adam sinned, sin, guilt, and desert of ruin became *universal* in the world, long before the law given by Moses to the Jewish nation had any being.

The apostle's remark, that sin entered into the world by *one man*, who was the father of the whole human race, was an observation which afforded proper instruction for the Jews, who looked on themselves as an holy people, because they had the law of Moses, and were the children of Abraham, an holy father; while they looked on other nations as by nature unholy and sinners, because they were not Abraham's children. He leads them up to a higher ancestor than this patriarch, even to Adam, who being equally the father of Jews and Gentiles, both alike come from a sinful father; from whom guilt and pollution were derived alike to all mankind. And this the apostle proves by an argument, which of all that could possibly be invented, tended the most briefly and directly to convince the Jews; even by this reflection, that death had come equally on all mankind from Adam's time, and that the posterity of Abraham were equally subject to it with the rest of the world. This was apparent in *fact*, a thing they all knew. And the Jews had always been taught that *death* (which began in the destruction of the body, and of this present life) was the proper punishment of *sin*. This they were taught in Moses's history of Adam, and God's first threatening of punishment for sin, and in the constant doctrine of the law and the prophets; as already observed.

And the apostle's observation—that *sin was in the world* long before the *law* was given, and was as *universal* in the world from the times of Adam, as it had been among the heathen since the law of Moses—shewed plainly, that the Jews were quite mistaken in their notion of their particular law; and that the *law* which is the original and universal rule of righteousness and judgment for all mankind, was another law, of far more ancient date, even the law of nature. This began as early as the human nature began, and was established with the first father of mankind, and in him with the whole race. The positive precept of abstaining from the forbidden fruit was given for the trial of his compliance with this law of nature; of which the main rule is supreme regard to God and his will. And the apostle proves that it must be thus, because if the law of Moses had been the highest rule of judgment, and if there had not been a superior, prior, divine rule established, mankind in general would not have been judged and condemned as sinners, *before* that was given, (for "sin is not imputed when there is no law") as it is apparent in fact they were, because *death reigned* before that time, even from the time of Adam.

It may be observed that the apostle both in this epistle, and in that to the Galatians, endeavours to convince the Jews of these two things, in opposition to the notions and prejudices they had entertained concerning *their law*. (1.) That it never was intended to be the *covenant*, or method by which they should actually be *justified*. (2.) That it was not the *highest* and *universal* rule or law, by which mankind in general, and particularly the heathen world, were *condemned*. And he proves both by similar arguments. He proves that the law of Moses was not the *covenant* by which any of mankind were to obtain *justification*, because that covenant was of older date, being expressly established in the time of Abraham, and Abraham himself was *justified* by it. This argument the apostle particularly handles in the third chap. of Galatians, particularly in ver. 17—19. and especially in Rom. iv. 13—15. He proves also that the law of Moses was not the *prime* rule of judgment, by which mankind in general, and particularly the heathen world, were *condemned*. And this he proves also the same way, viz. by shewing this to be of *older date* than that law, and that it was established with Adam. Now these things tended to lead the Jews to right notions of their law, not as the intended method of *justification*, nor as the original and universal rule of *condemnation*, but something *superadded* to both; superadded to the *latter*, to illustrate and confirm it, that the *offence might abound*: and superadded to the *former*, to be as a schoolmaster, to prepare men for its benefits, and to magnify divine *grace* in it, that this might *much more abound*.

The chief occasion of obscurity and difficulty, attending the scope and connection of the various clauses of this discourse, particularly in the 13th and 14th verses, is, that there are *two* things (although closely connected) which the apostle has in view *at once*. He would illustrate the grand point he had been upon from the beginning, even *justification through Christ's righteousness alone*, by shewing how we are originally in a sinful miserable state, how we derive this sin and misery from Adam, and how we are delivered and justified by Christ as a second Adam. At the same time he would confute those foolish and corrupt notions of the Jews, about their *nation*, and their *law*, which were very inconsistent with these doctrines. And he here endeavours to establish, at once, these two things in opposition to those Jewish notions.

(1.) That it is our natural relation to Adam, and not to Abraham, which determines our native moral state; and that, therefore, being natural children of Abraham, will not make us by nature holy in the sight of God, since we are the natural seed of sinful Adam. Nor does the Gentiles being not descended from Abraham, denominated them *sinners*, any more than the Jews, seeing both alike are descended from Adam.

(2.) That the law of Moses is not the prime and general law and rule of judgment for mankind, to *condemn* them, and denominate them *sinners;* but that the state they are in with regard to a higher, more ancient and universal law, determines them in general to be *sinners* in the sight of God, and liable to be *condemned* as such. Which observation is, in many respects, to the apostle's purpose; particularly in this respect, that if the Jews were convinced, that the law, which was the prime rule of *condemnation*, was given to *all*, was common to all mankind, and that all fell under condemnation through the violation of that law by the common father of all, both Jews and Gentiles, then they would be led more easily and naturally to believe, that the method of *justification*, which God had established, also extended equally to *all* mankind: And that the Messiah, by whom we have this justification, is appointed, as Adam was for a common head to all, both Jews and Gentiles—The apostle aiming to confute the Jewish notion, is the principal occasion of those words in the 13th verse, "for until the law, sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed, when there is no law."

As to the import of that expression, *even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, not only is the thing signified, in Dr. T.'s sense of it, *not true;* or if it had been true, would have been impertinent, as has been shewn: But his interpretation is, otherwise, very much *strained* and unnatural. According to him, "by sinning after the similitude of Adam's transgression," is not meant any simi-

litude of the act of sinning, nor of the command sinned against, nor properly any circumstance of the *sin;* but only the similitude of a circumstance of the *command, viz. the threatening* with which it is attended. A far-fetched thing truly, to be called a *similitude of sinning!* Besides, this expression in such a meaning, is only a needless, impertinent, and awkward *repetition* of the same thing, which it is supposed the apostle had observed in the foregoing verse, even after he had proceeded another step in the series of his discourse. As thus, in the foregoing verse the apostle had plainly laid down his argument, (as our author understands it) by which he would prove, that *death* did not come by *personal sin, viz.* because death reigned before any *law, threatening* death for personal sin, was in being: so that the sin then committed was against *no law*, threatening death for personal sin. Having laid this down, the apostle leaves this part of his argument, and proceeds another step, *nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses:* And then returns, in a strange unnatural manner, and *repeats* that argument or assertion again, but only more obscurely than before, in these words, *even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression;* i. e. over them that had not sinned against a law threatening death for personal sin. Which is just the same thing as if the apostle had said, "they that sinned *before the law*, did not sin against all law threatening death for personal sin; for there was no *such law* for any to sin against at that time: *Nevertheless* death reigned at that time, *even over such as did not sin* against a law threatening death for personal sin." Which latter clause *adds* nothing to the premises, and tends nothing to illustrate what was said before, but rather to obscure and darken it. The particle (καὶ) *even*, when prefixed in this manner, is used to signify something additional, some advance in the sense or argument; implying that the words following express something more, or express the same thing more fully, plainly, or forcibly. But to unite two clauses by such a particle, in such a manner, when there is nothing besides a flat repetition, with no superadded sense or force, but rather a greater uncertainty and obscurity, would be very unusual, and indeed very absurd.

I can see no reason why we should be dissatisfied with that explanation of this clause, which has more commonly been given, *viz.* That by *them who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, are meant *infants;* who, though they have indeed sinned in Adam, yet never sinned as Adam did, by actually transgressing in their own persons: unless it be, that this interpretation is too *old*, and too *common*. It was well understood by those to whom the apostle wrote, that vast numbers had *died* in infancy, within that period of

which he speaks, particularly in the time of the deluge. And it would be strange, that the apostle should not have the case of such infants in his mind; even supposing his scope were what our author supposes, and he had only intended to prove that death did not come on mankind for their *personal* sin. How directly would it have served the purpose of proving this, to have mentioned so great a part of mankind who are subject to death, and who, all know, never committed any sin *in their own persons?* How much more plain and easy the proof of the point by that, than to go round about, as Dr. T. supposes, and bring in a thing so dark and uncertain as this, that God never would bring death on all mankind for *personal* sin, (though they had personal sin) without an express revealed *constitution;* and then to observe, that there was *no* revealed constitution of this nature from Adam to Moses,—which also seems to be an assertion without any plain evidence—and then to infer, that it must needs be so, that it could come only on *occasion of Adam's sin*, though not *for* his sin, or as any punishment of it; which inference also is very dark and unintelligible.

If the apostle in this place meant those who never sinned by their personal act, it is not strange that he should express this by their *not sinning after the similitude of Adam's transgression.* We read of two ways of men being like *Adam*, or in which a similitude to him is ascribed to men: One is, being begotten or born in his *image* or *likeness*, Gen. v. 3. Another is, transgressing God's Covenant or law, *like him*, Hos. vi. 7. *They like Adam*, (so, in the *Heb.* and *Vulg. Lat.*) *have transgressed the covenant.* Infants have the former similitude, but not the latter. And it was very natural, when the apostle would infer that infants become sinners by that one act and offence of Adam, to observe, that they had not renewed the act of sin themselves, by any second instance of a like sort. And such might be the state of language among Jews and Christians at that day, that the apostle might have no phrase more aptly to express this meaning. The manner in which the epithets, *personal* and *actual*, are used and applied now in this case, is probably of later date, and more modern use.

And the apostle having the case of *infants* in view, in this expression, makes it more to his purpose to mention death reigning before the law of Moses was given. For the Jews looked on all nations besides themselves as *sinners*, by virtue of *their law;* being made so especially by the *law of circumcision*, given first to Abraham, and completed by Moses, making the want of circumcision a legal *pollution*, utterly disqualifying for the privileges of the sanctuary. This law, the Jews supposed, made the very infants of the Gentiles to be sinners, polluted and hateful to God; they being uncircumcised, and born of uncircumcised parents. But the apostle proves against these

"But that at that time sin was *imputed*, and men were by their judge reckoned as *sinners*, through guilt and corruption derived from Adam, and condemned for sin to *death*, the proper punishment of sin, we have a plain proof in that it appears in fact, all mankind, during that whole time which preceded the law of Moses, were subjected to that temporal death, which is the visible introduction and image of that utter destruction which sin deserves, not excepting even *infants*, who could be sinners no other way than by virtue of Adam's transgression, having never in their own persons actually sinned as Adam did; nor could at that time be made polluted by the law of Moses, as being uncircumcised, or born of uncircumcised parents."

14. *Nevertheless, death reigned from* Adam *to* Moses, *even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of* Adam's *transgression.*

Now, by way of reflection on the whole, I would observe, that though there are two or three expressions in this paragraph, *Rom.* v. 12, &c. the design of which is attended with some difficulty and obscurity, as particularly in the 13th and 14th verses, yet the scope and sense of the discourse in general is not obscure, but on the contrary very clear and manifest; and so is the particular doctrine mainly taught in it. The apostle sets himself with great care to make it plain, and precisely to fix and settle the point he is upon. And the discourse is so framed, that one part of it greatly clears and fixes the meaning of other parts; and the whole is determined by the clear connection it stands in with other parts of the epistle and by the manifest drift of all the preceding part of it.

The doctrine of *original sin* is not only here taught, but most plainly, explicitly, and abundantly taught. This doctrine is asserted, expressly or impliedly, in almost every verse, and in some of the verses several times. It is fully implied in that first expression in the 12th ver. *By one man sin entered into the world.* The passage implies, that sin became *universal* in the world; as the apostle had before largely shewn it was; and not merely (which would be a trifling observation) that one man, who was made first, sinned first, before other men sinned; or, that it did not so happen that many men began to sin just together at the same moment. The latter part of the verse, *and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that* (or, if you will, *unto which*) *all have sinned*, shews that in the eye of the Judge of the world, in Adam's first sin *all* sinned; not only in *some sort*, but all sinned *so* as to be exposed to that

death, and final destruction, which is the proper *wages of sin*. The same doctrine is taught again twice over in the 14th verse. It is there observed, as a proof of this doctrine, that *death reigned over them which had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, i. e. by their personal act; and therefore could be exposed to death, only by driving guilt and pollution from Adam, in consequence of his sin. And it is taught again in those words, *who is the figure of him that was to come*. The resemblance lies very much in this circumstance, viz. our deriving sin, guilt, and punishment by Adam's sin, as we do righteousness, justification, and the reward of life by Christ's obedience; for so the apostle explains himself. The same doctrine is expressly taught again, ver. 15. *Through the offence of one, many be dead*. And again twice in the 16th verse, *it was by one that sinned*: i. e. It was by Adam, that guilt and punishment (before spoken of) came on mankind: And in these words, *judgment was by one to condemnation*. It is again plainly and fully laid down in the 17th verse, *by one man's offence death reigned by one*. So again in the 18th verse, *By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation*. Again very plainly in the 19th verse, "By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners."

Here is every thing to determine and fix the *meaning* of the important *terms* used; As, the *abundant use* of them in all parts of the New Testament; and especially in this apostle's writings, which make up a very great part of the New Testament; and his repeated use of them in this epistle in particular; and in the former part of this very chapter; and also the *light* that one sentence in this paragraph casts on another, which fully settles their meaning: As, with respect to the words *justification*, *righteousness*, and *condemnation*; and above all, in regard of the word *sin*, which is the most important of all, with relation to the doctrine and controversy we are upon. Besides the constant use of this term every where else through the New Testament, through the epistles of this apostle, this epistle in particular, and even the former part of this chapter, it is often repeated in this very paragraph, and evidently used in the very sense that is denied to belong to it in the end of ver. 12. and ver. 19. though owned every where else. And its meaning is fully determined by the apostle varying the term; using together with it, to signify the same thing, such a variety of other synonymous words, such as *offence*, *transgression*, *disobedience*. And further, to put the matter out of all controversy, it is particularly, expressly, and repeatedly distinguished from that which our opposers would *explain* it by, *viz. condemnation* and *death*. And what is meant by *sin entering into the world*, in ver. 12, is determined by a like phrase of *sin being in the world*, in the next verse.—And that by the

offence of one, so often spoken of here, as bringing death and condemnation on all, the apostle means the *sin of one*, derived in its guilt and pollution to mankind in general (over and above all that has been already observed) is determined by those words in the conclusion of this discourse, ver. 20. "Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound: But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." These words plainly show, that the OFFENCE spoken of so often, the offence of *one* man, became the sin of *all*. For when he says, *The law entered, that the offence might abound*, his meaning cannot be, that the offence of Adam, merely as *his* personally, should *abound;* but, as it exists in its *derived* guilt, corrupt influence, and evil fruits, in the sin of mankind in general, even as a tree in its root and branches.*

What further confirms the certainty of the *proof* of *original sin*, which this place affords, is this, that the utmost art *cannot* pervert it to *another* sense. What a variety of the most artful methods have been used by the *enemies* of this doctrine, to *wrest* and *darken* this paragraph of holy writ, which stands so much in their way; as it were, to *force* the bible to speak a language agreeable to their mind! How have expressions been strained, words and phrases racked! What strange figures of speech have been invented, and with violent hands thrust into the apostle's mouth; and then with a bold countenance and magisterial airs obtruded on the world, as from him! But blessed be God, we have his words as he delivered them, and the rest of the same epistle, and his other writings to compare with them; by which his meaning stands in too strong and glaring a light to be hid by any of the artificial mists which they labour to throw upon it.

It is really no less than *abusing* the scripture and its readers, to represent this paragraph as the most *obscure* of all the places of scripture, that speak of the consequences of Adam's sin; and to treat it as if there was need first to consider other places as more *plain*. Whereas, it is most manifestly a place in which these things are declared, the most plainly, particularly, precisely, and of set purpose, by that great apostle, who has most fully explained to us those doctrines in general, which relate to the redemption by Christ, and the sin and misery we are redeemed from. And it must be now left to the

* The *offence*, according to Dr. T.'s explanation, does not *abound* by the *law* at all really and truly, in any sense; neither the *sin*, nor the *punishment*. For he says, "The meaning is not, that men should be made more wicked; but, that men should be liable to death for every transgression." But after all, they are liable to no more deaths, nor to any worse deaths, if they are not more sinful: For they were to have punishments according to their desert *before*. Such as died, and went into another world before the law of Moses was given, were punished according to their *deserts;* and the law, when it came, threatened no more.

and by his obedience are *made righteous*, in the *resurrection* of the body, in the sense of Rom. v. 17, 19. And *all* mankind are thus the subjects of Christ's redemption, while they are perfectly guiltless, and exposed to no punishment, as by Christ they are entitled to a *resurrection*. Though, with respect to such persons as have *sinned*, he allows it is *in some sort* by Christ and his death, that they are saved from sin, and the punishment of it.

Now let us see whether such a scheme well consists with the scripture-account of the redemption by Jesus Christ.

I. The representations of the redemption by Christ, every where in scripture, lead us to suppose, that *all* whom he came to redeem are *sinners;* that his salvation, as to the term *from which* (or the evil to be redeemed from) in *all*, is *sin*, and the deserved *punishment* of sin. It is natural to suppose, that when he had his name *Jesus*, or *Saviour*, given him by God's special and immediate appointment, the salvation meant by that name should be his salvation in general; and not only a *part* of his salvation, and with regard only to *some* of them whom he came to save. But this name was given him to signify *his saving his people from their* SINS, Mat. i. 21. And the great doctrine of Christ's salvation is, that *he came into the world to save* SINNERS, 1 Tim. i. 15. And that *Christ hath once suffered, the just for the* UNJUST, 1 Pet. iii. 18. *In this was manifested the love of God towards us*, (towards such in general as have the benefit of God's love in giving Christ) *that God sent his only begotten son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, that he sent his son to be the propitiation for our* SINS, 1 John iv. 9, 10. Many other texts might be mentioned, which seem evidently to suppose, that all who are redeemed by Christ, are saved from SIN. We are led by what Christ himself said, to suppose, that if any are not *sinners*, they have *no need* of him as a Redeemer, any more than a man in health of a physician, Mark ii. 17. And that, in order to our being the proper subjects of the mercy of God through Christ, we must first be in a state of *sin*, is implied in Gal. iii. 22. "But the scripture hath concluded all under *sin*, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe." To the same effect is Rom. xi. 32.

These things are greatly confirmed by the scripture-doctrine of *sacrifices*. It is abundantly plain, both from the Old and New Testament, that these were types of Christ's death, and were for *sin*, and supposed *sin* in those for whom they were offered. The apostle supposes, that in order to any having the benefit of *the eternal inheritance* by Christ *there must of necessity be the death of the testator;* and gives that reason for it, that *without shedding of blood there is no remission*, Heb. ix. 15, &c. And Christ himself, in representing the benefit of

only a medicine; and one of the greatest of benefits. It is ridiculous to talk of person's needing a medicine, or a physician to save them from an excellent medicine; or of a remedy from a happy remedy! If it be said, though death be a benefit, yet it is so because Christ *changes* it, and turns it into a benefit, by procuring a *resurrection:* I would ask, what can be meant by *turning* or *changing* it into a benefit, when it never *was* otherwise, nor could ever *justly be* otherwise? *Infants* could not at all be brought under death as a calamity; for they never *deserved* it. And it would be only an abuse (be it far from us, to ascribe such a thing to God) in any being, to offer any poor sufferers, a Redeemer from a calamity which *he* had brought upon them, without the least *desert* of it on their part.

But it is plain, that mortality was not at first brought on mankind as a blessing, by the covenant of grace through Christ; and that Christ and grace do not *bring* mankind under death, but *find* them under it. 2 Cor. v. 14. "We thus judge, that if one died for all, then were *all dead.*" Luke xix. 10. "The son of man is come to seek and save that which was *lost.*" The grace which appears in providing a deliverer *from* any state, supposes the subject to be in that state *prior* to his deliverance. In our author's scheme, there never could be any sentence of death or condemnation, that requires a Saviour from it; because the very sentence itself, according to the true meaning of it, implies and makes sure all that good, which is requisite to abolish and make void the seeming evil to the innocent subject. So that the sentence itself is in effect the deliverer; and there is no need of another to deliver from that sentence. Dr. T. insists upon it, that "nothing comes upon us in consequence of Adam's sin, in any SENSE, KIND, or DEGREE, inconsistent with the *original blessing* pronounced on Adam at his creation; and nothing but what is perfectly consistent with God's blessing, love and goodness, declared to Adam as soon as he came out of his Maker's hands."* If the case be so, it is certain there is no evil or calamity at all for Christ to redeem us from; *unless things agreeable to the divine goodness, love and blessing*, are things from which we need redemption.†

IV. It will follow, on our author's principles, not only with respect to infants, but even *adult* persons, that redemption is *needless*, and Christ is dead in vain. Not only is there no need of Christ's redemption in order to deliverance from any consequences of Adam's sin, but also in order to perfect

* Page 88, 89, S.

† In this inferential short reply, our author is not quite so guarded as usual. It seems applicable only to *infants;* since adults have *actual* or *personal* sin and guilt from which to be redeemed. But what immediately follows anticipates the objection.—W.

freedom from *personal* sin, and all its evil consequences. For God has made other sufficient provision for that, *viz. a sufficient power and ability, in all mankind, to do all their duty, and wholly to avoid sin* Yea, he insists upon it, that "when men have not sufficient *power* to do their duty, they have *no* duty to do. We may safely and assuredly conclude, (says he) that mankind in all parts of the world have SUFFICIENT power to do the duty which God requires of them; and that he requires of them NO MORE than they have SUFFICIENT powers to do.* And in another place,† "God has given powers EQUAL to the duty which he expects." And he expresses a great dislike at R. R's supposing, that our propensities to evil, and temptations, are too strong to be EFFECTUALLY and CONSTANTLY resisted; or that we are unavoidably sinful in A DEGREE; that our appetites and passions will be breaking out, notwithstanding our everlasting watchfulness."‡ These things fully imply, that men have in their own natural ability sufficient means to avoid sin, and to be perfectly free from it; and so, from all the bad consequences of it. And if the means are *sufficient*, then there is no need of *more;* and therefore there is no need of Christ dying, in order to it. What Dr. T. says, (p. 72. S.) fully implies, that it would be unjust in God to give mankind being in such circumstances, as that they would be more likely to sin, so as to be exposed to final misery than otherwise. Hence then, without Christ and his redemption, and without any grace at all, MERE JUSTICE makes *sufficient provision* for our being free from sin and misery, by our own power.§

If all mankind, in all parts of the world, have *such* sufficient power to do their whole duty, without being sinful *in any degree*, then they have sufficient power to obtain righteousness by the law: and then, according to the apostle Paul. *Christ is dead in vain*, Gal. ii. 21. "If righteousness come by law, then Christ is dead in vain;"—διὰ νομὸς, without the article, *by law*, or the rule of right action, as our author explains the phrase.‖ And according to the sense in which he explains this very place, "it would have frustrated, or rendered useless the grace of God, if Christ died to accomplish what was or MIGHT have been effected by law itself, without his death."¶ So that it most clearly follows from his own doctrine, *that Christ is dead in vain*, and the grace of God is *useless*. The same apostle says, *if there had been a law* which COULD *have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law*, Gal.

* Page 111, 63, 64. S. † Page 67. S. ‡ Page 68. S.

§ Here also, our author will be thought not quite accurate, in the inference he draws against Dr. T. for the "sufficient power," for which Dr. T. pleads, relates only to the *prevention* of sin, but not to its *remission*, or the removal of its *effects*. But this also will soon be answered.—W.

‖ Pref. to Par. on Rom. p. 143, 38. ¶ Note on Rom. v. 20. p. 237.

iii. 21. i. e. (still according to Dr. T.'s own sense) if there was a law, that man, in his present state, had sufficient power perfectly to fulfil. For Dr. T. supposes the reason why the law could not give life, to be "not because it was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh, and the infirmity of the human nature in the present state."* But he says, "We are under a mild dispensation of GRACE, making allowance for our infirmities."† By *our infirmities*, we may upon good grounds suppose he means that infirmity of human nature, which he gives as the reason why the law cannot give life. But what *grace* is there in making that allowance for our infirmities, which *justice* itself (according to his doctrine) most absolutely requires, as he supposes divine justice exactly proportions our duty to our ability?

Again, if it be said, that although Christ's redemption was not necessary to preserve men from *beginning to sin*, and getting into a course of sin, because they have sufficient power in themselves to avoid it; yet it may be necessary to deliver men, *after* they have by their own folly brought themselves under the dominion of evil appetites and passions.‡ I answer, if it be so, that men need deliverance from those habits and passions, which are become too strong for them, yet that deliverance, on our author's principles, would be no salvation from *sin*. For, the exercise of passions which are too strong for us, and which we cannot overcome, is *necessary;* And he strongly urges, that a necessary evil can be no *moral* evil. It is true, it is the *effect* of evil, as it is the *effect* of a bad practice, while the man had power to have avoided it. But then according to Dr. T. that evil *cause* alone is sin; for he says expressly, "the *cause* of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it."§ And as to that sin which was the *cause*, the man needed no Saviour from *that*, having had *sufficient power* in himself to have avoided it. So that it follows, by our author's scheme, that *none* of mankind, neither infants nor adult persons, neither the more nor less vicious, neither Jews nor Gentiles, neither Heathens nor Christians, ever did or ever could stand in any *need* of a Saviour; and that, with respect to *all*, the truth is, *Christ is dead in vain.*

If any should say, although all mankind in all ages have sufficient ability to do their whole duty, and so may by their own power enjoy perfect freedom from sin, yet God *foresaw* that they *would sin*, and that *after* they had sinned, they would need Christ's death. I answer, it is plain, by what the apostle

* Note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297. † Page 92. S.

‡ See p. 228. and also what he says of the helpless state of the heathen, in paraph. and notes on Rom. vii. and beginning of chap. viii. § Page 128.

CHAP. II.

The Evidence of the Doctrine of Original Sin from what the Scripture teaches of the Application of Redemption.

THE truth of the doctrine of original sin is very clearly manifest from what the scripture says of that *change of state*, which it represents as necessary to an actual interest in the spiritual and eternal blessings of the Redeemer's kingdom.

In order to this, it speaks of it as absolutely necessary for every one, that he be regenerated, or *born again*. John iii. 3. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man (γεννηθη ανωθεν,) be begotten again, or born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Dr. T. though he will not allow that this signifies any change from a state of *natural propensity* to sin, yet supposes that the new birth here spoken of, means a man's being brought to "a divine life, in a right use and application of the natural powers, in a life of true holiness* ;" And that it is the attainment of *those habits of virtue and religion, which gives us the real character of true christians, and the children of God*;† and that it is *putting on the new nature of right action*.‡

But in order to proceed in the most sure and safe manner in understanding what is meant in scripture by *being born again*, and so in the inferences we draw from what is said of the necessity of it, let us compare scripture with scripture, and consider what *other* terms or phrases are used, where respect is evidently had to the same change. And here I would observe the following things.

I. If we compare one scripture with another, it will be sufficiently manifest, that by regeneration, or being *begotten* or *born again*, the same change in the state of the mind is signified with that which the scripture speaks of as effected in true REPENTANCE and CONVERSION. I put repentance and conversion together, because the scripture puts them together, Acts iii. 19. and because they plainly signify much the same thing. The word (μετανοια) *repentance* signifies a *change of the mind*; as the word *conversion*, means a *change* or *turning* from sin to God. And that this is the same change with that which is called *regeneration*, (excepting that this latter term especially signifies the change, as the mind is *passive* in it) the following things may shew.

In the *change* which the mind undergoes in *repentance* and *conversion*, is attained that *character* of true christians which is

* Page 144. † Page 246, 248. ‡ Page 251.

necessary to the eternal privileges of such, Acts iii. 19. "*repent* ye therefore, and be *converted*, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord."—And thus it is in *regeneration*; as is evident from what Christ says to Nicodemus, and as is allowed by Dr. T.

The *change* of the mind in *repentance* is that in which *saving faith* is attained. Mark i. 15, "The kingdom of God is at hand, *repent* ye, and *believe* the gospel." And so it is in being born *again*, or born of *God*; as appears by John i. 12, 13. "But as many as received him, to them he gave power to become the sons of God, even to them that *believe* on his name, which were *born* not of blood, &c. but of *God*."—Just as Christ says concerning *conversion*, Matth. xviii. 3. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye be *converted* and become as little children, ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven:" So does he say concerning being *born again*, in what he spake to Nicodemus.

By the change men undergo in *conversion*, they become *as little children*: which appears in the place last cited: And so they do by *regeneration*. (1 Pet. i. 23. and ii. 2.) "Being born again.—Wherefore, as new-born babes, desire," &c. It is no objection, that the disciples to whom Christ spake in Matth. xviii. 3. were converted already: This makes it not less proper for Christ to declare the necessity of conversion to them, leaving it with them to try themselves, and to make sure their conversion: In like manner as he declared to them the necessity of *repentance*, in Luke xiii. 3, 5. "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish."

The change effected by *repentance* is expressed and exhibited by *baptism*. Hence it is called the *baptism of repentance*. (Matth. iii. 11. Luke iii. 3. Acts xiii. 24. and xix. 4.) And so is *regeneration*, or being born again, expressed by *baptism*; as is evident by such representations of regeneration as those, John iii. 5. "Except a man be born of water, and of the spirit,"—Tit. iii. 5. "He saved us by the washing of regeneration.—Many other things might be observed, to shew that the change men pass under in their *repentance* and *conversion*, is the *same* with that of which they are the subjects in regeneration—But these observations may be sufficient.

II. The change which a man undergoes when born again, and in his repentance and conversion, is the same that the scripture calls the CIRCUMCISION OF THE HEART.—This may easily appear by considering. that as *regeneration* is that in which are attained the habits of true *virtue* and *holiness*, as has been shewn, and as is confessed; so is *circumcision of heart*. Deut. xxx. 6. "And the Lord thy God will *circumcise thine heart*, and the *heart* of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul."

Regeneration is that whereby men come to have the character of true christians; as is evident, and as is confessed; and so is circumcision of heart; for by this men become Jews inwardly, or Jews in the spiritual and christian sense, (and that is the same as being true christians) as of old, proselytes were made Jews by circumcision of the flesh. Rom. ii. 28, 29. "For he is not a *Jew*, which is one outwardly; neither is that *circumcision* which is outward in the flesh: But he is a *Jew*, which is one inwardly; and *circumcision* is that *of the heart*, in the spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of God."

That circumcision of the heart is the same with conversion or turning from sin to God, is evident by Jer. iv. 1—4 "If thou wilt *return*, O Israel, *return unto me*. *Circumcise* yourselves to the Lord, and put away the foreskins *of your heart*." And Deut. x. 16. "*Circumcise* therefore the foreskin of your *heart*, and be no more stiffnecked." *Circumcision of the heart* is the same change of the heart that men experience in *repentance;* as is evident by Levit. xxvi. 41. "If their *uncircumcised hearts* be humbled, and they accept the punishment of their iniquity."

The change effected in *regeneration*, *repentance*, and *conversion*, is signified by *baptism*, as has been shewn; and so is *circumcision of the heart* signified by the same thing. None will deny that it was this internal circumcision, which of old was signified by external circumcision; nor will any deny, now under the New Testament, that inward and spiritual baptism, or the cleansing of the heart, is signified by external washing or baptism. But spiritual circumcision and spiritual baptism are the same thing; both being "putting off the body of the sins of the flesh;" as is very plain by Colos. ii. 11—13. "In whom also ye are circumcised, with the *circumcision* made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh, by the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in *baptism*, wherein also ye are risen with him," &c.

III. This inward change, called *regeneration* and *circumcision of the heart*, which is wrought in *repentance* and *conversion*, is the same with that spiritual RESURRECTION so often spoken of, and represented as *a dying unto sin, and a living unto righteousness.*—This appears with great plainness in that last cited place, Col. ii. "In whom also ye are circumcised, with the circumcision made without hands,—buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are *risen with him*, through the faith of the operation of God, &c. And you, being dead in your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he *quickened together with him;* having forgiven you all trespasses."

The same appears by Rom. vi. 3—5. "Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptised into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was *raised up from the dead* by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life," &c. ver. 11. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but *alive unto God*, through Jesus Christ our Lord." In which place also it is evident, and by the whole context, that this spiritual *resurrection* is that change in which persons are brought to habits of holiness and to the divine life, by which Dr. T. describes the thing obtained in being *born again*.

That a *spiritual resurrection* to a new, divine life, should be called a being *born again*, is agreeable to the language of scripture. So those words in the iid Psalm, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," are applied to Christ's *resurrection*, Acts xiii. 33. So in Col. i. 18. Christ is called the *first* BORN *from the dead;* and in Rev. i. 5. *The first* BEGOTTEN *of the dead.* The saints in their *conversion or spiritual resurrection, are risen with Christ, and are begotten and born with him.* 1 Pet. i. 3. "Who hath *begotten us again* to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible." This inheritance is the same thing with that KINGDOM of HEAVEN which men obtain by being *born again*, according to Christ's words to Nicodemus; and that same "inheritance of them that are sanctified," spoken of as what is obtained in true CONVERSION. Acts xxvi. 18. "To turn them (or convert them) from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sin, and inheritance among them that are sanctified, through faith that is in me." Dr. T.'s own words, in his note on Rom. i. 4. speaking of that place in the iid Psalm, are very worthy to be here recited. He observes how this is applied to Christ's *resurrection* and exaltation, in the New Testament, and then has this remark, 'note, begetting is conferring a new and happy state: A son is a person put into it. Agreeably to this, good men are said to be the sons of God, as they are the sons of the *resurrection to eternal life*, which is represented as a παλιγγενεσια, a being BEGOTTEN, OR BORN AGAIN, REGENERATED.' So that I think it is abundantly plain, that the *spiritual resurrection* spoken of in scripture, by which the saints are brought to a new divine life, is the same with that being *born again*, which Christ says is *necessary* for every one, in order to his seeing the kingdom of God.

IV. This change, of which men are the subjects when they are *born again and circumcised in heart*, when they *repent*, and are *converted*, and spiritually *raised from the dead*, is the same change which is meant when the scripture

speaks of making the HEART and SPIRIT NEW, or giving a *new heart and spirit.*

It is almost needless to observe, how evidently this is spoken of as *necessary* to salvation, and as the change in which are attained the habits of true virtue and holiness, and the character of a true saint; as has been observed of *regeneration, conversion, &c.* and how apparent it is, that the change is the *same.* Thus repentance (μετανοια) *the change of the mind,* is the same as being changed to a NEW mind, or a NEW heart and spirit. *Conversion* is the turning of the heart; which is the same thing as changing it so, that there shall be another heart, or a *new heart,* or a new spirit. To be *born again* is to be born *anew;* which implies a becoming NEW, and is represented as becoming *new born babes.* But none supposes it is the *body* that is immediately and properly new, but the *mind, heart, or spirit.* And so a *spiritual resurrection* is the resurrection of the spirit, or rising to begin a NEW existence and life, as to the *mind, heart,* or *spirit.* So that all these phrases imply having a *new heart,* and being *renewed in the spirit,* according to their plain signification.

When Nicodemus expressed his wonder at Christ declaring it necessary that a man should be *born again* in order to see the kingdom of God, or enjoy the privileges of the kingdom of the Messiah, Christ says to him, "Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things?" i. e. 'Art thou one who is set to teach others the things written in the law and the prophets, and knowest not a doctrine so plainly taught in your scriptures, that such a change is necessary to a partaking of the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom?" But what can Christ refer to, unless such prophecies as that in Ezek. xxxvi. 25—27? Where God, by the prophet, speaking of the days of the Messiah's kingdom, says, "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean.—A NEW HEART also will I give you, and a NEW SPIRIT will I put within you—and I will put my spirit within you." Here God speaks of having a *new heart and spirit,* by being *washed with water;* and receiving *the Spirit of God* as the qualification of God's people, that shall enjoy the privileges of the Messiah's kingdom. How much is this like the doctrine of Christ to Nicodemus, of being "born again of water, and of the spirit?" We have another like prophecy in Ezek. xi. 19.—Add to this, that regeneration, or a being born again, and the renewing (or making new) by the Holy Ghost, are spoken of as the same thing, Tit. iii. 5. "By the washing of REGENERATION and RENEWING of the Holy Ghost."

V. It is abundantly manifest, that being born again, spiritually rising from the dead to newness of life, receiving a new heart, and being renewed in the spirit of the mind, are the

same thing with that which is called "putting off the OLD MAN, and putting on the NEW MAN."

The expressions are equivalent; and the representations are plainly of the same thing. When Christ speaks of being *born again*, two births are supposed: a first and a second, an *old* birth and a *new* one: And the thing born is called *man*.—So what is born in the first birth is the *old man*: and what is brought forth in the *second birth*, is the *new man*. That which is born in the first birth (says Christ) is *flesh*: It is the *carnal man*, wherein we have borne the image of the *earthly Adam*, whom the apostle calls the *first man*. That which is born in the new birth, is *spirit*, or the spiritual and heavenly man: Wherein we proceed from Christ the *second man*, the *new man*, who is made a quickening spirit, and is the Lord from heaven, and the Head of the *new creation*.—In the new birth, men are represented as becoming *new-born babes*, which is the same thing as becoming *new men*.

And how apparently is what the scripture says of the spiritual resurrection of the Christian convert equivalent and of the very same import with putting off the *old man*, and putting on the *new man?* So in Rom. vi. the convert is represented as *dying* and being *buried with Christ;* which is explained in the 6th verse, by this, that the old man is crucified, that the body of sin might be destroyed." And in the 4th verse, converts in this change are spoken of as "rising to newness of life." Are not these things plain enough? The apostle in effect tells us, that when he speaks of spiritual death and resurrection, he means the same thing as "crucifying and burying the old man, and rising as a new man."

And it is most apparent, that spiritual circumcision, and spiritual baptism, and the spiritual resurrection, are all the same with "putting off the old man and putting on the new man." This appears by Colos. ii. 11, 12. "In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, *in putting off* the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in *baptism*; wherein also ye are risen with him." Here it is manifest that the spiritual circumcision, baptism, and resurrection, all signify that change wherein men "put off the body of the sins of the flesh." But that is the same thing, in this apostle's language, as "putting off the old man;" as appears by Rom. vi. 6. "Our old man is crucified that the body of sin may be destroyed." And that putting off the *old man* is the same with putting off the *body of sin*, appears further by Ephes. iv. 22—24. and Colos. iii. 8—10. As Dr. T. confesses, that to be *born again*, "is that wherein are obtained the habits of virtue, religion, and true holiness;" so how evidently is the same thing predicated of that change, which is called "putting off the old man, and putting on the new man?" Eph. iv. 22—24. "That

ye put off the old man, which is corrupt, &c. and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."

And it is most plain, that this putting off the old man, &c. is the very same thing with making the *heart and spirit new.* It is apparent in itself; the spirit is called *the man*, in the language of the apostle: it is called the *inward man*, and the *hidden man.* (Rom. vii. 22. 2 Cor. iv. 16. 1 Pet. iii. 4.) And therefore, putting off the *old man*, is the same thing with the removal of the *old heart;* and the putting on of the *new man*, is the receiving of "a new heart, and a new spirit." Yea, putting on the *new man* is expressly spoken of as the same thing with receiving "a new spirit, or being renewed in spirit, Eph. iv. 22—24. "That ye put off the old man—and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye put on the new man."

From these things it appears how unreasonable, and contrary to the utmost degree of scriptural evidence, is Dr. T.'s way of explaining the *old man*, and the *new man*,* as though thereby was meant nothing *personal;* but that by the *old man* was meant the *heathen state*, and by the *new man*, *the Christian dispensation*, or state of professing Christians, or the whole *collective body of professors of* Christianity, made up of Jews and Gentiles; when all the colour he has for it is, that the apostle once calls the Christian church a *new man.* (Eph. ii. 15.) It is very true, in the scriptures often, both in the Old Testament and the New, *collective bodies*, nations, peoples, and cities, are figuratively represented by *persons*: particularly the *church* of Christ is represented as *one* holy person, and has the same appellatives as a particular saint or believer; and so is called a "child, a son of God," (Exod. iv. 22. Gal. iv. 1, 2.) "a servant of God," (Isai. xli. 8, 9. and xliv. 1.) "The daughter of God, and spouse of Christ," (Psal. xlv. 10, 13, 14. Rev. xix. 7.) Nevertheless, would it be reasonable to argue, that such appellations as a "servant of God, a child of God," &c. are *always* or *commonly* to be taken as signifying only the *church* of God in general, or great collective bodies; and not to be understood in a *personal* sense? But certainly this would not be more unreasonable than to urge, that by the *old* and the *new man* as the phrases are mostly used in scripture, is to be understood nothing but the great collective bodies of Pagans and of Christians, or the heathen and the christian world, as to their *outward* profession, and the dispensation they are under. It might have been proper, in this case, to have considered the unreasonableness of that practice which our author charges on others, and finds so much fault with in them,† 'That they content themselves with a *few scraps* of scripture, which, though wrong understood,

* Page 149—153.—S. † Page 224.

they make the test of truth and the ground of their principles, in contradiction to the *whole tenor of revelation.*"

VI. I observe once more, it is very apparent, that "being born again," and *spiritually raised* from death to a state of new existence and life, having a "new heart created in us, being renewed in the spirit of our mind," and being the subjects of that change by which we "put off the old man and put on the new man," is the same thing with that which in scripture is called *being created anew*, or made *new creatures.*

Here, to pass over many other evidences which might be mentioned, I would only observe that the representations are exactly equivalent. These several phrases naturally and most plainly signify the same effect. In the first *birth* or generation, we are *created* or brought into existence; it is then the *whole man* first *receives being:* The soul is then *formed*, and then our bodies are "fearfully and wonderfully made, being curiously wrought by our Creator." So that a new-born child is a *new creature.* So, when a man is *born again, he is created again;* in that *new birth*, there is a *new creation;* and therein he becomes as a *new born babe*, or a NEW CREATURE. So, in a *resurrection*, there is a *new creation.* When a man is *dead*, that which was made in the first creation is destroyed: When that which was dead is *raised* to life, the mighty power of the Author of life is exerted the second time, and the subject restored to a new existence and a new life, as by a *new creation.* So giving a new heart is called CREATING *a clean heart*, Psal. li. 10. Where the word translated *create*, is the same that is used in the first verse in Genesis. And when we read in scripture of the *new creature*, the creature that is called NEW IS MAN; and therefore the phrase, *new man*, is evidently equipollent with *new creature;* and putting off the *old man*, and putting on the *new man*, is spoken of expressly as brought to pass by a work of *creation.* Col. iii. 9, 10. "Ye have put off the old man—and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him that *created* him." So Eph. iv. 22—24. "That ye put off the old man, which is corrupt, &c. and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye put on the new man, which after God is *created* in righteousness and true holiness." These things absolutely fix the meaning of 2 Cor. v. 17. "If any man be in Christ, he is a *new creature:* Old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new."

On the whole, the following reflections may be made:

1. That it is a truth of the utmost certainty, with respect to *every* man born of the race of Adam by ordinary generation, *that unless he be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.* This is true not only of the heathen, but of them that are born of the professing people of God, as Nicodemus, and the Jews, and every man *born of the flesh.* This is most man-

ifest by Christ's discourse in John iii. 3—11. So it is plain by 2 Cor. v. 17. "That every man who is in Christ, is a NEW CREATURE."

2. It appears from this, together with what has been proved above, that it is most most certain with respect to *every* one of the human race, that he can never have any interest in Christ, or see the kingdom of God, unless he be the subject of that CHANGE in the temper and disposition of his heart, which is made in repentance and conversion, circumcision of heart, spiritual baptism, dying to sin, and rising to a new and holy life; and unless he has the old heart taken away, and a new heart and spirit given, and puts off the old man, and puts on the new man, and old things are passed away, and all things made new.

3. From what is plainly implied in these things, and from what the scripture most clearly teaches of the nature of them, it is certain, that *every* man is *born* into the world in a state of *moral pollution.* For SPIRITUAL BAPTISM is a cleansing from moral filthiness. (Ezek. xxxvi. 25. compared with Acts ii. 16. and John iii. 5.) So the washing of regeneration, or the NEW BIRTH, is a change from a state of wickedness. (Tit. iii. 3—5.) Men are spoken of as purified in their regeneration. (1 Pet. i. 22, 23. See also 1 John ii. 29. and iii. 1, 3.) And it appears that every man in his first or natural state is a *sinner;* for otherwise he would then need no REPENTANCE nor CONVERSION, no turning from sin to God. And it appears that every man in his original state has a *heart of stone;* for thus the scripture calls that *old heart*, which is taken away, when a NEW HEART, and NEW SPIRIT is given. (Ezek. ix. 19. and xxxvi. 26.) And it appears that man's nature, as in his native state, is *corrupt according to the deceitful lusts*, and of its own motion exerts itself in nothing but *wicked deeds.* For thus the scripture characterises the OLD MAN, which is put off when men are renewed in the spirit of their minds, and put on the NEW MAN. (Eph. iv. 22—24. Col. iii. 8—10.) In a word it appears that man's nature, as in its native state, is a *body of sin* which must *be destroyed*, must *die*, *be buried*, *and never rise more.* For thus the OLD MAN is represented, which is *crucified*, when men are the subjects of a spiritual RESURRECTION. Rom. vi. 4—6. Such a nature, such a body of sin as this, is put off in the spiritual RENOVATION, wherein we put on the NEW MAN, and are the subjects of the spiritual CIRCUMCISION. EPH. iv. 21—23.

It must now be left with the reader to judge for himself, whether what the scripture teaches of the APPLICATION of Christ's redemption, and the *change* of state and nature necessary to true and final happiness, does not afford clear and abundant evidence to the truth of the doctrine of *original sin.*

PART IV.

CONTAINING ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the OBJECTION, *That to suppose Men* BORN IN SIN, *without their Choice, or any previous Act of their own, is to suppose what is inconsistent with the Nature of* SIN.

SOME of [illegible] ns made against the doctrine of original sin, whic[illegible] ence to particular arguments used in defence of it, h[illegible] sidered in the handling of those argument[illegible] nat [illegible] erefore now consider, are such objections as I have [illegible] a occasion to notice.

There is no argume[illegible] sists more upon, than that which is taken from the [illegible] d Pelagian notion of freedom of will, consisting in the will's *self-determination*, as necessary to the being of moral good or evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, then *sin* must be *natural* to us; and if natural, then *necessary;* and if necessary, then *no* sin, nor any thing we are blameable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help: And he urges, that sin must proceed from our own *choice*, &c.*

Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of freedom of will as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favoúrite point with Pelagians and Arminians, and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion: On the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a *needless* task for me particularly to consider that matter in this place; having already largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this

* Page 125, 128—130, 186—188, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 258. 63, 64, 161. S. and other places.

notion, and the arguments used to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the reader.* It is very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerne ing this point should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined: For without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist about many of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of *freedom* consisting in the *self-determining power of the will*, as necessary to *moral agency*, and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines concerning *original sin*, the *sovereignty* of grace, *election*, *redemption*, *conversion*, the *efficacious operation* of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving *faith*, *perseverance* of the saints, and other principles of the like kind. However, at the same time, I think this will be as strong a fortress for the Deists, in common with them; as the great doctrines subverted by their notion of *freedom*, are so plainly and abundantly taught in the scripture. But I am under no apprehensions of any danger which the cause of christianity or the religion of the reformed is in, from any possibility of *that notion* being ever established, or of its being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold *demonstration* lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless for me to enter into a particular disquisition of this point here; from which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of consulting what I have already written. And as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.

I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross *inconsistencies* that Dr. T. has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the doctrine of original sin. In places which have been cited, he says, that "sin must proceed from our own choice:" And that "if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it cannot be our fault, or what we are to blame for: And therefore all our sins must be chargeable on our choice, which is the cause of sin:" For he says, "the cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it."† Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly insists, that nothing can be *sinful*, or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from our

* In vol I. of this edition. † Page 128.

the sin in the world? It must not come *necessarily*, without men's choice; for if so, it is *not* sin, nor is there any *disobedience* in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a *disobedient will;* and so on, *in infinitum.* Otherwise it must be supposed that there is some *sin* in the world which does not come from a *disobedient will:* contrary to our author's dogmatical assertions.

In p. 166. *S.* he says, "Adam *could not sin without a sinful inclination.*" Here he calls that inclination itself *sinful*, which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the *disobedient will* from whence all sin comes: And he allows*, that "the *law* reaches to all the "*latent principles* of sin;" meaning plainly, that it *forbids* and *threatens punishment* for those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all proceed from a *sinful choice;* because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without them. So that the *first* latent principles and inclinations from whence all sinful acts proceed, are *sinful;* and yet they are *not sinful*, because they do not proceed from a *wicked choice*, without which, according to him, "nothing can be sinful."

Dr. T. speaking of that proposition of the *assembly of divines*, wherein they assert that *man is by nature utterly corrupt*, &c.† thinks himself well warranted by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions to say, "Therefore sin is not natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the *assembly of divines* is FALSE." But it may be worthy of consideration whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the *Assembly's* proposition with *falsehood*, to have taken care that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to them, should be a little more *consistent;* that he might not have contradicted *himself*, while contradicting them; lest some impartial judges, observing his inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance, that "they should not scruple to say, Dr. T.'s doctrine is FALSE."

* Contents of Rom. chap. vii. in Notes on the epistle. † Page 125.

positive influence at all: And that it was thus in fact that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in him, and falling with him.*

* The sentiment contained in this paragraph, and illustrated in the following part of this chapter, is of the utmost importance, in order not only to remove Pelagian prejudices, and the cavils of modern philosophers, but also to give a just and consistent view of the nature and cause of sin; the cause of all sin, in general, and original sin in particular. Our author's explanation, which immediately follows, both in the text and in the note, is ingenious, and in some respects quite satisfactory. But a brief representation of the same result in another way, may demand some attention.

1. It is probably more philosophical, as well as more intelligible, in describing the two kinds of principles, as the author calls them, possessed by Adam, to say, that the *inferior* ones were, THOSE FACULTIES IN MAN WHICH CONSTITUTED HIM A MORAL AGENT; rather than calling them "the principles of *mere human nature*." The *superior* ones are very accurately described; but instead of calling them "*supernatural principles*;" they may more properly be termed, DIVINE BENEVOLENT, SOVEREIGN INFLUENCE, SUPERADDED TO THOSE FACULTIES WHICH CONSTITUTED ADAM A MORAL AGENT. This representation leads to the essential relations that subsist between God and his creature man. "Mere human nature," and "supernatural principles" convey no distinctive character of relation. "Faculties which constitute a moral agent," express the *ground of relation* between *equity* in God and *accountableness* in man; and "benevolent influences," express the *ground of relation* between *sovereignty* in God and *passiveness* in man.

2. That Adam had such qualifications or faculties as rendered him a *moral agent*, independently of his spiritual knowledge, righteousness, holiness, dominion, honour and glory—in other words, his divine light, holy life, and supreme love to God—is self-evident. For *after* he had lost these excellencies, he was confessedly no less a moral agent, and accountable to his divine Governor and Judge for his temper, thoughts, desires, words and works, than he was *before* he lost them.

3. The *philosophical cause*, or the *true origin* of Adam's defection was his *liberty* in union with his *passive power*. For an explanation of these terms, and the proof of the proposition just laid down, we must refer the reader to our *notes* on the first volume of this work, where the subject is professedly discussed.

4. The true and ultimate *cause* of the first sin of Adam, of all his subsequent sins, and those of his posterity, whether infants or adults, is not essentially different. If the principles, as our author calls them, or the faculties and qualifications which constitute moral agency and accountability, be left to themselves—whereby they become influenced by passive power, not counteracted by sovereign, benevolent, or holy divine influence—the effect will be the same, though attended with different circumstances.

5. When the cause of Adam's integrity, perfection, spirituality, and happiness, or his paradisical life, was no longer operative for his preservation, defection ensued; which consisted in the loss of the chief good, together with that disorder, confusion, and a conscious exposedness to a continuance in that state, whereby happiness was necessarily exchanged for a restless uneasiness called misery.

6. This was the case of Adam in his own person. But our author, in the next chapter, excellently shows, that Adam and all his posterity were strictly *one*. This union we may call a *systematic whole*. For mankind, or the whole race of man, has a *constituted connection* no less than a seed with its plant; for instance, the acorn with the oak-plant, and that with its future branches. We justly called it the *same tree* from the time it was planted to its utmost longevity, though some of its branches came into existence a hundred years or more after the first shoot. This union of Adam with his posterity, is no less a *constituted union*, than that which connects the solar system; or any other inferior systematic whole, as an animal body, which is regarded as *one* from its birth till its death. For instance, nothing but a *constitution* founded in the sovereign pleasure of God, caused the body of Methuselah to be the *same*, or *regarded* as the same, when in infancy, and above nine hundred years after. The parts of his body, at least most of them, were as different in old age, compared with his infancy, as any of his posterity are

was an *inferior* kind, which may be called NATURAL, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with

such as is any thing properly *positive*." But however just this remark, there is reason to fear that many beside Dr. TAYLOR have imbibed a notion of original sin considerably different from what is here asserted. It is not improbable that the *terms* by which the evil has been commonly expressed without a due examination of the idea intended, have had no small influence to effect this. The frequent use of such analogical and allusive terms as *pollution*, *defilement*, *corruption*, *contamination*, and the like, seems to intimate something positive; as these expressions in their original meaning convey an idea of something *superadded* to the subject. Whereas other terms, though equally analogical and allusive, imply no such thing; such as *disorder*, *discord*, *confusion*, and the like. We do not mean to condemn the use of the former, or to recommend the latter to their exclusion, but only design to caution from a *wrong inference* from a frequent use of them.

12. On the subject of the *imputation* of Adam's offence to his posterity, our author, in the next chapter, has treated very ably and fully. But we may here observe, that it is of the greatest importance to have just views of what is called *original guilt*. It is to be feared that many form very confused notions of the subject, when it is said, "we are all *guilty* when born," or "we are all *guilty* of Adam's transgression," or "the *guilt* of Adam's offence is ours." Though we conceive these and similar propositions to be expressive of an important truth, yet we are no less liable to be led astray from the true idea referred to by these expressions, than by others employed to represent moral depravity.

13. It may contribute to a clearness of conception on the subject, if we keep in mind that Adam was *guilty* by his first offence, under a two-fold consideration. He was *guilty* of a breach of law considered as a *rule* of rectitude, and of the same law as a *covenant* enjoining the observance of a special duty, which was the avowed and express condition of it. The performance of the condition was to secure not merely moral purity and innocence, but also the favour, or gracious benefit, which he possessed on the footing of a sovereign grant. This was his *federal privilege*. Now by the transgression of the law, considered as a *covenant*, this *favour* was forfeited; and for God to treat him as one deprived of this favour, is the *same thing* as to treat him as *guilty*. For how could he be treated otherwise, when the very condition on which he retained the favour was broken.

14. Whatever Adam possessed beyond those considerations which constituted him a moral agent, was the fruit of *sovereign benevolence*. Hence arises the propriety of regarding the possession of his privilege, on the observance of a specified condition, under the term *covenant*. For if Adam possessed some *spiritual principles*, or *benevolent influences*, as a person possesses immunities and privileges by *charter* for himself and his heirs; and if these chartered benefits be retained on *condition* of not offending in a specified manner; it follows, that a *privation* of such benefits belongs as much to the heirs as to the individual offending. But if they are treated for breach of such covenant, or charter held on condition, as persons included in the forfeiture, it is manifest they are regarded *so far guilty*, or *worthy to suffer* such loss.

15. From these considerations it follows, that Adam's breach of law as a *rule*, which brought *guilt* upon him as an *individual*, is not the guilt imputable to his posterity. During his long life, no doubt he was guilty of innumerable offences after the first transgression, but not one of these is imputed to us; the reason is, that after he broke the condition of the charter, he stood upon the bare ground of personal moral obligation. But personal guilt, on such ground, cannot in *equity* be transferred from one to another. The sins of the father, whether the first father or any other, considered merely as a *personal* deviation from rectitude, or a breach of moral obligation, cannot be imputed to the children.

16. What Adam therefore suffered for breach of covenant, was a privation of chartered benefits. The unavoidable effect of this was DEATH; a privation of spiritual life—which continued is death eternal—and a privation of that protection and care which would have preserved from temporal death. There seems little room to doubt, that even the corporeal or elementary part of Adam, underwent a great change by the fall. However, having forfeited his charter of preservation

pend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God's spirit: Which though withdrawn, and man's nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man's nature, as such, being entire without these divine *principles*, which the scripture sometimes calls SPIRIT, in contradistinction to *flesh*. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man's nature. When man sinned and broke God's covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: For indeed God then left him; that communion with God on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man, and continue by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption and ruin; nothing but *flesh* without *spirit*. The inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, *of course* became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a *fatal catastrophe*, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up *himself*, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of GOD. These inferior principles are like *fire* in a house; which we say is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honour, separate interests, and private pleasure, which before was *wholly subordinate* unto love to God and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to God's honour, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when *against* God's honour and law, as when *agreeable* to them. God still continuing strictly to require *supreme* regard to himself, and forbidding all undue

ful grace, without God being the author of that *continuance* and prevalence of sin; then, by parity of reason, may the *being of sin* in the race of Adam, be in consequence of God's disposal by his withholding that grace which is needful to prevent it, without his being the author of *sin.*

If here it should be said, that God is not the author of sin, in giving up to sin those who have already made themselves sinful, because when men have once made themselves sinful, their continuing so, and sin prevailing in them, and becoming more and more habitual, will follow *in a course of nature;* I answer, let that be remembered which this writer so greatly urges, in opposition to them who suppose original corruption comes in a course of nature, *viz. That the course of nature is nothing without God.* He utterly rejects the notion of the "*course of nature's* being a proper active cause, which will work, and go on by itself, *without God*, if he lets or permits it."* But affirms, "That the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is *no cause* or *nothing;* and that the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at first produce itself, is *absolutely impossible.*" These strong expressions are his. Therefore, to explain the continuance of the habits of sin in the same person, when once introduced, yea, to explain the very being of any such habits, in consequence of repeated acts, our author must have recourse to those same principles which he rejects as absurd to the utmost degree, when alleged to explain the corruption of nature in the posterity of Adam. For, that habits, either good or bad, should continue after being once established, or that habits should be settled and have existence in consequence of repeated acts, can be owing only to *a course of nature*, and those *laws of nature* which God has established.

That the posterity of Adam should be born without holiness, and so with a depraved nature, comes to pass as much by the *established course of nature*, as the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his holiness. For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an *established course of nature*, as much as the branches of a tree are, according to a *course of nature*, from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or (to make use of the comparison which Dr. T. himself chooses from time to time, as proper to illustrate the matter*) *just as the acorn is derived from the oak.* And I think, the acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the *course of nature*, as the buds and branches. It is true, that God, by his own almighty power, creates the *soul*

* Page 134. S. See also with what Vehemence this is urged in p. 137. S.
† Page 146, 187.

of the infant; and it is also true, as Dr. T. often insists, that God, by his immediate power, forms and fashions the *body* of the infant in the womb; yet he does both according to that *course of nature*, which he has been pleased to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated by late improvements in philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, *viz.* Nothing but the established order of the agency and Operation of the author of nature. And though there be the immediate agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in generation, yet it is done according to the method and order established by the author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak; and as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once has existence. God's immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being, is as ich according to an *established order*, as is his immediate icy in any of the works of nature whatsoever. It is agree- to the established order of nature, that the good qualities wanting in the *tree*, should also be wanting in the *branches* and *fruit*. It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when a particular person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he should continue without them till some new cause or efficiency produces them. And it is as much agreeable to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of mankind, the root of that great tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or if any dislike the word *nature*, as used in this last case, and instead of it choose to call it a *constitution*, or *established order* of successive events, the alteration of the name will not in the least alter the state of the present argument. Where the name, *nature*, is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.

If any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be thus according to an established course of *nature*, then why are not principles of holiness, when restored by divine *grace*, also communicated to *posterity?* I answer, The divine laws and establishments of the author of *nature*, are precisely settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. *Grace* is introduced among the race of man by a *new establishment;* not on the ground of God's original establishment, as the head of the natural world and author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind; wherein *Christ* is made the *root* of the tree whose branches are his spiritual *seed*, and he is the *head* of the *new creation;* of which I need not stand now to speak particularly.

But here I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only; it is also owing to the just *judgment* of

God. But yet I think, it is as truly and in the same manner owing to the course of *nature*, that Adam's posterity come into the world without original righteousness, as that Adam himself continued without it, after he had once lost it. That Adam continued destitute of holiness when he had lost it, and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer, was not only a *natural* consequence, according to the course of things established by God as the author of nature; but it was also a *penal* consequence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous *judgment*, continued to absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit which he before had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind: All are looked upon as *sinning* in and with their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the manner and order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.

On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men being born corrupt, that it makes him who *gave us our being*, to be the cause of the *being of corruption*, can have no more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that if men by a course of nature *continue* wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes him, who is *the cause of their* CONTINUANCE *in being*, and *the cause of the* CONTINUANCE *of the course of nature*, to be *the cause of their* CONTINUED *wickedness*. Dr. T. says,* "God would not *make* any thing that is *hateful* to him; because, by the very terms, he would *hate to make* such a thing." But if this be good arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God would not *continue* a thing in being that is *hateful* to him; because, by the very terms, he would *hate to continue* such a thing in being? I think the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these propositions, as the other. In like manner the rest that he says on that head may be shewn to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word *continue*, in the place of *make* and *propagate*. I may fairly imitate his way of reasoning thus: To say God *continues* us according to his own original decree, or law of *continuation*, which obliges him to *continue* us in a manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: For it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he would, but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in us; viz. *continuing* us sinful when he

* Page 136. S.

condemns us for *continuing* ourselves sinful." If the reasoning be *weak* in the one case, it is no less so in the other.

If any shall still insist, that there is a *difference* between God so disposing things, as that depravity of heart shall be *continued*, according to the settled course of nature, in the same person, who has by his own fault introduced it; and his so disposing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be *born* with depravity, in consequence of Adam's introducing of sin, by his act which he had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with: On this I would observe, that it is quite going off the objection which we have been upon, from God's agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that *simply* for him, from whose agency the course of nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things as that we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin: But the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an agent so to dispose, *in this case*, and only in consequence of Adam's sin; it not being just to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. And this matter shall be particularly considered in answer to the next objection: to which I now proceed.

CHAP. III.

That great Objection against the imputation of Adam's sin to his Posterity, considered, that such imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his Posterity are not one and the same. With a brief Reflection subjoined of what some have supposed, of God imputing the Guilt of Adam's Sin to his Posterity, but in an infinitely less Degree, than to Adam himself.

That we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections against supposing the guilt of Adam's sin to be imputed to his posterity; I would premise some observations with a view to the right *stating* of the doctrine; and then shew its *reasonableness*, in opposition to the great clamour raised against it on this head.

I think it would go far towards directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: That God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being *one with him*. And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the *head* of the whole body, and the *root* of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with

all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.

From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all co-existed, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended at the same instant with the same alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a *constituted oneness or identity* of Adam and his posterity in this affair.

Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a *double guilt*, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The *guilt* a man has upon his soul at first existence, is one and simple, *viz.* the guilt of the original apostacy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as *two* things, *distinctly* imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed principle and appears in its consequent operations, is a *distinct and additional* guilt: But the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is *not* distinct from their guilt of Adam's first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil disposition or inclination of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had *double*, as for two distinct sins: One, the wickedness of his will in that affair; another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by it. His guilt was all truly from the act of his inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient *for*, and entirely amounting *to*, all that appeared in the act he committed.

The depraved disposition of Adam's heart is to be considered two ways. (1.) As the *first rising* of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of heart *continuing* afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came

by God's forsaking of him; which was a *punishment* of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.

In like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam's posterity. The *first existing* of a corrupt disposition, is not to be looked upon as sin *distinct* from their participation of Adam's first sin. It is as it were the *extended pollution* of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted *union* of the branches with the root; or the *inherence* of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the head in that first act. But the depravity of nature remaining as an *established principle* in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is a *consequence* and *punishment* of the first apostacy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The *first being* of an evil disposition in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to *approve* the sin of his first father, so far as to imply a full and perfect *consent* of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather *prior* to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to Adam's posterity, or rather, the *co-existence* of the evil disposition implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the *root* and *branches*, is a consequence of the *union* that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a *consequence* of the *imputation* of his sin; nay, is rather *antecedent* to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself.*

* My meaning in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose that Adam and all his posterity had *co-existed*, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of the body to the head, so as to constitute as it were *one* complex person, or *one* moral whole: So that by the law of union there should have been a *co-union* and *co-existence* in acts and affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as *one whole*, in the disposition and action of the head: as we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected as the head is affected; and the whole body concurs when the head acts. Now in this case, all the branches of mankind, by the constitution of nature and law of union, would have been affected just as Adam, their common root, was affected. When the Heart of the root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of all the branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the branches; and when the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like manner would it have fared with all the branches; and when the root, in consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been

The first existence of an evil disposition, amounting to a full consent to Adam's sin, no more infers God being the

the same with all the branches; and as new guilt on the soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution and depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. Now, difference of the *time* of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in the same order, any more than difference of *place* in a co-existence of time.

Here may be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some things that are said by STAPFERUS, an eminent divine of *Zurich*, in *Switzerland*, in his *Theologia Polemica*, published about fourteen years ago;—in *English* as follows. "Seeing all Adam's posterity are derived from their first parent, as their root, the whole of the human kind, with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole, or one mass; so as not to be properly distinct from its root; the posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the branches from the tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the root sinned, all that which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the root, but one with it."—*Tom.* i. Cap. 3. § 856. 57.

"It is objected against the imputation of Adam's sin, that we never committed the same sin with Adam, neither in number nor in kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the *physical act* itself which Adam committed, and the *morality* of the action and *consent* to it. If we have respect only to the external act, to be sure it must be confessed that Adam's posterity did not put forth their hands to the forbidden fruit: In which sense, that act of transgression and that fall of Adam cannot be *physically* one with the sin of his posterity. But if we consider the *morality* of the action, and what *consent* there is to it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity committed the *same* sin, both in number and in kind, inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For where there is consent to a sin, there the same sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his posterity constitute but *one moral person*, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law, both in number and in kind. Therefore this reasoning avails nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin of Adam to all mankind, or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason mentioned, we may rather argue thus. The sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore the sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity."—*Id.* Tom. iv. cap. 16. § 60, 61.

The imputation of Adam's first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were *like himself;* and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very laws of nature; therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute Adam's sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity *like himself*, and to *impute* his sin to them is one and the same thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter. Our *adversaries* contend with us chiefly on this account, that according to our doctrine of original sin, such an *imputation* of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native *corruption*, esteems all Adam's posterity as *guilty*, and holds them as liable to condemnation, *purely* on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they without any respect had to *their own sin*, and so, as *innocent* in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to shew, that they do *injuriously* suppose those things to be *separated* in our doctrine which are *by no means* to be separated. The whole of the controversy they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the *mediate* and the *immediate* imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as *immediate* and abstractedly from the *mediate;* when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered *separately* from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any

Adam and his posterity as *one*, I would make the following observations.

I. It signifies nothing to exclaim against plain *fact*. Such is the *fact*, the most evident and acknowledged *fact*, with respect to the state of all mankind, without exception of one individual among all the natural descendants of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his posterity as *one*, in reference to his apostacy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has been demonstrated, and shewn to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating God's holy law, (if they ever live to act at all as moral agents) and being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin.* And God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as *one* with their first father and so treats them as *sinful* and *guilty* by his apostacy; or (which will not mend the matter) he, *without* viewing them as at all concerned in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly *innocent*, subjects them nevertheless to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by his sin was exposed to the *calamities and sorrows of this life*, to *temporal death and eternal ruin;* as is confessed. And it is also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come into the world in such a state, as that the certain consequence is their being *exposed*, and *justly* so, to the *sorrows of this life*, to *temporal death and eternal ruin*, unless saved by grace. So that we see, God *in fact* deals with them together, or as *one*. If God orders the consequences of Adam's sin, with regard to his posterity's welfare—even in those things which are most important, and which in the highest degree concern their eternal interest—to be the *same* with the consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as *one* in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with difficulty, *fact* obliges us to *get over* it, either by finding out some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in other innumerable cases, where apparent and undeniable *fact*, in God's works of creation and providence, is attended with events and circumstances, the *manner* and *reason* of which are difficult to our understandings.—But to proceed.

II. We will consider the *difficulties* themselves, insisted on in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: *First*, That such a constitution is *injurious* to Adam's posterity. *Secondly*, That it is altogether *improper*, as it im-

* Part I. Chap. I. the three first sections.

plies *falsehood*, viewing and treating those as one, which indeed are not one, but entirely *distinct*.

FIRST *difficulty*. That appointing Adam to stand, in this great affair, as the moral *head* of his posterity, and so treating them as *one* with him, as standing or falling with him, is *injurious* to them. To which I answer, it is demonstrably *otherwise;* that such a constitution was so far from being *injurious* to Adam's posterity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, attended with a more eligible *probability* of a *happy* issue than the latter would have been; And so is a constitution that truly expresses the *goodness* of its Author. For,

1. It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as *likely*, on account of his capacity and natural talents, to *persevere in* obedience, as his posterity, (taking one with another) *if* they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his posterity, and that he stood as a public person or common head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.

2. There was a *greater tendency* to a happy issue in such an appointment, than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam had *stronger motives to watchfulness* than his posterity would have had; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his posterity: (2) Adam was in a state of complete *manhood* when his trial began. *It* was a constitution very agreeable to the *goodness* of God, considering the state of mankind, which was to be propagated in the way of generation, that their *first father* should be appointed to stand for all. For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state of *infancy*, and their coming so gradually to *mature* state, and so remaining for a great while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after they were become moral agents, they would be *less fit* to stand for themselves, than their first father to stand for them.

If any man, notwithstanding these things, shall say that for his own part, if the affair had been proposed to him, *he* should have *chosen* to have had his eternal interest trusted in *his own* hands: It is sufficient to answer, that no man's vain opinion of himself, as *more fit* to be trusted than others, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves. Nor is it a just objection, that this constitution has in *event* proved for the *hurt* of mankind. For it does not follow, that no advantage was given for a *happy* event in such an establishment, because it was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other event.

3. The *goodness* of God in such a constitution with Adam appears in this: That if there had been no *sovereign gracious* establishment at all, but God had proceeded only on the basis of mere *justice*, and had gone no further than this required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they should perform *perfect perpetual obedience*, without ever failing in the least instance, on pain of *eternal death;* and might have made this demand *without* the *promise* of any positive *reward* for their obedience. For perfect obedience is a *debt*, that every one owes to his Creator; and therefore is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his debtor for discharging his just debt.—But such was evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the consequence of his preserving fidelity, to all such as were included within that constitution (of which the *tree of life* was a sign) as well as eternal death to be the consequence of his disobedience.—I come now to consider the

SECOND *difficulty*.—It being thus manifest that this constitution, by which Adam and his posterity are dealt with as *one*, is not unreasonable on account of its being *injurious* and *hurtful* to the interest of mankind, the only thing remaining in the objection against such a constitution is the *impropriety* of it, as implying *falsehood*, and contradiction to the true nature of things; as hereby they are viewed and treated *as one*, who are *not* one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered is not true.

This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call *sameness* or *oneness*, among created things; and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the *degree*, in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the supreme Author and Disposer of the universe.

Some things are *entirely distinct*, and *very diverse*, which yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, that by virtue of that establishment, they are in a sense *one*. Thus a *tree*, grown great, and a hundred years old, is *one* plant with the little *sprout*, that first came out of the ground from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant succession; though it is now so exceeding *diverse*, many thousand times bigger, and of a very different form and perhaps not one atom the very same: Yet God, according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same qualities, and most important properties, as if it were *one*. It has been his pleasure to constitute an union in these respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to

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to look upon all as one.—So the *body* of *man* at forty years of age, is one with the *infant-body* which first came into the world, from whence it grew; though now constituted of different substances, and the greater part of the substance probably changed several (if not hundreds) of times: And though it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the course of nature which he has been pleased to establish, has ordained that in a certain method it should communicate with that *infantile* body, in the same life, the same senses, the same features, and many the same qualities, and in union with the same soul; and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt with by him as *one* body. Again the *body* and *soul* of a man are one, in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse as can be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine constitution, or law of nature, which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become one, in most important respects; a wonderful mutual communication is established;-so that both become different parts of the *same man*. But the union and mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated and limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution he has been pleased to establish.

And if we come even to the *personal identity* of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist *wholly* in what Mr. LOCKE supposes, i. e. *Same consciousness;* yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But it is evident, that the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator.—If any should here insist that there is no need of having recourse to any such *constitution*, in order to account for the continuance of the *same consciousness;* and should say, that the very *nature* of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for it, its ideas and consciousness being retained, according to the *course of nature:* Then let it be remembered, who it is that gives the soul this nature; and let that be remembered, which *Dr.* T. says of the course of nature, before observed; denying, that "the course of nature is a proper active cause, which will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it;" saying, "that the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing; and affirming, that "it is absolutely impossible, the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than produce itself:* and

* Page 134. S

that God, the original of all being, is the *only cause* of all natural effects.*" Here is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. TURNBULL says of the laws of nature, as cited from Sir Isaac Newton.† "It is the will of the mind that is the *first cause*, that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those *laws*, who is the *efficient cause* that produces the *phænomena*, which appear in analogy, harmony and agreement, according to these *laws*." And, "the same principles must take place in things pertaining to *moral*, as well as natural philosophy.‡"

From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of *consciousness* depends wholly on a law of *nature;* and so, on the sovereign *will* and *agency of* GOD. And therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine *constitntion;* and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness of substance requisite. For, if same consciousness be *one thing* necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's sovereign *constitution*, it will still follow, that personal identity depends on God's sovereign *constitution.*

And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its duration, I think we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute, independent identity of the FIRST BEING, whereby he is *the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.* Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated, that even this oneness of created substance existing at different times, is a merely *dependent* identity; dependent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of him who *worketh all in all.* This will follow from what is generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all things, and gave them being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them in being. This being a matter of considerable importance, it may be worthy here to be considered with a little attention. Let us inquire therefore, in the first place, whether it be not evident, that God does continually, by his immediate power, *uphold* every created substance in being; and then let us see the *consequence.*

That God does, by his immediate power, *uphold* every created substance in being, will be manifest, if we consider that their present existence is a *dependent* existence, and therefore is an *effect* and must have some *cause;* and the cause must be one of these two; either the *antecedent existence* of the same substance, or else the *power* of the *Creator.* But it cannot be the *antecedent existence* of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the *moon*, at this present

* Page 140. S. † Mor. Phil. p. 7. ‡ Ibid. p. 9.

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[illegible] cannot be the *effect* of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a *time and place in which itself is not.* It is plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, *when* and *where* it is not existing. But the moon's past existence was neither *where* nor *when* its present existence is. In point of *time*, what is *past* entirely ceases when *present* existence begins; otherwise it would not be *past*. The past moment has ceased, and is gone when the present moment takes place; and no more *co-exists* with it, than any other moment that had ceased twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the particles of this *moving body* produce effects in any *other place*, than where it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in every point of it, is in a different *place* from where its existence was at the last preceding moment. From these things I suppose it will certainly follow, that the present existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so to speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space or duration, though ever so near one to another, do not at all *co-exist* one with the other; and therefore are as truly different effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder. And the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age before, or at a thousand miles distance, without any existence to fill up the intermediate time or space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the effect of the *immediate* agency, will, and power of GOD.

If any shall insist upon it, that their present existence is the effect or consequence of past existence, according to the *nature* of things; that the established *course of nature* is sufficient to *continue* existence once given; I allow it. But then it should be remembered, *what* nature is in created things; and *what* the established *course* of nature is; that, as has been observed already, *it is nothing, separate from the agency of God;* and that, as Dr. T. says, GOD, *the original of all being, is the* ONLY *cause of all natural effects.* A father, according to the course of nature, begets a child; an oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud; so according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present existence. In the one case, and the other, the new effect is consequent on the former, only by the *established laws* and *settled course of nature;* which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of GOD, according to a *constitution* that

he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, according to what our author urges; as the child and the acorn which come into existence according to the *course of nature*, in consequence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the oak, are truly *immediately* created by God; so must the existence of each created person and thing, at each moment, be from the immediate *continued* creation of God. It will certainly follow from these things, that God's *preserving* of created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a *continued creation*, or to his creating those things out of nothing at *each moment* of their existence. If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on God's preservation, then those things would drop into *nothing*, upon the ceasing of the present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to cause them to exist in the following moment.* If

* The CHRISTIAN OBSERVER, (Vol. V. p. 177.) in reviewing a sermon entitled, "Predestination to Life," remarks: "It may be allowed (though even this is not to us in the sense formerly explained, a *self-evident* proposition) that all created nature, as such, tends to nihility. Since it sprung out of nothing, only through the intervention of Almighty Power, it must certainly relapse into nothing when the intervening power is removed. Since it became something only during the pleasure of another, it will cease to be something when left to itself. But it is not so apparent, why that which never subsisted but in a state of virtue and purity, should of itself have a tendency to subsist in any other state; or why, when left to itself, if it continue at all, it should not continue in that state in which it was left."—But, in p. 186, he *retracts* what he first said, in the following very singular *note*: "The preceding sheet was printed off before we perceived that we had expressed ourselves at p. 177, col. 2. in language which may be construed into an admission of the truth of the doctrine maintained by Dr. WILLIAMS, as it respects the necessary tendency of all created nature to *nihility*. In a *popular* sense, indeed, it may perhaps be said (though the proposition will be found 'to fill the ear rather than the mind') that what sprung out of nothing at the pleasure of another, must again become nothing when left to itself; and, for the sake of shortening the discussion, we were willing to concede thus much. We must at the same time confess that *we do not quite understand* the position, that *created beings tend to nihility*; and we leave it to our readers to judge whether there be much more meaning in saying that "what *is* tends *not to be*," than in saying "that what *is not* tends *to be*;" or, in other words, whether a tendency to *annihilation* in that which *exists*, be at all more conceivable, than a tendency to *become existent* in that which *exists not*."

How far the writer had any good reason for *retracting* what he first asserted, and thereby *opposing* the sentiments, not only of the author he reviews, but of *nearly all* the divines that ever have written upon providence, let the reader judge by a careful perusal of this chapter. We are not ignorant of what Bishop BURNET says on this head, (Art. 1. p. 30. 3d Ed.) but are well satisfied his notion is as incapable of being supported by sound reason, as it was *novel*; and as little calculated to support the cause of *piety* as any one opinion he advances, in his undecisive and latitudinarian exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles. (See particularly Art. ix. on Original Sin.) For what can be a more heterodox opinion, or more full of horrid *impiety*, if traced to its just consequences, than the sentiment advanced by that Bishop, and by the CHRISTIAN OBSERVER! though we are far from supposing that either the one or the other *foresaw* those consequences. The best excuse we can form for this writer is, that "he *does not quite understand the position*" against which he writes. *This record*, we believe, *is true*; and is equally applicable to *several other* positions in that article. But then the public expects from a *Reviewer* a comprehensive acquaintance with the subject which he

there be any who own that God *preserves* things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in being without any further help from him, after they once have existence; I think, it is hard to know what they mean. To what purpose can it be, to talk of God *preserving* things in being, when there is *no need* of his preserving them? Or to talk of their being *dependent* on God for continued existence, when they would of themselves continue to exist, without his help; nay, though he should wholly withdraw his sustaining power and influence?

It will follow from what has been observed, that God's upholding of created substance, or causing of its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an *immediate production out of nothing*, at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is not merely in part from *God*, but wholly from him; and not in any part, or degree, from its *antecedent existence*. For, to suppose that its antecedent existence *concurs* with God in *efficiency*, to produce some *part* of the effect, is attended with all the very same absurdities, which have been shewn to attend the supposition of its producing it *wholly*. Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper influence or assistance in the affair: And consequently *God* produces the effect as much from *nothing*, as if there had been nothing *before*. So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only *circumstantially*; as, in *first* creation there had been no such act and effect of God's

criticises, instead of "a wood of words" and inconclusive declamations. However, he seems to be *notoriously deficient* in comprehending the *true state of the question*. A great part of that long article consists in *proving* what was *not denied*, and in *disproving* what was *never asserted*; with a goodly portion of *contradictory propositions*.

We might have expected, that an author who *studiously shuns the intricacies* of a subject which will, in his apprehension, "descend to posterity with all its difficulties on its head"—a subject, the *depth* of which "the sounding line of metaphysics will *never fathom*"—would have kept himself more free from embarrassments and *self-contradictions*. And it was also to be expected from one who professes to advocate the cause of *piety* and *practical* religion, that he should keep aloof from the *horrible* sentiment suggested by BURNET, in opposition to the *almost unanimous* verdict of all the pious and learned divines that ever lived. We almost shudder to draw the inference demonstrably implied in the sentiment—*That the world would continue in being, were there no God to uphold it!* When we say, that this is the just inference drawn from the sentiment held by the CHRISTIAN OBSERVER, we mean, by the individual *Reviewer* in question, whose critique disgraces that excellent work.

Aware, perhaps, that the author whose works we now publish was of the *same way of thinking*; or at least, that his works have *the same tendency* with what he opposes, he observes: "We are apt to think that the metaphysical cast which the celebrated Mr. EDWARDS gave to his writings in divinity, has to a certain degree produced an unfavourable effect on the minds of his followers." It would have been extremely difficult for this writer to point out any *preacher* who came closer to men's consciences, or any *writer* who more effectually promotes the interest of genuine, humble, holy, practical religion, than President EDWARDS; and the editors of his works are *fully conscious*, that what they publish tends, in the *most direct manner*, when duly considered and understood, to *essential truth*—to GOD; *of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.* W.

power *before;* whereas his giving existence afterwards, *follows* preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an established order.

Now, in the next place, let us see how the *consequence* of these things is to my present purpose. If the existence of created *substance*, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power in *that* moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of *nothing*, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a *new effect;* and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it and follows it according to a certain established method.* And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but

* When I suppose, that an effect which is produced every moment by a new action or exertion of power, must be a *new* effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which existed in preceding moments, what I intend may be illustrated by this example. The lucid colour or brightness of the *moon*, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a *permanent* thing, as though it were perfectly the same brightness continued. But indeed it is an effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point of time; and so becomes altogether a *new* effect at each instant; and no one thing that belongs to it is numerically the same that existed in the preceding moment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which cause the effect, are none of them the same: The impression made in each moment on our sensory, is by the stroke of *new* rays: And the sensation excited by the stroke is a new effect, an effect of a *new* impulse. Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the *sound* of the wind that blows now is individually the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before; which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more than the agitated *air*, that makes the sound, is the same; or than the *water* flowing in a river, that now passes by, is individually the same with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus with the brightness or colour of the moon, so it must be with its *solidity*, and every thing else belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a *new* exertion or application of power.

The matter may perhaps be in some respects still more clearly illustrated thus.—The *images* of things in a *glass*, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know, that these images are constantly *renewed*, by the impression and reflection of *new* rays of light; so that the image impressed by the former rays is constantly vanishing, and a *new* image impressed by *new* rays every moment, both on the glass and on the eye. The image constantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same, than if it were by some artist put on anew with a pencil, and the colours constantly vanishing as fast as put on. And the new images being put on *immediately* or instantly, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the intermission of an *hour* or a *day*. The image that exists this moment, is not at all *derived* from the image that existed the last preceding moment: for, if the succession of new *rays* be intercepted by something interposed between the object and the glass, the image immediately ceases; the *past existence* of the image has no influence to uphold it, so much as for one moment. Which shews, that the image is altogether new-made every moment; and strictly speaking, is in no part numerically the same with that which existed the moment preceding. And truly so the matter must be with the *bodies* themselves, as well as their images. They also cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency, or exertion of the powerful cause of their existence. If so, the existence caused is every instant a new effect, whether the cause be *light* or immediate *divine power*, or whatever it be.

for *that;* but all according to the *sovereign pleasure* of the fountain of all being and operation.

It appears, particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by virtue whereof *pollution* and *guilt* from *past* wickedness are derived, depends entirely on a *divine establishment.* It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime committed twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the world and for ever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such thing, and where, as *consciousness* of acts that are past; and for the continuance of all *habits*, either good or bad: And on this depends every thing that can belong to *personal identity.* And all communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties, or relations, natural or moral, from what is *past*, as if the subject were *one*, depends on no other foundation.

And I am persuaded that no solid reason can be given, why God—who constitutes all other created union or oneness according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects he pleases—may not establish a constitution whereby the natural *posterity* of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as *one* with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt*.

* I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial appearance and view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous judgment, whether on supposition that all mankind had *co-existed*, in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such an *union* between Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in that case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam's posterity had actually, according to the law of nature, some how *grown out of him*, and yet remained *contiguous* and literally *united to him*, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the *same time*, though in *different places*, as the head and members are in different places: In this case, who can determine that the author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such an *union* between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute *one* moral whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each *moral alteration*, and that the heart of every *branch* should at the same moment participate with the heart of the *root*, be conformed to it and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking, in its state, as a *part of the same thing?* Why might not God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of the various parts of such a *moral whole*, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, according to his sovereign pleasure? And if he might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such an union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different *places*, I do not see why he might not also do the same, though they exist in different *times*. I know not why succession, or diversity of *time*, should make any such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of *place*. The only reason why diversity of *time* can seem to make it unreasonable, is that difference of time shews there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those different times: But it shews this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the *place* of existence.

cumstances of the world of mankind; "all made of one blood to dwell on all the face of the earth," to be united and blended in society, and to partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of this lower world.

Dr. T. urges* that sorrow and shame are only for personal sin; and it has often been urged, that repentance can be for no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of *words* is very arbitrary: But that men's *hearts* should be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think is not in the least unreasonable. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that men should be *ashamed* of things done by *others*, in whom they are nearly concerned. I am sure it is not *unscriptural;* especially when they are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully consenting and concurring.

From what has been observed it may appear there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing for the race of mankind truly to partake of the *sin* of the first apostacy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become *their* sin; by virtue of a real *union* between the root and branches of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence) established by the author of the whole system of the universe; to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part of that system; and by virtue of the full *consent* of the hearts of Adam's posterity to that first apostacy. And therefore the sin of the apostacy is not theirs, merely because God *imputes* it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that *ground* God imputes it to them.

By reason of the established *union* between Adam and his posterity, the case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adam's race betwixt whom is no such constituted *union*: As between children and other ancestors. Concerning whom is apparently to be understood that place, Ezek. xviii. 1—20† where God reproves the Jews for the use they made of that proverb, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge;" and tells them, that hereafter they shall no more have occasion to use this proverb; and that if a *son* sees the wickedness of his *father*, and sincerely *disapproves* it and *avoids* it, and he himself is righteous, "he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; that all souls, both the soul of the father and the son are his, and that therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son; but the soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the righteousness of the

* Page 14. † Which Dr. T. alledges, p. 10, 11 S.

of any of his matters, and whose ways are past finding out"—will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions against the *justice* of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy word, concerning the derivation of depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity.

This is enough, one would think, for ever to silence such bold expressions as these—"If this be *just*,—if the *scriptures* teach such doctrine, &c. then the scriptures are of *no use*—understanding is *no* understanding,—and, *what* a GOD mus*the* be, that can thus *curse* innocent creatures!—Is *this* thy GOD, O *Christian!*"—&c. &c.

It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the *imputation* of Adam's sin) concerning the opinions of two divines, of no inconsiderable note among the dissenters in England, relating to a *partial imputation* of Adam's first sin.

One of them supposes, that this sin, though truly *imputed* to INFANTS, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper *punishment*, yet is not imputed to them in such a *degree*, as that upon this account they should be liable to *eternal* punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to *temporal death*, or *annihilation;* Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely *more guilty* by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe; that to suppose God imputes not *all* the guilt of Adam's sin, but only some *little part* of it, relieves nothing but one's *imagination.* To think of poor little *infants* bearing such torments for Adam's sin as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one's *reason.* There is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the *whole* of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in *part.* For all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the *imputation;* not the *quantity* or *degree of what is imputed.* If there be any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or communication of guilt from one that acted, to another that did not act; then it lies against *all* that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against imputing Adam's sin to his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this, That Adam and his posterity are not *one.* But this lies as properly against charging a *part* of the guilt as the whole. For Adam's posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a *little* of what was done than the whole. They were as absolutely free from being

Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are justly treated as sinners, truly guilty, and children of wrath, on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression; at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself.

CHAP. IV.

Wherein several other Objections are considered.

DR. T. objects against Adam's posterity being supposed to come into the world under a forfeiture of God's blessing, and subject to his curse through his sin,—That at the *restoration* of the world after the flood, God pronounced equivalent or greater *blessings* on Noah and his sons, than he did on Adam at his creation, when he said, "be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c.*—To this I answer in the following remarks.

1. As it has been already shewn, that in the threatening denounced for Adam's sin, there was nothing which appears inconsistent with the continuance of this present life for a season, or with *propagating* his kind; so for the like reason, there appears nothing in that threatening, upon the supposition that it reached Adam's posterity, inconsistent with enjoying the temporal blessings of the present life, as long as this is continued; even those temporal blessings which God pronounced on Adam at his first creation. For it must be observed, that the blessings which God pronounced on Adam when he created him, and before the trial of his obedience, were not the same with the blessings which were suspended on his obedience. The blessings thus suspended, were the blessings of *eternal life;* which, if he had maintained his integrity through his trial, would have been pronounced upon him *afterwards;* when God as his judge should have given him his reward. God might indeed, if he had pleased, *immediately* have deprived him of *life*, and of all temporal blessings given him before. But those blessings pronounced on him beforehand, were not the things for the obtaining of which his *trial* was appointed. These were *reserved* till the *issue* of his trial should be seen, and *then* to be

* See page 82, &c. N.

wrath of God, which had destroyed the rest of the world, and the world was as it were restored from a ruined state, there was a proper occasion to point to the *great salvation* to come by Christ: As it was a common thing for God, on occasion of some great *temporal* salvation of his people, or restoration from a low and miserable state, to renew the intimations of the great *spiritual* restoration of the world by *Christ's Redemption.** God deals with the generality of mankind in their present state, far differently, on occasion of the redemption by Jesus Christ, from what he otherwise would do: For, being capable subjects of saving mercy, they have a day of patience and grace, and innumerable temporal blessings bestowed on them; which, as the Apostle signifies (Acts xiv. 17.) are testimonies of God's reconcileableness to sinful men, to put them upon *seeking after God.*

But beside the sense in which the posterity of Noah in general partake of these blessings of *dominion over the creatures*, &c. Noah himself, and all such of his posterity as have obtained like precious *faith* with that exercised by him in offering his *sacrifice*, which made it a *sweet savour*, and by which it procured these blessings, have *dominion* over the creatures, through Christ, in a more excellent sense than Adam in innocency; as they are "made kings and priests unto God, and reign with Christ," and "all things are theirs," by a covenant of Grace. They partake with Christ in that "dominion over the beasts of the earth, the fowls of the air, and fishes of the sea," spoken of in the 8th Psalm; which is by the Apostle interpreted of Christ's dominion over the world, (1 Cor. xv. 27. and Heb. ii. 7.) And the time is coming, when the greater part of the posterity of Noah, and each of his sons, shall partake of this more honourable and excellent dominion over the creatures, through him "in whom all the families of the earth shall be blessed." Neither is there any need of supposing that these blessings have their most complete accomplishment, till many ages after they were granted, any more than the blessing on Japhet, expressed in those words, "God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem."

But that Noah's posterity have such *blessings* given them through the great Redeemer, who suspends and removes the *curse* which came through Adam's sin, surely is no argument, that they originally, as in their natural state, are not under the *curse.* That men have blessings *through grace*, is no evidence of their being not justly exposed to the curse *by nature;* but it rather argues the contrary. For if they did not deserve the curse, they would not depend on *grace and redemption* for

* It may be noted, that Dr. T. himself signifies it as his mind, that these blessings on Noah were on account of the *covenant of grace*, p. 84, 90, 91, 92, 8.

new existence, which shall be an exceeding miserable existence, by reason of exposedness to eternal ruin; then *his own* scheme must be supposed *contrary* to the attribute of God's goodness: For he supposes, that God will raise multitudes from the dead at the last day (which will be giving new existence to their bodies, and to bodily life and sense) in order only to their suffering eternal destruction.

4. Notwithstanding we are so sinful and miserable as we are by nature, yet we may have great reason to bless God, that he has given us our being under so glorious a dispensation of grace through Jesus Christ; by which we have a happy opportunity to be *delivered* from this sin and misery, and to obtain unspeakable eternal *happiness*. And because through our own wicked inclinations, we are disposed so to neglect and abuse this mercy, as to fail of final benefit by it, this is no reason why we ought not to be *thankful* for it, even according to our author's own sentiments. What (says he*) if *the whole world lies in wickedness*, and few therefore shall be saved? Have men no *reason* to be *thankful*, because they are wicked and ungrateful, and abuse their being and God's bounty? Suppose our own *evil inclinations* do withhold us, viz. from seeking after happiness, of which under the light of the gospel we are placed within the nearer and easier reach; "suppose the whole Christian world should lie in wickedness, and but few Christians should be saved, is it therefore certainly true, that we cannot reasonably *thank* God for the gospel?" Well, and though the *evil inclinations*, which hinder our seeking and obtaining happiness by so glorious an advantage, are what we are *born* with, yet if those inclinations are *our fault or sin*, that alters not the case; and to say they are *not* our sin, is still begging the question. Yea, it will follow from several things asserted by our author, that notwithstanding men are *born* in such circumstances as that they are under a very great improbability of ever becoming righteous, yet they may have reason to be thankful for their being. Thus particularly, Dr. T. asserts, that all men have reason of thankfulness for their being; and yet he supposes that the heathen world, taken as a collective body, were dead in sin, and could not deliver or help themselves, and therefore stood in necessity of the Christian dispensation. And not only so, but he supposes that the Christian world is now at length brought to the like deplorable and helpless circumstances, and needs a *new* dispensation for its relief. According to these things, the world in general, not only formerly but even at this day, are dead in sin, and helpless as to their salvation; and therefore the generality of them that are born into it, are much more likely to perish, than otherwise, till the *new* dispensation comes: And yet he supposes we all have reason to be thankful for our being. Yea, further still, I think ac-

* Page 72, 73. S.

no, or whether men are to be looked upon as one with him, and so partakers in his sin, is what in no respect tends to manifest either of these distinctions.

1. The *first* thing to be manifested, will be the *state* that each man is in, with respect to the *grand distinction* of the whole world of mankind into *righteous* and *wicked;* or, in metaphorical language, *wheat* and *tares;* or, the *children of the kingdom* of Christ, and the *children of the wicked one;* the latter, the head of the apostacy; but the former, the head of the restoration and recovery. The Judge, in manifesting this, will prove men's hearts by *their works*, in such as have had opportunity to perform any works in the body. The *evil works* of the children of the *wicked one* will be the proper manifestation and evidence or proof of whatever belongs to the general state of such; and particularly they will prove that they belong to the kingdom of the great deceiver, and head of the apostacy, as they will demonstrate the exceeding corruption of their nature, and full consent of their hearts to the common apostacy; and also that their hearts never relinquished the apostacy, by a cordial adherence to Christ, the great restorer. The Judge will also make use of the *good works* of the *righteous* to shew their interest in the redemption of Christ; as thereby will be manifested the sincerity of their hearts in their acceptance of, and adherence to the Redeemer and his righteousness. And in thus proving the state of men's hearts by their actions, the *circumstances* of those actions must necessarily come into consideration, to manifest the true *quality* of their actions; as, each one's talents, opportunities, advantages, light, motives, *&c.*

2. The other thing to be manifested, will be that *secondary distinction*, wherein particular persons, both righteous and wicked, differ from one another in the degree of secondary good or evil; the degree of evil fruit, which is additional to the guilt and corruption of the whole body of apostates and enemies; and the degree of personal goodness and good fruit, which is a secondary goodness, with respect to the righteousness and merits of Christ, which belong to all by that sincere faith manifested in all. Of this also each one's *works*, with their circumstances, opportunities, talents, &c. will be the proper evidence.

As to the nature and aggravations of the general apostacy by Adam's sin, and also the nature and sufficiency of the redemption by Jesus Christ, the great restorer, though both these will have vast influence on the eternal state which men shall be adjudged to, yet neither of them will properly belong to the trial men will be the subjects of at that day, in order to the manifestation of their state, wherein they are distinguished one from another. They will belong to the business of that

But whether it be so or not, although in both these places the word *impute* be applied to personal sin, and to the very act, or although this could be said of all the places which our author reckons up; yet that the word *impute* is never expressly applied to Adam's sin, does no more argue that it is not imputed to his posterity, than it argues that pride, unbelief, lying, theft, oppression, persecution, fornication, adultery, sodomy, perjury, idolatry, and innumerable other particular moral evils are never *imputed* to the persons that committed them, or in whom they are; because the word *impute*, though so often used in scripture, is never applied to any of these kinds of wickedness.

I know not what can be said here, except one of these two things: That though these sins are not expressly said to be *imputed*, yet *other* words are used that do as plainly and certainly *imply* that they are imputed, as if it were said so expressly. Very well, and so I say with respect to the imputation of Adam's sin. The thing meant by the word *impute*, may be as plainly and certainly expressed by using other words, as if *that* word were expressly used; and more certainly, because the words used instead of it, may amount to an explanation of this word. And this, I think, is the very case here. Though the word *impute* is not used with respect to Adam's sin, yet it is said, *all have sinned;* which, respecting infants, can be true only of their sinning by his sin. And, it is said, "by his disobedience many were made sinners;" and, "judgment and condemnation came upon all by that sin;" and that by this means *death*, the wages of sin, *passed on all men*, &c. Which phrases amount to full and precise explanations of the word *impute;* and therefore do more certainly determine the point really insisted on.

Or perhaps it will be said, with respect to those personal sins before-mentioned, *pride*, *unbelief*, &c. it is no argument they are not *imputed* to those who are guilty of them, that the very word *impute*, is not applied to them; for the *word* itself is *rarely* used; not one time in a hundred, and perhaps five hundred, of those wherein the thing meant is plainly implied, or may be certainly inferred. Well, and the same also may be applied likewise, with respect to Adam's sin.

It is probable Dr. T. intends an argument against original sin, by that which he says in opposition to what R. R. suggests of "children discovering the principles of iniquity, and seeds of sin, before they are capable of moral action,"* viz. That "little children are made *patterns* of humility, meekness and innocence." (Matth. xviii. 3. 1 Cor. xiv. 20. and Psal. cxxxi. 2.)

* Page 77, 78, 8.

what in him lies to prevent our seeking a remedy from that, which if not remedied in time, must bring us finally to shame and *everlasting contempt*, and end in perfect and remediless destruction hereafter.

Another objection, which some have made against this doctrine, much like the former, is, that it tends to "beget in us an ill opinion of our fellow-creatures, and so to promote ill-nature and mutual hatred.

To which I would say, if it be truly so, that we all come *sinful* into the world, then our heartily acknowledging it tends to promote humility: But our disowning that sin and guilt which truly belongs to us, and endeavouring to persuade ourselves that we are vastly better than in truth we are, tends to a foolish self-exaltation and pride. And it is manifest, by reason, experience, and the word of God, that pride is the chief source of all the contention, mutual hatred, and ill-will which are so prevalent in the world; and that nothing so effectually promotes the contrary tempers and deportments, as humility. This doctrine teaches us to think no worse of others than of ourselves: It teaches us that we are *all*, as we are by nature, companions in a miserable helpless condition; which under a revelation of the divine mercy, tends to promote mutual compassion. And nothing has a greater tendency to promote those amiable dispositions of mercy, forbearance, long-suffering, gentleness and forgiveness, than a sense of our own extreme unworthiness and misery, and the infinite need we have of the divine pity, forbearance and forgiveness, together with a hope of obtaining mercy. If the doctrine which teaches that mankind are corrupt by nature, tends to promote ill-will, why should not Dr. T.'s doctrine tend to it as much? For he teaches us, that the generality of mankind are very wicked, having made themselves so by their own free choice, without any necessity: which is a way of becoming wicked, that renders men truly worthy of resentment; but the other, not at all, even according to his own doctrine.

Another exclamation against this doctrine is, that it tends to "hinder comfort and joy, and to promote melancholy and gloominess of mind."*

To which I shall briefly say, doubtless, supposing men are really become sinful, and so exposed to the displeasure of God, *by whatever means*, if they once come to have their eyes opened, and are not very stupid, the reflection on their case will tend to make them sorrowful; and it is fit it should. Men with whom this is the case may well be filled with sorrow, till they are sincerely willing to forsake their sins, and turn to God. But there is nothing in this doctrine that in the least

* Page 231, and other some places.

it must be a *sin* to generate." But there is no appearance of evidence in that position, any more than in this: "So far as any is *upheld in existence* in sin, it is a *sin* to uphold them in existence." Yea, if there were any reason in the case, it would be strongest in the latter position: For parents, as Dr. T. himself observes, are not the authors of the beginning of existence: Whereas, God is truly the author of the *continuance* of existence. As it is the known will of God, to continue Satan and millions of others in being, though the most sure consequence is the continuance of a vast infernal world, full of everlasting hellish wickedness: so it is part of the revealed will of God, that this world of mankind should be continued, and the species propagated, for his own wise and holy purposes; which *will is complied with* by the parents joined in lawful marriage. Their children, though they come into the world in sin, yet are capable subjects of eternal holiness and happiness: Which infinite benefits for their children, parents have great reason to expect, in the way of giving up their children to God in faith, through a Redeemer, and bringing them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. I think this may be answer enough to such a cavil.

Another objection is, That the doctrine of original sin is no *oftener* and no more *plainly* spoken of in scripture; it being, if true, a very important doctrine. Dr. T. in many parts of his book suggests to his readers, that there are *very few texts* in the whole bible, wherein there is the least appearance of their teaching any such doctrine.

Of this I took notice before, but would here say further: That the reader who has perused the preceding defence of this doctrine, must now be left to judge for himself, whether there be any ground for such an allegation; whether there be not texts in sufficient number, both in the Old Testament and New, that exhibit undeniable evidence of this great article of christian divinity; and whether it be not a doctrine taught in the scripture with great plainness. I think there are few, if any, doctrines of revelation, taught more plainly and expressly. Indeed it is taught in an explicit manner more in the New Testament than in the Old. Which is not to be wondered at; it being thus with respect to all the most important doctrines of revealed religion.

But if it had been so, that this doctrine were but *rarely* taught in scripture; yet if we find that it is indeed declared to us by God, if held forth to us by *any* word of his; then what belongs to us, is to believe his word, and receive the doctrine which he teaches us; and not to prescribe to him how *often* he shall speak of it, and to insist upon knowing what reasons he has for speaking of it *no oftener*, before we will receive what he teaches us; or to pretend that he should give us an account

heaven;*—and that all were *sinners*, as well as those whose blood *Pilate* mingled with their sacrifices, *&c.* and that *every one who did not repent, should perish*;†—Withal directing every one to pray to God for *forgiveness of sin*;‡—Using our necessity of forgiveness from God, as an argument with all to forgive the injuries of their neighbours;§—Teaching that earthly *parents*, though kind to their children, are in themselves *evil*,‖—And signifying that things *carnal* and *corrupt* are properly *the things of men*;¶—Warning his disciples rather to beware of *men*, than of wild beasts;**—Often representing the WORLD as *evil*, as *wicked* in its works, at *enmity* with *truth* and *holiness*, and *hating him*;††—Yea, and teaching plainly, that all men are extremely and inexpressibly sinful, owing *ten thousand talents* to their divine creditor.‡‡

And whether Christ did not plainly teach *Nicodemus* the doctrine of original total depravity, when he came to him to know what his doctrine was, must be left to the reader to judge, from what has been already observed on John iii. 1—11. And besides, Christ in the course of his preaching took the most proper method to convince men of the corruption of their nature, and to give them an effectual and practical knowledge of it, in application to themselves in particular, by teaching and urging the holy and strict *law* of God, in its extent and spirituality and dreadful threatenings: Which, above all things, tends to search the hearts of men, and to teach them their inbred exceeding depravity; not merely as a matter of speculation, but by proper conviction of conscience: which is the only knowledge of original sin, that can avail to prepare the mind for receiving Christ's redemption; as a man's sense of his own sickness prepares him to apply in good earnest to the physician.

And as to Christ being no more frequent and particular in mentioning and inculcating this point in a *doctrinal* manner, it is probable one reason to be given for it, is the same that is to be given for his speaking no oftener of God's *creating of the world:* Which, though so important a doctrine, is scarce ever spoken of in any of Christ's discourses; and no wonder, seeing this was a matter which the *Jews*, to whom he confined his personal ministry, had all been instructed in from their forefathers, and never was called in question among them. And there is a great deal of reason, from the ancient Jewish writers, to suppose, that the doctrine of original sin had ever been allowed in the open profession of that people:§§ though

* Matt. xviii. 3. † Luke xiii. 1—5. ‡ Matt. vi. 12. Luke xi. 4.
§ Matt. vi. 14, 15. and xviii. 35. ‖ Matt. vii. 11. ¶ Matt. xvi. 23.
** Matt. x. 16, 17. †† John vii. 7. and viii. 23. and xiv. 17. and xv. 18, 19.
‡‡ Matt xviii. 21. to the end.
§§ What is found in the more ancient of the *Jewish* rabbis, who have written

lent, especially among the Pharisees, which were indeed inconsistent with it. And though on account of these preju-

Rabbi Salomon interprets Gen. viii. 21. *The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth*, of its being evil from the time that he is taken out of his mother's bowels." Aben-Ezra thus interprets Psal. li. 5. "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me; that evil concupiscence is implanted in the heart from *childhood*, as if he were *formed* in it; and by *my mother*, he understands Eve, who did not bear children till she had sinned. And so Kafvenaki says, "How shall I avoid sinning? My *original* is corrupt, and from thence are those sins." So Manasseh Ben Israel, from this place (Psal. li. 5.) concludes that not only David, but *all* mankind, ever since sin was introduced into the world, do sin from their *original*. To this purpose is the answer of Rabbi Hakkadosch which there is an account of in the Talmud. *From what time does concupiscence rule over man? From the very moment of his first formation, or from his nativity?* Ans. *From his formation.*" —Pool's Synops. in Loc.

On these things I observe, there is the greatest reason to suppose, that these old Rabbis of the Jewish nation, who gave such heed to the *tradition of the elders*, would never have *received* this doctrine of *original sin*, had it not been delivered down to them from their *forefathers*. For it is a doctrine very disagreeable to those practical principles and notions, wherein the religion of the unbelieving Jews most fundamentally *differs* from the religion maintained among *Christians*: particularly their notion of *justification* by their own righteousness, and privileges as the children of Abraham, &c. without standing in need of any satisfaction, by the sufferings of the Messiah. On which account the modern Jews do now universally reject the doctrine of original sin, and corruption of nature; as Stapferus observes. And it is not at all likely, that the ancient Jews, if no such doctrine had been received by *tradition* from the fathers, would have taken it up from the *Christians*, whom they had in such great contempt and enmity; especially as it is a doctrine so peculiarly agreeable to the Christian notion of the *spiritual* salvation of Jesus, and so contrary to their *carnal* notions of the Messiah, and of his salvation and kingdom, and so contrary to their opinion of themselves; and a doctrine which men in general are so apt to be prejudiced against. And besides, these Rabbis do expressly refer to the opinion of their *forefathers*; as R. Manasseh says, "according to the opinion of the *ancients*, none are subject to *death*, but those which have *sinned*: for where there is *no sin*, there is *no death*." Stapfer. Tom. iii. p. 37, 38.

But we have more direct evidence, that the doctrine of original sin was truly a *received* doctrine among the ancient Jews, even before the coming of Christ. This appears by ancient Jewish writings, which were written before Christ; as, in the apocryph, 2 Esdras iii 21: "For the first Adam, bearing a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome: and so be *all* they that are *born of him*. Thus *infirmity* was made permanent; and the law also in the heart of the people, with the *malignity* of the root; so that the *good* depart away, and the *evil* abode still." —2 Esdras iv. 30. For the grain of *evil seed* hath been sown in the heart of Adam from the beginning; and how much ungodliness hath it brought up unto this time? And how much shall it yet bring forth, till the time of threshing shall come?" And chap. vii. 46. "It had been better not to have given the earth unto Adam; or else, when it was given him, to have restrained him from sinning; for what profit is it, for men now in this present time, to live in heaviness, and after death, to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done! For though it was thou that sinned, *thou art not fallen alone, but we all that come of thee.*" And we read, Eccles. xxv. 24. "Of the woman came the *beginning of sin, and through her we all die.*"

As this doctrine of *original corruption* was constantly maintained in the church of God from the beginning; so from thence, in all probability, as well as from the evidence of it in universal experience it was, that the wiser heathens maintained the like doctrine. Particularly Plato, that great philosopher, so distinguished for his veneration of ancient traditions, and diligent enquiries after them. Gale in his Court of the Gentiles, observes as follows: "Plato says (Gorg. fol. 493.) I have heard from the wise men, that we are now dead, and that the body is but our sepulchre.' And in his Timæus Locrus (fol. 103.) he says, 'The cause of calamity is from our parents, and first principles rather than from ourselves. For that we

As to the arguments made use of by many late writers, from the universal *moral sense*, and the reasons they offer from experience, and observation of the *nature* of mankind, to shew that we are *born* into the world with principles of *virtue;* with a natural prevailing relish, approbation, and love of righteousness, truth, and goodness, and of whatever tends to the public welfare; with a prevailing natural disposition to dislike, to resent and condemn what is selfish, unjust, and immoral; and a native bent in mankind to mutual benevolence, tender compassion, &c. those who have had such objections against the doctrine of original sin thrown in their way, and desire to see them particularly considered, I ask leave to refer them to a *Treatise on the* Nature *of true* VIRTUE, lying by me prepared for the press, which may ere long be exhibited to public view.

CONCLUSION.

On the whole I observe, there are some *other* things, besides arguments, in Dr. T.'s book, which are calculated to influence the minds, and bias the judgment of some sorts of readers. Here, not to insist on the profession he makes in many places, of *sincerity*, *humility*, *meekness*, *modesty*, *charity*, &c. in searching after truth; and freely proposing his thoughts, with the *reasons* of them, to others;* nor on his magisterial *assurance*, appearing on many occasions, and the high *contempt* he sometimes expresses of the opinions and arguments of very excellent divines and fathers in the church of God, who have thought *differently* from him†—*both* of which, it is not unlikely, may have a degree of influence on some of his readers—I would take some notice of another thing observable in the writings of Dr. T. and many of the late opposers of the more peculiar doctrines of christianity, tending (especially with *juvenile* and *unwary* readers) not a little to abate the force, and prevent the due effect of the clearest *scripture-evidence* in favour of those important doctrines; and particularly to make void the arguments taken from the writings of the Apostle Paul, in which those doctrines are more plainly and fully revealed than in any other part of the bible. What I mean is this: These gentlemen express a *high opinion* of this apostle, and that very justly, for his eminent genius, his admirable sagacity, strong powers of reasoning, acquired learning, &c. They speak of him as a writer of masterly address, of extensive reach, and deep design, every where in his epistles, almost in every word he says,

* See his Preface, and p. 6, 237, 265, 267, 175. S.
† Page 115, 125, 150, 151, 159, 161, 183, 188, 77. S.

But I humbly conceive that their interpretations—particularly of the Apostle Paul's writings, though in some things ingenious—are in many things extremely absurd, and demonstrably disagreeable, in the highest degree, to *his* real design, to the language he commonly uses, and to the doctrines currently taught in his epistles. Their *criticisms*, when examined, appear far more subtile than solid; and it seems as if nothing can possibly be strong enough, nothing perspicuous enough, in any composure whatever, to stand before such *liberties* as these writers indulge. The plainest and most nervous discourse is analysed and criticized, till it either dissolves into nothing, or becomes a thing of little significance. The holy scripture is subtilized into a mere mist; or made to evaporate into a thin cloud, that easily puts on any shape, and is moved in any direction, with a puff of wind, just as the manager pleases. It is not in the nature and power of language, to afford sufficient defence against such an art, so abused; as, I imagine, a due consideration of some things I have had occasion in the preceding discourse to observe, may abundantly convince us.

But this, with the rest of what I have offered on the subject must be left with every candid reader's judgment; and the *success* of the whole must now be left with God, who knows what is agreeable to his own mind, and is able to make his own truths prevail; however mysterious they may seem to the poor, partial, narrow, and extremely imperfect views of mortals, while looking through a cloudy and delusory medium; and however disagreeable they may be to the innumerable prejudices of men's hearts:—And who has promised, that the gospel of CHRIST, such as is really *his*, shall finally be victorious; and has assured us, that the *word* which goes out of his mouth, "shall not return to him void, but shall accomplish that which he pleaseth, and shall prosper in the thing whereto he sends it."—Let GOD arise and plead his own cause, and glorify his own great name. AMEN.

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